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Abstract
Corporate groups are notoriously difficult to tax. At the moment it is not clear whether 
corporate groups should be approached as single taxable entities, or whether a separate tax 
existence should be attributed to corporate group members. The current ambiguity 
generates a substantial deadweight loss. This study determines what may be the best 
approach to tax corporate groups, once the perspectives o f government and corporate 
groups are taken into account. The study adopts an interdisciplinary approach, whereby 
elements, such as market imperfections, the economic, legal and functional nature o f 
corporate groups and the rules o f related regulatory fields, are brought into the 
investigation. The study is based on the US federal corporate income tax system, although, 
for certain issues, the UK tax system is analyzed. The study adopts a closed economy 
perspective. The study shows that the design and operation o f the corporate income tax 
system is subject to several constraints and distortions, and argues that to simply look at 
how far a certain policy is from optimality may be insufficient to determine whether an 
incremental improvement occurs. The study proposes a new approach to corporate income 
tax policy whereby the pursuit o f incremental improvements requires the minimization o f 
transaction costs and other sources o f deadweight loss and the taking into account o f the 
collateral effects o f the corporate income tax system, including its interaction with market 
imperfections, the behavioural and operational nature o f business entities, the frictions 
imposed by other regulatory fields and corporate governance. Following this policy 
approach, the study concludes that treating corporate groups as single taxable entities is the 
best approach to tax corporate groups and recommends a revision o f certain technical 
aspects o f the current US and UK legislation for taxation o f corporate groups.
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INTRODUCTION | The Problem, the M ethod and the Structure o f the Thesis
A. The Problem
Corporate groups are notoriously difficult to tax. Faced with the difficulty to deal with 
these entities, the tax legislator oscillates between the attribution o f a separate tax existence 
to corporate group members and the treatment o f corporate groups as single taxable 
entities.1 This fuzzy approach to the taxation of corporate groups generates loopholes in 
the tax system and undermines its structural logic.2 The arsenal o f anti-abuse rules that 
currently plagues the US and UK tax laws provides a visible sign o f the difficulty in dealing 
with these entities.3 These rules make the CIT systems more complex and result in an 
increase o f tax overhead costs, both for the government and the corporate groups.4
The current state o f affairs creates problems not only for the government and society, but 
also for corporate groups, generating a substantial deadweight loss for the entire economic 
system.5 At the moment it is not clear which is the best approach to tax corporate groups 
once their perspective and the perspective o f the government is taken into consideration. 
In the light o f the current state o f affairs, the central research question that this thesis 
intends to answer is: What is the best approach to tax corporate groups once both the perspectives of the 
government and corporate groups are taken into consideration?
The answer to this central question presupposes the answer to three preliminary questions. 
First o f all, how should research approach corporate taxation? Second, does it make sense 
for research to focus on potential improvements to the current CIT system or, in light o f 
other potentially available alternatives, should it simply be discarded as a viable option to 
tax the corporate sector? Third, and fundamentally, assuming there is merit to the 
maintenance o f a CIT system, how may research identify the reasons for the CIT system’s
1 See discussion infra at pg. 77ff and pg. 140ff.
2 See discussion infra at pg. 111 ff.
3 The situation is similar in most OECD countries. The arsenal o f anti-abuse rules aimed at controlling 
corporate groups’ potential for manipulation o f  the corporate tax system includes transfer pricing rules; thin- 
cap rules; complex ownership attribution rules; form over substance principles; etc. See discussion infra at pg. 
118ff.
4 By tax overhead costs this thesis means the amount o f resources (including the value o f  time or labour) 
consumed in applying the tax system, through taxpayer or government activities such as tax planning, 
compliance, litigation, administration, and law making. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, A n Efficienty Analysis of 
Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the federal Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1992) at 24.
5 See discussion infra at pg. 131 ff.
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difficulty to tax corporate groups and define a path for improvement o f the status quo that is 
beneficial both to the government and the corporate groups?
The next section will try to provide an answer to the first preliminary question posed. This 
demands an understanding o f the nature o f the subject under study. Once this thesis 
defines its methodological approach, it will then present its proposed structure to deal with 
the remaining research questions.
B. The Nature of Corporate Income Tax Law
CIT law is moulded by economic, political, social and ideological influences.6 This 
permeability o f CIT law to its historical and material context is a consequence o f the 
important role it plays in the political and economic shaping o f society. To determine the 
proportion o f revenues to be transferred from the private sector to the public sector to 
fund public goods (through a particular definition o f the corporate tax base and the 
corporate tax rate), which economic activities to encourage or discourage (through the 
introduction o f particular incentives and disincentives in the corporate tax laws), or when 
and how to stimulate overall economic activity (namely, through the reduction o f the tax 
charge on the corporate sector and its transference to other sectors o f society) is an 
endeavour that results in tension among several sectors o f society.
In practice, different actors with distinct behavioural tendencies and aims become deeply 
involved in the tax legislative process. The legislator, the tax authorities, political parties, 
corporate lobbies and interest groups act in constant tension regarding the definition of 
CIT’s objectives and particular legislative shape.7 Due to its important societal role, CIT’s 
legislative process is particularly competitive, with these different internal cultural forces 
constandy dying to shape it according to their particular interests. The internal tension of 
these forces in the definition o f the corporate tax laws is a central element in the definition
6 See, e.g. AjAY MEHROTRA, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Materialism, 83 Indiana Law Journal 881 (2008) at 955 
(“[Tax] rules are a product not solely o f  economic ideas or legal logic, but also o f changing social, political 
and economic conditions and interests — a product, that is, o f historical sequence and material context!*). Emphasis 
added. See also AjAY MEHROTRA, et al., The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press. 2009).
7 See ROBERT J. CLARK, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: A.n Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 Yale Law 
J. 90 (1977) at 95.
o f  the corporate tax culture.8 Historically, it has significantly contributed to turning the 
process o f CIT reform into a controversial and piecemeal endeavour that has often 
generated genetically asymmetric and logically incoherent tax rules and principles.9
The imperfections o f the economic system and the behavioural nature o f the corporate 
taxpayer bolster the propensity for the internal asymmetry and the logical incoherence o f 
the CIT system. CIT rules are implemented in an imperfect economy, i.e., an economy with 
information asymmetries and transaction costs.10 In this imperfect economy, valuation o f 
assets, knowledge o f the tax rules, compliance and administration have associated costs. 
These costs fundamentally determine the structure and operation o f the CIT system.11 For 
instance, a theoretically sound tax solution may often be too unpractical to be implemented 
due to the transaction costs involved in the valuation o f assets, the transaction and agency 
costs generated by too burdensome compliance requirements, or the degree o f 
sophistication o f the tax authorities. Last, but certainly not least, the behavioural nature o f
8 In this sense see id. at 95 (“The principal internal forces that have shaped the corporate tax culture derive 
from the motivations and aspirations o f its different groups o f  participants. Each group — taxpayers, the 
Service, courts, and legislators — displays characteristic behavioral tendencies that are themselves cultural 
activities and part o f  the corporate tax culture as defined.”).
9 See MARTIN FELDSTEIN, On the Theoty of Tax Reform, 6 J. Pub. Econ. 77 (1976) at 90-94 (noting how changes 
in tax systems are often slow, piecemeal and laced with political compromises); SIDNEY I. ROBERTS, et al., A  
Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 Tax L. Rev. 325 (1972) at 339 (“[T]he tax law has not evolved 
gradually through the implementation o f the lessons o f  history, but has evolved by a series o f amendments 
superimposed upon each other, reflecting an immediate need for revenue, the popular demand for tax relief, 
the pressure o f  interested special groups or an effort to prevent some type o f  abuse.”). See also SHAVIRO, A n  
Efficiency Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 11.
10 For purposes o f  this thesis, transaction costs are defined as "conditions impeding the carrying out o f  
mutually beneficial exchanges... such [as]... information costs, costs o f  negotiating and contracting, and costs 
imposed by ... regulations." See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, Law and Economics: A  Comparative Approach to 
Theory and Practice (West Publishing Co. 1990) glossary at 163. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, Economic 
Analysis o f  Law (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 1998), 3.1, at 39. Note that the definition o f transaction costs in 
the literature is not consensual. The literature uses inconsistent and widely varying definitions o f  transaction 
costs. See e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. 
& Econ. 233 (1979) at 233 (the concept o f  transaction costs "wants for definition"); GIDEON 
PARCHOMOVSKY & PETER SieGELMAN, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 
Cal. L. Rev. 75 (2004) at 94 (transaction costs are "notoriously difficult to define"). See also CAROL ROSE, The 
Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 Yale Law J. 2175 (1997) at 2184-89 (distinguishing between Type I transaction 
costs that are incurred prior to bargaining and Type II transaction costs that arise after bargaining has begun); 
DOUGLAS W. A l l e n , Transaction Costs, in Encyclopedia o f  Law and Economics (Volume One: The History 
and Methodology o f Law and Economics) (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit D e Geest eds., 2000) at 913 
(stating that two definitions prevail in the literatures: one that defines transaction costs as only occurring 
when a market transaction takes place; the other defining transaction costs as occurring whenever any 
property right is established or requires protection).
11 See JOHN PREBBLE, Why is Tax Eaw Incomprehensible?, 4  British Tax Review 380 (1994) at 393 (“Tax law is 
founded not on principle, but on practicality.”). On the contribution o f  these external constraints to the 
asymmetry and complexity o f  the CIT system see id. at 392 (“Income tax law will never exactly fit the 
economic activity to which it relates. The compromises and adjustments that must be made to make the 
system work mean that there can never be a single, coherent system o f income taxation.”). See also discussion 
infra at pg. I l l  for the impact o f these external world constraints on the shaping o f the current CIT system’s 
structure.
the corporate taxpayer, which is in a constant struggle to maximize profits, and, thus, to 
reduce tax payments, introduces an additional external constraint to the design and the 
operation o f the CIT system, since in their effort to reduce tax payments, corporations 
often distort the envisaged effect o f the tax rules.12
O n top o f these external world constraints, the limitations imposed by other regulatory 
fields constrain the design and operation o f CIT rules. CIT, both for practical and historical 
reasons, is built on certain concepts and theoretical blocks developed in other disciplines.13 
This places strict limits on CIT’s development and internal logic, in that the clarification of 
certain core CIT concepts, such as the definition o f income, the principle o f realization or 
the definition o f corporate control, may only be operated with reference to other 
disciplines, such as economics, accounting and corporate law.14 In addition, on its daily 
application, CIT is in constant operational interaction with other regulatory fields.15 This 
introduces a further limitation to CIT’s design and operation, in that, at least from an 
optimal point o f view, tax rules should interact properly with other relevant regulatory 
fields.16
Further, CIT law is conditioned by internal constraints. The logic o f CIT’s fundamental 
postulates, such as the separate tax personality of corporate entities and the realization 
principle, strongly determines the design and operation o f the CIT system.17 As will be
12 See infra discussion at pg. 127ff.
13 For instance, the realization concept derives in part from the accounting practice o f  when to include an 
increase in value on the balance sheet. See BORIS I. BlTTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, Federal Taxation o f  
Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren Gorham & Lamont 3rd ed. 2005), 5.9, at 5-76 to 5-78 (explaining how a 
taxpayer's accounting method affects the realization o f  income); see also DAVID A. WEISBACH, Formalism in the 
Tax Law, 66 Univ. Chicago Law Rev. 860 (1999) at ft. 27 (“The realization requirement appears to be the 
result o f ...a  desire for conformity with accounting rules, which also have historical roots.“) and MARJORIE 
E. KORNHAUSER, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do With It?, 39 Sw. U. L. Rev. 869 
(1985). Similarly, the Haig-Simmons concept o f  income developed in economics and the definition o f control 
for tax law purposes is based on corporate law concepts. See discussion infra at pgs. 71 and 120.
14 As will be discussed, this organic connection to other regulatory fields contributes to the formation o f tax 
laws o f  incongruent logical shapes and in the development o f  certain characteristics, such as rigidity, 
formalism and a frequent asymmetric treatment o f  materially identical situations, which introduce a high level 
of complexity to the tax laws. See discussion infra at pg. 11 Iff.
15 Namely, as discussed below, corporate law and accounting. Depending on the CIT system, the interaction 
may be weaker or stronger. See, e.g., M. LAMB, et al., International Variations in the Connections between Tax and 
Financial Reporting, in Accounting and Business Research (M. Lamb, et al. eds., 1998).
16 See DAVID M. SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Columbia Law Review 1312 (2001). See 
also discussion infra at pgs. 58 and 76 on how the CIT system may be improved by optimizing the interaction 
between the tax system and other regulatory fields.
17 CLARK, supra note 7, at 92 (“The corporate tax culture is . ..o f  endogenous origin. The pressures created by 
its own basic postulates have controlled its development."); DAVID A. WEISBACH, Line Drawing Doctrine, and 
Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1627 (1998) at 1633 (“Many doctrines, such as the realization 
requirement, are fundamental building blocks o f our tax system."). See also discussion infra at pg. I l l
further discussed, the development of CIT law tends to occur in a cumulative way, with 
new concepts building upon these fundamental postulates.18 These postulates, which due to 
the particularities o f  CIT’s design process are often genetically incoherent, contribute to the 
asymmetric development o f the CIT law.19 Lastly, certain core CIT policy principles pose a 
final layer o f constraint to the tax legislator, in that at the time o f the reform, policy makers 
m ust consider the effect o f proposed rules on core CIT principles such as efficiency, equity 
and the protection o f existing property rights.20
In  short, CIT law is influenced and constrained by a wide range o f elements. These 
different influences and constraints, including the nature o f the tax legislative process, 
market imperfections, the behavioural nature o f the corporate taxpayer, the relationship 
with other regulatory fields and the logic from CIT’s basic postulates, fundamentally 
determine the design and operation o f the CIT system. The CIT system’s propensity for 
internal asymmetry and logical incoherence reflects these different influences and 
constraints.
C. The Methodological Approach
CIT law is influenced and constrained by a wide range o f elements. Therefore, the proper 
apprehension o f the problem under study demands that these different influences and 
constraints are factored into the analysis. This, in turn, demands the adoption o f an
examining the impact o f  realization and separate tax corporate personality on the current CIT system’s 
structure.
18 See CLARK, supra note 7, at 92 (“The present highly developed law o f  the taxation o f corporations and 
shareholders is the product o f a few basic decisions...”); id. (“[T]he corporate tax culture has developed from 
these principles in a cumulative, evolutionary way rather in a cyclical or random manner...This cumulative 
evolution...has had a fairly constant direction, and that direction has been toward legal rules o f ever- 
increasing complexity and specificity[.]”). Historically, such evolution, however, tends not to be regular, in 
that it is also constrained by the historical materialism process described above and external world 
constraints. See id. at 95 (“By themselves, abstract principles cannot develop into a culture. In this obvious 
sense, corporate tax law has not been a mere unfolding o f the logic o f  its postulates.").
19 See CHRIS E d w a r d s , Replacing the Scandal-Plagued Corporate Income Tax with a Cash-Flow Tax, 484 Cato 
Institute Policy Analysis 1 (2003) at 9 (“A key problem is that the income tax superstructure has been built 
ever higher on a very problematic base.”). See also SAUL LEVMORE, Recharacterisations and the Nature of Theory in 
Corporate Tax Taw, 136 Uni. Pa. L. Rev. 1019 (1988), at 1061-1062 (”[I]t is virtually impossible to develop 
normative arguments about questions that arise as a result or in the shadow of...[CIT's]...basic starting 
points.”); id. (“The nature o f  corporate tax law often defies normative argumentation...Corporate tax law is 
arbitrary because...it requires a specific recognition event before it taxes appreciation in asset values and 
because it regards corporations as taxable entities that are distinct from their shareholders”); DAVID A. 
WEISBACH, Tine Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Taw, supra note 17, at 1637 (“fO]ne cannot use the 
purpose behind the realization doctrine to decide many o f the most basic questions concerning the scope o f  
the doctrine, or to resolve difficult borderline issues.); JOHN PREBBLE, supra note 11, at 390 (“[T]here are 
fundamental problems o f principle with the income tax law.”). See also discussion infra at pg. 111.
20 See M ar tin  Fe l d st e in , supra note 9, at 90-94.
interdisciplinary approach whereby elements, such as market imperfections, the behavioural 
nature o f the corporate taxpayer or the rules o f related regulatory fields, are brought into 
the investigation. For this reason, this thesis will adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the 
study o f corporate taxation, factoring into the analysis research from economics, corporate 
law and business management.21
Further, in light o f the nature o f CIT law, this thesis believes that it may be more 
productive to adopt an analytical perspective that starts from the analysis o f the existing 
CIT system and takes into consideration its different influences and constraints, than to 
assume a clean plate perspective.22 For this reason, this thesis will adopt a perspective o f 
incremental change rather than a fundamental tax reform perspective.
The internal asymmetry and logical incoherence o f the CIT system, coupled with the 
different influences and constraints that must be brought into the analysis, will require the 
thesis to engage in rather complex balancing processes. In order to facilitate these 
processes, this thesis will adopt an economic discourse. As will be demonstrated, the 
adoption o f an economic discourse is an extremely valuable tool to allow for a clearer 
evaluation o f  the impact o f the different elements involved in the analysis. N ote that, 
although the thesis will adopt an economic discourse, the thesis will not engage in formal 
economic analysis. The thesis will use, instead, a heuristic approach.
Further, the thesis will adopt a closed economy perspective. Specifically, the core problems 
studied in this thesis are approached under the assumption that all corporate group 
members reside in the same domestic jurisdiction and that all the transactions that occur 
between corporate group members and other related and unrelated parties are domestic. 
This requisite approach allows for an accurate application o f the interdisciplinary data,
21 See, e.g., recommending an interdisciplinary approach to tax research, M. LAMB & A. LYMER, 
Interdisciplinary Research in Taxation: Research Approaches and Bibliographic Survey (The Institute o f  
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 1999); S. JAMES, Taxation Research as Economic Research, 
University o f  Exeter Research Discussion Paper N o. 01/07 (2001). See also C. NOBES & S. JAMES, The 
Economics o f Taxation (Prentice Hall 7th ed. 2005)
22 See MARTIN FELDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 90-94. Professor Feldstein defends that policy makers do not start 
with a clean slate in designing tax systems and contends that the optimal tax reform o f  an existing situation 
likely differs from the optimal structure if one were able to design a tax structure de novo. As discussed, this is 
due to several elements, such as the need to coordinate a potential revamp o f the existing CIT system with 
the remaining relevant regulatory fields or the difficulties associated with the political process o f  tax design 
and promulgation. See also WEISBACH, Tine Drawing Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Taw, supra note 17, at 
1633 (“Policymakers need guidance in this second-best context which they encounter on a daily basis, in 
which change short o f  fundamental reform is being considered.”).
especially from economics, and for a proper focus on the structural components o f the 
problems identified.23
The analysis is based on the rules o f the US federal corporate income tax system. For 
certain issues, a comparative analysis will follow. The comparative approach will be used to 
allow for a better focus on the conceptual structure that underlies the problem to be 
tackled.24 This thesis will follow the functionalist comparative perspective. This perspective 
is followed since this thesis considers it the most appropriate theoretical standpoint to 
study corporate tax law.25 The regime selected for m ost comparative analysis is the UK. 
This approach was taken because the tax systems o f the US and the UK, due to their 
cultural, economic and legal similarities, allow for a higher precision o f the research and for 
an easier transferability o f its results.26 Also, the selection o f these two jurisdictions as a 
basis for research avoids potential language problems, which could endanger the reliability 
o f  the research results.27
For purposes o f analysis, the CIT system will be segregated into two components. First, the 
Standard C IT System, which includes the rules for taxation o f corporations per j?,28 with the 
exclusion o f Tax Integration Solutions. Second, the Tax Integration Solutions, which include
23 Some o f the economic research used in this study has assumed a closed economy setting.
24 See W. BARKER, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Earn To Promote Democratic Policy, 109 Penn State Law 
Review 102 (2005) (arguing that comparative analysis needs to confront the assumptions underlying tax law). 
See also VICTOR THURONYI, What Can We Team From Comparative Tax Law?, 103 Tax Notes 459 (2004) 
(arguing that the purpose o f  comparative tax law is to focus on the elements that underlie legal thought, 
which are often inarticulated or taken for granted) and VICTOR THURONYI, Comparative Tax Law (Kluwer 
Law International. 2003).
25 This thesis suggests that the criticisms generally made to the functionalist perspective (such as the fact that 
it does not take into account cultural diversity) are not as relevant in corporate tax law due its predominantly 
technical nature (as opposed to, for instance, family law) and to the common identity o f  most o f the 
problems to which it is generally applicable {i.e., corporate distributions, corporate restructurings, etc.). For 
description o f  functionalist perspective see KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, Introduction to Comparative 
Law (Oxford University Press 3rd ed. 1998). For criticism to functionalist perspective see PIERRE LEGRAND 
& RODERICK MUNDAY, Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press. 
2003). For the most recent discussion on comparative tax law analysis see CARLO GARBARINO, Comparative 
Taxation and Legal Theory: The Tax Design Case of the Transplant of General Anti-Avoidance Rules, 11 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 765 (2010) and OMRI Y. MARIAN, The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law 58 American 
Journal o f  Comparative Law 415 (2010).
26 See A. WATSON, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University o f  Georgia Press 2nd ed. 
1993) (author argues that comparisons may not be particularly worthwhile except when the legal systems are 
closely related); see also A. WATSON, Legal Transplants and European Private Law, 4.4 Electronic Journal o f  
Comparative Law, available at http://www.ejcl.org/44/art44-2.html (2000). On the advantages o f  comparing 
the US with the UK  tax systems see, e.g. W. BARKER, A  Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, 46 Catholic University Law Review 7 (1996); see also CEDRIC SANDFORD, Why 
Tax Systems Differ: A Comparative Study o f  the Political Economy o f  Taxation (Fiscal Publications. 2000).
27 See R. SACCO, Legal Formants: A  Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 The American Journal o f  
Comparative Law 1 (1991).
28 This excludes trusts, corporations treated as disregarded entities, partnerships, etc.
group taxation regimes and flow-through regimes. In  turn, the analysis o f each o f these 
components o f the CIT system is made in two distinct analytical stages, i.e., mechanic and 
dynamic analysis.
The purpose o f the mechanic analysis is to study the technical structure o f the CIT system. 
The mechanic analysis is made utilizing a transactional approach. Specifically, tax rules are 
analyzed in terms o f end result achieved by a corporation for each transactional route used 
and form adopted to transact with other corporations. This approach allows for a different 
angle o f analysis o f the tax rules, i.e., it allows the analysis o f the tax rules to be made from 
the perspective o f their users. The dynamic analysis, in turn, aims at understanding the 
operation o f the mechanic structure o f the CIT system by studying its impact on taxpayer 
behaviour.
The analysis is not concerned with European Union tax law, transfer pricing and tax 
evasion issues. Besides not being central to the purposes o f this research project, due to 
their breadth, each o f these subjects would require its own separate treatment. Finally, the 
analysis deals solely with corporate income tax issues. It does not explore individual income 
taxes, indirect taxes, or stamp and real estate taxes issues.
D. The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into three parts. In part I, this thesis will investigate how to approach 
the central research question. First, the thesis will examine the core structure o f the current 
CIT system and will determine the advantages and drawbacks o f taxing the corporate 
sector through a CIT system. The analysis will be made assuming a world o f costly 
contracting and political constraints. Based on the results from such analysis, the thesis will 
determine whether it makes sense for research to focus on potential improvements to the 
current CIT system or whether, in light o f other potentially available alternatives, the 
current system should simply be discarded in its entirety. Subsequently, the thesis will 
examine the CIT system’s impact on corporate behaviour. Once the thesis determines 
whether it is valuable to pursue further work on the current CIT system, identifies its core 
strengths and problems, and understands the determinants associated with its impact on 
corporate behaviour, it will suggest how the central research question should be 
approached.
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In part II, following the policy guidelines developed in part I, the thesis will investigate how 
the Standard CIT System taxes corporate groups and the consequences o f such taxation 
methodology. Following the same approach, in part III, the thesis will examine how Tax 
Integration Solutions tax corporate groups and will determine the consequences o f that 
taxation approach. After taking into consideration the perspectives o f the government and 
corporate groups, the thesis will conclude by suggesting how best to tax corporate groups.
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PART I | The Policy Approach
A. The Core Structure of the CIT System
A t its core, the current CIT system is a realization-based income tax separately levied on 
corporations at rates unrelated to those o f shareholders. The next section will be dedicated 
to investigating these core structural characteristics o f the current CIT system. The section 
will start by investigating the concept o f realization, identifying its primary advantages and 
drawbacks in a world o f costly contracting and political constraints. Then, it will analyze 
the implications o f devising a CIT system based on the existence o f a separate tax levied on 
corporations at rates unrelated to those o f shareholders. The section will conclude by 
assessing, in light o f other potentially available alternatives, whether further work on the 
current CIT system is justified and how it should be approached.
/. The Concept of Realisation
The concept o f realization is a fundamental building block o f the current CIT system.29 In 
general, under a realization-based CIT system, tax is only due when a transfer in the sense 
o f  a sale, an exchange or the receipt o f proceeds, which constitute earnings rather than a 
return o f capital, occurs.30 That is, gain or loss is includable in a corporation’s taxable 
income only when property and services are actually converted into cash.31 Realization 
should always result in taxability provided that no non-recognition rule is applicable to the 
transaction.32
29 For an in-depth analysis o f the impact o f  realization on the design o f the mechanical structure o f the 
current CIT system see discussion infra at pg. 111. Hereinafter, all references to “IRC Section” and “IRC 
Treas. Reg. Section” are to the United States Internal Revenue Code o f  1986 and the regulations promulgated 
thereunder.
30 Further, the property exchanged must be substantially different for realization to occur. See Cottage Sav. 
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503, 1508-09 (1991) and IRC Treas. Section Reg. Section 1.1001-1(a). This 
requirement is satisfied so long as the two items "embody legally distinct entitlements," and thus is satisfied 
even where as an economic matter, or to the taxpayer, they are "substantially identical." Cottage Savings, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1511. See also SHAVIRO, A n  Efficienty Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income 
Tax, supra note 4, at 12.
31 See EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, For Realisation: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable 
Virtues, 19 Cardozo L. Rev 861 (1997) at 864. See also TERRENCE R. CHORVAT, Perception and Income: The 
Behavioral Economics of the Realisation 36 Conn. L. Rev. 75 (2003) at 82.
32 For purposes o f  this thesis, whereas realization refers to the occurrence o f  a taxable event such a sale or 
exchange, recognition refers to the nonapplication o f nonrecognition rules, under which events that 
technically constitute realizations are treated, in effect, as if  they had not occurred. See SHAVIRO, A n  Efficiency 
Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 2 (“Recognition is the 
twin sister o f  realization, and both are necessary for tax consequences to arise.”). See also discussion infra at pg. 
101.
The erection o f the CIT system on the realization pillar gives the tax system the 
characteristics o f a hybrid income tax system, which blends elements o f a transfer tax with 
an accretion tax and a consumption tax.33 To start with, in light o f the prominent role 
played by realization, the current CIT system is partly a transfer tax in that it works as a tax 
on the act o f engaging in transactions such as sales and exchanges.34 While transfer 
determines the moment when tax is due, accretion concepts, in turn, determine how much 
is levied at that moment. That is, while the timing o f the tax liability is determined based on 
transfer tax concepts, its nominal amount is established based on accretion.35 Further, the 
system blends accretion tax with consumption tax concepts, in that although it reaches 
income arising from capital, such as interest, just as an accretion tax would do, it fails, like a 
consumption tax, to currently tax unrealized appreciation in the value o f assets.36
a. The Advantages o f Realization
The hybrid income tax characteristics o f the current realization-based CIT system present 
significant advantages in a world o f costly contracting. To begin with, due to its 
characteristics o f a transfer tax, the current CIT system is able to provide a costless and 
reliable valuation o f the assets transferred and services provided in the corporate sector 
when parties are unrelated. The reliability o f the valuation process is ensured by the 
economic dynamics that exist between buyer and seller in their effort to optimize their own 
individual profit on the transaction. Specifically, while the seller is interested in selling for 
the highest possible price, but is averse to disclosing it to the tax authorities in order to 
avoid high tax payments,37 the buyer is interested in making the acquisition for the lowest 
possible value, but in disclosing it to the tax authorities by the highest possible amount in 
order to minimize its tax bill.38 The end result is a sale or exchange for the highest possible
33 Id. at 11.
34 Id. at 2.
35 Id. at 11. But see id. at 2 (“The actual relative importance o f  the transaction tax and accretion tax 
elements.. .might be expected to vary both between sectors o f the economy and over time.”).
36 Id. at 2. Nevertheless, certain rules in the corporate income tax may have nothing to do with any o f these 
basic models. See WILLIAM D. ANDREWS & DAVID F. BRADFORD, Savings Incentives in a Hybrid Income Tax, in 
Uneasy Compromise: Problems o f a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax (Henry J. Aaron, et al. eds., 1988), at 
270.
37 On the general interest o f corporations to reduce tax payments see discussion infra at pg. 45.
38 This alignment o f the buyer and tax authorities interests, vital to the proper working o f  the system, occurs 
because by reporting a higher acquisition amount the buyer is able to obtain a higher tax basis in the asset 
acquired or tax deductible expense on the services purchased, and, thus, a reduction in future tax payments. 
In agency terms, “the buyer's interest in maximizing his basis and deductions is aligned with the IRS's interest 
in the disclosure to it o f  the correct price paid to the seller.” See ZELINSKY, supra note 31, at 902. See also id. at 
881 (“[T]he moment o f  realization is the only time when the taxpayer and the tax collector have perfectly- 
aligned interests in maximizing the recognized value o f  the taxpayer's property.”).
value, due to the pressure exerted by the seller, with a disclosure o f the highest possible 
amount, as a result o f the pressure made by the buyer. Therefore, realization benefits the 
interests o f  the tax authorities, in that the regular economic dynamics that operate between 
the parties on the transfer transaction ensure a proper tax result without the need for direct 
supervision o f the transaction. By relying on the natural dynamics o f the market, the tax 
system avoids the potentially significant transaction costs that would otherwise be required 
to adequately control the transaction.39 In addition, the amount transferred is automatically 
calculated based on the fungibility of the property surrendered by the buyer, thereby 
avoiding additional transaction costs to value the property.40
Further, its hybrid income tax characteristics allow the CIT system to finance itself in a 
relatively cost-efficient way. Since the tax system fails, just as a consumption tax would, to 
tax unrealized appreciation in assets, the onus to find the necessary sources o f funds to 
finance the tax system until realization occurs is placed on the government.41 Since the 
government is able to secure loans more consistently and at a better rate than the majority 
o f taxpayers, the tax system may be financed with lower interest and transactional costs.42 
In addition, the government, as a single, centralized borrower, benefits from sizeable 
economies o f scale, in that to obtain the same funds through innumerable separate loans 
would result in much higher overall transaction costs.43 In the context o f today’s capital 
markets, which are generally not willing to accept unrealized capital gains as collateral for 
borrowing, an alternative system based on pure accretion concepts should result in much 
higher transaction costs to ensure the overall liquidity o f the tax system.44
39 See id. at 880 (Under a realization regime, “the tax system does not make its own independent assessment 
o f value, with attendant expense to the public treasury. Instead, the tax system cosdessly relies on the value 
negotiated by the taxpayer.”). In addition, the taxpayer, on top o f  the tax authorities’ supervision, often has 
the surveillance o f  other governmental authorities {e.g., real estate transfers). That is, tax benefits also from 
frictions from other regulatory fields on certain transfers.
40 See id. at 889 (“[F]rom the vantage o f  minimizing the transactions costs o f valuation, the rule o f  realization, 
which cosdessly uses the valuations automatically produced as incidents o f cash and cash equivalent 
transactions, is superior to accretionism which requires expensive appraisals for many common forms o f  
property.”).
41 See id. at 890.
42 See id. at 891 (“[T]he Treasury is our society's most economical borrower; the rate at which the Treasury 
obtains funds is the accepted benchmark for risk-free interest. A relative handful o f taxpayers can borrow at 
the Treasury rate; virtually none can borrow below it; most taxpayers obtain funds at considerably higher 
rates.”).
43 See id. at 891 (“An accretionist tax system would necessitate millions o f  separate loan transactions as 
taxpayers acquire the funds to discharge their tax obligations. We can only guess at the resulting costs - legal 
and appraisal fees, recording and other closing expenses, bank fees, and the taxpayers' time. We can, however, 
confidently predict that these costs will be considerable.”).
44 See CHORVAT, supra note 31, at 91-94 (“If taxpayers could accurately ascertain the value o f  an asset, banks 
and others with liquid assets would be willing to lend to them a sufficient amount to pay the taxes assessed 
due to the increased value, thus eliminating the liquidity problem. However, because such lending generally
The current realization-based CIT system also presents significant political advantages. As 
demonstrated in neurological and psychological research, requiring a realization event to 
measure taxable income is consistent with how individuals actually perceive income.45 That 
is, from the taxpayer’s psychological perspective, gains or losses are only potential gains or 
losses until a realization event occurs.46 The intuitive acceptability o f the tax system that 
naturally follows from its alignment with the taxpayer’s psychological reality should aid 
taxpayer compliance.47 In addition, at a more practical level, a realization-based CIT system 
should be easier to approve politically by avoiding the hardships imposed on the taxpayer 
by a pure accretion system, which most often forces the taxpayers to borrow in order to 
pay such taxes.48 This political appeal o f a realization-based CIT system is further enhanced 
by the lack o f clarity that surrounds the question o f incidence on this type o f hybrid tax 
system, which makes its burden difficult to trace to individual taxpayers.49
A further advantage o f the current CIT system is its reduced potential for manipulation 
when no related parties are involved. That is, the sale or exchange o f an asset is generally a 
fairly significant event to unrelated taxpayers, sufficiently compelled or discouraged by non­
does not occur, this form o f  tax could cause substantial hardship.”). See also WOLFGANG SCHON, Tax and 
Corporate Governance: A  Legal Approach, in Tax and Corporate Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed. 2008) at 44. 
But see ZELINSKY, supra note 31, at 890 (“[U]nder an accretdonist system, taxpayers can borrow to pay their tax 
or can use cash from other sources to satisfy their obligations to the fisc. Once taxpayers understand their 
liabilities under an accretionist regime, the argument runs, they will arrange their affairs to generate the cash 
necessary to pay their taxes.”).
45 Neurological studies have demonstrated that the receipt o f  gains and anticipation o f  gains activate different 
areas o f  the brain and are very likely perceived differently by the taxpayers See CHORVAT, supra note 31, at 
110- 111.
46 In practice, investors do not seem to perceive a gain or loss as occurring until it is realized. At the very 
minimum, unrealized gains are treated as significantly less valuable than if they were currently realized. See 
CHORVAT, supra note 31, at 112.
47 See ZELINSKY, supra note 31, at 893.
48 See CHORVAT, supra note 31. See also ZELINSKY, supra note 31.
49 See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income in Dimensions o f  Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review (J. 
Mirrlees, et al. eds., 2010) at 867 (“[C]orporate taxes may exist in part because o f  the political advantage o f  
imposing taxes the burdens o f which are difficult to trace through to individuals [.]”). The incidence question 
is still unsettled. In economic terms, it is unclear whether the corporate tax actually falls on shareholders. In 
certain cases, it may be shifted to consumers or labour. Most economists assume, however, that the tax falls 
at least partly on shareholders in the short run and on all capital providers in the long run. See, eg., MARTIN 
FELDSTEIN, Incidence of a Capital Income Tax in a Growing Economy with Variable Saving Rates, 41 Rev. Econ. Stud. 
505 (1974) at 510-11; DON FULLERTON & GILBERT E. METCALF, Tax Incidence, NBER, Working Chapter 
No. w8829 (2002) at 20-23. See also ALAN J. AUERBACH, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A  Review of What We 
Know, NBER, Working Paper No. W11686 (2005) at 3 (“fT]he ultimate incidence o f  the [corporate income] 
tax remains somewhat unresolved.”). For a recent work on the theme questioning the classic assumptions see 
WlJI ArulaMPALAM, et al., The Direct Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages, Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation, Working Paper 09/17 (2009). For the classic work on the issue see ARNOLD HARBERGER, 
The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. Pol. Econ. 215 (1962).
tax motives.50 Finally, as will be discussed, the transactional basis o f a realization-based CIT 
system gives it important advantages as an instrument for corporate behavioural control.51
b. The Problems o f Realization
A realization-based CIT system presents, however, significant inefficiencies o f its own. 
First, a realization-based tax system only works well provided both parties have differing 
economic interests. When both parties have an identical economic interest, such as when 
two corporations are subject to common control, the natural behavioural dynamics that 
sustain the system collapse.52 This occurs because the differing economic interests that 
ensure adequate valuation, independent o f government supervision, o f the transferred 
property or rendered services are absent.53 Further, due to the several distortions 
introduced to the principle o f realization, in that not all realization events classify as taxable 
events, the system develops asymmetries that result in transactional discontinuities in the 
tax law and significantly contribute to its lack o f a clear guiding rationale.54 The negative 
impact o f these distortions, which are for the most part a result o f  the political and 
economic constraints surrounding the CIT system,55 tends to be magnified given the
50 See SHAVIRO, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, 
at 36 (“The sale or exchange o f  an asset often is a fairly significant event to the taxpayer, sufficiently 
compelled or discouraged on nontax grounds to reduce its tax elasticity.”). For this reason, certain authors 
argue that a realization-based tax system may be defended also on pure efficiency grounds in that it 
supposedly introduces fewer distortions to taxpayer behaviour than alternative tax systems. For instance,
Shaviro argues that the realization doctrine's inefficiencies may be greatly overstated. See id. at 6 (“I argue that,
whether by accident or design, the realization and recognition rules in the Code have some tendency to 
promote efficiency. In particular, the tax system often bases liability on events, the occurrence o f  which is 
relatively inelastic, while providing nonrecognition for those the occurrence o f which is relatively elastic.”). 
Rut see discussion infra at pg. 42ff. Another interesting defence o f realization is made by David Schizer. See 
DAVID M. Sch ize r , Realisation as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1549 (1998) at 1552. Schizer argues that the 
realization requirement may have beneficial consequences because it taxes income from investment less than 
other income and, thus, works in practice as an investment subsidy. See also CHORVAT, supra note 31, at 96.
51 See discussion infra at pg. 45ff.
52 See discussion infra at pg. 117.
53 Absent supervision, the valuation provided by related parties will likely be the one that provides a more 
advantageous result to the superior common interest o f  both parties, which is often contrary to the 
government interests. See discussion infra at pg. 126ff.
54 Saul Levmore, for example, argues that corporate tax law, due to its reliance on realization, is "arbitrary" 
and "almost necessarily devoid o f  a normative foundation" and that "[tjhere is, in short, no normative theory 
or rule that suggests the optimal number or coverage o f  recognition rules." See SAUL LEVMORE, 
Recharacterisations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, supra note 19, at 1061-1063. See also WEISBACH, 
Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, supra note 17, at 1637 (“[T]he realization requirement 
applies to traded stock, even though traded stock is liquid and valuation is easy...Thus, one cannot use the 
purpose behind the realization doctrine to decide many o f the most basic questions concerning the scope o f  
the doctrine, or to resolve difficult borderline issues.”). For the phenomenon o f discontinuities in the tax law 
and a discussion o f  its overall impact see discussion infra at pg. 55.
55 See NOEL B. Cu n n in g h a m  & D eb o r a h  H. Sc h e n k , The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 Tax L. Rev. 
319 (1993) at 327 (“It is clear...that Congress nominally has chosen a tax based on income and that 
deviations from that base are the source o f much inefficiency and complexity. Although it is true that the
pattern o f development o f the CIT law.56 This contributes significantly to the increase in 
complexity o f the CIT laws.57
Further, realization may arguably introduce significant distortions to the regular modus 
operand! o f economic agents, which may penalize their economic efficiency. In particular, 
realization is thought to possibly distort both the choice o f investment and the choice o f 
the moment to implement transfer transactions.58 First, realization is thought to distort the 
choice o f investment in that, since the taxation o f gains from certain assets may be deferred 
indefinitely, such assets may be subject to a lower rate o f tax even if  they are subject to the 
same nominal rate.59 Thus, assets with an identical pre-tax return may be favoured 
differendy by investors. This distorts the regular investment dynamics o f the market and, 
therefore, is considered by some to penalize the economy.60 Second, a realization system 
may distort the choice o f the moment to implement transfer transactions in that it may 
encourage corporations to retain assets beyond the optimal period (so-called “lock-in” 
effect) or to sell them before the optimal period (so-called “lock-out” effect). The type and 
magnitude o f the behavioural distortion should generally vary depending on the tax 
attributes o f the corporations in question and the type o f assets transferred.61 In general, 
since a potential built-in gain or loss on an asset is only includable in taxable income once a 
qualifying transfer occurs, corporations may anticipate, postpone or, in more extreme 
cases, cancel such transfer in order to obtain a better aggregate tax result. This may make 
investors less responsive to changes in the prospects o f their investments, and, thus, reduce 
the ability o f the market to shift capital to its most efficient use.62
An additional problem o f realization is that, due to the transactional discontinuities that it 
introduces in the CIT system and due to the fact that it allows taxpayers to strategically 
time their realizations so as to minimize taxes due, it provides a significant encouragement
current base is a hybrid, most deviations from the income tax base are explainable, either as being 
administratively required, or as promoting competing public policies.”); DEBORAH H. SCHENK, A n Efficiency 
Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based. Tax, 57 Tax L. Rev. 503 (2004) at 503 (“[BJecause o f  efficiency and 
equity concerns, a pure realization rule is indefensible in a system intended to impose a tax burden on capital. 
Since neither an accrual tax nor a pure realization rule is viable, the task for policymakers is to determine 
where along the continuum between the two to draw the line.”). See also discussion supra at pg. 1 Iff.
56 As discussed above, once a fundamental postulate such as realization is laid, the system will tend to develop 
cumulatively on top o f such postulate. See discussion supra at pg. 13. See also discussion infra at pg. 111.
57 For the negative consequences o f  the increase in complexity in CIT law see discussion infra at pg. 62ff.
58 See discussion infra at pg. 42ff for in-depth discussion o f  this issue.
59 See CHORVAT, supra note 31, at 88.
60 See discussion infra at pg. 43ff.
61 See discussion infra at pg. 53ff.
62 See discussion infra at pg. 44.
for taxpayers to engage in tax planning. That is, since the taxpayer may obtain a very 
different tax result for an economically identical transfer depending on the type of 
transaction that it chooses to implement or the timing o f the implementation o f such 
transaction, tax planning generally presents a quite advantageous return.63 Based on 
traditional neo-classical models, the taxpayer may generally be expected to engage in tax 
planning until the marginal value o f the planning is equal to its cost.64 Therefore, the cost 
o f the realization principle may consist not only o f lost revenue, but also in a distortion in 
the allocation o f resources due to the increase in tax planning and the resulting waste of 
resources.65 Lastly, as will be further discussed, the fact that realization requires the trigger 
o f  a qualifying transfer, such as a sale or an exchange, results in a significant dependency of 
the CIT laws on corporate law and property law concepts in order to determine when an 
actual transfer has in fact occurred.66 This, in turn, introduces significant formalism and 
complexity into the CIT laws.67
2. The Alternatives to a Teali^ation-Eased C IT  System
In light o f the significant problems that the realization principle introduces to the CIT 
system, the question that arises at this point is whether there are available alternative tax 
systems that, overall, present more benefits to tax the corporate sector. In order to proceed 
to this determination, the next section will examine alternative forms o f taxing the income 
generated in the corporate sector that mitigate or eliminate the impact o f the realization 
principle on the corporate tax system.
a. Accretion-Based Taxation
The first option that eliminates, or, under some proposals, mitigates, the impact o f the 
realization principle on the corporate tax system is taxation under mark-to-market or 
accretion-based taxation principles.68 One alternative would be to totally eliminate the 
realization principle from the tax system as well as the existence o f a separate tax for the
63 See discussion infra at pg. 127ff.
64 See CHORVAT, supra note 31, at 88-91.
65 Id.
66 See discussion infra at pg. 112ff.
67 Id.
68 Certain commentators refer to the taxation o f  unrealized gains and losses as "accretion" taxation, while 
others label it "accrual" taxation or "mark-to-market" taxation. For purposes o f this thesis, these three terms 
can be viewed as interchangeable. In the same sense see ZELINSKY, supra note 31, at 861.
corporate sector. Under this option, the taxation o f income generated on the corporate 
sector would occur solely at the shareholder level, with shareholders being taxed on a 
periodic basis on the increase in value o f their stock independendy o f realization.69 Note 
that this method o f taxation would require an adjustment where dividends are distributed. 
Either dividends would be taxed or would result in a reduction in the cost base of 
shareholdings.
Despite the substantial simplification that this type o f proposal would introduce to the tax 
system, most commentators have concluded, however, that it would be unmanageable if 
applied globally. Fundamentally, the valuation costs involved and the liquidity costs to the 
taxpayers (especially those with large accrued income but no cash income) would make the 
system too burdensome from a transaction cost perspective and,70 in principle, too difficult 
to approve politically.71
In recent years, in order to deal with these valuation and liquidity problems, economists 
and tax specialists developed several partial mark-to-market proposals. Their common 
denominator is that they do not totally eliminate the realization principle from the tax 
system, only mitigate its impact. One mitigation strategy would involve delaying taxation 
until realization, in order to allow for valuation through a market transaction, but impose 
an interest charge for earlier years’ taxes (based on the assumption that the change in value 
accrued ratably) to eliminate the value o f deferral.72 This type o f solution would rely on the
69 Property accretion could be taxed at regular intervals o f  a year or more without regard to realization, or, 
alternatively, taxation could occur annually assuming an annual rate o f  growth in the value o f  property. See 
SHAVIRO, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 5.
70 See DAVID F. Br a d f o r d  & U.S. TREASURY T a x  Policy , Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (Tax Analysts 
2nd ed. 1984) at 5, 81 (the study does not recommend taxation o f  gains as accrued because the administrative 
cost o f annual asset valuations is considered prohibitive and because otherwise taxpayers might face problems 
in making cash tax payments when no cash had been realized); JAMES W. WETZLER, Capital Gains and Losses, 
in Comprehensive Income Taxation (Joseph A. Pechman ed. 1977) at 115, 120 ("[CJompletely eliminating 
deferral means taxing on accrual, which must be ruled out because it would be extraordinarily difficult to 
value nonmarketable assets every year"). One additional significant obstacle is the failure to index. Adoption 
o f a mark-to-market system without indexation would result in very high effective tax rates. Currently, 
deferral offsets the negative effect o f  inflation. See NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, The 
Case for a Capital Gains Preference, supra note 55, at ft 107. But see id. at 347(“While practical obstacles to an 
accrual system remain, it is likely that, in the long run, they can be surmounted.”). See also ZELINSKY, supra 
note 31, at 880 (“An important theme o f  the contemporary literature on accretionism is that modern 
technology and techniques reduce [valuation] problems to manageable proportions, making annual appraisals 
o f  previously hard-to-value assets economical and precise.”).
71 See REED Sh u l d in e r , A  General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 243 (1992) 
at 246 ("Most, if  not all o f these problems [with taxing financial instruments] could be solved by . .  . adopting 
mark-to-market accounting for financial instruments . . . [but] it is unlikely that Congress (or the financial 
community) will accept wholesale use o f  mark-to-market accounting.").
72 See, e.g. ALAN J. AUERBACH, Restrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 167 (1991) at 168 
(proposing a realization-based tax that imposes a higher rate on gains held for longer periods o f  time to
valuation and liquidity advantages o f realization, while eliminating the distortions that it 
introduces due to deferral.73 Alternatively, certain assets, which are easily valued {i.e., 
primarily financial assets), could be subject to a pure market-to-market system, while others 
would continue to be subject to a realization system.74 For instance, Professor Dodge 
suggested an interesting variation o f this type o f partial accretionism for the taxation o f the 
corporate sector. Under Dodge’s proposal, realization could be eliminated through a dual 
system that cumulated pass through taxation for closely held-businesses, and a mark-to- 
market taxation o f shares in public corporations, which should present no problems of 
valuation or liquidity since they are publicly marketed.75 Although from a pure transaction 
cost perspective this system is more advantageous than the current CIT system, it is not 
clear whether this type o f selective accretionism would not introduce distortions and 
inequities to the tax system not very different from those currendy existing.76 Foreign and 
tax exempt shareholders could also pose serious administrative hurdles to this kind of 
proposal.
mimic an interest-bearing tax deferral regime). For a critical review o f  interest-bearing tax deferral proposals, 
see NOEL B. Cu n n in g h a m  & D ebo r ah  H. Sc h e n k , Taxation Without Realisation: A  "Revolutionary" Approach 
to Ownership, 47 Tax L. Rev. 725 (1992) at 744-746.
73 See discussion infra at pg. 42 ff for in-depth analysis o f  such distortions.
74 See, e.g. DAVID A. WEISBACH, A  Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 Tax L. Rev. 95 (1999) at 96-97 
(Weisbach would im pose a lower rate o f  tax on those assets which are marked-to-market than on those which  
are eligible for a deferral under the realization system. The difference in rates would attempt to compensate 
for the average difference in effective rates due to deferral). See also DAVID J. SHAKOW, Taxation Without 
Realisation: A  Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111 (1986) (describing a partial accrual tax 
system); JEFF STRNAD, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 Yale Law J. 1817 (1990) 
(describing a practical m ethod o f  implementing an accretion tax); NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM & DEBORAH H. 
SCHENK, Taxation Without Realisation: A  "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, supra note 72, at 727 (advocating 
a concept o f  realization that permits the taxation o f  gains as they accrue) and FRED B. BROWN, Complete 
Accrual Taxation, 33 San D iego Rev. 1559 (1996) at 1560-61 (considering a more com plete accrual system that 
seeks to value and tax the m ost difficult-to-value assets {i.e., non-marketed business interests and collectibles) 
on an annual basis).
75 See JOSEPH M. D o d g e , A  Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 
50 Tax L. Rev. 265 (1995). See also REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, Corporations, Society, and the State: A  Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 Virginia Law Review 1193 (2004) at 1204 (highlighting the merits o f  this kind o f proposal). 
A  further potential alternative proposal to eliminate realization and its associated lock-in effect is a rollover 
provision for reinvestment o f  the proceeds on disposition o f a capital asset. For a description o f such a 
proposal, see CYNTHIA J. BLUM, Rollover: A n  Alternative Treatment of Capital Gains, 41 Tax L. Rev. 385 (1986).
76 See ZELINSKY, supra note 31, at 915 (“[T]he efficiency o f accretionism applied globally challenges 
powerfully the virtues o f  the rule o f realization. But accretionism implemented selectively would engender the 
same kinds o f  distortions and inequities as the rule o f  realization.”). See also DAVID M. SCHIZER, Sticks and 
Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1339 (2000) at 1400 ("[Ajlthough 
moving our system towards mark-to-market accounting is promising if  proper care is taken, every move 
toward mark-to-market is not inherendy wise"); SCHENK, A n Efficiemy Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Rased 
Tax, supra note 55, at 504 (“Some steps toward accrual taxation and some attempts to tax appreciation before 
realization are not worth taking. Many responses to realization abuses simply change behaviour without 
raising revenue, creating deadweight loss.”).
b. Consumption-Based Taxation
Another possibility to eliminate the realization principle is to structure the corporate tax 
system based primarily on consumption tax concepts. Several consumption-based 
proposals have been put forward during the last decades,77 some retaining the existence of 
a separate tax on firms and others eliminating it outright.78 Under the proposals that would 
levy a business-level tax, the tax would be imposed on a firm’s net cash flow, instead of 
income or profits as in the previous models discussed. Specifically, under the most 
commonly proposed cash-flow tax model (an “R (real) - based” tax), receipts from the sale 
o f goods and services less current and capital expenses would constitute the firm’s tax 
base.79 Further, under cash-flow accounting, firms would include receipts when cash is 
received, and deduct the full costs o f materials, inventories, equipment and structures when 
they are purchased. Significantly, financial items such as interest, dividends and capital gains 
would not be included in income or allowed as deductions.80 Alternative cash-flow tax 
models introduce variations to this basic framework, such as the so-called “R+F (real plus 
financial) base,” where firms would instead take into account all flows o f cash, other than
77 Cash-flow taxes have been discussed in academic and policy circles for several years now. For a discussion 
o f  some o f  the most prominent academic and legislative proposals in the US since the 1970s, see, e.g., CHRIS 
EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 32-35. In the UK see, eg. ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra 
note 49. See also JACK M. MlNTZ & JESUS SEADE, Cash Flow or Income? The Choice of Base for Company Taxation, 6 
World Bank Research Observer 177 (1991) at 180.
78 Certain consumption-based tax proposals would apply a comprehensive tax at the individual level without 
the need for a corporate-level tax. One model is the saving-deferred cash-flow tax proposal, which would 
replace the individual and corporate income taxes with a flat rate individual tax on a base o f income less net 
savings. The result would be that business earnings would be taxed at the individual level when not reinvested 
by individuals. See STEPHEN ENTIN, The Inflow-Outflow Tax - A  Savings-Dejerred Neutral Tax System, Institute for 
Research on the Economics o f Taxation (available at www.iret.org) (1998). A similar proposal is the model 
cash-flow consumption tax, which would eliminate the corporate-level tax and allow individuals a choice o f  
two treatments for savings (i.e., savings in qualified accounts would be deducted up front with withdrawals 
taxed later. Alternatively, savings could be made from after-tax earnings with the returns received tax-free). 
See DAVID F. Br a d fo r d  & U.S. T reasury  T a x  P olicy , Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (U.S. Treasury 
Department. 1977).
79 For instance, under one o f the most prominent R-base tax proposals, the so-called “Hall and Rabushka” or 
“flat tax” model, taxation would occur at two levels: Individual and corporate level. Individuals would be 
taxed on wages and pension benefits at a flat 19 percent, with large exemptions provided, so as to avoid the 
regressive effect o f  this type o f taxation. Further, individuals would not be taxed on interest, dividends, or 
capital gains. As for businesses, the corporate tax base would be defined by the total earnings (such as 
receipts from the sales o f goods and services) reduced by the total expenditure o f  the company (such as 
purchases o f materials, equipment, buildings and other expenses, including wages), i.e., all sales made by the 
company minus all purchases it made, including the wages o f  employees, which would be taxed at the 
individual level. Businesses would pay a 19 percent tax on this tax base. In addition, businesses would 
disregard interest, dividends, and capital gains. See ROBERT HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, The Flat Tax (Hoover 
Institution Press. 1995).
80 See M er v y n  KING, The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax, NBER, Working Paper No. 1993 (1986). See also 
MARTIN Su lliva n , Flat Taxes and Consumption Taxes: A Guide to the Debate (American Institute o f  
Certified Public Accountants. 1995) at 7.
to their own shareholders, when calculating their tax base.81 Lastly, there are certain hybrid 
models, such as the McClure and Zodrow model, where individuals would be taxed under 
the Hall-Rabushka-style individual tax,82 but firms would be taxed under a R+F cash-flow 
basis.83
Although none o f these consumption-based models has ever been implemented,84 they 
have repeatedly received considerable support from both academics and politicians.85 Just 
recently, the UK’s Mirrlees report proposed the substitution o f the current UK CIT system 
with a R +F cash-flow tax.86 After analyzing different possibilities o f taxing corporations,87 
the report concluded that to tax only the economic rent accruing in the corporate sector 
through a destination-based cash-flow tax (i.e., basically, a “destination-based value added 
tax but with labour costs deductible”)88 should deserve “serious consideration.”89 A cash 
flow tax certainly yields several advantages. Capital gains taxation, capitalization and the 
associated concept o f “tax basis” are eliminated in this type o f system, and with them, as 
will be discussed, a significant part o f the complexity o f the existing CIT system.90 Further,
81 See, e.g. HENRY AARON & HARVEY GALPER, Assessing Tax Reform (Brookings Institution. 1985) (Aaron 
and Galper propose an R+F based cash-flow tax on businesses within a comprehensive tax plan).
82 See supra note 79.
83 See CHARLES MCLURE & G e o r g e  Z o d r o w , A  Hybrid Approach to the Hired Taxation of Consumption, in 
Frontiers o f Tax Reform (Michael J. Boskin ed. 1996) at 76.
84 Nevertheless, in recent times, variations o f  this type o f  taxes are increasingly making inroads into taxation 
practice. On the whole these are variants that graft a single uniform tax rate onto the old tax bases. Basically, 
a similar tax rate is applied to all the components o f  income with no exemptions or reliefs allowed apart from 
a certain amount o f  personal allowance and strictly determined operating or business expenses. In recent 
times, some versions o f such a flat income tax have been introduced in countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Slovakia, Georgia and Romania. What all these have in common is that 
income is taxed at a uniform rate, with the abolition o f  tax exemptions and reliefs allowing for a broadening 
o f the tax base and a consequent reduction in the tax rate. See MARINA KESNER-Sk r eB, A  Flat Consumption 
Tax Concepts, 29 Financial Theory and Practice 205 (2005) at 205-208. See also JEFFREY OWENS, Fundamental 
Tax Reform: The Experience o f OECD Countries (OECD. 2004); A. IVANOVA, et al., The Russian Flat Tax 
Reform, IMF, Working Paper No. W O /05/16  (2005).
85 See Chris E d w a r d s , supra note 19.
86 See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49.
87 The report discusses corporate tax systems with different potential tax bases (i.e., taxes on the return to 
equity investment, taxes on economic rent and taxes on the return to all capital) and o f different geographical 
dimensions, comparing sourced-based taxation with residence-based and destination-based taxation. Id.
88 Proposals for cash-flow taxes tend to differ with regard to whether labour costs are deductible. When these 
costs are disallowed, the tax is a pure value-added tax, capturing the value added by both labour and capital at 
the business level. See CHRIS EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 32-33.
89 The report proposes a destination-based cash-flow tax, essentially a destination-based VAT, but with 
labour costs deductible and with border adjustments: imports would be taxed, but tax on exports would be 
refunded. The report puts forward a case for implementing a tax o f  this type on both real flows and on 
financial flows, on the grounds that this would also tax the economic rents generated by banks on lending to 
domestic borrowers. See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 838-839.
90 See JACK M. MlNTZ & Jesus SEADE, Cash Flow or Income? The Choice of Base for Company Taxation, supra note 
77, at 180; MARTIN SULLIVAN, supra note 80, at 7; MERVYN KING, supra note 80. See also discussion infra at pg. 
99ff. The bias against savings and distortions caused by inflation under the current CIT system would also be 
eliminated. See CHRIS EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 10.
certain important inconsistencies o f the current realization-based CIT system, such as the 
different tax treatment o f debt and equity, and the different rules imposed on corporations 
and other businesses, which, as will be further discussed, may often result in behavioural 
distortions, would be mitigated or eliminated.91 Additionally, the broad base o f a cash-flow 
tax would, in principle, need only a low tax rate to raise the same amount of revenue as the 
current corporate tax, and, thus, it would theoretically reduce the incentive for tax planning 
or tax evasion.92 Finally, the supposed simplicity that characterizes the tax should lead to a 
reduction in the costs o f tax compliance.93
However, a cash-flow tax presents several problems o f its own. While it could potentially 
mitigate, or, in some cases, eliminate several problems o f the current CIT system, it could 
also pose new problems to the tax system. Specifically, one problem with the basic R-base 
cash-flow tax is the separation o f financial flows from nonfinancial flows, which may 
potentially create a new source o f tax avoidance opportunities. For example, businesses 
may try to characterize normal sales receipts as interest in order to exclude them from 
taxation.94 Further, financial businesses, such as banks and insurance companies, would 
require special rules since the R-based cash-flow tax does not include financial flows in the 
tax base.95 As recently suggested by the Mirrlees report,96 this problem could, however, be 
solved through the adoption o f a R +F cash-flow tax basis.97
Also, a number o f tax avoidance problems under the current tax system could continue to 
be a problem under some cash-flow taxes. For instance, transfer pricing would continue to 
be a problem under certain cash-flow taxes.98 Once again, as proposed in the Mirrlees
91 The distinction between debt and equity is not totally eliminated under cash-flow taxation. The R-base 
requires a distinction to be made between real and financial flows and the R+F base requires the tax system 
to make a distinction between debt and equity. Nevertheless, the distinction is much less important than 
under conventional corporation taxes because only the economic rent arising from debt transactions would 
be taxed. See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 887.
92 See CHRIS E d w a r d s , supra note 19, at 32-33
93 Id. at 33 (“Economists generally agree that a business cash-flow tax would be simpler and more efficient 
than the corporate income tax.”).
94 Id. at 33-34.
95 Id.
96 See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 839.
97 Another option would be to simply exclude financial businesses under a new consumption-based tax 
system, as is the case under most US state retail taxes and certain VATs. See CHRIS EDWARDS, supra note at 
34.
98 See, eg. the “Hall-Rabushka” style cash-flow tax, ROBERT HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, supra note 79.
report," through the use o f well-thought solutions, namely through the introduction o f 
cash-flow taxes that are “border adjustable,”100 this problem could be mitigated.
A more serious challenge would be to create transition rules to move from the current CIT 
system to a cash-flow system. A core problem is the treatment o f the existing tax basis in 
assets, i.e., the portion o f the asset’s cost not yet recovered by depreciation deductions.101 
That is, a very significant part o f the costs o f machines and buildings would be only 
partially written o ff at the time of the change o f tax system.102 To disallow the remaining 
deductions on these assets would impose unacceptable losses on taxpayers. The opposite 
solution, to allow complete and immediate deduction for these assets, should however 
involve a substantial short-term government revenue loss. The solution may rest in a 
middle-ground approach. A similar problem would be the fate given to the accumulated tax 
losses o f businesses. Further, since most countries have implemented a CIT system to tax 
the corporate sector, certain problems o f integration o f an individual country’s cash-flow 
system with the global community could arise, namely with regard to the international tax 
treaty network and the calculation o f foreign tax credits. The higher social inequality that 
theoretically may result from the implementation o f a consumption-based tax system 
presents an additional relevant problem.103 Finally, despite its apparent simplicity, a cash­
flow tax should also impose administrative problems o f its own.104
In light o f the relative virtues and problems o f the different alternatives examined, the 
question that arises at this point is whether, overall, further work on the current CIT 
system is justified, or whether the current system should simply be discarded. Since some
99 See ALAN J. A uer ba c h , et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 883-886.
100 A border adjustable tax would exempt exports from domestic taxation and symmetrically deny a deduction 
for imported inputs. CHRIS EDWARDS, supra note 19, at ft. 239.
101 See id. at 34.
102 See id. at 35 (estimates an amount in the range o f trillions o f dollars for the US).
103 This is because consumption-based tax systems tend to develop regressive characteristics. See OECD, 
Consumption Taxes: The Way of the Future?, OECD Policy Brief (2007). Nevertheless, this problem may be 
ameliorated, to a certain extent, through the introduction o f  innovative solutions. For instance, under the 
Hall-Rabushka model, the employees pay tax on what they earn, but according to a progressive tax system. 
This progressiveness in the taxation o f individuals is incorporated in the tax system through the setting o f a 
personal allowance and the marginal tax rate. See ROBERT HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, supra note 79.
104 The simplicity o f  the cash flow tax may, to a certain extent, be apparent in that, for instance, some critics 
state that there is no shortage o f problems related to the actual definition o f the scope o f income and the 
determination o f operating expenditure. See MARINA KESNER-SKREB, supra note 84, at 205-208. For a 
discussion o f possible administrative problems with a flat tax see, e.g. DAVID A. WEISBACH, Ironing Out the Flat 
Tax, University o f  Chicago - John M. Olin Law & Economics , Working Paper N o. 79 (1999). See also 
PARTHASARATHI SHOME & CHRISTIAN SHUTTE, Cash-Flow Tax, in Tax Policy Handbook (Parthasarathi 
Shome ed. 1995) at 172 and WILLIAM GENTRY & R. GLENN HUBBARD, Fundamental Tax Reform and Corporate 
Financial Policy, NBER, Working Paper No. 6433 (1998) at 29.
o f the alternatives discussed would entail the elimination o f a separate tax levied on the 
corporate sector, the next section will investigate the consequences o f levying a separate 
corporate-level tax before proceeding to a final assessment.
3. Taxing the Corporate Sector through a Corporate-Tevel Tax
The corporate sector does not necessarily need to be taxed through a separate tax levied on 
corporations. As discussed above, there are systems available to levy taxes on the corporate 
sector that impose taxes only at the ultimate shareholder level, i.e., on physical persons. In 
order to better assess the potential merits and weaknesses o f the current CIT system, the 
next section will be dedicated to studying the consequences from levying taxes on the 
corporate sector through a separate corporate-level income tax.
a. Corporate-Level Taxation and the Firm’s Agency Problems
Taxing business income by levying a separate tax on corporations, as occurs under the 
current CIT system, rather than exclusively through shareholder level taxes, gives rise to 
significant regulatory consequences. For purpose o f this thesis, they will be classified as the 
“Reliability Effect,” the “Deterrent Effect,” the “Reversal o f Clientele Effect” and the 
“Control Effect.” As will be discussed, these consequences o f CIT’s existence as a separate 
corporate-level tax contribute to the reduction o f the firm’s agency problems and to the 
limitation and control o f managerial power.
i. The Reliability Effect
Levying a separate tax on corporations provides a financial incentive for the state to invest 
in the verification o f the reliability o f the firm’s disclosed information regarding its 
operations.105 Consequently, due to the existence o f the CIT system, two distinct auditing 
bodies generally supervise the reliability o f the firm’s disclosed information, i.e., external 
auditors and the state.106 The level o f detail o f  tax information,107 coupled with the strength
105 See M. DESAI, et al., Corporate Governance and Taxation, NBER, Working Paper available at 
http://140.247.200.140/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/03.Dyck.taxation.pdf (2003) 
at 38 (CIT provides a “source o f  revenues that will entice the government to verify the accuracy o f corporate 
income in a manner that only the government can.”).
106 Id. at 5 (“[Ejffectdve tax enforcement makes hiding and diverting profits more difficult.”). See also SCHON, 
Tax and Corporate Governance: A  Legal Approach, supra note 44, at 60 (“[T]he mere existence o f  the corporate
o f the state’s supervision and enforcement mechanisms,108 turn the state into an important 
and differentiated inspector o f the reliability o f the firm’s disclosed information regarding 
its operations.109 Significantly, the state has an incentive to verify the reliability o f the 
disclosed information and to enforce its rights even when the cost o f doing so is higher 
than the recompense it can derive. In other words, the state does not face a “free rider 
problem” in monitoring and enforcing its rights.110 By auditing accounts or taking legal 
action against a corporation or corporate group, the state sets forth a case that induces 
other firms to behave.111 This supervision activity o f the government is o f especial 
relevance for the protection o f  minority shareholders interests112 and for the accuracy o f 
small companies’ books, which are often not legally obliged to have their accounts 
audited.113
ii. The Deterrent Effect
The firm’s financial results often determine the amount o f control shareholders exercise 
over, and payments made to, corporate managers.114 Further, the financial results o f the 
firm generally dictate its stock value and the willingness o f investors to invest in it.115 For 
these reasons, corporate management retains a natural interest in reporting the highest 
possible profits and the lowest possible amount o f losses for financial purposes. The 
existence o f a separate corporate tax levied on corporate profits works as a friction against 
this natural propensity, and, thus, as a deterrent against the disclosure o f fraudulent
tax...puts an extra layer o f  certification on the calculation o f  corporate profits, in addition to the control 
mechanisms applied by shareholders themselves and public accountants.”).
107 Tax compliance obliges firms to disclose a significant amount o f  information regarding the operation o f  
their business. In the US, apart from the information disclosed in the tax returns, this includes extensive 
transfer pricing compliance requirements {see IRC Section 482) and compliance with demanding anti-shelter 
regulations {see IRC Sections 6111 and 6112).
108 In general, the regulatory strength o f  the state is based on its quantity o f  administrative personnel, available 
information, legal power and availability and strength o f  sanctions.
109 See SCHON, Tax and Corporate Governance: A  Legal Approach, supra note 44, at 60 (“As tax inspectors do not 
face the same collective action problems which shareholders encounter and — even more importantly — rarely 
are subject to the same conflict o f  interests as auditors are, the natural process o f  tax auditing proves to be 
helpful for the overall framework o f  corporate governance.”).
110 See M. DESAI, et al., Corporate Governance and Taxation, supra note 55, at 38.
111 Id. (authors refer to this phenomenon as the “spillover” effect).
1,2 See SCHON, Tax and Corporate Governance: A  Legal Approach, supra note 44, at 60 (“ [T]he tax authorities are a 
major player when it com es to the protection o f  minority interests.”).
113 See id. at 66 defending this argument for Germany.
114 See MYRON S. SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach (Pearson Prentice Hall 
3rd ed. 2005) at 169 (arguing that compensation contracts for top managers are often based on accounting 
earnings).
115 Id. (claiming that analysts and investors use accounting numbers to price securities - both debt and equity 
— and arguing that managers might be concerned that reporting lower income may lead to lower stock prices 
and higher interest costs).
financial results.116 The closer the relationship between financial accounting and tax 
accounting, and thus, the greater the potential for an effective cross-check, the stronger 
should be the tax friction.117 That is, the higher the conformity between financial 
accounting and tax accounting,118 the easier it should be for discrepancies between book 
income and taxable income to attract the scrutiny o f the tax authorities.119 Due to the 
penalties generally associated with wrongful tax disclosure,120 the interest in understating 
profits (and overstating losses) for tax purposes should, therefore, work as a friction against 
the natural propensity to overstate profits (and understate losses) for financial purposes.121
iii. The Reversal o f Clientele Effect
The clientele effect assumes that investors are attracted to different firm policies, including 
tax policy, and that when a company’s policy changes, investors adjust their stock holdings
116 See JEFFREY O w e n s , The Interface of Tax and Good Corporate Governance 37 Tax Notes Int'l 767 (2005) at 768 
(“Companies in some instances might try to inflate corporate profits for financial accounting purposes. If the 
financial accounting rules are also used to determine profits for tax purposes, with a resulting increased tax 
cost, the tax rules can act as a deterrent to profit manipulation.”).
117 See M. DESAI & D . D h aRMAPALA, Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives, 79 Journal o f  
Financial Economics 145 (2007) (using the book-tax difference as a measure o f potential tax sheltering). For 
the causes and the consequences o f  book-tax differences see, e.g., G.B. MANZON & G. A. PLESKO, The Relation 
Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income, 55 Tax L. Rev. 175 (2002).
118 In the US, several commentators have been arguing for greater conformity between financial and tax 
accounting rules, based on the associated reduction o f compliance costs and the increased opportunities for 
monitoring. In Europe, the link between tax and financial accounts - although it takes varying forms and does 
not result in complete book-tax conformity - is more common. Despite the strong arguments in favour o f  
conformity, there are also good reasons for certain divergences. Fundamentally, financial and tax accounting 
are based on very different concepts and cultures and fulfil different objectives. Freedman, for instance, 
argues that “the most likely outcome in any system, whatever the starting point, should be partial 
convergence.” See JUDITH FREEDMAN, Financial and Tax Accouting: Transparency and "Truth", in Tax and 
Corporate Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed. 2008) at 71. According to Freedman, separate rules could be 
preferable to a system that purports to integrate two sets o f rules but does so without clarity. Far from 
removing opportunities for manipulation, the interaction o f two very different systems could increase the 
available opportunities for obfuscation. See id. at 72. Freedman concludes that “rather than arguing for 
conformity, which would then be the subject o f exceptions and, thus, lack o f clarity, it would be better to 
accept that there are differences and to make these explicit and rooted in established principles.” Id. at 78. See 
also JEFFREY O w e n s , The Inteface of Tax and Good Corporate Governance, supra note 116, at 768 (“[I]n some cases, 
the essentially conservative nature o f financial accounting rules, aimed at the protection o f  creditors, may not 
be appropriate for determining the government's share o f the company's operating results.”).
119 See MYRON S. SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 170 
(arguing that large differences between book income and taxable income can lead to greater scrutiny and 
audit adjustments by the IRS). See also C. BRYAN CLOYD, et al., The Use of Financial Accounting Choice to Support 
Aggressive Stock Positions: Public and Private Firms, 34 J. Acct. Res. 23 (1996) (reporting that managers believe that 
conformity results in lower tax audits).
120 In certain cases, this may include criminal penalties.
121 See M. DESAI & D . DHARMAPALA, Tax and Corporate Governance: A n  Economic Approach, in Tax and 
Corporate Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed. 2008) at 21 (“[A]t least for this sample o f  firms, the threat o f  
IRS monitoring o f  their taxable income loomed larger than did investor monitoring o f  their financial
statements managers and investors appear to appreciate the role o f a tax enforcement agency as a monitor
of managerial opportunism.”).
accordingly.122 As a result o f this adjustment, the stock price changes.123 The existence o f a 
separate tax on corporations should contribute to a significant reversal o f this effect with 
regard to the tax factor. That is, if investors were to be directly taxed on the firm’s income, 
the firm’s tax policy would take on a distinct dimension for them. Shareholders would be 
more interested in controlling the operations o f the firm in order to obtain a better 
individual tax result.124 This could result in additional agency problems. Further, the firm’s 
managers, who quite often are shareholders, would be more prone to act in a way most in 
line with their own tax circumstances or with the circumstances o f the group o f 
shareholders most willing to support them.125
iv. The Control Effect
As will be further discussed,126 a separate corporate-level tax allows society to limit and, to a 
certain degree, to control managerial power.127 CIT limits managerial power in that levying 
a separate tax on corporations slows down the accumulation o f corporate resources, which 
constitute the base o f managerial power.128 In addition, through the different incentives and 
disincentives it introduces to corporate activity,129 CIT may work as a tool to control 
corporate behaviour and, thus, to channel the use o f corporate assets to uses considered 
valuable to society.130
122 See EDWIN J. ELTON, et al., The Ex-Dividend D aj Behavior of Stock Prices; A  Re-examination of the Clientele Effect: 
A  Comment, in Investments: Portfolio Theory and Asset Pricing (Edwin J. Elton & Martin Jay Gruber eds., 
1999).
123 Id.
124 See SAUL LEVMORE & HIDEKI KANDA, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 Virginia Law 
Review 211 (1991) at 213 (“[T]he separate tax on corporations ‘equalizes’ shareholders preferences for 
corporate transactions even though shareholders are in diverse individual tax circumstances”).
125 Id. This line o f argument, although applying only to publicly traded corporations, has merit in light o f the 
substantial revenue levied over these corporations under the existing CIT. See Avi-YONAH, Corporations, 
Society, and the State: A  Defense of the Corporate Tax, supra note 75, at 1208.
126 See discussion infra at pg. 45ff.
127 See Avi-YONAH, Corporations, Society, and the State: A  Defense of the Corporate Tax, supra note 75, at 1244 (“My 
basic argument is...that the corporate tax is justified as a means to control the excessive accumulation o f  
power in the hands o f corporate management, which is inconsistent with a properly functioning liberal 
democratic polity.”).
128 See id. 1247.
129 Tax tries to control the firm’s behaviour through several incentives and disincentives, including 
deductibility vs. non-deductibility, credits and exemptions, recognition vs. non-recognition, deferral o f  
recognition vs. acceleration o f  recognition and relative tax rates. See discussion infra at pg. 46.
130 See Avi-YONAH, Corporations, Society, and the State: A  Defense of the Corporate Tax, supra note 75, at 1255 
(“Corporate taxation is an important regulatory tool and an important element in managing the delicate 
balance between corporations, society, and the state.”).
b. Traditional Arguments for Defence o f Corporate-Level Taxation
O n top o f these regulatory considerations, there is a set o f traditional rationales commonly 
found in the tax literature to defend the existence o f a corporate-level income tax. To begin 
with, a separate corporate-level income tax is an important backstopping instrument for 
personal income tax.131 In a tax system with personal income taxation, a corporate-level 
income tax is a rather convenient and effective device to collect income tax on 
shareholders. First, without a corporate-level tax, individuals could avoid taxation by 
earning their income through corporations. That is, absent some type o f  accrual or anti­
avoidance mechanism,132 tax could be deferred until a dividend was distributed or stock 
was sold. This, in turn, would provide a strong incentive for the indefinite retaining o f non­
taxed earnings at the corporate level. Second, CIT offers an easier way o f collecting taxes 
on corporate income.133 This occurs due to the reduced number o f corporations, when 
compared to the number o f shareholders, and because corporations offer an easier way of 
collecting relevant financial information.134 In addition, certain shareholders, namely those 
foreign and tax exempt, may often be hard to reach otherwise. Thus, a corporate-level CIT 
works as a rather efficient withholding mechanism for personal income taxation.135
Further, although the current CIT system is not completely non-distortionary in that, in 
addition to economic rent, it taxes the normal return to capital; it does tax economic rents 
in a more efficient way than some other alternative tax regimes.136 There are considerable 
efficiency advantages in taxing such rents at the corporate level, since taxes imposed on 
economic rents levy income from the private sector without distorting private economic
131 See R.M. BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, International Centre for Tax Studies. University o f Toronto. WP 96- 
2 (1996) at 1 (“[S]o long as the main form o f personal taxation is a personal income tax, some form o f  
corporation income tax will be a necessary part o f  the tax system.”).
132 See discussion infra at pg. 142ff for examples o f  accrual mechanics. Another possibility is the use o f  anti­
avoidance provisions such as the US Accumulated Earnings Tax (see IRC Section 531) or Personal Holding 
Company Regime (see IRC Section 541).
133 See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 867.
134 See R.M. BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, supra note 131, at 10 (“The key to effective taxation is information, 
and the key to information in the modern economy is the corporation.”).
135 See id. at 9.
136 To tax only economic rent requires all expenses to be deducted from taxable income when incurred. The 
current CIT system, therefore, has distortionary elements that should in principle affect the cost o f capital 
and corporate finance decisions. See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 842. 
For this reason, recent proposals for reform o f  the corporate tax systems, such as the proposal recently 
suggested by the Mirrlees report, aim to tax only the economic rent element o f corporate profits. Id. See also 
R.M. BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, supra note 131, at 5.
decisions.137 Other traditional defences o f  the current corporate-level CIT system include 
the arguments that corporate tax is a reasonable user fee for services provided by the 
government to corporations,138 that the tax allows the government a partial return on its 
implicit partnership investment in risk taking,139 or that the corporate tax offers a way of 
offsetting the social costs imposed by corporations because of their limited liability.140 
Although none o f these traditional arguments are particularly strong, in total they do 
provide an additional defence for the existence o f a separate corporate-level income tax
141system.
2. Taxing the Corporate Sector in an Imperfect World
As discussed in the previous sections, the corporate sector may be taxed in different forms. 
Fundamentally, using the realization principle as a touchstone, two basic sets o f options are 
available. First, a set o f options, which taxing either income or net cash flow, eliminates the 
realization principle. These taxation options may or may not involve the existence o f a 
corporate-level tax. Second, a set o f options that maintains the realization principle and 
that, likewise, may or may not involve the existence o f a corporate-level tax.142
137 See R.M. BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, supra note 131, at 5. See also ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing 
Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 842 (“Taxing only economic rent can be considered desirable since it is non- 
distortionary, leaving the (normal) return earned by the marginal investment free o f  tax.”).
138 Fundamentally, corporations may generally benefit from government actions {e.g., in providing the basic 
legal and institutional framework and physical infrastructure within which market activity takes place, in 
educating the labour force, and in maintaining a high and stable level o f  economic activity). See Avi-YONAH, 
Corporations, Society, and the State: A  Defense of the Corporate Tax, supra note 49, at 1207. See also REBECCA 
RUDNICK, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 965 (1989) at 985- 
986 (author argues that the corporate tax can be justified as a payment for the greater liquidity afforded by 
access to the public equity market). See also LEE, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, 
Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57 (1988) at 97 (author views 
corporate tax as appropriate user fee because corporations exploit foreign markets and therefore rely on the 
country's military power in order to ensure stability in those markets). But see Avi-YONAH, Corporations, Society, 
and the State: A  Defense of the Corporate Tax, supra note 75, at 1206 for objections to this type o f  defence.
139 J. STIGLITZ, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. Pub. Econ. 303 (1976) (regarding tax as levy on pure profits and 
entrepreneurship, and as partial return on an implicit government partnership in risk taking).
140 Limited liability, however, is also enjoyed by certain entities, such as limited partnerships in the US, which 
are not subject to the CIT system. See JULIE ROIN, Unmasking the "Matching Principle" in Tax Law, 79 Virginia 
Law Review 813 (1993) at 832. See also Avi-YONAH, Corporations, Society, and the State: A  Defense of the Corporate 
Tax, supra note 75, at 1206 (“[Sjome o f  the benefits conferred by government also flow to non-incorporated 
businesses not subject to tax. [Also] there is no correlation between corporate income and the benefits 
provided, since the same benefits apply (and in the case o f  limited liability, apply more forcefully) to 
corporations that lose money.”).
141 See R.M. BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, supra note 131, at 1 (“Although none o f  the possible rationales for 
taxing corporations is particularly strong, in total it is clear that we not only should but must impose some 
explicit taxes on corporations.”).
142 See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, for an alternative, economic-based, 
typology o f  CIT systems based on the type o f tax base, i.e., taxes on the return to equity investment, taxes on 
economic rent and taxes on the return to all capital.
The options discussed that eliminate the realization principle, as well as the imposition o f a 
separate corporate-level tax, include accretionism taxation and certain consumption-based 
proposals. Although a pure accretionist regime is attractive due to its simplicity, it should 
be unmanageable if applied globally. Further, this type o f system, due to its absence o f a 
corporate-level tax, would eliminate important regulatory functions o f the current CIT 
regime, namely the reliability, deterrent and control functions. The same is true for certain 
consumption-based proposals that propose to eliminate corporate-level taxation.143 These 
consumption-based proposals, in their outright substitution o f the current personal and 
corporate income system with a sole consumption-based system, should also, in principle, 
result in a less equitable tax system.
A different alternative would be to get rid o f realization, but maintain a corporate-level tax, 
as would occur under the cash-flow tax proposals. Although a cash-flow tax levied at the 
corporate level has several advantages, it also has im portant drawbacks. Further, it is not 
clear whether there would be a loss o f the reliability and deterrent functions currently 
found in the present corporate tax system. This should depend on the specific form o f 
implementation o f this tax and the type o f tax compliance associated with it. However, 
since tax is imposed on net cash flow, the potential for cross-checking o f tax and financial 
accounting should, in principle, be more reduced. While the reversal o f the clientele effect 
ensured by the current CIT system should be maintained, it is not clear what would be the 
behavioural control potential o f this type o f tax when compared with the current CIT 
system.
The second set o f options available to tax the corporate sector would entail maintaining the 
realization principle as a keystone o f the tax system. One possibility would be to maintain 
the realization principle, but to eliminate the existence o f a corporate-level tax. Under this 
option, shareholders could be directly taxed on the income they receive from corporations, 
be it at the moment o f receipt o f dividends or o f recognition o f capital gains on the sale of 
their stock. The double taxation o f corporate profits would be eliminated and the simplicity 
o f the regime would be considerable. However, since taxes could be deferred until a 
dividend was distributed or stock was sold, individuals could avoid taxation by earning their 
income through corporations. This, in turn, would provide a strong incentive for the 
indefinite retaining o f non-taxed earnings at the corporate level. Also, this type o f system
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143 See supra note 78.
should be administratively complex due to the large number o f shareholders involved, 
especially in the case of public corporations, and to the difficulty in obtaining relevant 
financial information for all o f them. Further, since individual taxation would be directly 
dependent on the managerial decision o f when to make shareholder distributions or to 
reorganize the corporation, there would be a worsening o f the clientele effect. That is, 
individual shareholders would be more interested in controlling the operations o f the firm 
in order to obtain a better individual tax result. Further, the firm’s managers, who are quite 
often shareholders, would be prone to act in a way most in line with their own tax 
circumstances or with the circumstances o f the group o f shareholders most willing to 
support them.
Alternatively, shareholders could simply be taxed on a pass-through basis, recognizing the 
income derived by the corporation as if it was its own. Although, as demonstrated by the 
current CIT system, the implementation o f such a system should pose no special problems 
for closely-held businesses, it should be administratively impractical and technically 
complex in the case o f large public corporations. The current complexities o f pass-through 
regimes, such as the US IRC Subchapter S or Subchapter K  provisions, should serve as a 
precise indicator o f the potential complexities involved in this type o f system, where a large 
mass o f shareholders, including foreign and tax exempt, are involved (i.e., allocation o f tax 
losses, deductions, etc.). Also, this system should worsen the clientele effect, should 
introduce liquidity problems for certain shareholders, and should reduce the deterrent, 
reliability and control effects o f the current CIT system.
A further option to tax the corporate sector would be to maintain the current core 
structural elements o f the CIT system, that is, the realization principle and a separate 
corporate-level tax.144 As discussed, the hybrid income tax characteristics o f the current 
realization-based CIT system present significant advantages in a world o f costly 
contracting. Further, the current CIT system provides considerable regulatory benefits, 
namely the reliability, deterrent, control and reversal o f clientele effects, thereby
144 A final option is to tax the corporate sector through taxes imposed exclusively at the corporate level, such 
as the comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) proposal. Under CBIT, neither dividends nor interest 
would be deductible by businesses. In addition, individual taxes on interest, dividends, and capital gains 
would be repealed. All businesses, corporate and noncorporate alike, would be taxed under the same rules. 
Although such a tax reform would be comprehensive, the CBIT would retain certain problems o f  the current 
CIT system, including capitalization, inflation-caused distortions, and a bias against savings and investment. 
See CHRIS E d w a r d s , supra note 19, at 32. See also U.S. TREASURY, Integration o f  the Individual and Corporate 
Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once (Government Printing Office. 1992).
contributing to the reduction o f the firm’s agency problems and to the limitation and 
control o f managerial power. A realization-based CIT system presents, however, significant 
deficiencies.
Overall, from the analysis undertaken, this thesis concludes that there are certain options 
that would entail the elimination o f the realization principle from the corporate tax system 
that merit further consideration. Specifically, the selective accretionism proposal that 
cumulates a dual treatment for closely-held companies and public corporations, and the 
cash-flow R+F based tax with border adjustments, are interesting and potentially viable 
substitutes for the current CIT system that warrant further work and development. Based 
on the analysis undertaken, the areas that deserve further consideration regarding selective 
accretionism are the study o f the distortions and inequities that a dual corporate tax system 
may impose on the tax system, the investigation o f potential administrative solutions to 
solve the problems that foreign and tax exempt shareholders could pose to this kind of 
system and the clarification o f its potential regulatory consequences.
O f  even stronger potential may be the R+F based tax with border adjustments. However, 
the implementation o f this type o f corporate tax system requires an in-depth study o f the 
solutions to be given to the integration o f an individual country’s cash-flow system with the 
global community, and to the treatment o f the existing tax basis in assets and the 
accumulated tax losses o f businesses. In addition, the potentially regressive nature o f this 
type o f tax system, its potential administrative problems, and the clarification o f its 
regulatory impact, should merit further analysis.145
Despite the merits o f these alternative proposals to tax the corporate sector, the current 
CIT system presents, as discussed above, significant virtues in a world o f costly contracting 
and political constraints. Furthermore, o f all the systems analyzed, the current CIT system 
is the system that presents the strongest regulatory potential. Significantly, it is the system
145 It should be underlined that the implementation o f each analyzed tax system represents different policy 
choices. For instance, the potential implementation o f  the selective accretionism system should result in a 
potentially significant reduction o f  transaction costs o f the tax system but it would completely eliminate its 
current regulatory functions. Similarly, the implementation o f  a cash-flow tax system, due to its impact on the 
taxation o f  investment and savings, may potentially result in a more regressive tax system despite its 
potentially significant transaction cost advantages. A specific country’s policy regarding international 
investment {i.e., capital import neutrality, capital export neutrality, national neutrality or capital ownership 
neutrality) should also be considered since each o f these systems, and their possible variations, may involve a 
different type o f interaction with the global economic reality. In sum, the selection o f  the best system to tax 
the corporate sector involves not only a technical analysis, as here undertaken, but also important political 
reflections on the particular shaping o f  the economy and society o f  a specific country.
that we currently have. Since a fundamental change to the corporate tax system is costly, 
complex, and politically controversial,146 it may reasonably be expected that the current CIT 
system will remain in place for a considerable period o f time.147 Thus, potential 
improvements that may be made to the status quo should be very helpful.148 For these 
reasons, this thesis believes that research focusing on the optimization o f the current CIT 
system should be rather useful.149 Therefore, the thesis will focus its efforts on the study o f 
the current CIT system.
As demonstrated in this section, and as will be further discussed, most o f the current CIT 
system’s deficiencies reside on its theoretical pillars. Due to the nature o f CIT’s process o f 
development, these deficiencies tend to be amplified due to the bulk o f legislation that 
subsequently builds on such structural pillars. Thus, based on the analysis undertaken, the 
current CIT system should be approached by taking into consideration the following 
problems:
1. The deficiencies o f the system when related parties are involved;
2. The asymmetries that result in transactional discontinuities;
3. The encouragement provided for taxpayers to engage in tax planning;
4. The distortions introduced to the regular modus operandi o f economic agents that 
penalize their economic efficiency; and
5. The formalism and the complexity o f the CIT law.
In addition, it would be important to factor into the analysis the current system’s specific 
strengths, namely its regulatory potential. In light o f the fair amount o f research currently
146 On the different issues associated with the design and operation o f a corporate tax system, such as the 
controversial and piecemeal nature o f the tax legislative process or the interaction with other regulatory fields 
and with the business environment, including the interaction with the global community, see generally 
discussion supra at pg. 11 ff.
147 See SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 20 (“[0]ur 
current tax system is unlikely to change dramatically in structure.”).
148 In the same sense see WEISBACH, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, supra note 17, at 1633 
(“Policymakers need guidance in this second-best context which they encounter on a daily basis, in which 
change short o f fundamental reform is being considered.”).
149 Several commentators have also reached this conclusion, including ZELINSKY, supra note 31; SHAVIRO, A n  
Efficieny Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4; DEBORAH H. 
SCHENK, A n Efficieny Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Rased Tax, supra note 55; R.M. BIRD, Why Tax 
Corporations?, supra note 131; and Avi-YONAH, Corporations, Society, and the State: A  Defense of the Corporate Tax, 
supra note 75.
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being undertaken on the Reliability Effect and the Deterrent Effect, this thesis believes that 
further work should focus on the Control Effect.150
Based on these considerations, the next section will be dedicated to investigating two 
closely related elements associated with the impact o f the CIT system on corporate 
behaviour, namely, the distortions it introduces to the regular modus operandi o f corporations 
and its control potential. Once the thesis has understood the determinants associated with 
the impact o f the current CIT system on corporate behaviour, it will then suggest how to 
approach the central research question.
B. The Corporate Income Tax and Corporate Behavioural Control
/. The Structural Distortions
The realization-based nature o f the CIT system may introduce distortions to the regular 
modus operandi o f corporations. A t this stage, this thesis is merely concerned with those 
distortions that may arise as a consequence o f the interaction o f a realization-based CIT 
system with market forces, that is, the “Structural Distortions.” This excludes the potential 
behavioural distortions associated with the classification o f a payment as deductible or non­
deductible and with the classification o f a transaction as a recognition or non-recognition 
event.151 In particular, for purposes o f this thesis, Structural Distortions refer to those 
distortions introduced to the behaviour o f corporations that arise as a necessary side effect 
o f the adoption o f a realization-based CIT system in a market-based economy. The current 
CIT system may introduce Structural Distortions at the following levels:
1. The timing o f transactions;
2. The level o f after-tax return on assets;
3. The level o f risk-taking; and
4. The level o f transaction costs incurred by firms.
150 For the current research on the reliability and deterrent effects see, e.g., WOLFGANG SCHON, Tax and 
Corporate Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed., Springer 2008).; DESAI & DHARMAPALA, Corporate Tax 
Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives, supra note 47; and OWENS, The Interface of Tax and Good Corporate 
Governance, supra note. 116.
151 For the potential distortions associated with these asymmetries see infra discussion at pg. 48ff.
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As previously discussed, under a realization-based CIT system, a potential built-in gain or 
loss on an asset is only includable in taxable income once a qualifying transfer occurs.152 
Accordingly, by anticipating or postponing an asset transfer, the taxpayer may effectively 
control when to include such asset’s built-in gain or loss on its taxable income. Thus, a 
realization-based CIT system may distort the timing o f transfer transactions, in that it may 
encourage corporations to retain assets beyond the optimal period (“lock-in” effect) or to 
sell assets before the optimal period (“lock-out” effect).153 The type and magnitude o f the 
behavioural distortion should generally vary depending on the tax attributes o f the 
corporation in question and the type o f asset transferred.154
Further, since the taxation of gains from certain assets may be deferred indefinitely, such 
assets should be subject to a lower rate o f tax even if  they are subject to the same nominal 
rate.155 Thus, assets with an identical pre-tax return may have differing after-tax returns and 
be favoured differently by corporations.
In addition, a realization-based CIT may impact the level o f corporate risk taking. As will 
be discussed in more detail, in principle, pure neutrality towards risk should not be possible 
under a realization-based CIT system. The characteristics o f the loss offset system should 
dictate whether the CIT enhances or reduces the risk-taking capabilities o f corporations.156 
While, theoretically, the adoption o f an unlimited loss offset regime should increase the 
level o f risk-taking, the adoption o f a severely restrictive loss offset regime should tend to 
decrease the level o f risk-taking.157
Finally, due to its realization-based nature, CIT affects the level o f transaction costs 
incurred by firms. In particular, by making the taxpayer’s decisions regarding what to sell or
152 See discussion supra at pg. 19.
153 See SHAVIRO, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 
4, at 5 (“Taxes triggered by the act o f  transfer...are inherently distortive...they straightforwardly influence 
taxpayers to avoid transfers that yield taxable gain, and to engage as soon as possible in transfers that yield 
deductible loss.”). See also CHORVAT, supra note 31, at 89.
154 See discussion infra at pg. 127ff.
155 See CHORVAT, supra note 31, at 80 (”[N]ot all ... income is taxed at the same rate under a realization tax 
system, because the longer the asset is held, the longer the tax on any gain or loss is deferred, which lowers 
the effective rate o f  tax on income from that asset.”).
156 See E vsey  D . DOMAR & Rich ar d  A. Mu sg r a v e , Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 The 
Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 388 (1944) (authors argue that whether an income tax system with a 
realization requirement encourages or discourages risk depends on how the system treats losses). See also 
discussion infra at pg. 191ff.
157 As will be discussed, due to the different types o f  restrictions introduced to the loss offset mechanism and 
to its interaction with other elements o f  the CIT system, the assessment o f CIT’s impact on risk taking is far 
more complex than may at first be envisaged. See discussion infra at pg. 191ff.
to retain more complex, and by creating additional legal issues for taxpayers to consider, 
CIT increases regular business transaction costs by adding a further element that must be 
taken into consideration whenever two parties decide to contract.158 This includes 
information costs to determine applicable rules (including lawyer’s fees and financial 
professional advice), compliance costs and tax planning costs.
These Structural Distortions may affect the investment and financing preferences of 
corporations and result in deadweight loss for the economy. First, since the CIT system 
allows taxpayers to strategically time their realizations to minimize taxes due, it may make 
investors less responsive to changes in the prospects o f their investments, thereby reducing 
the ability o f the market to shift capital to its most efficient use at the most optimal time. 
Further, it may provide significant encouragement for taxpayers to engage in tax planning. 
Both o f these aspects may result in deadweight loss for the economic system.159 Second, 
since assets with an identical pre-tax return may be favoured differently by investors due to 
the different after-tax return that results from deferral, deferral may alter taxpayer 
preferences between investments that generate current or deferred compensation, and 
between appreciating assets and assets which generate current cash returns.160 This may 
alter regular investor preferences regarding investments and may yield negative economic 
consequences. Third, the potential impact o f the CIT system on corporate risk-taking may 
affect the optimal level o f risk-taking in an economy.161 Finally, the increase in business 
transaction costs may reduce the ordinary frequency o f transactions and, thus, the ability o f 
an economy to allocate capital to its most efficient uses, generating deadweight loss.162
In sum, there are certain distortions introduced by a realization-based CIT system that 
operate independently o f the legislator’s intent or action. They occur as a natural and 
necessary side-effect o f the adoption o f the realization principle as a basis for corporate 
income taxation. Accordingly, the study o f the behavioural impact o f the tax rules under a 
realization-based CIT should depart from the premise that the “playing field” is already 
distorted, not only due to natural market imperfections, but also due to the Structural
158 See SHAVIRO, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 
4 at 24.
159 See discussion infra at pg. 131 ff.
160 See ZELINSKY, supra note 31, at 914.
161 See discussion infra at pg. 171ff.
162 See discussion infra at pg. 131ff.
Distortions that result from the mere adoption o f a realization-based CIT as a basis for 
corporate taxation.
2. The C IT and Corporate Behavioural Control
As discussed, one important advantage o f a realization-based CIT system is its potential for 
behavioural control. First o f all, this potential for control is due to its corporate-level 
nature. Although shareholder-level taxation may potentially impact corporate behaviour,163 
it does so in an indirect, more obscure and less targeted form.164 Secondly, it results from 
the adoption o f the realization principle as a foundation stone o f the CIT system. A 
realization-based CIT system operates on a transactional basis,165 with tax consequences 
generally determined on a separate basis for each transfer and for each taxpayer.166 This 
transactional nature o f the CIT system allows for targeted behavioural control, in that, for 
instance, by classifying a particular transfer as a recognition or a non-recognition event, or 
by allowing or by not allowing for deductibility o f the associated payments to one or both 
parties, the legislator may determine with relative precision preferred routes o f corporate 
action. Finally, the behavioural nature o f the corporate taxpayer yields the CIT system’s 
control potential. That is, behavioural control through the CIT law is attainable because o f 
the corporate taxpayer’s interest to reduce its tax bill,167 in certain cases even with outright 
disregard for ethical and public opinion concerns.168
163 See, e.g., discussion supra on tax clientele effect at pg. 34. See also discussion on impact o f shareholder-level 
taxes on the firm’s dividend policy at STEVEN A. BANK, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Dong Run, 2007 
University o f  Ilinois Law Review 533 (2007).
164 See, e.g., JOHN R. GRAHAM, Taxes and Corporate Finance: A. Review, 16 The Review o f  Financial Studies 1075 
(2003) at 1075 (“Many issues remain unresolved...including under standing... whether corporate actions are 
affected by investor-level taxes.”). See also discussion infra at pg. 48ff.
165 See discussion infra at pg. 105ff for in-depth analysis o f  transactional basis o f  a CIT system.
166 Although there are certain cases where tax consequences may be determined on an aggregate transactional 
basis (e.g., through a judicial re-classification o f several transactions as a sole transaction under the step- 
transaction doctrine), those cases constitute the exception rather than the norm under CIT systems.
167 See SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 4 (“Most 
taxpayers around the world pay no more tax than they believe they must and they spend nontrivial resources 
to arrange their affairs to keep the tax bite as painless as possible. It is precisely this behaviour that provides 
tax policy with so much potential as a means to achieving a variety o f societal goals.”); SHAVIRO, A n Efficienty 
Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 5 (“[Ajmong well- 
informed informed and conventionally self-interested taxpayers, only those with sufficiently important 
competing nontax goals will fail to follow the tax-preferred course o f action.”).
168 See PETER C. Ca n e l l o S, A  Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring 
Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 S.M.U.L. Rev. 47 (2001) at 47 (“Corporations are increasingly willing 
to treat taxes as a cost to be avoided, with the efficacy o f avoidance increasingly being measured purely in 
monetary, probabilistic terms with only passing attention to ethical and public perception concerns.”). But see 
SCHON, Tax and Corporate Governance, supra note 150 (arguing that certain corporations are increasingly 
aware o f  ethical and public perception concerns regarding tax avoidance).
3. The Behavioural Control Instruments under a CIT System
In  face o f the corporate taxpayer’s behavioural nature, the keystone for corporate 
behavioural control is the corporation’s tax bill.169 That is, the encouragement or 
discouragement o f a certain corporate conduct through CIT law is fundamentally based on 
the alteration o f its after-tax cost.170 In particular, the instruments available for behavioural 
control may be grouped in two major categories depending on whether their end result is 
to increase or to decrease the corporate tax bill: a first set o f instruments that decreases the 
corporate tax bill, thereby encouraging a certain course o f action, which includes deferral, 
exemptions, exclusions, deductions, credits and preferential tax rates [i.e., so-called “tax 
expenditures”); and a second set o f  instruments that increases the corporate tax bill, 
therefore being used to discourage certain conduct. It comprises recognition, limitation o f 
deductibility on otherwise deductible expenses, reclassification o f otherwise non-taxable 
transactions,171 and aggravated tax rates (i.e., so-called “tax penalties”) (Hereinafter, tax 
expenditures and tax penalties are both referred to as “Behavioural Control Instruments”). 
An additional device for corporate control, unrelated to the corporation’s tax bill, is the 
imposition o f penalties directly on the corporation’s management.
The Behavioural Control Instruments may be introduced both at the corporate-level and 
the shareholder-level. As discussed, their introduction at the corporate-level (i.e., through 
CIT) should allow for a more efficient behavioural targeting than at the shareholder-level 
(i.e., through personal income taxes). That is, the technical alternatives available at the 
corporate-level should generally allow for a more refined targeting o f the control measures 
than those available at the shareholder-level.172 For instance, when a transfer occurs, the 
Behavioural Control Instruments may be introduced on the tax attributes associated with 
the transferred property, both at the level o f the transferor corporation (e.g., immediate 
inclusion o f the potential built-in gain or loss in the property transferred or, instead,
169 See ARNE FRIESE, et al., Taxation and Corporate Governance - The State of the A rt, in Tax and Corporate 
Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed. 2008) at 371 (“[T]ax provisions directed at influencing behaviour 
...achieve this goal by limiting favourable tax consequences or threatening increased tax costs if  a certain 
conduct is not consistent with the government’s policy.”).
170 Some commentators note that certain firms may also be motivated by other concerns, namely, reputation 
issues. See SCHON, Tax and Corporate Governance, supra note 150.
171 Namely, through the use o f tax law principles such as substance over form or business purpose.
172 In the case o f  the typical corporation where there is separation o f  ownership and control, the use o f  
personal taxes to influence corporate behaviour should always be an indirect way o f  influencing corporate 
behaviour.
deferral o f such inclusion,173 thus granting a temporary tax benefit to the transferor 
corporation),174 and the transferee corporation (e.g., allow the transferee corporation to 
have a cost basis in the property, or instead, a carryover basis), as well as on the payment 
received, both at the level of the transferor corporation (e.g., exempt or exclude from the 
tax base the payment received from the transferee in exchange for the property transfer) 
and at the level o f the transferee corporation (e.g., classify payment made to the transferor 
corporation as a deductible payment or as a non-deductible payment, in its entirety or 
partially).175
Even when no transfer occurs, other Behavioural Control Instruments o f relative accuracy 
are available, such as, the granting o f amortization deductions on acquired property, either 
at regular or accelerated depreciation rates;176 or the use o f relative tax rates, either across 
different taxpaying units, across different tax periods for the same taxpayer, or across 
different economic activities for the same taxpayer and during the same time period.177
In contrast, intervention at the shareholder-level induces corporate behaviour indirecdy by 
changing the taxation o f its shareholders on the corporate income that accrues to them. 
Also, the quantity o f available behavioural instruments is more limited. For example, 
important Behavioural Control Instruments, such as direct transactional intervention or the 
granting o f depreciation deductions for machinery and other business assets, are 
unavailable. Further, by avoiding entering into the corporation-shareholder relationship to 
encourage or to discourage a certain conduct, CIT law evades potential agency problems.178
173 Each treatment will generally give rise to different tax consequences at the level o f the transferee 
corporation.
174 This benefit may be made permanent if  the taxpayer refrains from subsequently transferring the property 
through a taxable transaction or ensures that the conditions required to be afforded non-recognition 
treatment are not violated or cease to exist.
175 This targeted control potential allowed by the CIT system due to its transactional basis and the separate 
tax treatment o f the taxpayers and property involved in the transaction, involves a certain degree o f  
complexity in that the treatment o f the property transferred and the payment received in return, both at the 
levels o f the transferor and transferee corporations, must be properly coordinated to avoid a malfunctioning 
o f the CIT system.
176 This Behavioural Control Instrument is generally implemented in order to privilege the investment in a 
certain class o f assets.
177 SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 11.
178 See discussion supra at pg. 34.
In sum, the Behavioural Control Instruments available at the corporate-level should allow 
for a more direct and refined targeting o f the control measures than those available at the 
shareholder-level.179
4. The Types of Possible Behavioural Control
There is a substantial amount o f research demonstrating the impact o f the Behavioural 
Control Instruments, introduced both at the corporate-level and the shareholder-level, on 
corporate behaviour. Specifically, existing research has demonstrated that the use o f these 
instruments may impact the decisions o f corporations regarding their financial structure,180 
organizational form and ownership,181 general investment decisions,182 and corporate
179 See ARNE FRIESE, et al., Taxation and Corporate Governance - The State of the A rt, supra note 169, at 412-413 
defending the same type o f  approach for the imposition o f  personal penalties (“If penalties are imposed on 
the corporation as a whole, the shareholders will ultimately bear them, as the penalties will reduce their 
returns...the effect o f  penalties in this case is very indirect. They primarily affect the shareholders and these 
effects have to be translated into incentives for managers...a more direct way o f  affecting the agent’s actions 
is to apply penalties directly to them. This short-cuts the principal-agent relationship.”). See also id. for 
advantages, disadvantages and practical issues o f  applying penalties directly to managers.
180 See ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 858 (“The observed reaction o f  
borrowing to tax incentives confirms that the tax treatment o f  debt and equity influences corporate financial 
decisions [.]”); DAVID F. BRADFORD, Untangling the Income Tax (Harvard Univ. Press. 1999) at 105 (“The 
tax system...exerts strong incentives effects on the corporation’s financial choices.”). See also GRAHAM, Taxes 
and Corporate Finance: A  'Review, supra note 164 (reviewing specialized literature and arguing that research often 
finds that taxes affect corporate financial decisions); JEFFREY K. MACKlE-MASON, Do Taxes Affect Corporate 
Financing Decisions?, 45 The Journal o f Finance 1471 (1990) at 1472 (author provides clear evidence o f  
substantial tax effects on financing decisions); JULIAN S. ALWORTH, The Finance, Investment and Taxation 
Decisions o f Multinationals (Basil Blackwell. 1988) (demonstrating the influence o f  taxation on corporate 
financial policy); ALAN J. AUERBACH, Taxation and Corporate Financial Policy, NBER, Working Paper No. 8203 
(2001) (discussing the impact o f taxation on corporate financial policy).
181 See M. DESAI, et al., Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration NBER, Working 
Paper No. w ll4 6 9  (2005) (arguing that taxation can significantly influence patterns o f  equity ownership); 
STEVEN A. Ba n k  & B rian  R. CHEFFINS, Tax and the Separation of Ownership and Control, in Tax and Corporate 
Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed. 2008) at 157 (“[T]ax can help to explain ownership structures in large 
companies in a particular country.”). See also R. GORDON & J. MACKIE-MASON, How Much do Taxes Discourage 
Incorporation?, 52 Journal o f  Finance 477 (1997) (discussing impact o f  taxes on incorporation); A. GOOLSBEE, 
Taxes, Organisational Form and the Deadweight Loss of the Corporate Income Tax, 69 Journal o f  Public Economics 
143 (1998) (discussing the behavioural responses to tax incentives surrounding the choice o f  organizational 
form).
182 See DAVID F. Br a d f o r d , Untangling the Income Tax, supra note 180, at 112 (“The corporation tax 
system...creates strong pressures on the composition o f  corporate investment.”); id. at 108 (“The effect o f  
existing rules is to provide very different incentives to undertake different sorts o f investment. ..according to 
the different characteristics o f  projects.”); DANIEL B. THORNTON., Managerial Tax Planning Principles and 
Applications, in Critical Perspectives on the World Economy, Vol. 4 (Simon R. James ed. 2002) at 119 
(“[B]usiness decisions affect taxes and taxes affect business decisions.”); GRAHAM, supra note 164, at 1076 
(“Taxes can affect...restructurings, payout policy and risk management...Some studies have documented 
that....asset sales are structured in response to tax considerations, and that corporate bankruptcy and highly 
levered restructurings have tax implications.”). See also MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, The Effects 
of Changes in Tax Laws in Corporate Reorganisation Activity, 63 Journal o f  Business Finance SI 41 (1990) (authors 
present evidence that CIT law has an impact on M&A activity); ALAN L. FELD, Tax Policy and Corporate 
Concentration (Lexington Books. 1982) (author demonstrates influence o f  taxation on corporate 
concentration).
governance.183 However, most existing research has not concluded undisputably on CIT’s 
impact on corporate behaviour.184 Fundamentally, while most o f the research concluded 
that CIT impacts several areas o f corporate behaviour, research has not been able to 
determine whether such effects are due mosdy, or exclusively, to CIT provisions. That is, 
CIT generally has an impact on corporate behaviour, but the precise determination o f the 
extent o f such impact is clouded with doubt in most cases.185
Overall, based on the results from such research, the CIT system may potentially be used 
to pursue pure economic policy goals as well as corporate governance objectives. Although 
the pursuit o f both policy aims may be achieved using similar Behavioural Control 
Instruments, each intervention retains different elements and implications that must be 
taken into consideration. Further, existing research demonstrates that both types of 
intervention raise complex interaction problems. Specifically, incentives and disincentives 
based purely on economic rationales often have corporate governance implications, and 
vice versa.186
Based on the governmental intention, economic intervention may be implemented directly, 
through an intentional use o f Behavioural Control Instruments to pursue economic policy 
objectives, or indirectly, as a side-effect o f corporate governance driven Behavioural 
Control Instruments. By the same token, corporate governance effects may arise as a 
consequence o f direct intervention, through an intentional use o f Behavioural Control 
Instruments to pursue corporate governance objectives, or through indirect intervention, 
that is, as a consequence o f economic-driven Behavioural Control Instruments.
5. The Interaction Problems of C IT Behavioural Intervention
A major problem o f behavioural intervention through the CIT law stems from the 
interaction between the effects caused by the different types o f possible interventions and
183 See, e.g. OWENS, The Interface of Tax and Good Corporate Governance, supra note 116, at 768 (“The tax rules can 
... have an implicit regulatory function that is similar in some respects to rules that are directly focused on 
corporate governance issues.”). See also SCHON, Tax and Corporate Governance, supra note 150.
184 See discussion infra at pg. 52ff.
185 See, e.g. GRAHAM, supra note 164, at 1075 “(Many issues remain unresolved...including understanding 
whether tax effects are o f first-order importance...”); DAVID F. BRADFORD, Untangling the Income Tax, supra 
note 180, at 201 (“[W]e do not have a full understanding o f the way tax rules affect corporate behaviour.”). 
See also GOOLSBEE, Taxes, Organisational Form and the Deadweight Toss of the Corporate Income Tax, supra note 181, 
and ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49.
186 See discussion infra at pg. 50ff.
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the natural distortions of the “playing field.” The interaction o f economic intervention and 
corporate governance intervention with the necessary side-effects o f a CIT system 
generates a first interaction problem. As discussed, a set o f indirect economic and 
regulatory effects arise due to the mere adoption o f a realization-based CIT system. These 
effects, necessary by-products o f the adoption o f a realization-based CIT system, should be 
conceptualized as part o f the existing playing field for both types o f intervention.
Specifically, the mere adoption o f a realization-based CIT to tax corporations should 
necessarily result in a set o f economic consequences that this thesis previously classified as 
Structural Distortions. Further, the implementation o f a realization-based tax system through 
a corporate-level tax should have as an offshoot certain regulatory consequences that, for 
the most part, consist in policing corporate malfeasance, namely, the Reliability Effect and 
the Deterrent Effect.187 The playing field for the introduction o f Behavioural Control 
Instruments is distorted due to these necessary side-effects o f the adoption o f a CIT 
system, and, thus, any type o f intervention should take these pre-existing elements into 
consideration before trying to encourage or to discourage a certain corporate conduct. For 
example, a Behavioural Control Instrument geared at increasing the investment in a certain 
class o f assets may be distorted by the CIT system’s pre-existing tendency for lock-in and 
lock-out behaviour, or its tendency to alter the after-tax return on certain assets.188
An even more complex interaction problem relates to the fact that a direct intervention 
with a pure economic rationale may often have corporate governance implications, and 
vice versa. Consider the case when certain forms o f  income are given preferential tax 
treatment through the use o f a Behavioural Control Instrument, in order to pursue a pure 
economic aim. For example, the legislator may opt to give preferred treatment to income in 
the form o f capital gains on shares, as opposed to dividend distributions, with the pure 
economic aim o f increasing the quantity o f funds available for direct corporate-level 
investment. For example, this type o f shareholder-level direct intervention could be made 
by imposing an extra tax on distributions, thereby discouraging corporate distributions and 
encouraging retentions, at least in the case o f middle-aged corporations.189 In turn, more or 
less distributions should impact where cash is located {i.e., firm vs. shareholder level), and,
187 See discussion supra at pg. 32ff.
188 See discussion supra at pg. 42ff.
189 See BANK, Dividends and Tax Polity in the Long Run, supra note 163. See also OWENS, The Interface of Tax and 
Good Corporate Governance, supra note 116, at 768.
thus, should induce different types o f investments.190 Specifically, the company should be 
freer to make investment decisions concerning the retained funds, without the restraints o f 
direct market discipline. Therefore, in this case, the economic objective o f strengthening 
direct corporate-level investments could be achieved, at least for middle-aged corporations.
However, this direct economic-led intervention could shape the shareholders’ attitude to 
corporate control, in that with low taxation o f capital gains and few distributions (or highly 
taxed distributions) shareholders might have an incentive for “flight and not fight” 
behaviour.191 That is, if problems o f corporate performance arose, the existence o f a 
preferential tax treatment could make it much simpler and cheaper for shareholders to just 
sell the shares rather than try to improve corporate conduct.192 Further, the increase o f cash 
available for managers without direct market control could increase the firm’s agency 
problems.193 Thus, in this case, a direct economic-led intervention using the CIT system 
could lead to indirect negative corporate governance consequences. This situation should 
not be uncommon and other examples may be thought of, for instance, when preferential 
treatment is given to certain transfers through the Behavioural Control Instrument o f 
recognition and non-recognition.194
Lasdy, the interaction o f CIT interventions with market forces may be problematic, in that 
certain interventions which may theoretically result in a negative distortion may, in effect,
190 Arguably, if  the funds were first distributed to the shareholders, who would then have the ability to decide 
whether to reinvest in that company or another company, a more efficient allocation o f funds might be 
achieved. See OWENS, The Interface of Tax and Good Corporate Governance, supra note 116, at 768. See also JOINT 
ECONOMIC Co m m itt ee , Dividend Tax Relief and Capped Exclusion, available at 
http://jec.senate.gov/_files/DividendTaxRelief.pdf. 2003) (arguing that, with the reduction o f dividend 
taxes, paying dividends rather than retaining earnings would become a more attractive proposition for 
companies, would promote a more efficient allocation o f capital and give shareholders, rather than 
executives, a greater degree o f  control over how a company’s resources are used.).
191 OWENS, The Interface of Tax and Good Corporate Governance, supra note 116, at 768.
192 Id.
193 As noted by Bank, the elimination o f  direct market discipline may increase the firm’s agency costs that 
arise as a result o f  the separation o f  ownership and control. Managers are self-interested agents, and therefore 
do not always act in the best interests o f  their principal, the shareholders. The argument in favour o f  
dividends is that manager-shareholder interests will becom e better aligned by reducing the cash managers 
could use to engage in self-serving projects. Managers will be forced to seek funding for such projects in the 
capital markets where they will be subject to the discipline o f  outside monitoring. See BANK, Dividends and Tax 
Policy in the Tong Run, supra note 116. See also RANDALL MORCK & BERNARD YEUNG, Dividend Taxation and 
Corporate Governance, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 163 (2005) (arguing that the reduction o f  managers’ control over 
retained earnings reduces the temptation for managers to engage in excessive corporate expansion using 
retained earnings). For a good  background on  the firm’s agency problems see EUGENE F. FAMA, Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. E con. 288 (1980); MICHAEL C. JENSEN & WILLIAM H. MECKLING, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agemy Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
194 See, eg. discussion infra at pg. 137ff regarding the corporate governance impact o f recognition vs. non­
recognition treatment for certain intra-group transactions.
yield a positive economic effect or a corporate governance effect. For instance, certain 
interventions using Behavioural Control Instruments which theoretically seem negative 
may generate positive consequences that ameliorate or eliminate a natural market 
imperfection. Consider the preference given on the deductibility o f debt over dividend 
payments at the corporate-level. Tax theorists often argue that, as a principle, tax law 
should abstain from creating arbitrary distinctions since they give rise to economic 
inefficiencies.195 However, it has been demonstrated that an increased commitment to pay 
interest may reduce the firm’s agency problems. For instance, Jensen and Meckling 
emphasize the role o f debt in facilitating greater insider ownership o f firm equity. With 
greater ownership, insiders care more about the firm's performance.196 Thus, in this case, a 
seemingly negative Behavioural Control Instrument may result in positive consequences by 
contributing to the reduction o f the firm’s agency problems.
Quite often the design o f tax rules does not take these interaction problems into account.197 
Based on the analysis undertaken, the effective use o f CIT to control corporate behaviour 
should, from an optimal point o f view, require a coordination o f the different types of 
intentional influences and non-intentional influences o f CIT, with a strong working 
knowledge o f market forces and the distortions introduced by the simple adoption o f a 
realization-based CIT system.
6. The Firm’s Reaction to the Behavioural Control Instruments
Existing research has demonstrated that the use o f Behavioural Control Instruments may 
impact the decisions o f corporations regarding several aspects o f their operation. However, 
most o f the existing research has not yet concluded indisputably the precise determination 
o f the extent o f such impact. The difficulty incumbent to arriving at definitive conclusions 
on this issue may be due to the interaction problems described above as well as to the 
several variables that impact the operation o f Behavioural Control Instruments.
195 See, e.g. WEISBACH, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, supra note 17.
196 See MICHAEL C. Je n s e n  & WILLIAM H. M e c k l in g , Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, supra note 193. See also MICHAEL C. JENSEN, Agemy Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers, 76 American Economic Review 323 (1986).
197 See, e.g., OWENS, The Interface of Tax and Good Corporate Governance, supra note 119, at 768 (“The tax rules for 
certain transactions, responding to tax principles and considerations, are often structured without taking their 
impact on corporate governance issues into account [.]”).
Specifically, based on existing research, the firm’s behavioural reaction to the tax rules may 
vary depending on the following circumstances:
a. The current and expected future tax position o f the taxpayer;
b. The degree o f substitution to the specific tax provision, which may vary
depending on:
•  The existence and direct cost o f alternative transactional routes;
•  The drafting o f the particular tax provision;
•  The existence o f  tax law restrictions;
•  The relative importance o f competing non-tax goals;
•  The existence o f frictions in other regulatory fields;
•  The risk-taking profile o f the firm;
•  The firm’s organizational design; and
c. The stage o f  development o f the firm.
a. The current and expected future tax position o f the taxpayer
The impact o f the Behavioural Control Instruments should vary significandy depending
upon the current and expected future tax position o f a taxpayer. Specifically, whether the 
taxpayer expects to be at a taxable gain or loss position at year end may impact how the 
taxpayer chooses to structure a transaction, i.e., as a taxable transaction or a non-taxable 
transaction, as well as the timing of its implementation. By the same token, the 
accumulated tax attributes o f the taxpayer, such as tax loss carryovers, especially when
close to expiry, may fundamentally alter this decision.198 That is, the taxpayer should react 
differendy to the Behavioural Control Instruments depending upon the specific tax 
attributes that are more advantageous to its particular tax position. For instance, the 
incentive to adopt a certain conduct provided by the deductibility o f a payment, or the 
non-recognition o f a specific transaction involving built-in gain assets, may be made totally 
irrelevant to a taxpayer who is in a loss position with a substantial amount o f tax losses to 
be expired. For such taxpayer, those specific Behavioural Control Instruments may have no 
impact whatsoever.
b. The degree o f substitution to the specific tax provision
An additional element that may impact the effect o f the Behavioural Control Instruments is 
the capacity o f the corporate taxpayer to substitute transactions, and, therefore, to fail to 
adopt the conduct that the tax legislator tried to induce through the introduction o f a 
specific Behavioural Control Instrument. When a taxpayer substitutes a transaction, instead 
o f implementing the transaction that it would in principle implement based on its regular 
business considerations - and which tends to be the basis upon which the legislator defines 
the actions o f Behavioural Control Instruments - the taxpayer implements an alternative 
transaction. In principle, the alternative transaction should lead to a similar economic 
result, but with a differing, more advantageous tax treatment.199 Based on current research, 
the desire to find substitutes for a transaction to reduce the tax bill should be presumed a 
normal behavioural pattern o f the corporate taxpayer.200 The problem o f substituting a 
transaction is that the taxpayer will find an alternative, which may neutralize the expected 
behavioural effect o f the Behavioural Control Instruments. The degree o f substitution o f a 
CIT system generally varies depending on several items, namely its degree o f continuity, the 
direct costs o f the substitution, the existence and relative strength o f tax law restrictions or 
non-tax law frictions, the risk-taking profile o f the firm, the firm’s organizational design 
and the corporate tax rate.
198 In this sense see, e.g. DAVID F. BRADFORD, Untangling the Income Tax, supra note 180, 112 (“The 
incentives bearing on a corporate decision are very different according to the current and potential future gain 
or loss positions o f the company for income tax purposes.”).
199 Depending on the extent o f the tax benefit allowed by the substitution and the relative strength o f  the 
economic interest underlying the transaction, there may be situations in which the taxpayer foregoes its initial 
economic interest merely to obtain a substantial tax benefit. This type o f  extreme behaviour falls, however, in 
the realm o f tax evasion, a subject not directly tackled on this thesis.
200 See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM & SCHENK, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, supra note 55, at 351-353 (“Any 
tax, except a head tax, imposed on any item or activity, prompts taxpayers to investigate alternatives or 
substitutes to avoid the tax.”).
The degree o f continuity o f the tax law depends directly on how the tax system faces the 
line-drawing problem. When line-drawing is too discontinuous, a minor change in 
transactional form may generate a substantially different tax result.201 Therefore, a 
discontinuous law may make the Behavioural Control Instruments relatively ineffective or 
totally ineffective.202 Discontinuity in tax law may stem from several elements, namely 
excessive formalism or rule-based tax law.203 In particular, the excess o f formalism in tax 
law lends to inefficient line-drawing because artificial categories, which correspond to an 
identical economic reality, are established based on legal principles and rules.204 As a result, 
the taxpayer, without changing the economics o f a transaction, merely by altering its legal 
characteristics, can often produce a very different tax result.205
Further, the drafting o f the particular tax provision may enhance or discourage 
substitution. Specifically, when tax provisions are enacted in the form o f rules, minor 
changes in transactional form often create substantial changes in tax liability.206 That is, 
rules tend to create discontinuities,207 in that they create a bright line between two types of 
transactions.208 Thus, a minor change in the transaction often causes a significant change in 
tax consequences (e.g., characterization o f an instrument as debt or equity).209 Standards are 
“fuzzy at the borders,” reducing this problem (i.e., rules are more uniform and standards 
less uniform).210 In terms o f behavioural impact, when there is a discontinuity in the tax
201 See discussion infra at pg. 105ff.
202 See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 873 (“A discontinuous law...may have very 
different behavioural effects than a continuous law [.]”). See also DAVID A. WEISBACH, A n  Efficieny Analysis of 
Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 Journal o f  Legal Studies 71 (2000).
203 Due to CIT law’s formalism, often different formal transactions, with different tax results, lead to same or 
similar economic result. See discussion infra at pg. 105ff.
204 See WEISBACH, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, supra note 202, at 71 (“[L]ines should be 
drawn so that a transaction or item is taxed like its closest substitutes.”).
205 Due to the characteristics o f  a realization-based tax, the current CIT system has an innate propensity for 
discontinuity. See discussion infra at pg. 11 Iff.
206 For example, a “B” reorganization in the US may be made taxable by the mere introduction o f  some cash 
in the reorganization. See US IRC Section 368 (a)(1)(B).
207 See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 874. (“[R]ules will tend to be discontinuous while 
standards will not.”). See also id. at 873 (“Standards, ex post, are also discontinuous, in that a marginal change 
to a transaction can alter the application o f  the law. So, the courts or administrators who give content to 
standards have no greater ability to avoid the line drawing problem than the legislator who gives content to 
rules. However, ex ante, the taxpayer only knows probabilities. A small change in facts will only change the 
probability a little, creating a continuous change in the law from an ex ante perspective.”).
208 See id. at 873 (“N o matter how nuanced a rule is, it will create a bright line between the two types o f  
transactions. Moving one step to the left will cause a large change in tax consequences. In this sense, rules are 
discontinuous.).
209 As a consequence, rules are generally over and underinclusive relative to underlying norms. Standards 
better conform to the purpose underlying the law but they are more uncertain. See id.
210 See id. at 871 (“Another way to articulate the rules/standard problem in the tax law is to note that rules 
apply to their complete domain even if at the borders they are inaccurate...standards are fuzzy at the borders, 
reducing this problem.”).
rules, taxpayers sufficiently close to the discontinuity may be expected to move to the lower 
tax regime, if transaction costs are inferior to the tax savings and associated risk.211
Further, the corporate taxpayer generally takes into consideration the direct costs o f the 
substitution. These costs include legal fees to restructure a transaction, accounting fees, 
filing costs and similar costs.212 The larger the tax benefit that the taxpayer may extract 
from substituting the transaction, the higher must these costs be in order to deter the 
taxpayer from substituting.213
The existence o f tax law restrictions provides an additional variable to substitution. 
Imposed by the tax law, these restrictions constrain behaviour, generally backed up by fines 
and other sanctions with the intent o f deterring taxpayers from substituting a transaction in 
socially undesirable ways.214 For example, a tax law requiring the investor to assume a 
certain level o f risk, or to personally participate in an activity in order to use a transaction 
or structure, may often dissuade substitution.215
The existence and relative strength o f non-tax law frictions constitute another fundamental 
variable to substitution. When a taxpayer structures a transaction, beyond considering its 
tax consequences, it also takes into consideration other non-tax law factors, which in many 
cases may be considered more important by the taxpayer than the mere tax 
consequences.216 Non-tax law frictions encompass a set o f transaction costs and other 
negative consequences that may result from the implementation o f the substitute 
transaction.217 These external frictions, together with the direct costs from substitution
211 See id. at 874.
212 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based Tax-, supra note 55, at 509.
213 See id. 509 (“Unless the costs o f  the substitute transaction are significantly higher, they may have little or 
no bearing on the ability to substitute.”); SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16„ at 
1323 (“The larger the tax benefit from substitution, the higher the costs must be to deter substitution.”); 
SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 90 (“The classical 
investment model would predict that an investor will engage in tax planning so long as the marginal cost is 
less than the benefits derived.”).
214 See SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A  Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 9 (“By tax-rule 
restrictions, w e mean restraints im posed by the taxing authority that prevent taxpayers from using certain tax 
arbitrage techniques to reduce taxes in socially undesirable ways.”). See also THORNTON., Managerial Tax 
Planning Principles and Applications, supra note 182, at 150 (“Whereas frictions such as agency costs and 
transaction costs discourage tax arbitrage automatically, restrictions do so through legal prohibitions, backed 
up by fines and other sanctions.”).
215 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n  Efficienty Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based Tax, supra note 55, at 509.
216 Id.
217 This terminology has been originally coined by Scholes. SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A  
Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 9 (“By frictions, we mean transaction costs incurred in the marketplace 
that make implementation o f certain tax planning strategies costly.”).
discussed above, generally reduce the after-tax return on the investment, and, thus, 
depending upon the magnitude o f the extra costs and other negative consequences 
involved, may powerfully deter the substitution o f transactions.218
In particular, there are ways o f structuring transactions, which, despite reducing the 
potential tax costs generally associated with a specific transaction, result in a substantial 
increase o f collateral transaction costs and in other negative consequences, be it for the 
taxpayer or another party involved.219 When such costs and other negative consequences 
outweigh the advantages o f the substitution, the taxpayer may decide not to substitute the 
transaction.220 Several types o f external frictions to the tax law exist. The most im portant 
are the taxpayer’s business preferences and legal and accounting constraints.221
The taxpayer’s business preferences include factors such as risk, timing (i.e., how long 
taxpayers must hold an asset or wait before taking a particular step), complexity, 
preferences about capital structure or organizational design.222 When these business 
preferences are strong, and it is difficult to switch to a perfect substitute without requiring a 
change in preferences, these business preferences may constitute powerful frictions to 
substitution.223 For instance, in certain cases, taxpayers will choose better governance over 
tax reduction,224 and, thus, a strategy that requires an organizational form that is less 
effective at constraining agency costs (e.g., a limited partnership instead o f a corporation), 
or that results in a significant increase in internal transactional complexity and 
organizational rigidity, may be discarded despite its tax advantages.
218 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Rased Tax; supra note 55, at 509 
(“Together with the direct costs, external frictions...reduce the after-tax return on the investment ...These 
costs can be thought o f as an implicit tax on the remaining realization-based opportunities...The implicit tax 
would be the net cost because many o f  the transactions costs may be deductible.”); SCHOLES, et al., Taxes 
and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 111 ("We can see that frictions have the same 
effect on investment returns as implicit taxes.").
219 See SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16, at ft. 35.
220 See Id. at 1321 (“[T]he cost imposed by the friction must outweigh the tax benefit.”).
221 In addition to these two categories o f frictions, Schizer indicates a third one, i.e., the state o f technology 
and markets See id. at 1326.
222 Id. at 1326.
223 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n Efficiency Approach to Preforming a Realisation-Based Tax; supra note 55, at 512.
224 See SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning^  supra note 16, at 1328-1330. See also SCHOLES, et al., 
Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 167-176.
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Also, legal and accounting constraints may provide an effective deterrent to substitution.225 
In particular, legal restraints external to the tax law may render certain tax advantageous 
transactions more costly or risky. In certain cases, they may even result in an outright 
prohibition to implement the transaction.226 For instance, certain legal regimes may impose 
certain substantive preconditions for the transaction to be legally binding for all the parties 
involved or to avoid legal penalties. The potential incurrence o f “credit risks” can also deter 
substitution, in that the enforcement o f a legal right, especially against a party with no 
assets, can be costly.227
A similar kind o f dissuasion to substitution may result from accounting constraints. 
Specifically, the desire o f corporations to keep earnings high may work as a powerful 
friction, in that transactions that lower taxes tend to decrease earnings.228 Thus, quite often 
a firm may be put in a position o f having to choose between lower taxes or higher earnings. 
Several research studies have demonstrated that, when put in this position, many firms 
choose to forego the tax benefit for the privilege o f higher earnings.229 Even when 
substitution decreases taxes but does not result in a change to earnings, the accounting 
friction may deter, in that many managers fear that the lack o f book-tax conformity may 
prom pt special scrutiny from the tax authorities.230 The relative strength o f each o f these 
frictions to impede substitution should vary from taxpayer to taxpayer at any time.231 In
225 Legal and accounting constraints may be quite effective because they are important for nontax reasons and 
are difficult to avoid. See SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16, at 1328-1334. 
Schiezer notes that legal and regulatory regimes are influential in four ways: by imposing substantive 
preconditions, agency costs, credit risk, and by regulatory and financial accounting rules that may impede 
other parts o f  the taxpayer's business. Id.
226 Id. at 1328-1330.
227 Id.
228 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n Efficiency Approach to Preforming a Preali^ation-Based Tax; supra note 55, at 510- 
511.
229 See id. at 510. For a discussion o f the reasons why managers might trade off tax benefits to avoid financial 
reporting issues, see SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 
141-42. See also id. at 129 (noting efficient tax planning requires identifying and weighing nontax costs (such as 
lower earnings) against tax benefits). Some literature over the past years has attempted to identify the nontax 
factors that firms will trade off against tax factors. Empirical work has revealed that firms, particularly 
publicly held companies, often choose higher earnings. It is suggested that, in part, they do so because o f  
capital market pressure: That is, they fear that investors will be unable to distinguish poor performance from 
decreased income resulting from tax strategies. The central argument is that public firms would find it much 
more difficult to communicate tax planning strategies to their shareholders because a public disclosure might 
trigger scrutiny by the tax authorities. As a result, they choose earnings management over tax management. 
Apparendy, in some cases, firms may even pay taxes on phantom earnings in order to fraudulently boost 
earnings. See generally DEBORAH H. SCHENK, A n  Efficienty Approach to Preforming a Peali^ation-Based Tax; supra 
note 55, at 511.
230 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n Efficiency Approach to Preforming a Peali^ation-Based Tax; supra note 55, at 510. 
See also discussion supra on reliability function o f  a corporate-level tax at pg. 32ff.
231 See SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16, at 1326.
general, frictions may be expected to provide a strong dissuasion to substitution when their 
overall negative consequences exceed the tax benefit at stake.232
A final set o f conditions to substitution is the risk-taking profile o f the firm, its 
organizational design and the corporate tax rate. To begin with, how the specific firm 
perceives the odds o f an audit may impact its willingness to substitute a transaction, 
especially when substantial tax risk is involved.233 Furthermore, a firm’s organizational 
design may impact the way it reacts to the tax rules.234 For instance, due to the formalism of 
CIT law, the flexibility of a business entity to restructure its internal ownership structure 
may give it increased flexibility to substitute. As will be discussed, this phenomenon is 
especially acute with corporate groups, in that the ability to use the corporate veil o f its 
affiliates and the possibility to more easily structure complex internal transactional flows 
{e.g., structuring o f indirect transactional flows instead o f direct transactional flows) gives 
them wide flexibility for substitution in light o f the nature o f the CIT law.235
Lastly, as the corporate tax rate increases, the incentive to substitute should also increase.236 
That is, the higher the benefit the taxpayer may have from substituting a transaction in the 
form o f a reduced tax bill, the more it will be interested in finding an alternative 
transactional route to substitute the transaction.
In sum, in certain cases, the envisaged effects o f the Behavioural Control Instruments may 
be neutralized or distorted by the capacity o f the corporate taxpayer to substitute 
transactions, and, therefore, to fail to adopt the conduct that the tax legislator tried to 
induce through the introduction o f a specific Behavioural Control Instrument.
232 David Schizer has offered a methodology by which various frictions can be evaluated for their likely 
success in supporting targeted reform. He labels the valuable frictions as "discontinuous" and those that have 
no social value as "continuous." The former is one that would cause the taxpayer or a counterparty to suffer 
a "dramatic and unavoidable decline in utility [that] would exceed the tax benefit at issue." See id. at 1325.
233 JOSEPH BANKMAN, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775 (1999) at 1776.
234 See SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 155-169 
(demonstrating how organizational design affects the way firms respond to taxes).
235 See discussion infra at pg. 122ff.
236 As the tax rate increases, the avoidance incentive also increases. It long has been recognized that there is a 
revenue maximizing rate for most taxes, a point at which, if  the tax rate were increased, the tax would 
generate less revenue than if  it were left unchanged. The revenue maximizing rate declines with the ease o f  
avoidance. See CUNNINGHAM & SCHENK, The Case fora Capital Gains Preference, supra note 55, at 351-353.
c. The stage o f development o f the firm
The effect o f the Behavioural Control Instruments on the corporate taxpayer may also 
depend on the corporate taxpayer’s stage o f economic development.237 Existing research 
demonstrates that different stages o f development are characterized by particular financing 
constraints and investment dynamics,238 which, in turn, affect the way firms respond to 
certain Behavioural Control Instruments. Based on existing research, three broad categories 
may be established, namely, new firms, middle-aged firms, and large, established
239corporations-
Specifically, while new firms tend to have little or no access to capital markets, the marginal 
source for middle-aged firms tends to originate in the public market {i.e., middle-aged firms 
tend to have access to capital markets and no significant retained earnings).240 Yet, in the 
case o f large, established corporations, since they tend to have high bond ratings and a 
ready supply o f retained earnings, much, if not most, capital investment is funded by debt 
or retaining earnings instead o f new equity.241 Thus, middle-aged firms, that is, firms that 
fall between the two extremes o f the infant firm and the longstanding firm, tend to be the 
most likely to issue new shares.242
As the recent discussion on the impact o f the taxation o f dividends on corporate behaviour 
demonstrates, the consequences o f these differences for tax policy may be quite 
substantial.243 For instance, middle-aged firms need to pay dividends despite the tax cost in 
order to attract investors,244 while for large, established corporations dividends tend to be 
residual payments, used as the main method o f distributing cash only after exhausting
237 See ALAN J. A u e r b a c h , et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 864 (“|T]t is important to distinguish 
the effects o f  taxation on existing companies and new ones.”); BANK, Dividends and Tax Polity in the Long Run, 
supra note 163, at 569 (“[F]irms are different depending upon their stage o f  development.”).
238 See, e.g., ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 864 (“While existing 
corporations may finance their expansions through retained earnings, new corporations must establish an 
equity base and may face a higher cost o f capital as a result.”).
239 See BANK, Dividends and Tax Polity in the Long Run, supra note 163.
240 See id. at 572
241 See id. at 556
242 See id. at 569.
243 See, e.g., BANK, Dividends and Tax Polity in the Long Run, supra note 163, and ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., 
Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49.
244 See BANK, Dividends and Tax Polity in the Long Run, supra note 163. This is explained by the fact that 
dividends have unique benefits to investors. One such benefit is the dividend’s ability to signal profitability to 
both current and potential shareholders. By definition, distributing a dividend indicates the presence o f  
current or accumulated earnings and profits. Beyond that, however, a special dividend can also be used to 
inform shareholders about some significant event that differentiates the firm from its competitors, and an 
increase in a firm’s regular dividend can signal some permanent increase in profitability. Id.
potential investment opportunities.245 Thus, the impact o f Behavioural Control Instruments 
on the taxation o f dividends should be very different on each firm category.
In sum, due to these different variables, it remains quite difficult to predict whether a 
certain Behavioural Control Instrument will have the desired behavioural effect across the 
board for all corporate taxpayers. The same rule may work as an incentive or restriction for 
different taxpayers situated in different positions. In addition, certain entities, which are not 
the target o f the tax provision at stake, may change behaviour merely to qualify for the 
benefit allowed by a certain Behavioural Control Instrument.246 The difficulty incumbent to 
accurately predicting the effect o f the Behavioural Control Instruments is further 
complicated by the interplay that occurs among the several variables discussed.247 For 
instance, the strength o f an external friction may vary depending on the degree o f 
continuity o f the CIT law, just as the current and expected future tax position o f a 
corporate taxpayer may be closely intertwined with its stage o f development and associated 
financing constraints. Lastly, understanding and measuring the effect o f the Behavioural 
Control Instruments is made more challenging by the inter-temporal difficulty to measure 
their behavioural effects. That is, the effect o f a tax change may vary with time, and, thus, 
the immediate impact o f a tax change may be significantly different from its impact over 
the course o f time.248 Overall, these differing variables that condition the behavioural 
response o f the corporate taxpayer to the tax rules may contribute to the discrepancy in 
results often found in the available research and reveal the difficulties incumbent to 
efficiently controlling corporate behaviour across the board for all taxpayers.
245 See id. at 557.
246 See SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16, at ft. 29 (“Wasteful planning can arise 
not only when taxpayers avoid a reform, but also when they deliberately qualify. For instance, sometimes a 
reform imposes treatment that is unfavorable in the context that reformers are considering, but is unduly 
generous in some other context unknown to reformers. The reform thus prompts taxpayers to change their 
behavior to become eligible for a regime, not to avoid it.”). See also SCHIZER, Sticks and Snakes, supra note 76, 
at 1345-46.
247 See THORNTON., Managerial Tax Planning Principles and Applications, supra note 182, at 147 (“ [There is an] 
interplay between unrestrained market forces (which lead to implicit taxes), frictions (such as agency costs 
and transaction costs) and restrictions (such as tax rules) [.]”). See also SHAVIRO, A n Efficiency Analysis of 
Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 32 (Shaviro notes that the effect o f  
tax rules on corporate behaviour depends on "how strongly . . . the taxpayer [is] constrained by the friction” 
and "what alternative routes with different tax consequences . . .  the taxpayer [can] use").
248 See GEREMIA PALOMBA, Firm Investment, Corporate Finance, and Taxation, IMF Working Paper W P /02/237  
(2002) at 4 (“[T]he effect o f a tax change varies with time...reductions in corporate profit taxes increase firm 
investment, but this is only a temporary effect...to  confine the attention to the immediate impact o f  
taxes.. .may be, therefore, misleading. Indeed, the intertemporal aspects can make a great deal o f  difference to 
the way we think about corporate tax policy.”). See also BANK, Dividends and Tax Polity in the Tong Run, supra 
note 163 (discussing different inter-temporal effect o f reductions o f  tax rate in the taxation o f  dividends at 
the shareholder level).
7. The Complexity of the CIT System When Used For Behavioural Control
As a result o f their interaction problems and o f the numerous variables that condition their 
application, it is difficult to predict the behavioural effects o f Behavioural Control 
Instruments. A further drawback o f behavioural intervention is that it may introduce ^ a§e 
substantial complexity to the tax system and, thus, increase its deadweight loss.249
In particular, the use o f Behavioural Control Instruments may result in three different types 
o f complexity, namely transactional, rule and compliance complexity. Transactional 
complexity refers to the hardships associated with altering behaviour to benefit from the 
preferred routes o f action defined by the legislator through the Behavioural Control 
Instruments.250 Transactional complexity arises because, due to the indiscriminate use o f 
Behavioural Control Instruments, economically similar activities may have different tax 
consequences as a result o f essentially irrelevant distinctions among activities or 
transactions. For instance, whether to be allowed a deduction on a certain payment or a tax 
deferral on a specific property transfer may be made dependent on a minor formal or 
substantive requirement. These asymmetries in tax treatment generally result in 
transactional discontinuities in the tax law.251 In turn, discontinuity tends to increase the 
degree o f substitution o f  the CIT law, and thus, beyond causing taxpayers to base 
economic decision-making at least in part on tax considerations, as opposed to the 
underlying economic factors, it generally leads to an increase in the costs incurred by 
taxpayers to search for and adopt substitute transactions.252 This tax-minimi2ing behaviour, 
in turn, breeds additional complexity from tax reformers and legislators who respond with 
measures designed to circumvent the latest tax manoeuvres.253
249 Complexity in the tax law is susceptible to various definitions. Relatively consensual definitions include the 
following: “Either a reasonably certain conclusion cannot be determined despite diligent and expert research 
by an able and honest practitioner, or a reasonably certain conclusion can be determined only after an 
expenditure that is excessive in time and dollars.” ROBERTS, et al., A  Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 
supra note 9, at 327; or “[A] complex tax system would be one where neither taxpayers nor the revenue 
authority could identify a taxpayer’s tax liability with an appropriate degree o f  certainty at reasonable cost, not 
could that liability be cheaply and easily satisfied, nor enforced.” GRAEME S. COOPER, Themes and Issues in Tax 
Simplification, in Critical Perspectives on the World Economy, Vol. 2 (Simon R. James ed. 2002) at 421.
250 See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Imw, supra note 13, at 860.
251 See discussion infra at pg. 105ff.
252 DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n  Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based Tax-, supra note 55, at 516.
253 DAVID F. B r a d f o r d , Untangling the Income Tax, supra note 180, at 266-267.
The use o f Behavioural Control Instruments tends also to result in rule complexity, that is, 
an increased challenge to interpret the tax rules.254 Specifically, the proliferation o f 
Behavioural Control Instruments in the CIT law quite often leads to complex substantive 
rules with intricate inter-relationships, characterized by unclear variations in the tax 
treatment o f transactions not differing substantially.255 The use o f complex statutory 
terminology aggravates this complexity problem.256 This ambiguity in rules increases 
compliance costs through the need for a team of professional tax preparers, lawyers, and 
accountants, and, in the long-run, may increase the frustration and cynicism o f the 
taxpayer.257
Finally, the use o f Behavioural Control Instruments may result in compliance complexity. 
Compliance complexity refers to the problems taxpayers encounter in ensuring their 
ongoing compliance with the rules.258 It includes the difficulties faced by taxpayers, such as 
keeping records, choosing forms and making necessary calculations.259 The need to provide 
adequate proof o f the fulfilment o f the formal and substantive requirements commonly 
associated with Behavioural Control Instruments, as well as o f the anti-abuse rules 
generally associated with them, should add another level o f complexity.260
Due to complexity, it is more expensive for the taxpayer to determine what rules and 
regulations are applicable to a specific transaction, to determine the ensuing tax 
consequences and to comply with them.261 At some point, the transaction costs fostered by 
the lack o f certainty become so prohibitive that the planned action does not occur, because
254 See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 860.
255 See STANLEY S. SURREY, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail 34 
Law and Contemporary Problems 673 (1969).
255 The complexity arising as a result o f  a deficient drafting o f  the tax rules has been analyzed in great detail by 
the plain language movement. This literature stresses the importance o f the expression, design and 
presentation o f legislation as documents intended to communicate information to the reader. See GRAEME S. 
COOPER, Themes and Issues in Tax Simplification, supra note 249, at 255. For a good discussion o f the theme see 
MENAHEM PASTERNAK & Ch riSTOPHE Ric o , Tax Interpretation, Planning, and Avoidance: Some Linguistic Analysis 
23 Akron Tax Journal 33 (2008). See also, as a practical demonstration o f  this movement, the UK’s Tax Law 
Rewrite Project at www.hmrc.gov.uk/rewrite/ (the aim o f  the Tax Law Rewrite Project is to rewrite the UK’s 
primary direct tax legislation to make it clearer and easier to use, without changing the law).
257 See MICHAEL J. STEPEK, The Tax Reform A ct of 1986: Simplification and the Future Viability of Accrual Taxation 
62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 779 (1987) at 791-792.
258 See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 860.
259 See DAVID F. Br a d f o r d , Untangling the Income Tax, supra note 180, at 266-267. The obligation imposed 
on the taxpayer may require the taxpayer to perform substantial tasks and incur significant costs beyond the 
amount o f  tax to be collected. This is the realm o f compliance costs literature. Its m ost prominent scholar is 
Cedric Sandford. This literature attempts to estimate the deadweight loss o f the tax system. See generally 
CEDRIC Sa n d f o r d , Tax Compliance Costs Measurement and Policy (Fiscal Publications. 1995).
260 See discussion infra at pg. 119ff.
261 See JAMES A. Fellow s, Nonrecourse Debt and Real Estate: The Issues of Tax Basis, 26 Real Est. L.J. 270 (1998) 
at 271.
the “expected benefits o f the action are less than the sum o f the costs o f implementing the 
action plus the transactions costs o f determining its legal outcome.”262 This problem should 
be especially acute with regard to new and small firms.263 If  the firm does not undertake the 
planned action, society's wealth lowers, as the firm thrusts aside an otherwise productive
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Finally, the transaction costs incurred by the government in writing and enacting the laws 
and regulations upon which the tax system is built, and in enforcing the laws and 
regulations when it perceives a lack o f compliance, should substantially increase in light o f 
the complexity o f the tax law.265 In sum, behavioural intervention tends to introduce 
substantial complexity into the tax system, which most often results in substantial 
deadweight loss.
8. Other Negative Consequences of Behavioural Control
Beyond the increase in complexity o f the tax system, the use o f Behavioural Control 
Instruments may breed other negative consequences. In particular, two problems o f 
especial relevance and interest merit consideration, namely, the impact o f Behavioural 
Control Instruments on the firm’s organizational arrangements and their interaction with 
general market dynamics.
Existing research has demonstrated that organizational arrangements arise because of 
asymmetrical distribution o f information among economic agents.266 That is, different ways 
o f organizing economic activity give rise to differences in transaction costs.267 Further, it 
has also been demonstrated that different ways o f organizing economic activity may give
262 Id. at 271. See also BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, supra note 131, at 1 (“[U]ncertainty as to the precise tax 
implications o f various corporate decisions may act as a general deterrent to investment.”); COOPER, Themes 
and Issues in Tax Simplification, supra note 249, at 244 (“[W]hen faced with complexity (in the sense o f an 
uncertain outcome), all taxpayers are risk-avoiders and will try to eliminate the risk arising from uncertain tax 
outcomes, even if it means abandoning the transaction altogether.”).
263 See BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, supra note 131, at 1 (“[T|he complexity o f  corporate taxes may impose 
significant costs and barriers to expansion o f new and small firms...”).
264 See JAMES A. F ellow s, Nonrecourse Debt and Real Estate: The Issues of Tax Basis, supra note 261, at 271.
265 Together, these costs can be a very substantial burden on the economy. See KNEAVE RlGGALL, 
Comprehensive Tax Base Theory, Transactions Costs, and Economic Efficiency: How to Tax Our Way to Efficiency, 17 Va. 
Tax Rev. 295 (1997) at 320.
266 See SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 155. See also infra 
discussion on economic nature o f  corporate groups at pg 77ff.
267 Id.
rise to different sorts o f agency problems.268 Finally, and interestingly, existing research has 
demonstrated that different ways o f organizing economic activity may give rise to 
differences in tax costs.269 This means that an efficient organizational arrangement, from a 
perspective o f transaction costs and agency, may not necessarily minimize tax costs as well. 
For instance, the implementation o f tax strategies often requires shifting income. Since 
shifting income may require considerable coordination, tax rules may induce a greater 
degree o f  centralization o f management than would otherwise be optimal.270 This is 
relevant in that in order to benefit from the advantages o f Behavioural Control Instruments 
certain firms may need to alter their organizational arrangements. Thus, as will be further 
discussed,271 the firm may adopt organizational arrangements that are sub-optimal from a 
transaction cost and agency perspective in order to benefit from the advantages o f 
Behavioural Control Instruments or to avoid their application. As will be discussed, this 
type o f behaviour should result in deadweight loss.272
Further, there are certain consequences o f the interaction o f Behavioural Control 
Instruments with general market dynamics that merit special attention. The core o f the 
problem is the following: when two assets give rise to identical pre-tax cash flows, but, as a 
result o f Behavioural Control Instruments, the cash flows from one o f such assets is taxed 
more favourably, taxpayers will generally bid for the right to hold such tax-favoured asset. 
As a result, the price o f the tax-favoured asset will increase relative to the price o f the tax 
disfavoured asset. As Scholes explains, “given differences in tax treatment, if after-tax 
returns are to be equalized, then before-tax rates o f return must differ across the assets.” 273 
That is, more lightly taxed investments require lower before-tax rates o f return than do 
more heavily taxed investments. As a result, investors pay tax explicitly on heavily taxed 
investments and pay taxes implicitly on lightly taxed investments through lower before-tax 
rates o f return.274 Thus, implicit taxes arise because the before-tax investment returns
268 See JENSEN & Me c k l in g , Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, supra 
note 193. See also JENSEN, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, supra note 196.
269 See SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 155.
270 Id. at 167. See also THORNTON., Managerial Tax Planning Principles and Applications, supra note 182, at 142 
(“Agency costs, generally the costs o f people not trusting each other, often get in the way o f tax planning. 
Indeed, in seeking tax savings, taxpayers often spawn new mutations o f  agency costs.”).
271 See discussion infra at pg. 132ff.
272 Id.
273 SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 119.
274 Id.
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available on tax-favoured assets are less than those available on tax-disfavoured assets. This 
reduced yield represents an implicit tax.275
In sum, tax rules may affect the firm’s organizational arrangements, and the before-tax 
rates o f  return on assets, i.e., the rate o f return earned from investing in an asset before any 
taxes are paid.276 This alters regular market dynamics and may produce deadweight loss.
9. C IT’s Behavioural Control Instruments vs. Direct Subsidies
D ue to interaction problems, uncertainty as to behavioural impact, complexity and other 
negative consequences, CIT law may not be the best method available to induce corporate 
conduct. In many cases, direct subsidies may provide a more efficient policy instrument to 
achieve the same objectives, in terms o f associated transaction costs and behavioural 
impact. In many cases, direct subsidies should have higher targeting potential and lower 
associated transaction costs than tax incentives.
In particular, direct subsidies tie the incentives or disincentives to the specific category of 
economic actors, activities or geographic regions that should be caught by them.277 In 
contrast, CIT law, applicable to the masses o f corporate taxpayers, may not allow for such 
refined targeting unless substantial complexity is built into the tax system.278 Also, in many 
cases, direct subsidies should provide a more efficient option from a transaction cost 
perspective. Specifically, although it is debatable whether the direct costs o f promulgation 
and publicity are lower with direct subsidies,279 the indirect costs o f tax intervention should 
be higher than those associated with direct subsidies, because o f the costs associated with 
the increase in the tax system’s complexity {i.e., higher promulgation costs due to the
275 Id. at 6.
276 Id. at 2.
277 EDWARD YORIO, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform A ct of 1986, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 395 (1987) at 423.
278 Id. at 423.
279 Certain commentators argue that tax incentives may be more efficient than direct subsidies due to their 
lower transaction costs for dissemination o f  information. The core o f the argument is that tax incentives 
enable the government and citizens to utilize the existing tax system, at relatively low marginal cost, to 
disseminate and obtain information about government policies. There are, however, strong reasons to doubt 
that tax incentives actually reduce transaction costs. As Yorio notes, “for taxpayers who have a network for 
obtaining information about direct subsidy programs, the marginal costs o f digesting information about a 
new subsidy are probably no higher than the costs o f assimilating similar information about a tax incentive.” 
See EDWARD Y o r io , supra note 277, at 427. Moreover, if  the government already disseminates information 
about direct subsidies through an existing communication channel and has previously identified the potential 
beneficiaries o f such subsidies, the marginal costs to the government o f  disseminating information about new  
subsidies should, in principle, be lower than the costs o f communicating information about a similar tax 
incentive to all taxpayers. Id.
increase in rule interaction problems; increased compliance costs; increased administration 
and enforcement costs, etc.) and the increased tax planning that stems from the 
asymmetries in the tax law produced by Behavioural Control Instruments.280 Finally, the 
use o f Behavioural Control Instruments may produce significant non-intended negative 
consequences and, due to the several variables that condition their application, be subject 
to a significant degree o f uncertainty with respect to their intended behavioural effects.281 
Thus, the major problem with direct subsidies appears to be political. The lack of 
transparency to the electorate surrounding the introduction o f incentives and disincentives 
through the tax system may make it more attractive from a political perspective.282
10. C IT and Corporate Behavioural Control
Behavioural intervention using the CIT law has drawbacks. Medicines also have side- 
effects. W hether their desired effects are superior on a specific case to their side-effects and 
whether there are no better options available in the case at hand remain determinative. This 
thesis believes that this should also be the case with behavioural intervention using the CIT 
law. Behavioural Control Instruments should only be used when their advantages fa r outweigh their 
negative impact and there is no other available solution that may provide a better overall result.283 In 
particular, based on the discussion undertaken, there are several important conclusions to 
bear in mind when considering the use o f the CIT system for corporate behavioural 
control.
280 Id.
281 See id. at 410 (Yorio notes that a tax incentive may stimulate excessive production o f  a tax-favoured good 
or service and/or stimulate their excessive consumption, causing a misallocation o f  resources and a decline in 
overall utility. Further, due to its application across the board for all taxpayers, a tax incentive may provide 
benefits that greater than those required to accomplish the government's objective). See also discussion supra at 
pg. 53ff.
282 See FRIESE, et al., Taxation and Corporate Governance - The State of the Art, supra note 169, at 393-395 (“[A] lack 
o f transparency can ... be brought forward against tax provisions as regulative tools. Direct regulation has a 
much more visible impact [.]”); EDWARD YORIO, supra note 277, at 421 (“[T]ax expenditures are more likely 
to escape rigorous cost-benefit analysis than direct subsidies.”).
283 See reaching similar conclusions BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, supra note 131, at 12 (“There is no obvious 
reason why taxes and tax reliefs should be excluded from the set o f  policy implements that governments use 
to achieve their various distributive and allocative goals. O f course, such policies may entail costs and may fail 
to achieve their goals, but tax policies are no different from others in these respects, and it seems 
unreasonable, and indeed nonsensical, to expect any government to take a vow o f  non-interference.”); 
SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 21 (“We can make the 
tax system simple only if we abandon using it as a means o f achieving desired social policies....but...it is not 
obvious that these tax rule changes are desirable, since the alternative means o f implementing policy may well 
be both more cosdy and less effective.”); GEORGE MUNDSTOCK, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1179 (1987) at ft. 14 ("[T]here is no reason, per se, to believe that a slight reduction in the tax 
system's effect on behaviour will increase efficiency.").
First, the use o f CIT law for behavioural intervention should only occur when direct 
subsidies are not a better option.284 In many cases, direct subsidies should have a higher 
targeting potential and lower associated transaction costs. Further, the use o f Behavioural 
Control Instruments may produce significant non-intended negative consequences and, 
due to the several variables that condition their application, may be subject to a 
considerable degree o f uncertainty regarding their intended behavioural effects.
Second, if  considered that in a specific situation tax intervention may be more adequate 
than direct subsidies, the introduction o f Behavioural Control Instruments should be as 
effective as possible. That is, tax intervention should achieve the desired behavioural 
effects with as few associated distortions and costs as possible. Although there are certain 
variables that are outside the control o f the legislator, such as the present and expected tax 
position o f the taxpayer, the legislator has a certain degree o f control over others. 
Specifically, the introduction o f Behavioural Control Instruments should take into 
consideration:
a. The tax provision’s degree o f continuity. The degree o f continuity o f the tax law is 
directly dependent on how the tax system faces the line-drawing problem. As 
discussed, when line-drawing is too discontinuous, a minor change in transactional 
form may result in a substantially different tax result. Therefore, a discontinuous 
law may make the Behavioural Control Instruments relatively or totally ineffective. 
Discontinuity in tax law may arise due to several elements, namely its excess o f 
formalism or an excessively rule-based tax law. For this reason, for CIT law drafting 
it remains important to push in the direction o f line-drawing based on economic 
reality, and to favour the use o f standards or rules backed up by general anti-abuse 
provisions.
284 In the same sense see EDWARD YORIO, supra note 277, at 422 (“The critical issue is not whether tax 
expenditures are occasionally inefficient, but whether in a particular case a tax expenditure would be more or 
less inefficient than a direct subsidy in accomplishing the government's objective.”). Note, however, that 
some commentators defend that no governmental intervention should occur, independently o f  whether it 
takes the form o f tax benefits or direct subsidies. The basic argument tends to be couched in terms o f  
government failure {i.e., governmental intervention is vulnerable to failure due to factors such as imperfect 
information, market distortions, etc). See, e.g., JULIAN LE GRAND, The Theoty of Government Failure, 21 British 
Journal o f  Political Science 423 (1991). Although there is merit to this line o f  argument, leaving the market by 
itself is also no better option since market failures should also naturally occur. Obviously, this denotes a clear 
political option defending the role o f the state as regulator in the economy.
b. The importance o f tax law restrictions and the affirmative use o f non-tax law 
frictions. Tax law restrictions are an important instrument at the reach o f the 
legislator to dissuade substitution. For example, a tax law requiring the investor to 
assume a certain level o f risk or to personally participate in an activity in order to
use a transaction or structure often dissuades substitution. Further, non-tax law ^ a8e 
frictions work as a powerful deterrent to the substitution o f transactions. While the 
taxpayer’s business preferences are outside the control o f the legislator, the 
interaction o f tax law with other regulatory fields is an area that presents significant 
potential for behavioural control. In particular, it is important to analyze the 
interaction o f Behavioural Control Instruments with the frictions imposed by other 
regulatory fields, and, wherever possible, make an affirmative use o f them.285
c. Focus on corporate-level intervention and avoid shareholder-level intervention. As 
discussed, the introduction o f Behavioural Control Instruments at the corporate- 
level should allow for more efficient behavioural targeting than at the shareholder- 
level. Intervention at the shareholder level induces corporate behaviour indirectly 
and has a more limited quantity o f behavioural instruments available. Further, by 
avoiding entering into the corporation-shareholder relationship to encourage or 
discourage a certain conduct, CIT law avoids creating potential agency problems.
d. As the corporate tax rate increases, the incentive to substitute should also increase.
That is, the higher the benefit the taxpayer may have from substituting a transaction 
in the form o f a reduced tax bill, the greater the interest in finding an alternative 
transactional route to substitute the transaction. Thus, the tax legislator should 
privilege taxation using broad tax bases with low corporate tax rates.
e. A firm’s organizational design may impact the way it reacts to the tax rules. For 
instance, the flexibility o f a business entity to restructure its internal ownership may 
give it an increased flexibility to substitute. As will be discussed, this phenomenon 
is especially acute with corporate groups in that the ability to make use o f the 
corporate veil o f its affiliates, and the potential to more easily structure complex 
internal transactional flows, gives them a wide flexibility for substitution in light o f 
the nature o f the CIT law. Thus, as will be further discussed below, CIT law should
285 But see infra discussion on problems o f using non-tax law frictions at pg. 76.
privilege a non-uniform approach to taxation and design provisions properly 
adapted to the economic and legal nature o f the entity at hand.286
f. Short carryover periods may lead to higher distortionary behaviour. In the cases of 
substantial expiring tax attributes, the taxpayer may change the timing of 
transactions or even implement transactions whose sole purpose is to take 
advantage o f those tax attributes. Thus, in order to avoid distorting taxpayer 
decisions, the tax legislator should privilege long carryover periods for tax 
attributes.
g. Take into consideration the pre-existing distortions o f the playing field, namely 
those resulting from adoption o f a CIT system and market forces. CIT 
interventions occur in a distorted playing field, not only due to natural market 
imperfections, but because the adoption o f a CIT system produces necessary 
economic and regulatory consequences. A good knowledge base and better 
understanding o f such consequences is required to introduce more effective 
Behavioural Control Instruments.
Finally, pursue economic-biased policies under these limitations but eliminate corporate governance-biased 
intervention and be mindful of potential indirect corporate governance implications of economic-biased 
policies. To use Behavioral Control Instruments to directly pursue both economic-biased 
objectives and corporate governance-biased objectives would lead to a tax law o f daunting 
complexity and, based on the analysis undertaken, would with great probability result in 
interaction problems between the two types o f intervention. For this reason, this thesis 
proposes that Behavioral Control Instruments directly pursue only economic-biased 
objectives. This option to privilege economic-biased objectives for direct intervention is 
based on the fact that while the use o f Behavioral Control Instruments may, subject to the 
limitations discussed above, pursue certain economic-biased objectives with relative 
accuracy, in most cases that does not occur with the pursuit o f corporate governance- 
biased objectives. In most cases tax law is simply not sophisticated enough to pursue such 
kind o f objectives.287
286 But see infra discussion on certain drawbacks o f  non-uniform approach at pg. 75.
287 See e.g., FRIESE, et al., Taxation and Corporate Governance - The State of the Art, supra note 169, at 393-395 (“ |I]t 
is difficult to link the tax measures to specific fact patterns that allow a differentiation between beneficial and 
harmful behaviour. Furthermore, the analyzed measures tend to have uncertain effects and to pursue 
conflicting interest...Tax rules are generally not sophisticated enough to reflect whether or not a certain
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Thus, as far as corporate governance is concerned, CIT’s role should be restricted to 
ensuring that its provisions, namely those resulting from economic-biased intervention, do 
not result in indirect negative corporate governance implications,288 and to profiting from 
the corporate governance advantages that naturally result from its mere existence. As 
discussed, the implementation o f a realization-based tax system through a corporate-level 
tax should have as an offshoot certain regulatory consequences that, for the most part, 
consist o f policing corporate malfeasance, namely, the Reliability Effect {i.e., control of 
company’s accounts) and the Deterrent Effect {i.e., control o f management’s wrongdoing). 
This, plus the attention to indirect corporate governance effects o f economic-biased 
policies, should be as far as tax should go on this issue. As a rule, CIT law should abstain 
from direct and purposeful action on corporate governance matters.
C. A New Policy Approach
1. A  New Policy Approach to C IT
As the analysis has demonstrated, the design and operation o f the CIT system remains 
subject to several constraints and distortions. Thus, to simply look at how far a certain 
policy is from optimality in order to determine whether an incremental improvement 
occurs may be insufficient. As explained under the theory o f the second-best, the 
introduction o f an improvement towards optimality will not necessarily result in an overall 
improvement if  the underlying context is itself imperfect.289 Therefore, to determine 
whether a proposed reform moves us closer to the Haig-Simons ideal, or, by that matter, 
any other normative tax policy ideal, may not be sufficient to ensure a successful 
incremental change to CIT.290 By the same token, the application o f optimal tax research
conduct is actually detrimental to the com panies’ interest [.]”); id. ([T]ax provisions are in m ost cases not 
suitable for influencing corporate governance [.]”). See also BANK, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Tong Run, supra 
note 163, at 572 (“ [A]ttempting to resolve corporate governance concerns through tax changes may be futile 
or even counterproductive.”).
288 In a similar sense see FRIESE, et al., Taxation and Corporate Governance - The State of the Art, supra note 169, at 
365 (“[T]ax rules should in principle be drafted in a way that ensures that they do not encourage behaviour o f  
management that is in conflict with the interests o f the shareholders or the company itselff.]”); id. at 393-395 
([R]ather than ineffectively attempting to influence management conduct by tax norms the legislator should 
eliminate provisions o f the tax system that allow the management to act without control o f  the shareholders 
when control o f the management behaviour seems necessary.”); OWENS, The Interface of Tax and Good Corporate 
Governance, supra note 116, at 768 (“[It Is important to ensure] that tax rules do not encourage behaviour that is 
contrary to the interest o f the company and/or its shareholders.”).
289 For the theory o f the second best see R.G. LlPSEY & KELVIN LANCASTER, The General Theory of Second Best, 
24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11 (1956).
290 In the same sense see DEBORAH H. SCHENK, A n  Efpcienty Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based Tax; supra 
note 55, at 519 (“In a second best world...it makes no sense to focus on whether a particular reform moves
may be insufficient to ensure a successful incremental change.291 In sum, based on the 
analysis undertaken, to simply look at how far we are from optimality may be insufficient 
to ensure an incremental improvement.
For that reason, the path this thesis proposes to determine whether incremental 
improvements are indeed improvements consists in looking for more efficient tax solutions and, 
then, go further by identifying the distortions and their interactions associated with the operation of the CIT  
system, andfactor them into tax polity analysis.292
For this purpose, this thesis defines efficiency as the minimization o f transaction costs and 
other sources o f deadweight loss. Following Shaviro, this includes the minimization of 
substitution effects (i.e., changes in taxpayer decisions or behaviour due to the tax system) 
and tax overhead costs (i.e., the amount o f resources, including the value o f time or labour, 
consumed in applying the tax system, through taxpayer or government activities such as tax 
planning, compliance, litigation, administration, and law-making).293 Based on the analysis
us closer to a normative definition o f income since that approach contributes nothing helpful in determining 
whether a reform is warranted”). See also WEISBACH, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, supra 
note 17, at 1628 (“[TJraditdonal tax policy concerns, such as whether something is ‘income’ within the Haig- 
Simmons definition, are neither helpful nor relevant to most disputes.”); LEVMORE, Recharacterisations and the 
Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, supra note 19, at 1061 (“The nature o f  corporate tax law defies normative 
argumentation.”).
291 This is because o f  the limitations o f  its theoretical models, which usually depart from the assumption o f  
perfect markets and no externalities. Further, the application o f the existing optimal tax research has not yet 
focused appropriately on CIT issues. In particular, the impact on behaviour and utility o f  CIT is still fairly 
unknown. Also, CIT is strongly determined by administrative and compliance issues, an issue generally not 
explored by optimal taxation due to difficulty to model these items. See C. HEADY, Optimal Taxation as a Guide 
to Tax Policy: a Survey, 14 Fiscal Studies 1 (1993). But see Slemrod’s theory on optimal tax systems, JOEL 
SLEMROD, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 Journal o f Economic Perspectives 157 (1990) at 158 
(“[The theory o f  optimal tax systems] embraces the insights o f  optimal taxation but also takes seriously the 
technology o f raising taxes and the constraints placed upon tax policy by that technology. A theory o f  optimal 
tax systems has the promise o f  addressing some o f  the fundamental issues o f tax policy in a more satisfactory 
way than the theory o f  optimal taxation.”).
292 O n the defence o f  efficiency as the m ost appropriate way to deal with tax issues see, e.g., CUNNINGHAM & 
SCHENK, The Case fora Capital Gains Preference, supra note 55, at 370-72 (“In [a second best] world, efficiency is 
the touchstone.”); DAVID A. WEISBACH, A n  Efficiemy Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, supra note 202, at 
74 (“Doctrinal issues o f  the sort that tax policy makers face on a daily basis can and should be grounded in 
efficiency.”); DEBORAH H. SCHENK, A n  Efficiemy Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based Tax, supra note 55, at 
519 (“Since any reform will result in treating som e equals equally and som e differentially, efficiency should 
control.”). As previously discussed, this thesis identifies the distortions and their interactions associated with 
the operation o f  the CIT system through an interdisciplinary and evaluative approach. See supra pg. 15.
293 The definition o f efficiency for purposes o f  this thesis is based on the work developed by Dan Shaviro. See 
SHAVIRO, An Efficiemy Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 4 
(“The efficiency norm that I use is that o f minimizing excess burden, or the deadweight loss generated by the 
tax system.”); id. at 24 (“The standard tax efficiency norm of minimizing excess burden implies two principal 
objectives. The first is minimizing substitution effects, or changes in taxpayer decisions or behaviour due to 
the tax system. The second is minimizing ...the amount o f  resources ...consumed in applying the tax system 
[.]”). See also WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 870 (“Efficiency in the tax law is measured 
by whether the law raises revenue without creating adverse incentives.”); HARVEY S. ROSEN, Public Finance 
(McGraw-Hill/Irwin 6th ed. 2001) at 284-303 (noting that a tax is efficient if it raises revenue with a
undertaken, this thesis proposes that this efficiency objective may be pursued, among other 
means, by looking for the tax treatment best aligned with the particularities associated with 
the nature o f each category o f business entities.294 There are a number o f classification 
criteria that could be used for this purpose, such as firm maturity or corporate structure. 
This thesis will focus on corporate structure.
In addition, in order to adequately factor into the analysis the different distortions and their 
interactions associated with the operation o f the CIT system the following guidelines 
should be observed:
•  As a general rule, the use o f the CIT system to implement policy objectives other 
than raising cash should be minimized;
•  Take into consideration the pre-existing distortions o f the playing field, including 
the Structural Distortions, market imperfections, and the regulatory effects o f the 
CIT system;
•  Focus on corporate-level intervention and avoid shareholder-level intervention;
• Ensure that the tax intervention does not result in indirect negative corporate 
governance implications and profit from the corporate governance advantages that 
naturally follow from CIT’s existence. In this regard, the elimination o f transaction 
costs and other sources o f deadweight loss should be pursued only when it does 
not adversely affect CIT’s regulatory functions. Otherwise, when regulatory 
functions are at stake, go through a cost-benefit analysis before eliminating 
transaction costs and other sources o f deadweight loss;295
minimum o f  behavioural distortions and other sources o f deadweight loss). As may be noted, tax scholars 
often use efficiency in a manner different from that used by law and economics scholars, who generally refer 
to Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See DEBORAH H. SCHENK, A n Efficiemy Approach to Reforming a 
Realisation-Rased Tax; supra note 55, at 507.
294 This suggestion is added to the traditional advices o f using standards for CIT law drafting and privilege 
broad tax bases in CIT design.
295 See DAVID M. DRIESEN & Sh u bHA G h o sh , The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost 
Minimisation in a World of Friction, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 61 (2005) at 103 (“If a particular transaction cost serves no 
function at all, it constitutes waste and deserves elimination.”).
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•  To the extent consistent with the tax policy objectives, minimize the negative 
impact o f tax rules on the operation o f business entities. This requires that the 
objectives and needs o f business entities are adequately taken into consideration in 
the process o f policy design;
•  Favour long carryover periods for tax attributes; and
•  Analyze the interaction o f the CIT system with the frictions imposed by other 
regulatory fields and consider the possibility o f making an affirmative use o f such 
frictions.
Lastly, following the efficiency standard above, this thesis is not concerned with equity 
issues. Following other commentators, this thesis believes that equity issues may be better 
dealt with at the shareholder’s level, i.e., with personal income taxation rules or, 
alternatively, with adjustments to the CIT rate structure (i.e., different tax rates applicable to 
different classes o f corporate taxpayers).296
2. Issues raised by the New Policy Approach
This thesis argues that the design o f tax rules properly adapted to the specific nature o f 
each category o f business entities should minimize the deadweight loss associated with the 
CIT system and more effectively control the collateral effects o f the tax rules on the 
operation o f the firm. The consequences o f adopting this type o f non-uniform approach to 
corporate taxation remain an important point to consider.
A uniform taxation system, i.e., a sole tax system for all types o f business entities ignoring 
their maturity or corporate structure, has some considerable advantages.297 Fundamentally,
296 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based Tax', supra note 55, at 519 
defending that efficiency should be privileged in a second-best world (“Whether horizontal equity has any 
meaning in designing a tax system, it has far less meaning in a second-best world. That is because it is 
impossible to tax equals equally where there is a deviation from the base that cannot be eliminated (in this 
case, the realization rule). Therefore it is very difficult to say whether any change in a second-best world 
promotes the equal treatment o f  equals. Since any reform will result in treating some equals equally and some 
differentially, efficiency should control.”). See also DAVID A. WEISBACH, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing 
in the Tax Law, supra note 202, at 74 (defending that decisions regarding redistribution should be left for 
adjustments to the rate structure).
297 A tax system may also approach the taxation o f  types o f  income in a uniform or non-uniform basis. 
Specifically, the tax system may tax income in a uniform manner by imposing the same rules on all income;
a uniform corporate tax system covering all different types o f business entities should 
eliminate differential tax rates between investment vehicles, and, by this token, minimize 
the tax distortions on taxpayer behaviour in the selection o f investment vehicles. Although 
this type o f  approach to taxation has a strong intuitive appeal, research has demonstrated 
that it should not produce economically efficient results.298 Further, this type o f approach 
may not be simpler since complexity may arise from the lack o f specific guidance in the tax 
rules. W hether such system works remains in dispute. Finally, timing and income 
characterization issues would remain, and, thus, most o f CIT’s complexity should remain 
unchanged.
Conversely, the design o f a CIT system with differing structural rules for different business 
entities should allow for a higher adaptability o f the tax system to the nature o f the 
economic actor and, thus, as will be demonstrated, contribute to the reduction o f 
deadweight loss.299 That is, a non-uniform tax system allows for a better adaptability o f the 
tax law to the underlying economic and business reality o f the real world o f transaction 
costs, information asymmetries and agency costs.300 However, it does raise some im portant 
issues. Specifically, it may involve significant interaction costs due to the body o f rules that 
are necessary for the different tax regimes to interact with each other and ensure that by 
making hybrids o f different regimes, taxpayers do not distort their original policy intent.301
tax certain types o f  income differently by having rules for determining the amount o f income subject to tax 
that vary by the source o f income or tax certain types o f  income differently by applying varying tax rates to 
the income. See ERIC M. ZOLT, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 Va. Tax Rev. 39 (1996) at 52. This 
issue, however, is not directly relevant for our analysis and, thus, will not be directly explored here.
298 See id. at 60. See also id. at 44 (“A uniform tax system will produce optimal results only if certain heroic 
assumptions are satisfied: there are no externalities or other market imperfections, different types o f  income 
have similar elasticities, and the administrative costs in collecting and enforcing taxes do not vary by type o f  
income.”).
299 See id. at 60 (“Support for nonuniform taxes rests on at least three factors. First, efficiency gains may be 
obtained from nonuniform taxes because taxes distort and individuals react differently to taxes imposed on 
different sources o f  income. Second, nonuniform taxes may be desirable because they address market 
imperfections such as externalities. Third, administrative considerations may support nonuniform taxes.”).
300 See id. at 108 (“[N]either economic theory nor equity considerations require uniform treatment...Efficiency 
gains arise because selective use o f nonuniform taxes may reduce tax-induced distortions. ...Nonuniform tax 
rules may also be useful in addressing externalities or other market imperfections. Finally, administrative 
considerations may support different tax treatment for different types o f income.”).
301 Consider, for example, the serious interaction problems o f the US Consolidated Return regime with the 
US regime for taxation o f  partnerships and disregarded entities. Broadly, US taxpayers take advantage o f  the 
tax rules for taxation o f  partnerships and disregarded entities in order to manipulate abusively the US 
Consolidated Return regime. See, e.g., describing several planning strategies, TERRILL A. HYDE, et al., The Use 
of Partnerships and LL.Cs in Structuring Consolidated Groups in Tax Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions, 
Dispositions, Spin-Offs, Joint Ventures, Financings, Reorganizations & Restructurings (Practising Law 
Institute ed. 2005); BRYAN P. COLLINS, et al., Consolidated Return Planning and Issues Involving Disregarded Entities, 
in Tax Strategies for Corporate Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-Offs, Joint Ventures, Financings, 
Reorganizations & Restructurings (Practising Law Institute ed. 2005). As Weisbach notes, “the more complex 
tax law gets, the greater the number o f  interactions among the rules and the more complex the law must be.
Furthermore, several tax regimes create an incentive for tax planning and may induce 
potential distortions on the choice o f investment vehicle and organizational structure. 
Despite these drawbacks, in light o f the very significant advantages associated with this 
type o f approach, this thesis will follow a non-uniform approach to CIT design with regard 
to business entity categories.302
Further, this thesis recommends an affirmative use o f non-tax law frictions in tax policy. 
However, the legislator should be aware that the use o f frictions has associated costs. In 
particular, in order to make an affirmative use o f frictions, the legislator will need to incur 
information-gathering costs in order to familiarize itself with the details o f the other 
regulatory areas that may be used as frictions {e.g., corporate law, accounting, etc.).303 In 
addition, it must consider whether the particular friction at stake has the potential to block 
all possible avoidance strategies that may be devised by the taxpayer, not just the particular 
transaction under analysis.304 Further, there are certain ex post costs associated with the use 
o f frictions. Since all regulatory areas are generally subject to change, the legislator will need 
to track legislative changes to know that the friction at stake remains valid, i.e., that the 
provisions at stake remain in full force and effect.305 Finally, the legislator should be aware 
that, just like Behavioural Control Instruments, frictions have the potential to be 
underinclusive or overinclusive and they may spawn negative distributional effects since 
certain taxpayers may be more able than others to avoid that particular friction.306
This thesis will now apply this proposed policy approach to study the taxation o f corporate 
groups. The following section will start by analyzing the fundamental economic, legal and 
functional characteristics o f corporate groups. Based on such analysis, this thesis will then 
identify the problems that may arise when groups are taxed under the Standard CIT 
System.
The number o f  interactions is approximately proportional to the square o f  the number o f  rules.” WEISBACH, 
Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 871.
302 In a similar sense see ALAN J. AUERBACH, et al., Taxing Corporate Income, supra note 49, at 867 (“[The] 
heterogeneity in behavioural responses suggests a need for flexibility in the design o f  tax reforms ... to allow 
treatment to vary among firms and individuals according to circumstances.”). See also BANK, Dividends and Tax 
Policy in the Long Run, supra note 163, at 572.
303 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n  Effiaeng Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based Tax, supra note 55, at 515- 
516; SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16, at 1334-1337.
304 Id.
305 See DEBORAH H. Sc h e n k , A n  Effideng Approach to Reforming a Realisation-Based Tax, supra note 55, at 514; 
SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16, at 1334-1337.
306 See SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16, at 1334-1337.
PART II | The Taxation o f  Corporate Groups under the Standard CIT System
A. The Nature of Corporate Groups
This thesis argues that the design o f tax rules properly adapted to the specific nature o f 
each category o f business entities should minimize the deadweight loss associated with the 
CIT system and more effectively control the collateral effects o f the tax rules on the 
operation o f the firm. Based on this insight, the purpose o f the following sections is to 
examine the economic, legal and functional nature o f  corporate groups in order to 
subsequently identify the potential sources o f deadweight loss and other collateral effects 
that may arise when corporate groups are taxed under the Standard CIT system.
1. The Economic Nature of Corporate Groups
This section will examine the distinction between firm and market in economic literature, 
and will assess the extent to which such distinction may be applicable to characterizing the 
internal economic dynamic o f corporate groups.
a. Beyond the Classic Distinction o f Firm and Market
The original distinction between the firm and the market as governance structures dates 
back to Coase’s seminal work “The Nature o f the Firm.”307 The Coasean insight is that 
firms exist in those situations where the market is inefficient due to its implicit operational 
costs.308 Coase suggests that by forming a firm and allowing the “entrepreneur” to direct its 
resources, these costs may be reduced or, in some cases, eliminated.309 Accordingly, under
307 See R. H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937). See also, for further development, OLIVER 
E. WILLIAMSON & SIDNEY G. W in t e r , The Nature o f  the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development 
(Oxford University Press. 1993).
308 These costs include the costs o f  finding the most competitive supply price or o f  negotiating and writing 
enforceable contracts for each exchange transaction. Id.
309 This is fundamentally because o f the firm’s efficiency to cope with market uncertainties. Specifically, since 
in an uncertain world not all eventualities can be foreseen, contracts are necessarily incomplete and need to 
be re-negotiated from time to time. Instead, in the firm, the entrepreneur may “acquire the legal rights o f  all 
the parties” and the rearrangement o f activities may be operated not on the basis o f “a rearrangement o f  
rights by contract, but as a result o f  an administrative decision as to how the rights should be used.” This 
replacement o f a series o f  market contracts with a sole, broad contract for each factor results in more 
flexibility and, therefore, better ability to deal with uncertainty. This, in turn, results in reduction o f  
transaction costs. See R. H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 307, at 400.
the classical Coasean theorem, a firm will arise whenever the internal organization of 
transactions allows for the reduction o f market costs.310
This crucial insight has been developed by subsequent researchers.311 In  particular, 
Williamson notably synthesized the reasons for market failure in the formula o f “bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity.”312 Broadly, Williamson suggests that 
whenever an asset is highly specific its value will be significantly reduced if it is put to uses 
other than those for which it is suited. Consequendy, a supplier that invests in a highly 
specific asset to satisfy its client demands will be effectively “locked into” a transaction. 
Similarly, a buyer engaged in an asset specific transaction will face significant difficulties to 
obtain alternative sources o f supply on favourable terms. This contractual dependency is 
problematic in that, due to the behavioural characteristics o f the economic agent (i.e., 
opportunism and bounded rationality), it presents very strong inducements to 
opportunism. Indeed, the party with the strongest bargaining power can easily (and often 
will) profit o f the weakest party’s dependence on the contractual relationship.
Williamson argued that if all these three conditions are present in a transaction, then the 
costs they impose may mean that the standard market mechanism o f free exchange cannot 
operate efficiently.313 According to Williamson, it is within these situations that the firm as 
a governance structure usually steps in due to its superior organizational and control 
characteristics.314 Specifically, Williamson suggests that “classical market contracting will be
310 R. H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, in The Nature o f  the Firm: Origins, Evolution and 
Development (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993) at 48.
311 See, e.g, A. ALCHIAN & H. DEMSETZ, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organisation, 62 American 
E conom ic Review 777 (1972) (analysis o f  hierarchy as a coordinating mechanism) and B. KLEIN, et al., 
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 Journal o f  Law and Econom ics 
297 (1978) (developing notion o f  contractual incom pleteness as basis for the comparative advantage o f  the 
firm in relation to the market).
312 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, The Economic Institutions o f  Capitalism (Free Press. 1985). See also OLIVER 
E. WILLIAMSON, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications: a Study in the Economics o f  
Internal Organization (Free Press. 1975).
313 Id. at 30-32.
314 This advantage o f  the firm derives from its more diverse and sensitive control mechanisms for enforcing 
internal activities. Specifically, not only does the firm have a more economical and lawful access to the 
information required to perform more accurate own-performance evaluations than can a buyer, but its 
incentive and penalty instruments are more refined. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, Corporate Control and 
Business Behavior (Englewood Cliffs. 1970). But see H. DEMSETZ, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in The 
Nature o f  the Firm: Origins, Evolution and Development (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 
1993) (Demsetz is not persuaded that asset specificity has the explanatory power that Williamson ascribes to 
it). See also NEIL KAY, Corporate Governance and Transaction Costs, in Corporate Control and Accountability (Sol 
Picciotto ed. 1993) (Kay argues that Williamson’s approach makes it difficult to deal with issues such as 
domestic or international diversification involving horizontal expansion and economies o f  scope); C. N. 
PlTELIS, Transaction Costs and the Historical Evolution of the Capitalist Firm, 32 Journal o f Economic Issues 999 
(1998) (Pitelis also identifies certain theoretical flaws in transaction costs analysis).
efficacious wherever assets are non-specific to the trading parties; bilateral or obligational 
market contracting will appear as assets become semi-specific; and internal organisation will 
displace markets as assets take on a highly specific character.”315
That is, Williamson claims that there are several institutional arrangements available to 
govern transactions between economic agents and that each o f them is designed in 
response to a specific set o f transactional considerations with the objective to minimize the 
overall cost o f implementing transactions. Importandy, beyond the two primary 
institutional arrangements for resource allocation, the firm and the market, Williamson 
suggests that a range o f “hybrid” organizational structures o f “bilateral or obligational market 
contracting may be devised and implemented whenever deemed more efficient as 
transaction-cost-economizing governance structures. Thus, in the same way that market 
transactions assume a multitude o f forms, ranging from simple spot market transactions to 
complex long-term contracts, firms can adopt governance structures that put together 
different blends o f hierarchy and contract principles depending upon the transactional 
considerations at stake. As Williamson noted, “there are a variety o f distinguishable 
different transactions on the one hand and a variety o f alternative governance structures on 
the other. The object is to match governance structures to the attributes o f transactions in 
a discriminating way,”316 that is, in a transaction-cost-economizing way.
This comparative institutional perspective is fundamental to grasp the nature o f the 
corporate group. As will be demonstrated, the corporate group is essentially a “hybrid” o f 
market and organization, contract and hierarchy, or better, “an organized m arket.. .which 
replicates within its internal boundaries the structures o f both firm and market.”317 Thus, 
this theoretical perspective sheds light on the nature o f the corporate group as a specific 
institutional arrangement which has been designed under a precise set o f transactional 
considerations with the aim o f efficiendy minimizing the overall costs o f implementing 
transactions. The thesis will now inquire into the nature o f these transactional 
considerations.
315 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, The Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 T he Journal o f  
Econom ic Literature 1537 (1981) at 1548, emphasis added.
3,6 Id. at 1544. See also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON & INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
Comparative E conom ic Organization: the Analysis o f  D iscrete Structural Alternatives (ICS Press. 1994).
317 See GUNTHER T e u BNER, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, in Regulating Corporate 
Groups in Europe (D. Sugarman & G. Teubner eds., 1990) at 82; see also GUNTHER TEUBNER, The Many- 
Headed Hydra: Networks as Higher-Order Collective Actors, in Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe (D. 
Sugarman & G. Teubner eds., 1990).
b. Unitary Economic Direction and Organized Internal Markets
Corporate group members submit to a unitary business policy.318 This unitary business 
policy, which covers most business areas (including marketing, production and sales, 
research and development, financial and labour policy), submits group members to a global 
business strategy whereby assets, profits and personnel are transferred to those affiliates 
where the return on capital is highest (for comparable risks).319 This allocation o f the 
overall group resources to those members that can earn the highest rate o f return has two 
crucial - and interrelated - consequences to the group. First, it allows the group to 
maximize its overall profitability (since its resources are always being put to their highest 
economic use) and, second, it generates a competitive market dynamic among its
320constituency.
The internal economic dynamic that results from the interaction o f these two phenomena 
gives the corporate group the characteristics o f an “internal” or “organized” market.321 
That is, the different operating units o f the corporate group effectively compete against 
each other for communal group resources in a struggle coordinated by the price 
mechanism: each corporate member must provide to the collective entity the highest 
possible return on a specific resource to keep it. However, this competition does not have 
the same characteristics o f the one found in the open market. In the “organized internal 
market,”322 the collective interest is also present. Thus, an individual unit may compete with 
other group members only up to the point in which its individual interests collide with the 
collective interest o f overall profit maximization. In addition, although quasi-market 
principles dictate the location o f group resources, it is the hierarchical decision o f the 
headquarters that effectively allocates them to the individual group member.
318 See RICHARD CAVES, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2nd 
ed. 1996); DEREK F. CHANNON & MICHAEL JALLAND, Multinational Strategic Planning (Macmillan. 1978); 
MICHAEL Br o o k e  & H. LEE Rem m ers, The Strategy o f Multinational Enterprise (Pitman 2nd ed. 1978); 
PHILLIP BlumBERG, The Law o f  Corporate Groups - Problems o f Parent and Subsidiary Corporations under 
Statutory Law o f  General Application (Little. 1989); TOM HADDEN, Inside Corporate Groups, 12 International 
Journal o f  the Sociology o f  Law 271 (1984).
319 Id.
320 Id. See also TEUBNER, The Many-Headed Hydra: Networks as Higher-Order Collective Actors, supra note 317.
321 See TEUBNER, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, supra note 317, at 82 (The modern 
corporate group is “an organized m arket...which replicates within its internal boundaries the structures o f  
both firm and market.”).
322 This thesis has adopted this terminology since it considers that it better encapsulates the internal economic 
dynamics o f modern corporate groups.
c. The “Chameleon-like” Governance Structure
In order to ensure the constant maximization o f overall profits in the “organized internal 
market,” the corporate group possesses a mechanism o f self-regulation and control, based 
on the “double orientation” o f the actions o f its members. That is, in the context of a 
group, “individual actions...are simultaneously and cumulatively oriented both to the 
common goal and to the individual goals o f the members”323 with “no normative primacy 
o f one orientation or the other.”324 As a consequence o f the absence o f a higher ranking 
guiding principle, the pondering o f a corporate member’s “dual-oriented” action will always 
involve a certain degree o f decision-making subjectivity.
In this subjective process o f pondering decisions according to equally ranking individual 
and collective interests lies the main mechanism o f the corporate group for self-regulation 
and self-control. That is, the subjective balance o f interests operated in each individual 
decision o f group members allows the group, as a collective whole, to constantly control its 
constituent parts (in that incentives or disincentives may be introduced through 
discriminate decision-making) and to continually adapt itself to the outside environment (in 
that each corporation may alter the overall internal dynamic o f the group through the 
balance o f interests it introduces in each action that it takes). Thus, this internal decision­
making system turns the corporate group into a “multi-stable” enterprise with an ever 
changing internal governance structure.325
Due to the action o f this decision-making system, the corporate group’s governance 
structure may assume an indeterminate variety o f forms and characteristics, depending on 
the blending o f market and hierarchy, contract and organization, strategically implemented 
at each moment. In particular, research demonstrates that there may be significant variation 
in management policies, subject to factors such as the group’s size,326 industry sector,327 
organization o f production lines,328 or degree o f diversification.329 By the same token,
323 See TEUBNER, The Many-Headed Hydra: Networks as Higher-Order Collective Actors, supra note 317, at 50.
324 Id. at 51.
325 See TEUBNER, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, supra note 317, at 84.
326 See JOSE ENGRACIA ANTUNES, Liability o f Corporate Groups: Autonomy and Control in Parent- 
Subsidiary Relationships in US, German and EU Law (Kluwer Law. 1994) at 191-208.
327 See W. EGGELHOFF, Patterns of Control in US, UK and European Multinational Corporations, 15 J. Int. Bus. 
Studies 73 (1984). See also BROOKE & REMMERS, The Strategy o f  Multinational Enterprise, supra note 318.
328 See ROBERT J. ALSEGG, Control Relationships Between American Corporations and Their European 
Subsidiaries (American Management Association. 1971) (In general, groups organized along product lines
factors such as the nationality o f parent and subsidiary,330 the subsidiary’s size,331 overall 
performance and age,332 the legal and economic characteristics o f the parent-subsidiary 
relationship333 or the group’s economic, social and legal environment,334 may also affect the 
management policies. Thus, as a general rule, fixed characteristics o f management policies 
may be found only in the very limited realm o f a concrete parent-subsidiary relationship 
and a concrete business decision o f an individual corporate member.335
In  sum, the internal economic dynamics o f corporate groups lies beyond the traditional 
distinction o f firm and market insofar as they remain a hybrid o f the firm and the market 
(i.e., an “organized internal market”). In this “organized internal market,” the open 
transferability o f assets and income between group members guarantees that the group’s 
resources are constandy being put to their highest economic use and, thus, ensures the 
economic viability o f the corporate group. In  order to ensure the constant maximization of 
overall profits in the “organized internal market,” the corporate group possesses a 
mechanism o f self-regulation and self-control based on the double orientation o f the 
actions o f its members. Due to this internal decision-making system, the corporate group’s 
governance structure may assume an indeterminate variety o f forms and characteristics, 
depending on the blend o f market and hierarchy, contract and organization, strategically 
implemented at each moment. Thus, as a general rule, fixed characteristics o f management 
policies may be found only in the very limited realm o f a concrete parent-subsidiary 
relationship and a concrete business decision o f an individual corporate member.
generally retain greater central authority over decisions on key personnel; by comparison, those organized 
along geographical lines are a federation o f  corporations with a high degree o f  local autonomy).
329 See JOSE ENGRAciA ANTUNES, supra note 326, at 191-208.
330 See A. NEGHANDI & MARTIN WELGE, Beyond Theory Z: Global Rationalisation Strategies o f  American, 
German and Japanese Multinational Companies (JAI Press. 1984) (There is evidence that significant 
variations in management policies may occur depending on the country o f location o f the parent corporation, 
due to diverse management traditions, and o f  the subsidiary, due to factors such as country and political risk 
or capital market and supply conditions). See also ERRAMILLI, 'Nationality and Subsidiaiy Ownership Patterns in 
Multinational Corporations, 27 Journal o f  International Business Studies 225 (1996).
331 See D . CRAY, Control and Co-Ordination in Multinational Corporations, 15 J. Int. Bus. Studies 85 (1984).
332 See CHRISTOPHER T ijg e n d h a t , The Multinationals (Penguin. 1973) at 11.
333 The legal nature o f  the intercorporate control relationship may assume different forms, each with  
potentially different characteristics o f  decision-making centralization (wholly or majority-owned subsidiaries, 
joint ventures, contractual linkages such as licensing, subcontracting, management contracts, etc). A lso, the 
econom ic interdependence between the com ponents o f  the corporate group (often measured in terms o f  
intercorporate flows o f  goods, services and capital) is generally considered to play a decisive role in the degree 
o f  decision-making centralization. See JOSE ENGRACIA ANTUNES, supra note 326, at 191-208.
334 See OECD, Structure and Organisation o f Multinational Enterprises (OECD. 1987).
335 In this sense see JOSE ENGRAciA ANTUNES, supra note 326, at 191.
2. The Legal Nature of Corporate Groups
This section will examine the characteristics o f the legal personality o f a single corporation, 
how it is affected by intercorporate control and to what extent the concept of legal person 
may be extended to the corporate group.
a. The Distortions to the Legal Structure o f  a Corporation Introduced by 
Intercorporate Control
Under the classical corporate law paradigm, self-sufficiency and self-governing 
characterizes a corporation.336 That is, the corporation, endowed with legal personality, 
exercises sovereignty over its decisions. As a self-sufficient and self-governed legal person, 
the corporation owns assets and liabilities and possesses organs which allow it to form its 
own will. However, the sovereign nature o f the corporation is distorted when it is 
controlled by another corporate entity and, thus, submitted to an external (and potentially 
differing) interest.337 In this situation, the controlled corporation may lose its status as a 
self-determined entity and become an entity subject to an alien hierarchical structure that 
favours a higher collective interest over its own.338
In particular, the existence o f a unitary economic direction in the group (crucial for its 
existence as an “organized internal market”) may relegate the particular economic interest 
o f a subsidiary in support o f the common objective o f overall profit maximization. In 
addition, because a corporate group does not possess a formal organizational structure, 
and, thus, generally builds its structure using the organs o f its members as if  they were its 
own, intercorporate control tends to result in significant distortions to the original 
attributes o f the corporation’s organs. These distortions jeopardize the foundations o f the 
corporation’s legal personality.339
In particular, the main distortions to the corporation’s organizational structure tend to 
occur at the level o f the board o f directors and the general meeting o f shareholders. 
Basically, there is a dissipation o f the legal powers o f the general meeting o f shareholders
336 See JOSE ENGRAciA ANTUNES, supra note 326, at 56-64. See also MELVIN ElSENBERG, The Structure o f  the 
Corporation - A Legal Analysis (Little Brown. 1975); J. FARRAR, Company Law (Butterworths 4th ed. 1998).
337 Id.
338 See TEUBNER, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, supra note 317, at 82ff.
339 See]OSE ENGRAciA ANTUNES, supra note 326, at 64-80.
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and an associated enhancement o f the real powers o f the board o f directors.340 In contrast 
to the classic corporate law paradigm where the general meeting o f shareholders is the 
“supreme organ o f the organizational hierarchy endowed with sovereign powers on major 
issues o f corporate life,” in an affiliated corporation the board o f directors tends to be the 
core decision-making organ.341 This “strengthened” board o f directors acts stricdy in 
accordance with the directives o f the headquarters, and, thus, possesses a mere limited 
sovereignty over the corporation’s decisions and existence.342
Thus, due to the group’s unitary economic direction and to the group’s “appropriation” o f 
the corporation’s organizational structure, the corporation that is a member o f a corporate 
group possesses, in practice, only limited ownership rights over its assets (instead o f an 
autonomous patrimonial endowment) and relies on organs o f other group corporations for 
many o f its decision-making capabilities (instead o f relying on its autonomous 
organizational structure).343 This distorts the foundations o f the corporation’s legal 
personality {i.e., its capacity o f action and its legal capacity),344 and gives rise to a different 
type o f property rights within the groups, the so-called “organizationally-bound” property 
rights.345
b. The Corporate Group as a Legal Person
As a consequence o f the distortions introduced by intercorporate control, over the past 
decades, jurisprudence and legal doctrine have widely debated the possibility o f attributing 
legal personality to the corporate group. In the courts, the discussion has usually revolved 
around the controversies o f the so-called “disregard o f the corporate entity” or “piercing 
the corporate veil” jurisprudence.346 In the doctrine, the debate has centred on the
340 Id.
341 See JOSE ENGRACIA ANTUNES, supra note 326, at 56-80. This organizational mutation is confirmed by 
theories on the evolution o f the modern enterprise that describe it as a constellation o f corporate sub-units 
whose direction and coordination is achieved through a hierarchical network headed by managers. See 
ALFRED D . Ch a n d l e r , Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History o f  American Enterprise (MIT Press. 
1962) at 30. See also ALFRED D . CHANDLER, The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American 
Business (Harvard University Press. 1977) at 320; MELVIN ElSENBERG, The Legal Role of Shareholders and 
Management in Modem Corporate Decision-Making, 57 Univ. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1969).
342 See JOSE ENGRACIA An t u n e s , supra note 326, at 99-108.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 See T e u b n e r , supra note 317.
346 These jurisprudential approaches (in the UK and the US, respectively) operate on the basis o f  a rule- 
exception system: the courts start their analysis with the presumption that the separate legal personality o f  
affiliate corporations is to be respected for all legal purposes and are only prepared to disregard this rule in 
the most exceptional cases and circumstances. See PHILLIP BLUMBERG, The American Law of Corporate Groups,
possibility o f attributing legal personality to the corporate group based on its purported 
nature as a unitary enterprise.347 Despite the strong jurisprudential and doctrinal debate, 
corporate groups have not been afforded formal legal personality.348 Among the different 
obstacles to such personification, the issues o f limited liability and international 
coordination o f legal regimes remain most fundamental.349
Broadly, it is claimed that limited liability is a rule o f allocation o f risks and costs originally 
designed for the individual corporation,350 which is significantly distorted by the 
phenom enon o f intercorporate control.351 Although it has been widely recognized that this 
distortion gives rise to significant negative consequences (due to the ability o f the 
headquarters to ring-fence liability at the level o f selected parts o f its business),352 it has 
been suggested that it constitutes a primary reason for the existence o f corporate groups 
and, thus, that its elimination through the legal personification o f corporate groups would 
seriously compromise the viability o f these entities as business enterprises.353 Additionally, 
it has been argued that the attribution o f  legal personality to corporate groups is not 
feasible in a world with national legal systems overwhelmingly resting on entity law.354
Due to these problems, legal analysis o f corporate groups has concluded that “neither o f 
the two simplest approaches to the legal status o f corporate groups — the maintenance o f
in Corporate Control and Accountability (Sol Picciotto ed. 1993). See also F. WOOLDRIGE, Groups o f  
Companies - The Law and Practice in Britain, France and Germany (Institute o f Advanced Legal Studies. 
1981).
347 See A. BERLE, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Columbia Law Review 343 (1947).
348 This is the rule in most jurisdictions. See JOSE IRUJO, Trends and Realities in the Law of Corporate Groups, 6 
European Business Organization Law Review 65 (2005); see also D . SUGARMAN & GUNTHER TEUBNER, 
Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe (Baden-Baden. 1990); JOSE ENGRACIA ANTUNES, supra note 326; 
JANET D in e , The Governance o f  Corporate Groups (Cambridge University Press. 2000).
349 See JOSE ENGRAcia  A n t u n e s , supra note 326.
350 As Blumberg notes, “limited liability triumphed in the United States at a time when corporations lacked 
the power to acquire and hold shares o f other corporations unless expressly granted by special statute or 
charter provision.” PHILLIP BLUMBERG, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law: The Search for a 
New Corporate Personality (OUP USA. 1993), at 52. This has also been the rule in most other jurisdictions. 
See JOSE E n g r Acia A n t u n e s , supra note 326.
351 Broadly, it is suggested that the limitation o f  the liability o f  the controlling shareholder has no justification 
on the basis o f  the lack o f  control over the corporation’s business (i.e., there is no separation between 
management and control). Id. See also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, supra note 341.
352 It is suggested that the ability o f  the headquarters to, in practice, affirmatively elect to ring-fence liability at 
the level o f  selected parts o f  its business, allows the headquarters to externalize beforehand the costs o f  
potential risks associated with more risky ventures and thereby avoid product, environmental or tort liability 
exposure. This creates undesirable social costs and increased market inefficiency, an outcome that is in 
absolute contrast to the general economic rationale o f  any system o f allocation o f enterprise risks. See 
PHILLIP B lum berg , Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 Journal O f Corporation Law 573 (1986). See also 
JOSE E n g r Acia  An t u n e s , supra note 326; Dine, supra note 348.
353 JVeJosE E n g r Acia A n t u n e s , supra note 326, at 158-206.
354 Id.
the traditional view that each constituent company in the group must retain an entirely 
separate legal personality, and the recognition o f the group as a legal entity in its own right 
which submerges that o f its constituent companies — is likely to prove either workable or 
acceptable.”355 Therefore, more recent legal theory focuses on more innovative approaches 
to the corporate group, assuming as a starting point that the tension between the ® 1
“autonomy” o f the subsidiaries and “control” o f headquarters is a “constituent principle” 
o f corporate groups.356
c. The Corporate Group as a Polycorporative Network
Departing from the assumption that the legal personification o f the corporate group is not 
feasible and based on the theoretical foundations o f autopoesis legal theory,357 Teubner 
proposed an original conceptualization o f the corporate group as a “polycorporative” entity 
composed by a “network o f intersystemic relationships between autonomous action 
centres,” i.e., a “unitas multiplex,”358 Teubner conceptualizes the corporate group as a new 
type o f social actor, “a higher-order autopoetic social system,”359 whose specific nature is 
reflected, as discussed above, in the dual character o f its actions,360 and in the specificity o f 
its property rights.361 Within this “higher-order” social system, the direct hierarchical 
control that traditionally defines an organization is substituted by an indirect “contextual” 
control o f self-directed subunits.362 This relative autonomy o f the subunits, in turn, creates 
specific group’s internal dynamic {i.e., so-called “^ //-dynam ics”). That is, due to its 
decentralized structure, the corporate group enters into a process o f “self-referential 
relationship...observing itself and using this self-observation to control itself.”363 The dual
355 TOM HADDEN, supra note 318 at 343.
356 See JOSE E ng rAcia A n t u n e s , supra note 326, at 158-206; see also TEUBNER, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate 
Governance in Group Enterprises, supra note 317, at 82ff.
357 Autopoesis is a theoretical paradigm developed in biology which conceptualizes biological systems as units 
which repeatedly reproduce “their elements from their own elements.” This theory was originally applied to 
the social sciences by Niklas Luhmann. Teubner based his work with autopoesis on Luhmann’s autopoetic 
concepts. For a description o f  the main aspects o f autopoesis in legal theory see M. KING, The "Truth" About 
Autopoesis, 20 Journal o f Law and Society 218 (1993). See also A. BECK, Is Laiv an Autopoetic System?, 14 Oxford 
Journal o f  Legal Studies 401 (1994).
358 See TEUBNER, supra note 317.
359 Id.
360 See discussion supra at pg. 84.
361 Teubner defines the nature o f the controlled subsidiary’s property rights as “organizationally bound 
property rights.” That is “the allocation o f  control rights within the firm ...[is]... arranged ... according to 
efficiency viewpoints oriented towards the interests o f the ‘corporate actor’, which is different from that o f  
any participant.” See TEUBNER, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, supra note 317, at 
82ff.
362 Id.
363 Id.
character o f the group’s actions and the specificity o f its property rights, in turn, make 
possible the existence of its “organized market.”364 These fundamental traits distinguish 
the corporate group from previous forms o f enterprise and make its conceptualization as a 
legal person totally misplaced. As Teubner suggests, “the group not as ‘corporate actor’ but 
as ‘polycorporative network’ is the formula that perhaps best characterizes the new qualities 
o f the group as a developmental stage o f industrial organization.”365
In sum, the corporate group should be conceptualized not as a legal person or individual 
corporate actor, but as a polycorporative network with a specific type o f property rights 
and operational characteristics. Further, in light o f corporate law’s limitations, tax policy 
should depart from the assumption that the corporate group will not be considered, under 
normal circumstances, a legal person in its own right. Thus, for the purposes o f this thesis, 
it will be assumed that the legal personification o f the corporate group and, thus, its 
selection as a taxpayer in its own right, is highly improbable.366
3. The Functional Structure of Corporate Groups
The purpose o f this section is to examine the functional organization o f corporate groups. 
Tax policy should not assume that the functional structures o f corporate groups follow 
their legal structures. The analysis will suggest that the design o f a group’s functional 
structure follows a different rationale from the one that underlies the design o f its legal 
structure {e.g., insulation o f liability from specific parts o f the group’s business; legal or 
practical requirements imposed by operations in a foreign country, etc.). Although both 
structures may eventually coincide in certain groups, they increasingly diverge.367
As will be discussed, this divergence is o f extreme importance for CIT due its emphasis on 
legal form. Further, the analysis will suggest that the flexibility to create functional 
structures that deviate from legal structures is important to allow for the constant 
adaptability o f corporate groups to their economic reality. Specifically, the analysis will 
suggest that corporate groups continually re-arrange their functional structures, usually in a
364 See supra discussion at pg. 80ff.
365 See TEUBNER, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, supra note 317, at 77.
366 As will be further discussed, the CIT system choice o f  taxpayer is usually interrelated with the corporate 
law’s concept o f legal personality due to the potential liability for unpaid taxes, court proceedings, etc. See 
BERTIL WlLMAN, Equalising the Income Tax Burden in a Group of Companies, 28 Intertax 352 (2000) at 353.
367 In this sense see TOM HADDEN, supra note 318, at 279 (“[Tjhere is an increasing divergence between legal 
and managerial structures in ... large corporate groups”).
movement towards operational and administrative decentralization, in order to cope with 
growing administrative and operational complexity. Thus, tax policy must take into 
consideration that tax regulations that rigidify functional structures reduce corporate 
groups’ capacity o f adapt to outside disturbances and, thus, penalize their economic 
performance.
a. The Evolution o f Functional Structures
The growth in the productive and distributive capabilities o f the modern enterprise has 
always been accompanied, and indeed made possible, by the parallel development o f its 
governance structures.368 The historical evolution o f the firm indicates that once a firm 
reaches a certain level o f operational complexity (as a result o f the increase o f the 
enterprise’s scale and scope), the centralized single-unit governance structure cannot ensure 
its continued development. Further, the requirements imposed by growth do not exhaust 
themselves in the simple evolution from a single-unit and single-corporate enterprise to a 
multi-unit and polycorporate enterprise. Once the firm adopts a multi-unit form, evolution 
continues through the progression from centralized governance structures to decentralized 
governance structures.
i. From the Single-Unit and Single-Corporate Enterprise to the Multi-Unit and
Polycorporate Enterprise
Economic history explains the rise o f the modern industrial enterprise as a result o f the 
introduction o f technological developments that, demanding high-volume production for 
their use, forced entrepreneurs to develop large scale production capabilities to fully benefit 
from their innovative potential.369 This growth o f the firm’s production capabilities 
required an improvement in its production management techniques (since it now possessed 
more personnel, more products, higher demand o f raw materials, in sum, more requisite 
coordination and planning) and its capacity to sell (since the firm now required better and 
larger distribution and marketing services to sell its larger production output).370
368 See Alf r e d  D. Ch a n d l e r , supra note 341.
369 See Alf r e d  D. Ch a n d l e r  & TAKASHI H ik in o , Scale and Scope: the Dynamics o f Industrial Capitalism 
(Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press. 1990) at 8ff.
370 Id.
As a result o f these developments, large manufacturing firms started to enjoy “substantial 
economies o f scale and scope”371 and, thus, were able to start to “produce at lower unit 
costs than could the smaller works.”372 Initially, growth occurred through internal 
expansion, that is, by a simple increase in the size o f the traditional single-unit and single­
corporate enterprise. Subsequently, however, it occurred through the addition o f new units 
to the original single-unit form, i.e., it occurred through the creation o f a multi-unit 
structure.373 This change in growth policy, which led to the rise o f the polycorporate 
enterprise,374 occurred as a result o f the exhaustion o f the single-corporation as a solution 
to the requirements o f modern enterprise.
In  particular, the economic exhaustion o f the single-corporate form resulted from the 
interaction o f four different set o f factors, namely financial {i.e., exhaustion o f the 
corporation’s self-financing capabilities),375 organizational {i.e., impossibility to manage the 
complexity o f large operations in the centralized single-unit form),376 economic {i.e., need to 
add new units if  the firm were to maintain its profitability)377 and legal {i.e., anti-trust 
laws).378
371 Economies o f  scale are economies where the increased size o f  a single operating unit producing or 
distributing a single product reduces the unit cost o f  production or distribution. Economies o f scope are 
those resulting from the use o f processes within a single operating unit to produce or distribute more than 
one product. Id. at 96.
372 Id. at 8.
373 The external expansion o f the business enterprise by adding new units to its single corporate and single­
unit form occurred basically in four ways. One was by acquiring or merging with enterprises “using much the 
same processes to make much the same product for much the same markets”; that is, growth by horizontal 
combination. Another was by taking on units involved in the earlier or later stages o f  making a product, 
“from the mining or processing o f raw materials to the final assembling or packaging”; that is, growth by 
vertical integration. The third way o f growth was to expand geographically to distant areas. The fourth was to 
make new products that were related to the firm’s existing technologies or markets. Id. at 37. See also ALFRED 
D. CHANDLER, supra note 341.
374 The multi-unit enterprise has generally adopted the polycorporate form. This is due to the specific 
comparative advantages o f the polycorporate form (such as the benefit o f limited liability at the level o f each 
operating unit or the administrative efficiency o f its governance structure) and because a significant number 
o f  corporate expansions occurred through acquisition o f  shares in other companies. See JOSE ENGRACIA 
ANTUNES, supra note 326, at 20-38. For this reason, both terms are used interchangeably in this thesis.
375 Id. at 22-26.
376 See E.T. PENROSE, The Theory o f the Growth o f  the Firm (Basil Blackwell. 1959) at 162.
377 A s Chandler notes “the m odern  industrial enterprise has rarely continued  to  grow  or m aintain its 
com petitive  p osition  over an extended  period o f  tim e unless the addition o f  n ew  units has actually perm itted  
its m anagerial hierarchy to  reduce costs, to  im prove functional effic iency  in m arketing and purchasing as w ell 
as production , to  im prove existing products and p rocesses and to  d evelop  n ew  o n es, and to  allocate resources 
to  m eet the challenges and opportunities o f  ever-changing tech nolog ies and m arkets.” See ALFRED D. 
CHANDLER, supra n o te  369, at 15.
378 See L. HANNAH, Mergers, Cartels and Concentration: Legal Factors in the US and European Experience, in Law and 
the Formation o f  the Big Enterprises in the 19th and 20th Centuries (N. Horn & J. Kocka eds., 1979) at 
306ff.
ii. Centralized and Decentralized Governance Structures
Interestingly, the requirements imposed by growth do not exhaust themselves in the simple 
evolution from a single-unit and single-corporate enterprise to a multi-unit and 
polycorporate enterprise. Once the multi-unit form is adopted, evolution generally 
continues through the progression from centralized to decentralized governance structures.
In  particular, as operational complexity increases, the governance structure o f the corporate 
group tends to evolve from a centralized holding form (H-form) to a functionally 
departmentalized form (U-form) to a decentralized and multifunctional form (M-form).379 
This evolution arises out o f the failure o f centralized governance structures to manage 
complexity. Specifically, the increased operational complexity in centralized structures 
creates a loss o f control over the lower-tier affiliates’ operations, and higher associated 
costs to implement transactions.380 Also, the associated managerial overload o f the 
headquarters in these cases engenders deficient strategic approaches (i.e., “short-run issues” 
tend to dominate “long-run strategies”).381 As a result o f such problems, centralized 
governance structures, such as the H-form and the U-form, are generally abandoned as 
corporate groups expand and diversify.382
Once the corporate group’s operations reach a significantly complex level, the corporate 
group tends to adopt the M-form, a decentralized and multifunctional governance 
structure.383 The crucial feature o f this governance structure (which is the predominant 
functional model o f western corporate groups)384 is its mix o f administrative and 
operational decentralization (to handle operational complexity) with centralized strategy (to 
ensure the existence o f a unitary economic direction, crucial for the group’s viability). The
379 For a detailed description o f  the characteristics o f  each m odel and respective internal managerial structure 
see A lf r e d  D . Ch a n d l e r , supra notes 341 and 369.
380 In general, this is because in centralized structures information has to pass through multiple managerial 
levels. Id.
381 See WILLIAMSON, The Modem Corporation: Origins, 'Evolution, Attributes, supra note 315.
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 Although its acceptance has been slower among European than among US firms, M-Forms are arguably 
the dominant form o f governance structures among large diversified companies in the US and Europe. See R. 
WHITTINGTON & M. M a y e r , The European Corporation: Strategy, Structure and Social Science (Oxford 
University Press. 2000). It must be emphasized that the M-form structures are not a homogeneous set o f  
organizational arrangements. Considerable variation has been detected concerning the size o f  the corporate 
office, the use o f internal governance mechanisms and the vertical delegation o f  strategic tasks. See P. 
GOODERHAM & S. ULSET, "Beyond the M-FormTowards a Critical Test of the New Form, 9 International Journal 
o f the Economics o f Business 117 (2002).
administrative and operational decentralization is generally achieved through the 
coordination o f functional units (which commonly correspond to individual operating 
subsidiaries) by divisions (which normally aggregate operating subsidiaries under product 
lines or geographic regions). In turn, the centralized strategy is achieved by allocating the 
decision-making authority to the divisions.385 This blend o f administrative and operational 
decentralization with strategic centralization reduces the higher costs and control-and- 
strategy-formulating problems o f centralized governance structures.386
b. The Functional Structures o f Multinational Corporate Groups
Corporate groups handle operational complexity by decentralizing governance structures. 
The purpose o f this section is to reinforce this claim by demonstrating that the highly 
complex modern multinational corporate group (“M N G ”) is an extremely decentralized 
form o f enterprise. The results o f this analysis emphasize the significance o f the functional 
flexibility o f corporate groups for their continued economic development.
The Modem Multinational Corporate Groups: Beyond the M-Form
The M-form is the predominant functional structure o f western corporate groups. 
However, several economists suggest that an increasing number o f multinational corporate 
groups are structured under “a new organizational model...significantly different from the 
M-form organization.”387 The next section will be dedicated to the examination o f this 
claim. The investigation will be centred on two interrelated theories, namely the
385 The divisions in the M-form generally have to defend their expansion plans with regards to the the 
headquarters in terms o f profitability. These “divisional profit centers” are the foundation o f the “organized 
internal market” that characterizes most modern corporate groups. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, supra note 341 
at 37 and 383.
386 See O liver  E. W illia m so n , supra note 312.
387 See C. A. BARTLETT & S. GHOSHAL, Beyond the M-Form: Towards a Managerial Theoiy of the Firm, 14 Strategic 
Management Journal 23 (1993) at 24. Additional theorists that support a new conceptualization o f  the 
modern M NG include, among others, B. KOGUT &  U . ZANDER, Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary 
Theory of the Multinational Corporation, 34 Journal o f  International Business Studies 516 (2003) and J. 
BlRKINSHAW & A. MORRISON, Configurations of Strategy and Structure in Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations, 26 
Journal o f International Business Studies 729 (1995). Note, however, that some theorists question the validity 
o f this claim. See GOODERHAM &  ULSET, "Beyond the M-Form": Towards a Critical Test of the New Form, supra 
note 384. See also M. GOOLD & A. CAMPBELL, Strategies and Styles: The Role o f the Centre in Managing 
Diversified Corporations (Basic Blackwell. 1987) and WHITTINGTON &  MAYER, The European Corporation: 
Strategy, Structure and Social Science, supra note 384 (authors suggest that although several European 
corporate groups have been developing network organizations, their governance does not deviate 
substantially from the M-form principle o f  decentralized operations and centralized strategy).
“Transnationality” theory suggested by Bartlett and Ghoshal and the notion of 
“Heterarchy” advanced by Hedlund.
i. Transnationality
Under Bartlett and Ghoshal’s theoretical framework, the new critical source of competitive 
advantage for M NGs resides in the capacity o f their operating subsidiaries to innovate. 
This innovation capacity is anchored on the efficient use o f the resources and 
competencies located in the subsidiaries’ residence jurisdictions and results in the 
dissemination o f key assets and responsibilities throughout the corporate group.388 
Significantly, this new functional strategy reinforces intra-firm dependencies and, thus, 
strengthens the character o f the corporate group as a network. The end result o f this 
decentralization phenomenon is the transfer o f the locus o f entrepreneurship from the 
group’s parent to the operating subsidiaries.389
In particular, the managers o f the group’s subsidiaries (legal entities with their own balance 
sheet, profit and loss statement, and substantial financial independence),390 are given a 
“mandate to build their businesses as if they owned them.”391 Also, the managerial 
organization o f the group is streamlined, with more competencies attributed to local 
management.392 Under this new organizational model, the operational and business-level 
strategic decisions, and accountability for profits and losses are delegated directly to the 
operating subsidiaries, while the strategic decisions on inter-business and inter-division 
issues remain the responsibility o f division and corporate level management.
As a direct result o f this decentralized network structure, several o f the group’s operating 
companies are highly dependent on each other’s resources to achieve their own objectives. 
However, rather than simply place them into divisions, as in the traditional M-form, or let 
them stand entirely on their own feet, as in the holding company model, in the modern
388 See C. A. BARTLETT & S. GHOSHAL supra note 387.
389 See C. A. BARTLETT & S. GHOSHAL, The Individualized Corporation (Harper Business. 1997). Bardett and 
Ghoshal argue that the genesis o f  this phenomenon can best be understood in the context o f a gradual 
evolution o f multinational enterprises: from the international, multi-domestic and global enterprise to the 
transnational enterprise. For a description o f this evolutionary process see C. A. BARTLETT & S. GHOSHAL, 
Transnational Management (Irwin 2nd ed. 1995).
390 It is suggested that subsidiaries are generally permitted to retain a substantial portion {i.e., in general, 
approximately one third) o f  their net profits. Id.
391 Id.
M N G  these subsidiaries are linked both to their national management and to their global 
business area organization. Thus, in Bardett and Ghoshal’s model o f the corporate group 
as a “differentiated network,” the group’s organizational structure is fundamentally 
transformed from a hierarchy in which knowledge, resources and expertise are centralized 
at the parent group’s level or localized at the level o f a specific subsidiary, into a network 
where they might be located anywhere, but are able, by the use o f various communications 
systems, to be transferred to any other subsidiary when the circumstances require.
As a consequence o f the decentralization o f the group’s resources and entrepreneurial 
responsibility, indirect control mechanisms play a more significant role under this new 
group form than under the classical M-form. In particular, the headquarters focuses mosdy 
on driving the entrepreneurial process “by developing a broad set o f objectives and by 
establishing stretched performance standards,” with which the operating subsidiaries must 
comply.393 Thus, “normative social control,” that is, the implementation o f managerial 
control by emphasizing elements such as “institutional purpose, organizational process and 
the moulding o f people,”394 assumes a prominent role, substituting the M-form hierarchical 
governance mechanism and associated functional structure.
ii. Heterarchy
Hedlund proposes a similar theoretical framework to that advanced by Bartlett and 
Ghoshal. Hedlund suggests that networks composed o f several singular subsidiary nodes 
form the modern M NG.395 Like Bartlett and Ghoshal, Hedlund emphasizes the modern 
M N G ’s significant flexibility (both in the relationship between subsidiaries among 
themselves and in the relationship between subsidiaries and outside agents) and its use o f 
normative mechanisms o f control to ensure its unitary economic direction.396 In addition, 
Hedlund emphasizes the strengthened role o f the individual subsidiary in the definition o f 
the overall M N G ’s strategy397 and the loose organizational principles o f the M NG.398
393 See C. A. BARTLETT & S. GHOSHAL, supra note 387 at 29.
394 Id.
395 See G. HEDLUND, The Hypermodem M NC: A  Heterarchy?, Human Resource Management (1986); G. 
HEDLUND, A  Model of Knowledge Management and the N-Form Corporation, 15 Strategic Management Journal 73 
(1994).
396 These normative mechanisms are based on the development o f  a shared awareness o f  overall culture, 
values, goals and critical interdependencies. Id.
397 Specifically, Hedlund claims that the subsidiary management is given a strategic role, impacting both the 
subsidiary and the M NG as a whole. Id.
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In  sum, the organizational structures o f M NGs have been gradually decentralizing in 
response to the complexity o f managing innovation processes in the cross-border arena. 
The analysis suggests that multinationality accentuates two fundamental characteristics of 
the modern corporate group emphasized by Teubner in his “polycorporative network” 
theory. First, multinationality reinforces the nature o f the corporate group as a network of 
interdependent corporations. Second, multinationality emphasizes the role o f “normative” 
or, in Teubner’s taxonomy, “contextual” mechanisms o f control.
All told, the functional structures o f corporate groups do no t necessarily follow their legal 
structures. The design o f a group’s functional structure follows a different rationale from 
the one that generally underlies the design o f its legal structure and, although both 
structures may eventually coincide in certain groups, they increasingly diverge. Also, this 
flexibility to create functional structures that deviate from legal structures allows for the 
constant adaptability o f corporate groups to their economic reality. Corporate groups 
continually re-arrange their functional structures, usually in a movement towards 
operational and administrative decentralization, in order to cope with growing 
administrative and operational complexity.
4. The Nature of Corporate Groups
As member o f a corporate group, a corporation is part o f a larger entity, an atom of a 
molecular structure.399 Through its submission to a group level unitary economic direction, 
the corporate atomistic entity integrates into the molecular group structure. The tension 
between this unitary economic direction and the individual corporation’s legal and 
economic substratum generates the internal dynamic or chemical bond that gives rise to the 
corporate group’s molecular structure.400
398 In particular, Hedlund suggests that although there are multiple organizing principles (based upon 
function, product, geography and customer type) no single overriding dimension is super ordinate to the rest. 
Id.
399 For the classification o f corporate groups as molecular structures see JOSE ENGRACIA ANTUNES, supra 
note 326.
400 The definition o f  chemical bond is the following: “There is a chemical bond between two atoms or groups o f  
atoms when the forces acting between them are strong enough to lead to the formation o f  an aggregate with 
sufficient stability to be regarded as an independent species. All bonds arise from the attraction o f  tanlike 
charges.” In The Columbia Encyclopedia, available at
http://www.answers.com/library/Columbia+Encyclopedia-cid-14697 (Columbia University Press 6th ed. 
2001-04).
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This internal dynamic constitutes the critical element for the characterization o f the 
corporate group as a particular form o f enterprise. Specifically, a corporate group forms 
whenever certain opposing forces that are “strong enough to lead to the formation o f an 
aggregate with sufficient stability to be regarded as an independent species” act between 
atomistic corporations.401 These opposing forces are the coordinating principles o f the firm 
vs. the market and the autonomy o f the group’s affiliates vs. the control imposed by the 
group’s headquarters. The internal dynamic generated by the tension between these 
opposing principles fundamentally distinguishes the molecular corporate group from the 
atomistic single-corporate entity.
This internal dynamic or chemical bond materializes in the group’s organized internal market. 
In  this organized internal market, assets and income are constantly transferred between 
group members. Thus, in the same way that molecules only exist if atoms exchange 
electrons to create a chemical bond, the corporate group may only exist if group members 
exchange assets and income to create the internal dynamic o f an organized internal market. 
The corporate group requires flexibility to transfer assets and income internally in order to 
be economically viable.
In order to ensure the constant maximization o f overall profits in its organized internal 
market, the corporate group possesses a mechanism o f self-regulation and control, based 
on a double orientation o f the actions o f its members. That is, in the context o f a group, 
individual actions are simultaneously and cumulatively oriented to the common goal and to 
the individual goals o f the members, with no normative primacy o f one orientation versus 
the other. Subject to this internal decision-making system, the corporate group’s 
governance structure assumes an indeterminate variety o f forms and characteristics, 
depending upon the blend o f market and hierarchy, contract and organization, strategically 
implemented at each moment.
This internal dynamic o f the corporate group substantially distorts the individual 
corporation’s structure. When controlled by another corporate entity and submitted to the 
external (and potentially differing) interest o f the headquarters, the corporation’s sovereign 
nature is distorted. In this situation, the controlled corporation may lose its status as a self- 
determined entity and become an entity subject to an alien hierarchical structure that
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privileges a higher collective interest over its own single interest. This distorts the 
corporation’s legal personality and gives rise to a different type o f property rights within 
the groups, i.e., “organizationally-bound” property rights.
In  response to the distortions introduced to the legal characteristics o f a corporation, 
certain commentators claim that the molecular corporate group structure should be 
deemed the actual legal person. However, giving legal personality to corporate groups 
would extinguish them. That is, the tension between the opposing forces o f autonomy and 
control, and firm and market that generate its chemical bond would disappear and, thus, the 
group as a particular form o f business enterprise would cease to exist. Also, the potential 
conflicts that would arise from the required international coordination o f legal regimes in 
the case o f multinational corporate groups should make such approach impracticable. 
Therefore, the corporate group should be conceptualized not as a legal person or individual 
corporate actor, but as a polycorporative network with specific property rights and 
operational characteristics.
Finally, the functional structures o f corporate groups do not necessarily follow their legal 
structures. The design o f a group’s functional structure follows a different rationale from 
the one that generally underlies the design o f its legal structure and, although both 
structures may eventually coincide in certain groups, they increasingly diverge. Also, this 
flexibility to create functional structures that deviate from legal structures allows corporate 
groups to continually adapt to their economic reality. That is, corporate groups need to re­
arrange their functional structures in order to cope with administrative and operational 
complexity. Those changes generally occur in a movement towards operational and 
administrative decentralization.
5. Tax Policy and the Nature of Corporate Groups
Corporate groups require flexibility to transfer assets and income internally in order to 
remain economically viable. However, this flexibility may produce significant negative 
consequences. As will be further discussed, an “unbounded” organized internal market may 
open the doors to transfers o f assets and income between group members with the sole 
purpose o f obtaining more favourable tax treatment for the corporate group. Thus, the 
design o f tax rules for corporate groups faces a dilemma in that, while it must recognize
that the internal transfer o f assets and income is a fundamental requirement for their 
economic efficiency, it also needs to consider that granting unbounded flexibility to these 
entities may produce negative consequences capable o f compromising the regulatory 
purposes. Indeed, when granted unbounded flexibility, corporate groups may (and 
commonly do) transfer assets and income between group members merely to take 
advantage o f more beneficial tax treatment.
Further, the “chameleon-like” nature o f the corporate group, despite its beneficial 
consequences to the group’s economic efficiency, poses a serious challenge to tax policy 
since it may be (and often is) used to avoid tax regulations. That is, due to its extremely 
flexible decision-making structure, the corporate group may easily change its governance 
structure and make a discriminate use o f the corporate veil o f its affiliates to evade tax 
regulations.
In addition, tax policy should depart from the assumption that, in light o f corporate law’s 
limitations, the corporate group will not be considered a legal person in its own right under 
normal circumstances. Thus, for the purposes o f this thesis, it will be assumed that the legal 
personification o f the corporate group and, thus, its selection as a taxpayer in its own right, 
remains highly improbable. For purposes o f this research, the corporate group will be 
conceptualized not as a legal person or individual corporate actor, but as polycorporative 
network with a specific type o f property rights (i.e., organizationally-bound property rights) 
and operational characteristics.
Lasdy, tax policy should not assume that the functional structures o f corporate groups 
follow their legal structures. Also, tax policy must take into consideration that the flexibility 
to create functional structures that deviate from legal structures allows for the adaptability 
o f corporate groups to their economic reality. Thus, tax regulations that rigidify functional 
structures may reduce the corporate groups’ capacity to adapt to outside disturbances and 
penalize their economic performance.
In sum, in order to minimize the deadweight loss o f the CIT system, the design o f tax rules 
for corporate groups should take into consideration the following. First, that tax 
regulations should be structured so as to preserve the economic efficiency advantages that
corporate groups have developed during their evolution as business enterprises.402 Second, 
that tax regulations should implement models that, ab initio, take into consideration the 
“chameleon-like” nature o f corporate groups and its potential use to obtain (unlawful) tax 
advantages.403
Based on this analysis, this thesis will now identify the sources o f deadweight loss that may 
arise when corporate groups are taxed under the Standard CIT System. The thesis will first 
analyze the mechanics o f the Standard CIT System. Subsequently, it will determine how 
corporate groups may be expected to react to such body o f rules. The section will conclude 
by investigating the potential consequences o f taxing corporate groups under the Standard 
CIT system.
B. The Mechanics of the Standard CIT System
This section will examine the mechanic structure o f the Standard CIT System. Then, it will 
analyze the problems that may arise when the Standard CIT System faces the economic, 
legal and functional specificities o f corporate groups.404
/. The Basic Operational Structure of the Standard C IT System
Under a CIT system (i.e., a realization-based, corporate-level, income tax system), the 
receipt o f income and variations in the market value of assets and stock are subject to tax 
only when their legal titles are transferred between a corporation and another taxpayer.405 
For administrative reasons, the actual payment o f tax on such transfers generally occurs on
402 In a similar sense in the corporate law field see TEUBNER, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group 
Enterprises, supra note 317 (“[Tjhe maintenance, indeed the legal encouragement, o f  the extremely flexible 
nature o f  the network organization can be achieved only by systematically taking into account 
the...characteristics o f  the group”); see also TEUBNER, The Many-Headed Hydra: Networks as Higher-Order 
Collective Actors, supra note 317.
403 Teubner, for instance, suggests that the regulatory approach itself needs to be “chameleon-like,” that is “it 
needs to adapt itself to the flexible practice o f  corporate groups that chooses ad hoc and opportunistically the 
suitable blend between market and organization as well as the necessary degree o f centralization.” Id.
404 As previously noted, for purposes o f  this thesis, “Standard CIT System” refers to the current US CIT 
system rules with the exclusion o f  tax integration regimes {i.e., US Consolidated Return regime; de facto 
consolidation under the Check-the-Box rules; Subchapter S rules; etc). Where considered relevant, certain 
aspects o f  the UK corporate tax system will be brought into the analysis.
405 In particular, tax is only due when a transfer in the sense o f  sale or exchange or the receipt o f  proceeds, 
which constitute earnings rather than a return o f  capital, has occurred. See discussion supra at pg. 19.
a yearly basis.406 To give operational content to these structural pillars, several subsidiary 
rules are required.407
First, a distinction between capital and ordinary income is requisite.408 Specifically, since the 
realization principle gives selectivity to the taxpayer o f when to include income in its 
taxable income,409 the divide ensures that capital losses, which can be selectively triggered, 
do not reduce ordinary income.410
406 See, in the US, IRC Section 441 (a corporation, like any other taxpayer, must report its income on a 
taxable-year basis). The yearly tax assessment rule is imposed by practicality. Defining a moment on which all 
expenses and profits o f a certain period are determined and offset against each other is administratively much 
simpler. Further, it allows the government to receive income on a periodic basis to face its expenses.
407 In a similar sense see DAVID A. WEISBACH, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, 58 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2004) at 33 
(“[Realization creates a need for a host o f other tax rules [.]”); CLARK, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: A n  
Essaj in Statutory Evolution and Reform, supra note 7, at 96 (“Contemporary corporate tax law may be traced to 
... basic decisions or principles [.]”). See also discussion infra at pg. 111.
408 See id. at 33 (“[T]he concept o f  a capital gain is a creature o f  realization.”); STEPEK, The Tax Reform A ct of 
1986: Simplification and the Future Viability of Accrual Taxation, supra note 251, at 784-785 (“[T]he distinction 
between capital gain and ordinary income, with all its complexity, must be retained unless an alternative tax 
system can eliminate the need for the realization requirement.”). The distinction between capital and ordinary 
income is arguably based on an economic and practical distinction between types o f  income. From an 
economic perspective, it is argued that while certain income derives from the realized proceeds generated by 
an asset during the taxable period it is held (i.e., the income is a result o f  events that have already occurred 
and, thus, it is certain), other income derives from the sale o f  the asset itself, which is actually a realization o f  
the increase in the anticipated income the asset is expected to yield in future years (i.e., this gain has an 
uncertain nature, since it is based on ex ante anticipations and thus, it is a capital gain). Therefore, from a 
theoretical point o f  view, capital gains should be taxed only to the extent that there has been a change, during 
the holding period, o f  the anticipated flow o f  income that the asset may generate in future years. I f  no such 
change has occurred, such gain should not be subject to tax. This clear cut distinction has, however, not been 
implemented in US tax law. See YOSEPH M. EDREY, What are Capital Gains and Losses Anyway? , 24 Va. Tax 
Rev. 141 (2004) at 146. See also STANLEY S. SURREY, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation 69 Harvard 
Law Rev. 985 (1956) at 990 (defending the capital/ordinary income divide based on the division between 
"business" and "investment" income). But see CUNNINGHAM & SCHENK, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 
supra note 55, at 326, defending that there is no relevant economic distinction between capital and ordinary 
income. (“[N]othing inheres in the nature o f  a capital gain that warrants treating it differently from other 
sources o f  income.”). In addition, there is also a practical distinction between both types o f income under a 
realization-based tax system. In particular, while certain assets require the offset o f  realized gain against tax 
basis, other income is taxed in its entirety without the need for any offset against tax basis (i.e., this type o f  
income does not require the operation o f  the mechanism o f  basis because there is no need to record pre­
taxed amounts). See WEISBACH, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, supra note 407, at 33 (“[Distinctions remain 
between capital gains and ordinary income because capital gains generally are offset against basis while 
ordinary income is not.”). Certain countries, although not formally implementing this divide, have several 
limitations on the use o f  losses accrued on the transfer o f capital assets, which end up by having a similar end 
result.
409 See discussion supra at pg. 43.
410 See, in the US, IRC Section 1211. Interestingly, in the UK, “trading” losses may be set-off against capital 
gains o f  the relevant accounting period. The inverse, however, is not allowed. See JON FURSDON, British Tax 
Guide: Corporation Tax (CCH. 2009) at 79-80. For a defence o f the “cherrypicking” rationale to justify the 
capital/ordinary income divide see ROBERT H. SCARBOROUGH, Risk, Diversification and the Design of the Loss 
Limitations Under a Realisation-Based Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 677 (1993) at 681 (“It is widely agreed that the 
principal justification for limiting capital losses is to prevent selective realization, or "cherrypicking," o f  losses 
by taxpayers who have unrealized gains.”). See id. at ft 12 for extensive bibliography on the subject. See also 
ZELINSKY, supra note 31, at 908 (“[T]he limitation on capital loss deductions is a reasonable response to the 
possible manipulation o f  the realization regime, precluding taxpayers from accelerating the realization o f  loss 
while they postpone the realization o f  gain.”). Note, however, that some commentators critize this 
“cherrypicking” rationale to justify the capital/ordinary income divide. First, it is claimed that “cherrypicking”
Limitations on the use o f losses constitute a second category o f rules required by this type 
o f  tax system.411 To begin with, character loss limitations enforce the capital/ordinary 
income divide. That is, loss limitations avoid capital losses from being selectively 
characterized by the taxpayer as ordinary losses and, thereby, reduce ordinary income.412 
Further, in order to enforce the separate tax personality o f individual corporations, entity 
loss limitations are required so that taxpayers may not transfer losses to entities other than 
those that originated the loss.413 Lastly, year loss limitations are required. That is, in order to
is based on the faulty assumption that all taxpayers have both unrealized gains and losses, what may often not 
be true. Further, it is claimed that it is farfetched to assume that taxpayers, absent such divide, would rush to 
sell loss assets, what in many cases implies taking the tax element too far when compared with business 
motives. Finally, this assumes that taxpayers would be able to constandy generate new loss assets, what may 
not always be true. See MICHELLE ARNOPOL CECIL, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the Internal Revenue 
Code: A  New Paradigm for the Deductibility of Capital Losses 1999 U. 111. L. Rev. 1083 (1999) at 1118. See also 
ZELINSKY, supra note 31, at 908; STRNAD, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, supra note 
74, at 1888, fn.10. A  different type o f  argument against the existence o f this divide is that disallowing 
deductibility o f  capital losses (i.e., true economic losses) to taxpayers with no capital gains may discourage 
investment. See SCARBOROUGH, Risk, Diversification and the Design of the Loss Limitations Under a Realisation-Rased 
Income Tax, supra note 410, at 681 (“[T]he problem o f unusable losses is a problem o f behavior distortion; the 
limitation may discourage certain investments and risk management techniques.”); WEISBACH, The (Non) 
Taxation of Risk, supra note 407, at 33 (“[L]oss limitations often mean that losses cannot be fully deducted, 
which in turn means that losses effectively are taxed at a different rate than are gains.”); ZELINSKY, supra note 
31, at 908 (“[T]he limitation may...distort the economic behavior o f  such taxpayers as they seek capital gains 
to release otherwise nondeductible capital losses.”). For this reason, several commentators have defended a 
special capital gains rate (and it has indeed been implemented in certain time periods in the US) or a more 
effective taxation o f  undistributed corporate earnings. The problem with the special capital gains rate is that, 
although it may arguably reduce lock-in, it provides a very strong incentive to tax planning in order to change 
the character o f  income. Alternatively, other commentators defend that in order to reduce the problem of  
cherrypicking tax rules should strongly penalize retained earnings. The argument is based on the fact that a 
very high proportion o f  all capital gains and losses derive from the sale o f stock or other securities. That is, 
without accumulated earnings, there would be no significant capital gains to be taxed, and thus, the lock-in 
effect would be substantially reduced. See CECIL, supra note 410, at 1118. However, apart from the fact that 
these types o f  measures are not easy to implement (see e.g., the current anti-abuse rules to combat retained 
earnings in the US, i.e., IRC Section 531 (Accumulated Earnings Tax) and IRC Section 541 (Personal Holding 
Company regime)), as well as o f  its potential corporate governance side-effects, there could be an increase in 
lock-out behavior, since this measure could increase the amount o f  capital losses on stock dispositions. On 
the potential corporate governance implications see discussion supra at pgs. 50-51.
411 In the same sense see WEISBACH, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, supra note 407, at 33 (“[Bjecause o f  
realization, the actual tax system has a number o f limitations on the use o f  losses.”).
412 See e.g., in the US, rules applicable to limit bootstrap acquisitions. See infra note 531.
413 For instance, in the US, in the context o f  business combinations and reorganizations the availability o f loss 
carryovers to other entities is restricted by several, fairly complex, provisions including IRC Section 269 
(prohibits a carryover if  the principal purpose o f  the acquisition was to avoid federal income taxes); IRC 
Section 381 (restricts carryovers to only certain forms o f  tax-free corporate reorganizations and liquidations); 
IRC Section 382 (limits use o f carryover in certain stock acquisitions); IRC Section 383 (similar restrictions to 
those imposed by IRC Section 382, but applicable, among other attributes, to carryovers o f  capital losses) and 
IRC Section 384 (limits the use o f  carryovers on certain asset acquisitions). See also IRC Section 311 (a) 
(denies a loss deduction upon a corporation’s distribution o f  depreciated property to shareholders). Similar 
entity limitations exist in the UK. For instance, where a “trading” loss has been incurred in relation to one 
trade and that trade is subsequently merged with another trade, the income o f the merged trade must be 
streamed and the carried forward losses can only be set o ff against that part o f  the income o f  the merged 
trade which relates to the trade where the loss was incurred. Further, a body o f  anti-avoidance provisions 
applies to prevent the purchase o f shares in a company to obtain the benefit o f accumulated trading losses 
and to prevent the carryback o f  losses following a change o f  ownership. The provisions apply where, in any 
period o f  three years, there is a change in the ownership o f a company and a major change in the nature o f  
the conduct o f  the company’s trade, or if  at any time after the scale o f the company’s has become small or
counteract the negative effects o f the yearly tax assessment rule, there is a need to average 
income and, thus, permit carryover o f losses to tax years other than the one when the loss 
was incurred.414 However, due mosdy to administrative concerns, such possibility is limited 
either by restricting the carryover o f losses to prior tax years or by limiting the time allowed 
for their use in future tax years.415 In short, under a realization-based corporate-level 
income tax, paid on a yearly basis, character, entity and year loss limitations are necessary 
for the proper operation o f the system, i.e., to avoid the manipulation o f the realization rule 
by taxpayers and to cope with administrative concerns.
Third, in order to ensure that the tax is levied only when an actual transfer o f tide occurs, 
formal changes in corporate-shareholder relationships that involve a substantial continuity 
o f interest in a business enterprise should not be recognized for tax purposes. This avoids 
potential manipulations o f the realization rule and recognizes, for tax purposes, the 
continuity o f proprietary interest.416 However, it creates the need for a multitude o f rules to 
define continuity o f business interest, as well as to determine how to put into practice the
negligible and before any considerable revival there is a change in the ownership o f  the company. See 
FURSDON, British Tax Guide: Corporation Tax, supra note 410, at 87 and 91. Because o f  these different 
limitations on the use o f  losses, most often losses cannot be fully deducted, which in turn means that losses 
are taxed at a different rate than gains. See WEISBACH, The (Non) Taxation of RisA, supra note 407, at 33. 
Further, the accumulation o f these different loss limitations may arguably, as will be discussed further below, 
have a detrimental effect on corporate risk-taking. See discussion infra at pg. 191 ff.
414 See, in the US, IRC Section 172 (business operating losses may be carried back two years before the year o f  
the loss and forward twenty years) and IRC Section 1212 (for capital losses there is a carryback o f three years 
and a carryforward period o f five years). In the UK, for “trading” losses, carryback period o f  one year and 
unlimited carryforward period provided set-off is made against income arising from the same trade. As for 
capital losses, unlimited carryforward but no carryback period allowed. Note that from November 24, 2008 to 
November 23, 2010, as a temporary measure to counter the effects o f  the economic downturn, the period for 
which a business may carryback current trading losses against previous profits is extended to a period o f  three 
years. See FURSDON, British Tax Guide: Corporation Tax, supra note 410, at 85. See also on the need for year 
loss limitations PREBBLE, Why is Tax Law Incomprehensible?, supra note 11, at 385 (“[A]s soon as we draw lines 
to divide income into periods delimited by time we must have whole bodies o f rules to allocate receipts and 
expenses to their correct years...Also, we must have other bodies o f rules to try to minimize the unfair 
effects that strict year-by-year accounting otherwise has on people ...  who have incomes that are lumpy, in 
that they fluctuate in amount.”); M. CAMPISANO & R. ROMANO, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Lass Offsets, 
76 Northwestern University Law Review 709 (1981) at 710 (‘T h e present statutory scheme is usually 
supported by a rationale based on the concept o f income averaging: that is, the idea that taxpayers whose 
income fluctuate from year to year should receive tax treatment equivalent to those with stable incomes”).
415 While this administrative concern makes sense in the case o f  loss carrybacks, since it requires an alteration 
o f prior tax returns, there is no apparent reason for capping carryforwards. For this reason, from an 
administrative point o f  view, it looks like there should be a limitation for the years allowed as a carryback, but 
there should be no such limitation for carryforwards. From this point o f  view, an optimal solution would 
seem to rest on a hybrid o f the current US and UK year loss limitations, i.e., limit carryback to a longer period 
than the one presently allowed in the UK {i.e., from one to two years, as currently occurs in the US) but allow 
unlimited carryforwards o f losses (as presently occurs in the UK). This solution, which should go in the 
direction o f  the policy recommendation previously advanced {i.e., use o f long carryover periods for behavioral 
efficiency reasons), is also, as will be further discussed, a solution privileged by some economists due to its 
beneficial impact on corporate risk-taking. See discussion infra at pg. 191ff.
416 See discussion infra at pg. 120ff.
non-taxability o f the transaction, despite the transfer o f assets, income and, in certain cases, 
tax attributes, to a different taxpayer.417
Fourth, due to its nature as a separate tax levied on corporations, shareholder dispositions 
o f stock need to be taxed independendy o f corporate-level events. Accordingly, the need to 
create a dual set o f tax attributes, namely, a separate tax basis for assets and stock, so that 
dispositions o f stock may be treated purely as dispositions o f capital assets, follows.418 
Further, defining corporate distributions and determining their tax treatment ensues.419 
Finally, since in order to measure income, expenses must be recovered over time to match 
the realization o f income from an investment, this type o f tax system requires capitalization 
and depreciation rules.420
In sum, the selection o f a realization-based corporate-level income tax, which must be 
payable on a yearly basis, as a method for taxing the corporate sector demands the 
existence o f a subsidiary set o f rules in order for the system to operate properly.
417 For instance, in the US, the complexities associated with defining continuity-of-interest are considerable. 
As Bittker explains, ’’the continuity-of-interest doctrine has a multifaceted nature, depending on the context 
in which it arises. At the corporate level, the major focus is on the business enterprise and its continuation, 
under modified forms, following the corporate readjustment. At the investor level, the relevant factors are the 
nature and extent o f  investors’ continued participation in the corporation’s control, earnings, and assets as 
well as the relationship o f their interests to those o f  other shareholders and security holders after the 
transaction has been consummated. Thus, the nature o f the consideration received in the transaction (stock, 
debt or other property), the remoteness o f  the ownership interests from the underlying assets o f  the business, 
the proportion o f old owners who continue their participation after the transaction, the length o f time the 
investor interests continue (holding period aspects), and the special features and problems o f  debt securities 
all form important aspects o f the continuity-of-interest concept.” BORIS BITTKER &  JAMES EUSTICE, Federal 
Income Taxation o f  Corporations and Shareholders (WGL. 2005), Section 12.21 [1] at 12-26, 27. See also 
discussion infra at pg. 120ff.
418 See discussion infra at pg. 104.
419 In particular, an issue arises regarding which distributions classify as dividends and how to treat those 
dividends. See, e.g., in the US, IRC Section 316 (defines the term “dividend” as a distribution o f  property by a 
corporation to its shareholders from its current or accumulated earnings and profits). On the complexities 
associated with such definition see BITTKER &  EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f  Corporations and 
Shareholders, supra note 417, at Chapter 8. See also on the mechanics o f  the distribution, Section 301 
(providing whether property distributions by corporations to their shareholders are treated as dividends or as 
a return o f stock basis). For an in-depth coverage o f corporate/shareholder integration issues, an issue 
outside the scope o f  this thesis, see PETER A. HARRIS, Corporate/Shareholder Income Taxation and 
Allocating Taxing Rights Between Countries: A Comparison o f  Imputation Systems (IBFD Publications. 
1996). See also BITTKER &  EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f  Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 
417, at Section 1.08; for an exhaustive list o f  references on the topic see ALI, Integration o f  the Individual and 
Corporate Taxes (Alvin C. Warren. 1993) at 223. Further, in order to avoid absence o f  shareholder-level 
taxation, rules are required to tax retained earnings (see e.g. in US, Accumulated Earnings Tax (IRC Section 
531) and Personal Holding Company regime (IRC Section 541)). It is arguable, however, whether these tax 
law restrictions have any sizeable impact on the distribution policy o f  corporations. See CECIL, supra note 410, 
at 1118 (“[Tjhese provisions [i.e., accumulated earnings tax and personal holding company regime], as 
currently designed, merely act as a trap for the unwary. Savvy tax planners can work around them.”).
420 See WEISBACH, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, supra note 407, at 34 (“Realization... means that the tax system 
has to provide complex rules for the capitalization and depreciation o f  expenses.”).
Specifically, from a mechanical point o f view, the erection o f the corporate tax system on 
these structural pillars demands the following rules:
1. Distinction between capital and ordinary income {i.e., to avoid manipulation o f the 
realization-rule);
2. Character, entity and year loss limitations {i.e., to avoid manipulation o f  realization- 
rule and to cope with administrative concerns);
3. Rules to define and to implement the continuity o f business interest {i.e., to avoid 
manipulation o f the realization-rule and to recognize the continuity o f proprietary 
interest for tax purposes);
4. Dual set o f tax attributes, namely, a separate tax value for assets and stock {i.e., to 
allow for a corporate-level tax);
5. Rules to define corporate distributions and determine their tax treatment {i.e., to
allow for a corporate-level tax);
6. Tax basis and loss year carryover mechanisms {i.e., to implement the realization-rule 
in the context o f the yearly tax assessment rule); and
7. Capitalization and depreciation rules {i.e., to implement the realization-rule in the
context o f the yearly tax assessment rule).
Further, each corporation must have a basic set o f tax attributes in order for these rules to 
function. To begin with, each corporation must be attributed a tax value for its stock 
(“outside basis”) and a tax value for its assets (“inside basis”).421 This dual tax basis follows
421 Tax basis, like its equivalent financial accounting term “book value,” represents an investor's initial 
"investment" in an asset. In the US, the determination o f  the initial amount o f  basis fundamentally depends 
on the source o f  the taxpayer’s ownership o f  property. See IRC Section 1012. See also GLEN ARLEN KOHL, 
The Identification Theory of Basis, 40 Tax L. Rev. 623 (1985). In particular, separate groups o f  rules apply to cost 
basis, property acquired in an exchange, transferee basis, property acquired in a distribution, property 
acquired through contribution, and pass-through situations. The various basis rules reflect competing policy 
considerations. The determination o f basis is generally a multi-step process, beginning with basis arising from 
the nature o f the acquisition, continuing through the impact o f acquisition costs and liabilities, and ending 
with an analysis o f any applicable special rules. See JAMES E. MAULE, BNA Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. 
Income Series, Income Tax Basis: Overview and Conceptual Aspects (560-2nd) (Tax Management Inc. 2005).
from two main reasons. Firstly, outside and inside tax basis allow the system to keep track 
o f  untaxed amounts until an actual transfer o f tide o f the corporation’s stock or assets 
occurs.422 Secondly, inside tax basis allows the system to determine and to keep track of 
capitalized amounts.423
Lasdy, each corporation must be attributed individual accounts for current year taxable 
income and accumulated losses, in both cases, segregated into ordinary and capital 
income.424 These accounts provide the tax system with the ability to accurately record the 
amount, location and character o f the tax attributes o f each individual corporation.425 
Overall, three types o f losses recorded in the individual tax attributes of a corporation 
carryover, either to different tax years or to a different taxpayer. Specifically, ordinary losses 
(hereinafter “NOLS”),426 capital losses (hereinafter “NCLs”)427 (both o f which either 
incurred in the current tax year or accumulated from prior tax periods), and built-in losses 
(as recorded in the tax basis o f its assets).428 See diagram below for loss corporation P.429
Although the market value o f  stock and the underlying corporate assets is the same, each has an independent 
value for tax purposes and different elements that impact their tax value.
422 Specifically, upon an actual transfer o f  title, the existing tax basis in the property is subtracted from the net 
sales price (amount realized) to determine the taxable gain or loss on the sale. See IRC Section 1001. Since tax 
basis transcends taxable years, it is thus one o f  the devices, together with carryforwards and carrybacks o f  tax 
losses, for ensuring consistency from taxable year to taxable year. As Kohl notes, in many respects, the “role 
o f basis in the tax law is to identify the portion o f a taxpayer’s wealth that is exempt from future income 
taxation.” See KOHL, supra note 421. See also CAMPISANO &  ROMANO, supra note 414, at 716 (“A firm’s capital 
...consists o f  property that has already been taxed.”). This consistency, both on the record o f  taxed amounts 
and capitalization treatment, is especially relevant when property is transferred between different entities or 
when property is substituted for similar property. In particular, where the transaction is tax-free, the 
fundamental mechanics is based on the carryover-basis mechanism, i.e., the transferee gets the asset with a 
substituted basis, which may be either transferred or exchanged. That is, basis is determined by reference to 
the basis in the hands o f the transferor from whom the taxpayer acquired the property (“transferred basis”) 
or by reference to other property held at any time by the taxpayer (“exchanged basis”). The result o f this 
device is to defer the recognition o f  gain or loss until a proper recognition event takes place. As for taxable 
transfers, the fundamental mechanic device is to equalize basis with market value at the time o f  the realization 
event. Depending on the difference between their market value and their adjusted tax basis, a taxable 
exchange may result in the recognition o f  capital gain or loss by the seller. Note, however, that if  the asset 
transferred is considered to be part o f  the taxpayer’s trade or business, the taxable income will, in principle, 
be characterized as ordinary income. See IRC Section 1221. See also MAULE, supra note 421.
423 See, in the US, IRC Section 168 (in determining the annual depreciation deduction, taxpayers divide the 
initial inside tax basis by its useful life).
424 In addition, in the US, there is the so-called Earnings & Profits (“E&P) account, in order to keep record 
o f the distributions that may be classified as dividends. Once the E&P account is exhausted, the distribution 
is classified as a return o f capital. See IRC Section 316.
425 See, in the US, IRC Section 61 (generally interpreted as requiring that “income must be taxed to the one 
who earns it.”). See also BITTKER & EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations and Shareholders, 
supra note 417, Section 12.01 [2] at 14-6.
426 NOLs stands for N et Operating Losses.
427 NCLs stands for N et Capital Losses.
428 The carryover o f built-in losses on the corporation’s stock is a matter for its shareholder(s), not for the 
corporation itself.
429 The diagram assumes that Corporation P has an outside basis and an inside basis with built-in losses {i.e., 
in both cases, the value o f outside and inside tax basis is 4 and the market value o f  stock and assets is 2) as
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2. The Transactional Mechanics of the Standard CIT System
Each corporation, equipped with the tax attributes just described, transacts with other 
corporations.430 These transactions may transfer cash, assets, stock, and certain of the tax 
attributes described, between different entities. The tax treatment of such transfers depends 
fundamentally o f four interrelated considerations:
well as current NOLs and NCLs (both with a value o f  -2) and accumulated NOLs and NCLs (both also with 
a value o f -2). In the diagram, “ORD TI” refers to ordinary taxable income and “CAP TI” refers to capital 
taxable income.
430 For the purposes o f this work, the analysis will focus solely on the relationships between corporations per 
se. Nevertheless, where considered relevant, relationships with partnerships and other flow-through entities 
may be brought into the analysis.
a) The nature o f the good transferred;
b) The direction o f the transactional flow;
c) The relationship o f transferee and transferor corporations; and
d) The legal instrument adopted to implement the transfer.
a. Nature o f Good Transferred
Depending on the nature o f the good transferred (i.e., cash, assets or stock), there are 
different formal characterizations available and, in certain cases, different tax factors to 
consider when structuring a transfer transaction among corporate entities. Consider the 
formal characterizations available to implement a transfer o f assets or stock. W hen assets
or stock are transferred, depending on the facts o f the transaction, the transactions may be
characterized for tax purposes, for instance, as a sale, merger, capital contribution, 
liquidation, spin-off or distribution in kind.431 Certain o f these formal characterizations may 
not be available when only cash is transferred between corporations. For example, the 
characterization o f a transaction as a merger or a spin-off is unavailable when only cash is 
transferred between two corporations.432 By the same token, when only cash is transferred, 
alternative formal characterizations o f the transfer transaction may be available such as 
payment (or receipt) o f interest, royalties, service fees, rents (on contracts o f loan, licensing, 
rendering o f services and lease), distribution in cash or redemptions.433 In short, depending 
on the nature o f the good transferred, different formal characterizations may be available 
to implement the transfer transaction.
Second, the tax factors associated with the transfers o f assets, stock and cash differ. While 
the tax value o f cash always equals its market value, the tax value o f assets and stock may 
differ from their market value, i.e., assets or stock may have a built-in gain or loss.434 For 
that reason, they raise different tax issues. For instance, in order to avoid the manipulation 
o f the CIT System, transfers o f assets with built-in losses are usually subject to additional
431 For the formal requirements generally associated with each o f these transactions see in the US IRC Section 
1001 (sale); IRC Section 351 (capital contribution); IRC Sections 332 and 337 (liquidation); IRC Section 368 
(mergers and other corporate restructurings); IRC Section 355 (spin-offs and other corporate divisions) and 
IRC Section 311 (distributions in-kind).
432 See, e.g., in the US, IRC Sections 368 (mergers and other corporate restructurings) and IRC Section 355 
(spin-offs and other corporate divisions) requiring the transfer o f stock to be applicable.
433 Certain o f these formal characterizations may also be available for asset and stock transfers.
434 The transfer o f assets and stock, thus, demands tax basis adjustments in order for the system to keep track 
o f  already taxed amounts. See discussion supra at note 422.
restrictions to those imposed on the transfers o f assets with built-in gains.435 Further, the 
acquisition o f stock o f a business with NOLS or NCLs in its taxable income accounts are 
subject to different limitations to those imposed when only assets are acquired. That is, the 
taxable acquisition o f assets o f a business does not generally result in a transfer o f the 
corporation’s tax attributes.436 In contrast, the taxable transfer o f stock implies the transfer 
o f tax attributes, namely, potential current and accumulated NOLs and NCLs. For that 
reason, the selection o f whether to acquire a business through a stock or an asset 
acquisition raises different tax issues.437 In short, depending on the nature o f the good 
transferred, the transaction may have different tax factors to consider.
In  sum, depending on the nature o f the good transferred (i.e., cash, assets or stock), there 
may be different formal characterizations available and, in certain cases, different tax 
factors to consider when structuring a transfer transaction.
b. Direction o f Transactional Flow
The variety o f available direct transactional routes between a corporation and related or 
unrelated corporations differs.438 With unrelated corporations, only two possible types o f 
transactional flows occur, depending on the side of each party to the transaction (i.e., as 
buyer or a seller, lessor or lessee, lender or borrower), and a limited amount o f available 
formal characterizations for the transfer exist, namely, sale (or purchase) o f assets or stock, 
merger and payment (or receipt) o f interest, royalties, service fees and rents (on contracts
435 See e.g., in the US, imposing limits on the transfer o f built-in losses, IRC Section 269 (provides for the 
disallowance o f  deductions and other tax benefits when tax avoidance is the principal purpose for the 
acquisition o f control o f  a corporation or for certain transfers o f property from one corporation to another. 
Among other functions, it limits the use o f  losses from the sale o f  assets acquired with a built-in loss at the 
date o f  the acquisition) and IRC Section 382 (limits the amount o f  loss carryovers that can be used annually 
against the taxable income o f  a corporation acquired with, among other attributes, NOLs and “net 
unrealized” built in losses).
436 However, if  the asset transfer is implemented through a tax free transaction (qualifying, for instance, under 
IRC Section 332 (liquidation) or 368(a)(1)(D) (nondivisive reorganization)), NOLs and NCLs, among other 
tax attributes, may potentially carryover. See IRC Section 381.
437 See discussion infra at pg. 127 for in-depth discussion o f  the different elements associated with each type o f  
transaction. For similar asymmetries in the treatment o f  asset vs. stock acquisitions in the UK see JOHN 
TlLEY, Revenue Law (Hart Publishing 5th ed. 2005) at 846.
438 For indirect relationships and the issues they raise see discussion infra at pg. 123ff.
of loan, licensing, rendering of services and lease).439 All these transactions, excluding the 
merger, are generally taxable.440
Co.1All
Diagram 2
When corporations are related, three direct transactional routes are conceptually possible 
for a corporation, i.e., upward, downward and transversal. On each transactional route, two 
types of direction are possible, depending on which entity initiates the transaction.
A2
T3
T1
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Diagram 3
In particular, due to the stock relationship, extra transactional routes come into play, i.e., 
the upward and downward routes (See in the diagram above flows TI and T3). On each 
route, each transactional flow has different formal transactions available. Thus, on the 
upward flow, a corporation that initiates the transaction, on top of transactions available 
with unrelated parties, has other potentially available transactions - the liquidation, the
439 Mergers may be structured in several forms. The requirements for the formal characterization o f each o f  
these transactions are outside the scope o f this analysis. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, Federal Income 
Taxation o f Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 417, at Chapter 8.
440 The merger, provided certain conditions are met may be tax-free. Id.
spin-off and other divisive restructurings, distributions in cash or in kind and 
redemptions.441 On the downward flow, capital contributions may be available.442
In sum, a mid-tier corporate group member may initiate upward, downward or transversal 
transfers o f cash, assets and stock. The type o f formal characterization available to ^ a§e 
implement a transfer should vary depending on the direction of the transactional flow.443
c. Ownership Thresholds
On each transactional flow, tax treatment tends to vary depending on the degree of 
ownership, that is, on whether a corporation has low, medium or high degrees of 
ownership over another corporation.
A t
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Diagrams 4, 5 and 6
With a low degree of integration, tax treatment tends to equate to the treatment afforded to 
transfers between unrelated entities. That is, income and asset transfers, with the exclusion 
o f certain dividend distributions,444 are generally taxable.
441 As discussed below, this will depend on ownership thresholds and other specific requirements for 
qualification for these transactions. See e.g., in US, IRC Sections 332 and 337 (liquidations); IRC Section 355 
(spin-offs and other divisive restructurings); IRC Section 301 and 311 (distributions in cash and in kind); IRC 
Section 305 (stock distributions); IRC Section 302 and 317 (redemptions).
442 This will depend on ownership thresholds and other specific requirements for qualification. See, e.g., in US, 
IRC Section 351.
443 As discussed, some o f these transfers may also result in a transfer o f tax attributes, fundamentally, tax
losses. See, e.g., in the US, IRC Section 332 and IRC Section 368.
444 See, in the US, IRC Section 243(a)(1) (providing for a deduction o f  70 percent o f dividends received from a
domestic taxable corporation or 80 percent if shareholders own 20 percent or more o f the stock o f the
distributing corporation by vote and value).
With a medium degree of integration, certain non-recognition rules apply and, thus, certain 
transactional flows, depending on the facts and the legal instrument adopted to implement 
the transaction, may be tax-free.445 With a high degree o f integration,446 additional non­
recognition provisions apply to the upward and downward flows {e.g., capital contributions 
and liquidations).447 In these cases, due to the application o f non-recognition rules to only 
certain types o f transactions, the tax system increases its degree o f substitution.448 N ot 
coincidentally, therefore, several anti-abuse rules come into play only when medium to high 
degrees o f ownership are present.449
Thus, the higher the integration between corporations, the stronger the benefit facilitated 
by tax law. This “ranking” starts with the non-taxation o f dividends, and follows on to the 
tax-free transferability o f assets, stock and tax attributes. A similar ranking applies to anti­
avoidance provisions. While in a low integration context very few anti-avoidance 
provisions apply, many apply in the presence of medium to high degrees o f integration. 
Tax law favours economically integrated parties but as, a counter-entry, it increases the 
anti-tax avoidance arsenal.
445 See, e.g., in US IRC Section 368 (a)(2)(H) (allowing for tax-free treatment under a nondivive type D  
reorganization when 50 control is present).
446 In general, the threshold in the US tends to be 80% (75% in the UK). The wisdom o f the selection o f  such 
specific ownership thresholds is obviously debatable. See LEVMORE, Recharacterisations and the Nature of Theory 
in Corporate Tax Law, supra note 19, at 1063 (“(T]t is difficult to have strong feelings about the wisdom o f  an 
80% divide.”). See also discussion infra on the specificities associated with the definition o f control in tax law at 
pg. 120ff.
447 See, in the US, IRC Section 351 (capital contributions) and IRC Section 332 (tax-free liquidation). See also 
IRC Section 368 (corporate restructurings) and IRC Section 355 (corporate divisions).
448 See discussion infra at pg. 116. See also discussion supra at pg. 54.
449 See, eg., in the US, the arsenal o f anti-abuse rules that comes into play once medium to high ownership 
thresholds are present: IRC Section 267 (denies or defers deductions for payments to related parties), IRC 
Section 269 (provides for the disallowance o f  deductions and other tax benefits when tax avoidance is the 
principal purpose for the acquisition o f  control o f a corporation or for certain transfers o f  property from one 
corporation to another); IRC Section 482 (transfer pricing regime); IRC Section 163 (j) (defers a corporation’s 
deduction for so-called excess interest paid to certain related persons); IRC Sections 453 (e) and 453(g)(limits 
the use o f  the installment method in reporting gain on sales between related parties); IRC Section 1239 
(converts capital gains to ordinary income on the sale o f depreciable property between related parties); IRC 
Section 7872 (treats below-market interest loans between related parties as if  made at a rate tied to the federal 
borrowing rate); IRC Section 336 (d) (denies a corporation’s recognition o f  loss on its distribution o f  property 
to related persons in liquidation); Section 267(f) (defers losses from the sale or exchange o f  property, with the 
exception o f certain sales o f  inventory in the ordinary course o f business, between two members o f  same 
‘controlled group’ o f  corporations until such losses are realized by a sale or other transfer o f  the property 
outside the ‘controlled group.’ In general, ‘controlled group’ includes a more than 50 percent ownership 
threshold). See also discussion infra at pg. 118.
In sum, due to the applicability o f non-recognition provisions and anti-abuse rules, on each 
transactional flow tax treatment tends to vary depending on the degree o f integration 
between corporations.450
d. Legal Instrument Adopted
The adoption o f different legal instruments to implement a transaction, such as a sales 
contract, a lease contract or a merger deed, often results in differing tax consequences. The 
legal instrument adopted is closely intertwined with the elements discussed above, i.e., the 
nature o f the good transferred, the direction o f the transaction flow and the relationship o f 
transferee and transferor corporations.451
3. Structure, Form and Substance under the Standard C IT System
The analysis o f the mechanical operation o f the Standard CIT System brings a number o f 
issues to light. First, the core principles o f the CIT System fundamentally determine its 
asymmetric mechanical structure. Second, the formalism that naturally ensues from these 
principles significantly contributes to the complexity o f the tax system. Third, attributing 
tax significance to an economic unit under a tax system with these characteristics greatly 
increases its complexity. This section will now discuss each o f these aspects in turn.
a. The Basic CIT Principles and the Operational Structure o f the CIT System
Once certain core decisions are made, such as whether to tax the corporate sector through 
an accretion, a consumption or a realization-based tax, or whether to impose a tax directly 
on corporations or tax solely its shareholders, there is a subsidiary system o f rules and a set 
o f corporate tax attributes that must come into play in order for the corporate tax system 
to operate properly. In the case o f a CIT (i.e., a realization-based, corporate-level tax), paid 
on a yearly basis, these elements include the distinction between capital and ordinary 
income, loss limitations, capitalization rules, a dual tax basis for each corporation, rules to 
define the tax treatment o f corporate distributions and capitalization and depreciation rules. 
Since the remainder o f the tax system is built cumulatively on these principles and the
450 As will be discussed below, in tax law, the degree o f  integration between entities is generally assessed based 
on the percentage o f  shareholding as well as, in certain cases, certain additional requirements. See discussion 
infra at pg. 120ff.
451 As discussed, depending on each o f these elements, there may be different legal characterizations available. 
See discussion supra at pg. 106ff.
associated body o f subsidiary rules,452 their selection ends, thus, by strongly determining 
legislative evolution.453 In light o f the genetic incoherence o f these principles,454 the 
asymmetrical evolution of the CIT laws should not come as a surprise.455 The structural 
asymmetries o f the CIT system evidenced in the transactional analysis are, to a large extent, 
a logical consequence o f the genetic incoherence o f CIT’s core principles.
b. The Significance o f Form on Tax Treatment
The formalism that naturally ensues from these basic principles decisively contributes to 
the complexity o f the tax system. As evidenced in the transactional analysis o f the Standard 
CIT System, the tax treatment o f intra-corporate transfers varies depending on four 
interrelated considerations, i.e., the nature o f the good transferred, the direction o f the 
transactional flow, the relationship o f transferee and transferor corporations, and the legal 
instrument adopted to implement the transfer.
Tax treatment changes in these situations mostly because each o f these different elements 
induces changes in the formal characterization o f the transfer transaction.456 That is, 
whether the transfer involves cash, assets or stock; whether it occurs on an upward,
452 See discussion supra at pg. 14.
453 See SHAVIRO, A n Efficientry Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 
4, at 23 (“[Clorporate taxation is in many respects a closed, internally logical system, working out relendessly 
the consequences o f  initial premises, above all the treatment o f corporations as separate from their owners 
and corporate stock as distinct from corporate assets.”); CLARK, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: A n  Essay in 
Statutory Evolution and Reform, supra note 7, at 92 (“The corporate tax culture is . . .o f  endogenous origin. The 
pressures created by its own basic postulates have controlled its development."); WEISBACH, Line Drailing 
Doctrine, and Efficienty in the Tax Law, supra note 17, at 1633 (“Many doctrines, such as the realization 
requirement, are fundamental building blocks o f  our tax system.").
454 This genetic incoherence is fundamentally imposed by practicality. That is, the separation o f  an entity’s 
business life into yearly tax assessment periods, the selection o f  realization as a basis for taxation, or the 
differentiation o f tax treatment depending on whether a person holds an asset directly or indirectly, although 
genetically incoherent from an economic point o f view {i.e., they create fictional lines that do not correspond 
to economic reality), are imposed by practicality. See discussion supra at pg. 12ff. See also PREBBLE, Why is Tax 
Law Incomprehensible?, supra note 11, at 386 (“{T]he [tax] rules suffer from the handicap that their whole reason 
for existence is to divide something factual, the continuing flow o f  income, into a pattern that is imposed by 
the laws o f  men and women.”).
455 In the same sense see LEVMORE, Recharacterisations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, supra note 
19, at 1061-1063 (“Corporate tax law is arbitrary because...it requires a specific recognition event before it 
taxes appreciation in asset values and because it regards corporations as taxable entities that are distinct from 
their shareholders”); EDWARDS, Replacing the Scandal-Plagued Corporate Income Tax with a Cash-Flow Tax, supra 
note 19, at 9 (“A key problem is that the income tax superstructure has been built ever higher on a very 
problematic base.”). These asymmetries introduce substantial complexity and discontinuity in the tax system, 
which in turn, as will be discussed, may distort corporate behavior. See discussion infra at pg. 131 ff. See also 
discussion supra at pg. 13ff.
456 By "form" this thesis means the non-tax legal attributes o f  the transaction. By "substance" this thesis 
means the non-tax economic relationships between the parties created, and commercial goals achieved, by 
virtue o f the transaction. See LEWIS R. STEINBERG, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, 52 Tax 
Law. 457 (1999) at ft. 2.
downward or transversal direction and the entity initiates or does not initiate the 
transaction; whether the transferee and transferor corporations are related by low, medium 
or high stock ownership thresholds; or whether the transfer is implemented through a sales 
or a rental contract, determines the formal characterization o f the transaction and, thus, in
457m ost cases, its tax treatment.
This link between corporate tax treatment and the formal characterization o f a transaction 
occurs for several reasons. First, and fundamentally, the link stems from the erection o f the 
corporate tax system on top o f the realization principle. Since realization makes tax 
consequences occur only when a transfer o f property occurs between two independent 
taxpayers,458 tax comes into play only after commercial and property laws.459 Commercial 
and property laws determine which entities may classify as separate taxpayers,460 what 
classifies as “property,”461 which type o f legal title exists over a certain item o f property, 
and what constitutes a “transfer” o f property.462
Further, and interrelated, this emphasis on form results from CIT’s historical evolution.463 
In origin, CIT was built upon certain basic concepts developed in corporate law, 
bankruptcy law and accounting.464 Due to the essentially cumulative process of 
development o f corporate tax law, imported concepts such as “stock,” “debt,” “control,” 
or ’’reorganization,” have significantly contributed to the formalism o f the current CIT 
system.465 Lastly, this emphasis on form may be related to certain practical aspects
457 See discussion infra on the limitations imposed by anti-avoidance rules at pg. 119.
458 See discussion supra at pg. 19. See also discussion infra at pg. 116ff.
459 In general, under a realization-based tax system, rules come into play only after the application o f private 
law rules, primarily those o f property and commercial law. See YARIV BRAUNER, A  Good Old Habit\ or Just an 
Old One? Preferential Tax Treatment for Reorganisations, 2004 Brigham Young University Law Review 1 (2004) at 
18.
460 The CIT System’s choice o f  taxpayer is usually interrelated with the corporate law’s concept o f  legal 
personality. See discussion infra at note 480. This occurs not only for theoretical or historical reasons, but also 
due to practical motives, such as the potential liability for unpaid taxes, court proceedings, etc. See WlLMAN, 
Equalising the Income Tax Burden in a Group of Companies, supra note 366, at 353.
461 Although the CIT System then creates different classes o f  property for purposes o f  the capital/ordinary 
distinction. See IRC Section 1222(2).
462 Although some o f these concepts are then enriched with additional tax considerations, their definitions 
under commercial and property law tend to constitute the foundation o f  the tax law concepts. See discussion 
infra at pg. 13.
463 See, eg., CLARK, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: A n  Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, supra note 7; and 
STEINBERG, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, supra note 456, at 496 (“While some of 
Subchapter C embodies the logical elucidation o f fundamental tax principles, much o f corporate tax reflects 
the quirks o f history.”). See also discussion supra at pg. 13.
464 STEINBERG, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, supra note 456, at 496.
465 Id. See also id (“Initially, [the use o f  non-tax law concepts] made admirable sense, since it facilitated 
understanding by allowing taxpayers and their advisors to draw upon the rich body o f  meaning and 
interpretation already existing outside the tax law and was responsive to taxpayers' needs by clarifying how
associated with the operation o f the CIT system. Specifically, an emphasis may respond to 
a need for expediency in the tax law;466 to a belief that the tax law should give "fair notice" 
to taxpayers o f how their transactions will be taxed prior to their entering into such 
transactions;467 o f a desire to avoid whipsaw;468 or simply o f ensuring a notion o f 
transactional finality, such that later transactions or events do not affect the tax 
characterization o f earlier transactions.469
Independently o f its raison d'etre, this formalism o f the corporate tax system, when in face of 
the nature o f the corporate taxpayer, breeds complexity.470 Consider the central principle 
that taxability only occurs once a transfer o f property between two independent taxpayers 
takes place. Although the principle appears relatively straightforward, the problem is that 
while the transfer o f an asset’s ownership through a legal sale to an unrelated party is a sale, 
and possession o f  an asset without change is not, a substantial array o f possibilities between 
these two extremes exists.471 The tax law must classify transactions in this blurred area as 
either sold or held.472 That is, line-drawing under the Standard CIT System is mostly based
standard transactions will be taxed. Furthermore, because amendments to the Code were often made to stop 
particular kinds o f  abusive transactions, those amendments often referenced the particular types o f  
transactional patterns that had been commonly utilized by taxpayers, rather than the underlying tax principles 
or policies at issue.”).
466 See WEISBACH, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficienty in the Tax Law, supra note 17, at 1637 (“(T]he tax code 
might treat a taxpayer as holding an asset only if she has the risk o f  loss and opportunity for gain from the
asset But implementing this rule on a general basis proved [based on past experiences in US Courts] a
formidable proposition[.]”)
467 STEINBERG, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, supra note 456, at 497. See also id. (“Such a 
principle w ou ld  be prem ised n o t  only o n  n o tion s o f  fairness, bu t also o n  a desire n o t to  discourage taxpayers 
from  consum m ating econom ically  beneficial transactions because o f  uncertainty about h o w  such transactions 
w ill ultim ately be taxed.”).
468 Id. See also id. (“This argument has usually been adduced to support the Service's position that the taxpayer 
is bound by its chosen form. But, more generally, where different transactional forms have different tax 
consequences to the different parties to the transaction, some more favorable and some less favorable, taxing 
a transaction according to its form may be necessary to ensure that the parties receive the benefits they 
anticipated (and paid for) in entering into the deal.”).
469 Id. at ft. 187. See also id. at 497 (“[A] taxpayer that had previously consummated a commercially beneficial 
transaction would not have to fear that its after-tax position with respect to the earlier transaction would be 
adversely affected by entering into a subsequent transaction.”). The emphasis on form may also reflect the 
continuing importance o f  common law methods o f  reasoning in the law, with their emphasis on precedent, 
consistency and reasoning by analogy. Id.
470 For discussion on the nature o f  the corporate taxpayer see supra pg. 77ff.
471 WEISBACH, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, supra note 17, at 1634. See also id. (“The 
scope o f the realization requirement is elusive. N o underlying legal or economic concept serves as a 
touchstone.”). A significant problem arises, in particular, in those situations where there is a significant 
continuity o f  interest o f the transferor on the property transferred. A primary difficulty is the how to identify 
and treat such situations so as to recognize for tax purposes the continuity o f  interest, while safeguarding the 
system against abuses. See discussion infra at pg. 118.
472 Id. See also DANIEL SHAVIRO, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax 
Shelters, in Tax and Corporate Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed. 2008) at 234 (“[F]or a realization-based 
income tax to be feasible, one is virtually forced to make some sort o f inquiry into whether or not, as a matter 
o f  economic substance, particular transactions “really” were sales (whether so classified by the taxpayer or 
not). This, in turn, requires inquiry into actual changes in underlying economic relationships to assets.”).
on formal categories often detached from economic reality. Thus, merely by altering the 
legal characteristics o f a transaction, the taxpayer may obtain very different tax results for 
economically similar transactions.473
Directionality provides a further example o f this problem, clearly evidenced on the 
transactional analysis. As Steinberg notes, a transfer may have a different legal 
characterization depending on its transactional direction, i.e., depending on whether a 
person is viewed as initiating an action or, instead, as being the person against whom an 
action is initiated.474 By the same token, by choosing direct or indirect transactional paths 
the taxpayer may easily alter the type o f formal characterizations available to implement the
475transaction.
The problem is that the selection o f acquired versus acquiring status, or direct versus 
indirect transactional routes, is ultimately just a matter o f form and frequently indifferent to 
related parties.476 By manipulating the transactional direction, related parties may, thus, 
easily control the formal characterization o f the transfer transaction and, consequently, 
realization.477
473 See id. at 235 (“This basic tax law pattern — assessing the “reality” o f a transaction, and thereby inducing 
taxpayers to massage the economics o f what they are doing so as to achieve sufficient “reality” — is pervasive 
and fundamental.”); WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Taw, supra note 13, at 885 (“The tax law relies on form 
more than most areas o f the law, and one can easily manipulate form without changing the economics o f  a 
transaction.”); CANELLOS, A  Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring 
Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, supra note 168, at 55 (“Tax practitioners involved in real transactions 
are called upon to cast a desired business transaction in a form that is most beneficial from a tax 
perspective.”); id. at 50 (“To the tax adviser in true business transactions, the existence o f  substance is a given 
and form is usually a friend to the extent it permits the tax planner to control the tax results o f a given 
substantial transaction by employing one form rather than another.”); WEISBACH, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and 
Efficiency in the Tax Taw, supra note 17, at 1640 (“The distinctions between the taxable and the tax-free forms 
o f  ... transactions are ethereal. The order o f  otherwise interchangeable steps frequently determines the 
result.”); id. at 1638 (“Given the lack o f  definitive rules and the economic similarity between debt and equity, 
designing instruments to skirt the border has become one o f  the most active practices in tax planning.”).
474 See STEINBERG, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, supra note 456, at 458. See also id. at 472 
(“Because so many o f  the requirements for reorganization status apply only to the acquired corporation and 
its shareholders, and not to the acquirer, the parties have considerable flexibility in shaping the tax 
consequences to the parties o f  the transaction.”).
475 For example, instead o f  a direct distribution, a corporation may implement an indirect transfer o f cash 
using back-to-back loans with other related entities.
476 See id. at 458 (“Directionality is...another manifestation o f  form controlling tax consequences in 
Subchapter C [.]”). See also CHARLES I. KlNGSON, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 Yale 
Law J. 861 (1976) at 905 (“A transfer between commonly-owned entities is not an economic event. Its 
significance is the tax consequences. Accordingly, economic considerations cannot distinguish between 
transfers which are solely o f tax significance. The attempt to decide what tax significance should attach to an 
event which has no other significance creates disparities between taxpayers whose actions in all relevant 
respects are identical.”).
477 For this reason, a huge body o f jurisprudence and rules were developed based on the need to verify 
whether form really matches the substance o f  the transaction. See infra pg. 119.
In short, tax treatment is generally interrelated with the formal characterization o f 
transactions. This formalism o f the tax system makes it more discontinuous.478 In turn, as 
will be further discussed, the discontinuity o f the tax system increases the potential for 
substitution, breeding complexity and deadweight loss.479
c. Economic Integration and Tax Treatment
i. Economic Integration, Substitution and Discontinuity
A pillar o f the CIT System is the attribution o f a separate tax personality to business 
entities that are, or resemble, a corporation, i.e., an independent legal entity.480 As a rule, the 
tax system reacts when that independence is jeopardized and a person or entity controls 
their management.481 Historically, the tax system has reacted by either taxing the controlled 
entity on an accrual basis (i.e., making all the results o f the entity accrue directly to its 
shareholder),482 or implementing rules that force the transactions between entity and
478 See discussion supra at pg. 54ff.
479 See discussion infra at pg. 131 ff.
480 In the US, although the definition o f corporation for tax purposes includes certain entities that do not 
formally constitute corporations under state law, the corporate tax law definition is generally structured on 
the principle o f  attributing tax personality to entities that are or resemble a corporation in form or function. 
See IRC Section 11(a) (imposing a tax on the taxable income o f  “every corporation” but not defining the term 
“corporation.”) and IRC Section 7701(a)(3) (defining “corporation” to include associations and joint stock 
companies). As Bittker explains “[At the moment o f  the inception o f the corporate tax], Congress presumably 
had in mind the fact that a business entity may resemble a corporation in form and function even though it 
does not possess a state charter...Thus, classifying a domestic noncorporate entity...as a corporation is 
essentially a dual process: Federal law governs the corporate characteristics that must be present in order to 
find a ‘tax law’ corporation, but state....law determines whether the organization possesses these legal 
earmarks.” See BITTKER &  EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f  Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 
417, at Section 2.01 [1]. These legal earmarks are generally the characteristics associated with a corporation as 
an independent legal entity. On the current complexities associated with defining a “corporation” for US tax 
purposes, especially following the check-the-box rules, see id. Chapter 2.
481 See LEVMORE, Recharacterisations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax haw, supra note 19. As a rule, those 
who can control the timing o f  their taxable events are either taxed directly on such events or subject to 
additional anti-avoidance provisions. This occurs since parties that can control the timing o f  their taxable 
events may easily subvert the tax rules, accelerating or deferring realization events or even simulating false 
realization events to achieve unlawful tax benefits.
482 This is the base for the development o f  special tax regimes for the taxation o f  closely held corporations. In 
these cases, tax law assumes that shareholders/owners have too much power to influence the management o f  
the entity and thus, there is not enough separation between ownership and management to ensure separate 
tax treatment. First, in these cases, there is usually a community o f interests between the shareholders. 
Second, shareholders o f closely held corporations are likely to participate in management. The shareholders 
o f closely held corporations are, thus, more likely to be able to determine the timing and quantum o f dividend 
distributions. That is, they have an increased ability to manipulate when and if they realize corporate income 
in their personal capacity. A similar integration between ownership and management generally occurs in the 
case o f  partnerships. For these reasons, in both cases, tax law tends to integrate the treatment o f the entity 
with its owners. In the US, see IRC Subchapter S (elective flow-through regime for closely-held corporations) 
and Subchapter K (rules for taxation o f partnerships).
shareholder (or other entities owned by the shareholder) to be structured as if they were 
independent parties, to avoid abuses or manipulation.483
These reactions o f the tax system aim at to solve two different problems that arise when 
the system faces a controlled entity. First, when a controlled entity transacts with its 
owner/shareholder, the potential for substitution escalates. In principle, the higher the 
degree of integration, the easier it should be for parties to recast the formal characterization 
o f  the transaction and, thus, to manipulate abusively the tax system.484 Second, due to the 
applicability o f non-recognition provisions, the difference between the tax consequences o f 
economically similar transactions increases when high ownership thresholds come into 
play. That is, the system gets more discontinuous when high ownership thresholds are 
involved.
Consider the degree o f substitution o f the tax rules when parties are related. As previously 
discussed, the proper operation o f the realization principle presupposes a number o f 
frictions outside the control o f the taxpayer.485 When the integration o f the parties 
eliminates these frictions, the system does not work properly. With such integration, 
elements not commonly under the control o f only one o f the parties, and which form the 
basis on which the tax system determines the tax treatment o f the transaction, i.e., the 
value, timing and legal classification o f the transaction, are easily manipulated because o f 
the common economic interest that exists between both parties.486 In principle, the higher 
the degree o f economic integration, the worse the problem o f substitution should be.
In its effort to recognize for tax purposes the continuity o f business interest that generally 
exists between economically integrated entities,487 the tax system increases its degree o f 
discontinuity when dealing with entities related through high ownership thresholds and, 
admittedly, makes matters far worse. As a result o f the applicability o f non-recognition
483 These set o f  rules include transfer pricing rules and substance over form principles, among many others. 
See discussion infra at pg. 119.
484 See examples infra at pg. 127ff.
485 See discussion supra at pg. 20.
486 Substitution is not automatic in that there are several non-tax factors that may reduce the degree o f  
substitution, namely, the direct costs o f the substitution, the existence o f frictions in other regulatory areas 
and the taxpayer’s business preferences. See discussion supra at pg. 53ff.
487 CLARK, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: A n  Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, supra note 7, at 117 
(“Though certain nonrecognition rules arise from particular policy decisions, they principally reflect a desire 
to acknowledge for tax purposes a substantial continuity o f ownership interest.”).
provisions, the difference between the tax consequences o f economically similar 
transactions increases when high ownership thresholds come into play.488
ii. Economic Integration and Anti-Abuse
In the face o f increased potential for substitution when high ownership thresholds exist, 
the tax system reacts by either totally integrating the tax treatment o f the controlled entity 
with its owner/shareholder, thereby minimizing the potential for abuse, or through the 
introduction o f anti-abuse rules and principles to ensure that the transactions entered into 
between the related parties do not abusively manipulate the tax regime.
The accrual mechanism provides a particularly efficient method to solve such problems.489 
However, it is not feasible in all situations.490 In such cases, once separate tax personality is 
attributed to a controlled entity, the anti-abuse arsenal required to avoid manipulation is 
truly daunting. This is primarily because, under a CIT system, once separate tax personality 
is attributed to an entity, the system needs to constantly ensure the correct location, 
character and amount o f such entity’s tax attributes. As discussed, with related parties, this 
task is particularly hard. Absent specific tax or non-tax restrictions, related parties may 
easily manipulate value, timing, and legal characterization o f transactions. In light of the 
characteristics o f the CIT system, related parties have, thus, an increased ability to generate, 
to randomly allocate, and to characterize tax attributes, that is, to fundamentally alter their 
tax treatment.
The reaction o f the CIT system to this problem is materialized in a complex arsenal o f anti­
abuse rules. This arsenal consists, firstly, o f a set o f rules aimed at ensuring that related 
entities trade among themselves as independent parties. In essence, this set o f rules is 
aimed at ensuring that related parties do not manipulate either the value or the legal 
characterization o f transactions.491 Secondly, the imposition o f strict requirements to access 
the benefits granted where a continuity o f interest exists, as well as a set o f rules to ensure
488 As previously discussed, the increase in the tax system’s discontinuity generally results in an increase o f the 
potential for substitution. See discussion supra at pg. 54ff.
489 It raises some issues though. See, e..g., rules for allocation o f  tax attributes among shareholders and anti­
abuse rules on Subchapter S (BITTKER &  EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f  Corporations and 
Shareholders, supra note 417, at Chapter 6).
490 As previously discussed, to completely integrate the tax treatment o f  an entity and its owners/shareholders 
may not be possible in certain cases due to practical issues. A  paradigmatic case is the one o f widely-held 
corporations. See discussion supra at pg. 39.
491 To a large extent, timing is left to the free will o f the parties. But see discussion infra at note 570.
that the entities that qualify for such benefits do not abusively generate, eliminate or change 
the location or character o f their tax attributes.492
The control o f the value o f transactions entered into between related parties is essentially 
made through transfer pricing rules. These rules aim at ensuring that related parties pay 
arm’s length prices, i.e., that the traded goods are correcdy valued.493 In turn, the control of 
the legal characterization o f the transaction is mosdy obtained through the recourse to 
substance-over-form rules and principles. This body o f rules and principles essentially aims 
at determining whether the taxpayer's chosen transactional form should or should not be 
respected.494 This includes a number o f different doctrines, such as “substance-over-form,” 
step transaction, agency, conduit and tax ownership.495 Under these anti-abuse rules and 
principles, the government and the courts make the argument that the transaction should 
not generate the tax benefits associated with its form, because form does not reflect 
substance or because the transaction has no substance, i.e., no business purpose.496
492 It is interesting to note that anti-abuse rules exist mainly in the tax law. Weisbach contends that this may 
be due to the problem o f  uncommon transactions becoming common is worse in the tax law than in other 
areas. In particular, “[t]he tax law relies on form more than most areas o f the law, and one can easily 
manipulate form without changing the economics o f a transaction. In addition, taxpayers often feel entided to 
structure transactions to avoid taxes, an entitlement that has its origins in a long and distinguished line o f  case 
law. This type o f entitlement may encourage taxpayers to push the boundaries [.].” WEISBACH, Formalism in the 
Tax Law, supra note 13, at 885.
493 This issue is beyond the scope o f this thesis. For a good background on the US transfer pricing regime see, 
e.g., J. KUNTZ & R. PERONI, US International Taxation (Warren, Gorham & Lamont. 1992).
494 See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 860 (“A typical anti-abuse rule allows the 
government (and only the government) to override the literal words o f  a statute or regulation. Instead, the 
government may require a “reasonable” tax result if the taxpayer enters into or structures a transaction with a 
principal purpose o f reducing tax liabilities in a manner contrary to the purposes o f  the statute or regulation, 
even if  the transaction otherwise literally complies with the rules.”).
495 For a discussion o f these different doctrines in the US see e.g., LEVMORE, Recharacterisations and the Nature of 
Theory in Corporate Tax Taw, supra note 19; CHIRELSTEIN, Teamed Hand’s Contribution to the Taw of Tax Avoidance, 
77 Yale L. J. (1968); BOWEN, The End Result Test, 72 Taxes 722 (1994); STEINBERG, Form, Substance and 
Directionality in Subchapter C, supra note 456.
496 CANELLOS, A  Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business 
Transactions and in Tax Shelters, supra note 168, at 49. For instance, an excessive payment between controlled 
corporations is generally recasted as a constructive dividend to the common owner followed by a capital 
contribution from the common owner to the corporation receiving the funds. See Revenue Ruling 73-605 
1973-2 C.B. 109. See also CANELLOS at 53 (“To achieve the predictable result, carefully scripted scenarios are 
usually followed. Indeed, it is the choreographed series o f steps — typically foreign to the corporations’ usual 
business, involving extraneous parties and often employed by other users o f  the same shelter type — that 
courts often seize upon in branding a transaction as a shelter.”); STEINBERG, Form, Substance and Directionality 
in Subchapter C, supra note 456, at 488 (“[TJransactional form will be respected so long as the substance o f  the 
transaction is consistent with the form and does not contain steps that are unnecessary to achieve the parties' 
economic goals.”); id. at 459 (“[S]ubstance does not always control in Subchapter C, both because proper 
form is sometimes a necessary condition for the desired tax treatment and because, where the substance o f a 
transaction is ambiguous or capable o f being achieved through more than one transactional approach, form 
frequently becomes the dispositive factor in determining the tax treatment o f the parties.”). For a good 
definition o f business purpose in US jwIRC Treas. Reg. Sections 1.1368-l(b), 1.13684(c) and 1.1368-2(g).
The second type o f anti-abuse measures involves the imposition o f strict requirements to 
access the benefits granted where a continuity o f interest exists, as well as a set of rules to 
ensure that the entities that qualify for such benefits do not abusively use or transfer their 
tax attributes. As in the prior group o f anti-abuse measures, these rules are considerably 
complex. Consider the problem o f selecting a criterion to ensure that there is a continuity 
o f business interest in a transaction.
Both under the US and UK tax laws, the primary criterion adopted to define continuity o f 
interest, and thus, qualification for the applicability o f most non-recognition provisions and 
several anti-abuse provisions, is “control.”497 Control, however, may be implemented 
through a multiplicity o f legal and economic mechanisms.498 It is a complex phenomenon 
that extends far beyond simple de jure definitions, difficult to define and quite prone to 
manipulation.499
497 See, e.g., in US, definition o f  control required to access the tax benefits granted to certain corporate 
restructurings under IRC Section 368 at BITTKER &  EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f  Corporations and 
Shareholders, supra note 417, Section 3.07. See generally, in the UK, TlLEY, Revenue Law, supra note 437, at 
827 and 844. See also discussion infra on the control requirements used to allow access to the benefits o f  
Group Taxation in the US and the UK at pg. 181 ff.
498 The legal mechanisms to implement control include mechanisms o f  a financial nature (such as 
intercorporate stock ownership), mechanisms o f  a contractual nature (such as profit pools or business 
transfer contracts), mechanisms o f a personal nature (such as the device o f  interlocking board directorates), 
mechanisms o f  an organizational nature (such as special stipulations in the by-laws o f  companies that 
derogate the general principle o f  “one share one vote”) and mechanisms o f  a factual nature (such as supply 
agreements or exclusivity contracts). See ANTUNES, Liability o f  Corporate Groups: Autonomy and Control in 
Parent-Subsidiary Relationships in US, German and EU Law, supra note 326, at 144-155; P. C. DOLEY, The 
Interlocking Directorate, 59 American Economic Review 314 (1979) at 314ff; F. STOCKMAN, et al., Networks o f  
Corporate Power (Polity Press. 1985) at 44. The economic mechanisms o f control gravitate between the two 
poles o f direct control (with the parent corporation intervening in the everyday operational management o f  
the affiliate) and indirect control (generally exercised via general long-term planning or via supervision o f  the 
affiliate’s economic performance). See ALSEGG, Control Relationships Between American Corporations and 
Their European Subsidiaries, supra note 328; EGGELHOFF, Patterns of Control in US, UK and European 
Multinational Corporations, supra note 327; CRAY, Control and Co-Ordination in Multinational Corporations, supra note 
331.
499 Control is a “structural relation through which a particular category o f  owners have de facto capacity to 
mobilize the powers vested in the company itself.” See JOHN SCOTT, Corporate Groups and Network Structure, in 
Corporate Control and Accountability (Sol Picciotto ed. 1993) at 294. A symptom o f  the difficulty to define 
control is the inconsistency in the definitions available. In particular, inconsistencies may be found at three 
levels within the technical definition o f  the control requirement, namely, jurisdiction versus jurisdiction, 
specific tax legislation versus non-tax legislation and specific tax legislation vs. other tax legislation. See, e.g., 
MARGARET Lam b , When is a Group a Group? Convergence of Concepts of Group in European Union Corporate Tax, 4 
European Accounting Review 33 (1995).
The tax legislator faces therefore a dilemma.500 That is, while the adoption o f 
administratively more adequate de jure definitions makes the tax system easily subject to 
manipulation, the adoption o f more encompassing, or de facto standards, may not always be 
adequate to the need for expediency required in the tax world due to the high number o f 
transactions involved. The solution o f the tax legislator to this dilemma is varied, varying 
even between different provisions o f the same corporate tax laws. While, in certain cases, a 
definition o f control based on percentage o f vote and /or value o f stock suffices,501 in other 
cases additional substantive requirements are imposed.502 Once the benefits o f non­
recognition are accessed, an additional set o f rather intricate rules comes into play. This 
final set o f anti-abuse measures ensures that the entities that qualify for the benefits o f non­
recognition do not abusively use or transfer their tax attributes.503
500 In the same sense see CLARK, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: A n  Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 
supra note 7, at 118 (“Exactly which test will give specific content in specific contexts to the underlying 
concept o f continuity o f interest which is at the heart o f all nonrecognition transactions? The task is truly 
enormous, given the multiplicity o f ways in which businesses can operate and the manifold objectives they 
may serve.”).
501 In the US, certain provisions define “control” by reference to objective circumstances, such as percentages 
o f  stock ownership (see, e.g., IRC Sections 1563 and 267), while others use more unclear concepts. A 
paradigmatic case is IRC Section 482, which refers to organizations that are ‘owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by the same interests.” This US tax provision, through its regulations, adopts a broad interpretation 
o f what amounts to a relationship between related parties. It states that the term ‘controlled’ includes any 
kind o f  control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised’ and 
adding that ‘it is the reality o f the control which is decisive, not its form or the mode o f its exercise’.” See IRC 
Treas. Reg. 1.482-1 (i)(4). Further, certain rules prescribe attribution rules for determining stock ownership (see 
e.g., IRC Sections 1563 and 267), while others do not (see e.g., IRC Sections 482 and 269). As a rule, in the 
absence o f a statutory attribution rule, stock ownership generally will not be attributed from one shareholder 
to another. See BITTKER &  EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 
417, Section 13.01 [3][a], at 13-10. For similar difficulties to define control for tax purposes in the UK see 
generally UK, TlLEY, Revenue Law, supra note 437, at 827 and 844.
502 For instance, in the US, besides continuity o f interest, the passing o f  intricate continuity o f  business and 
business purpose tests is often required. In general, in the context o f business restructurings, the continuity o f  
business test requires that the acquiring corporation either continue the target corporation’s historic business 
or use in its own business a significant portion o f the target corporation’s assets. Alternatively, where the 
acquiring corporation fails to carry on the target corporation historic business, the continuity o f  business test 
can be met if a significant portion o f  the target corporation’s assets is used by the acquiring corporation. 
Even where these statutory requirements have been followed, the tax-free designation o f  the reorganization 
will not be allowed unless it has a bona fide business purpose. The business purpose test applies the substance- 
over-form principle, i.e., as previously discussed, looking through the transaction to determine what actually 
took place. These rules are generally applicable to corporate restructurings (IRC Section 368) and corporate 
divisions (IRC Section 355). See, e.g., IRC Section 355(b)(1)(A) (immediately after the distribution, both the 
distributing corporation and the controlled corporation (or corporations) must be engaged in the active 
conduct o f a trade or business).
503 See, in the US, IRC Section 269 (disallowing certain tax benefits if  control o f a corporation is acquired for 
the principal purpose o f  tax avoidance) and IRC Sections 382, 383 and 384 (limiting or disallowing the 
carryover o f net operating losses and certain other tax allowances when stock ownership shifts in specified 
ways). On the relative permeability o f these complex anti-abuse provisions see Bittker “Although the Service’s 
position in litigated cases may suggest implacable opposition to any and all transfers o f tax attributes, many, if  
not most, corporate reorganizations and other adjustments pass smoothly through the audit or tax-ruling 
process with their carryovers virtually intact.” BITTKER & EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f  
Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 417, Section 14.47[7] at 14-127.
Overall, in the presence o f high degrees o f ownership, the Standard CIT System develops a 
high degree o f complexity, which is attributable, firstly, to increased rule complexity. That 
is, with high degrees o f ownership, non-recognition provisions and an arsenal o f anti-abuse 
rules comes into play. Secondly, and interrelated, to increased transactional complexity, 
since with such degrees o f ownership, the CIT system develops high degrees of 
discontinuity and, thus, provides an additional encouragement to substitution. Finally, to 
increased compliance complexity, since due to the application o f several anti-abuse 
provisions, the bona fide o f the transactions must be extensively documented.504
C. The Nature of Corporate Groups and the Standard CIT System
As previously discussed, as a member o f a corporate group, the corporation is part o f a 
larger entity, an atom o f a molecular structure. The integration o f the atomistic corporate 
entity into the molecular group structure is achieved through its submission to a group 
level unitary economic direction. The tension between the individual corporation’s legal 
and economic substratum and the group’s unitary economic direction generates the 
dynamic o f  an organized internal market.
In the organized internal market, assets and income are continually transferred among 
group members. Specifically, in the same manner molecules may only exist if exchange of 
electrons among atoms occurs, the corporate group requires constant transfers o f assets 
and income among its nodes in order for its organized internal market to function.505 These 
internal transfers o f resources occur among different nodes o f the group, such as sister to 
sister, subsidiary to parent or members located in different tiers.506
504 In the US this includes, for instance, extensive transfer pricing compliance requirements (see IRC Section 
482), compliance with complex anti-shelter regulations (see IRC Sections 6111 and 6112) and compliance with 
information requirements for qualification for certain tax benefits (see, e.g., IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.368-3, 
requiring the participants in a tax-free reorganization to keep detailed records o f  the reorganization 
proceedings and to file with their returns for the year o f the reorganization a complete statement, setting out 
the information prescribed by the regulations). On the intricate and burdensome anti-corporate tax shelter 
provisions and their legislative background see BITTKER & EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f  
Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 417, at Section 5.10.
505 Personnel may also be transferred inside the group. This issue is outside the scope o f the present analysis. 
See generally ANTUNES, Liability o f  Corporate Groups: Autonomy and Control in Parent-Subsidiary 
Relationships in US, German and EU Law, supra note 326, at 97-98.
506 Id.; RICHARD Ca v e s , Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, supra note 318; CHANNON &  
JALLAND, Multinational Strategic Planning, supra note 318.
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These transfers may occur directly (e.g., corporation A2 to corporation P using transactional 
route T5) or indirecdy (e.g., corporation A2 to corporation P using transactional routes T2 
and TI or T2, T3 and T I ') and may assume different formal characteristics (e.g., a transfer 
of assets from corporation A1 to corporation P using transactional route TI may be 
structured as a distribution in-kind, a merger, a liquidation or a sale).307 In most cases, a 
corporate group, as a direct result of its unitary economic direction and chameleon-like 
structure, should be able to manipulate these elements with relative ease.308 Specifically, a 
group may easily select different transactional routes and legal forms to implement an intra­
group transfer of assets or cash.309 In addition, in certain cases, the group may also alter its 
legal or functional structures in order to obtain a more advantageous tax treatment.310
This flexibility of the corporate group to manipulate transactional routes, legal forms and 
functional and legal structures occurs for several reasons. As previously discussed, the
507 The different formal characterization o f the transaction should generally entail different tax consequences. 
See discussion supra at pg. 105ff.
508 Notable exceptions are transactions that have to necessarily be implemented in a certain way due to other 
business aspects.
509 The flexibility of corporate groups to manipulate the value o f  transactions is outside the scope o f  this 
thesis.
510 See discussion infra at pg. 128.
sovereign nature o f the corporation distorts when controlled by another corporate entity 
and, thus, submitted to an external interest.511 Significandy, due to the dilution o f the 
individual corporation’s ownership o f property within corporate groups,512 assets and 
income must be regarded as belonging to the collective group entity, an entity without legal 
existence per se, that simply allocates assets and income to their most economically efficient 
uses across its nodes.513
Once the legal fiction o f the corporate veil o f corporate group members is abandoned and 
formalism is set aside, the corporate group appears as a subject characterized by 
“organizationally-bound” property rights, i.e., an entity where assets and income may be 
transferred horizontally, vertically or transversally between its different nodes without 
actual change o f economic ownership. Hence, unless specific risk-management 
considerations, creditor demands or financial reporting issues are present, the identity o f 
the formal owner o f the group’s property should be largely irrelevant for the corporate 
group.
The internal allocation o f resources among the different group nodes under a unitary 
business policy often demands the relegation o f the particular economic interest o f a 
subsidiary in favour o f the common objective o f overall profit maximization. Significandy, 
this unitary business policy often involves obedience to a group tax strategy o f tax 
minimization.514 Thus, many groups look at the tax results o f their entities on a joint basis, 
having an added interest (and instruments) to engage in overall group tax planning.515
Finally, the group has a volatile nature. That is, the corporate group is able to change its 
governance structure and make a discriminate use o f the corporate veil o f its affiliates to
511 See discussion supra at pg 83ff.
512 The corporation that is a member o f  a corporate group possesses, in practice, only limited ownership 
rights over its assets. Id.
513 See discussion supra at pg. 80ff.
514 See e.g., concept o f  “global tax planning,” very fashionable among consulting companies, at 
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/whatwedo/tax/international-Corporate-Tax/Pages/default.aspx or 
www.deloitte.com/.../us tax OptimizingGlobalTaxStructuresforPrivateEquity 061710.pdf. Under the global 
tax planning concept, the tax attributes o f a multinational corporate group are managed under a globally 
coordinated group strategy.
515 In particular, there is a cooperation element that makes entities work together in order to reduce the 
overall group tax charge. However, elements o f competition remain in that it must be expected that entities 
will struggle for financing from the parent also claiming tax advantages on their treatment. See ANTUNES, 
Liability o f  Corporate Groups: Autonomy and Control in Parent-Subsidiary Relationships in US, German and 
EU Law, supra note 326, at 158-206. On an open setting scenario, this element gains renewed interest since 
the tax treatment o f each entity may vary significantly (including taxable base, tax rates, etc.).
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evade tax regulations. In particular, although often subject to business and operational 
restraints, a corporate group may, as a matter o f principle, manipulate the webs o f 
ownership inside the group and the functions performed by each legal entity. This should 
depend on a cost-benefit analysis. The higher the tax benefit, the more inclined the group 
may be to change its legal or functional structures to allow for a more efficient tax 
structure.516
D ue to the nature o f corporate groups, the degree o f substitution o f the Standard CIT 
System when facing corporate groups is, thus, especially high. Further, as previously 
discussed, the Standard CIT System is structurally discontinuous when high levels o f 
ownership are present. As a direct result o f these factors, the incentive for tax planning in 
intra-group transactions should, in many situations, be very significant. Consider the 
following transactional map for the transfer o f built-in gain assets under the Standard CIT 
System when high levels o f ownership (i.e., 80% ownership or more) are present:517
516 This cost-benefit analysis is generally required because the selection o f  an efficient tax structure (i.e., the 
structure with less associated tax costs for the group) may have collateral negative consequences for the 
group’s operation. See, e.g. SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A  Planning Approach, supra note 14, 
at 157 (“Incom e shifting and organizational forms that minimize taxes often give rise to costs along other 
dim ensions, leading to a trade-off between taxes and nontax costs. For example, incom e shifting within an 
organization might require more centralized organizational structures, but information asymmetries might 
require more decentralized organizational structures.”). In general, based on  traditional neo-classical models, 
the group may generally be expected to engage in tax planning until the marginal value o f  the planning is 
equal to its cost. See CHORVAT, Perception and Income: The Behavioral Economics of the Realisation, supra note 31, at 
88-91. See also THORNTON., Managerial Tax Planning Principles and Applications, supra note 182, at 147 (“A  
corollary to the Coase Theorem  is that people will engage in tax arbitrage up to the point where the marginal 
costs o f  performing the arbitrage are equal to the marginal gains.”).
517 This transactional map would be substantially different, with a different range o f  available formal 
possibilities, if  different goods (i.e., “built-in loss” assets, cash or stock) were being transferred or if there were 
lower levels o f  ownership (e.g., 50% ownership) in the corporate group members. The situation should be 
similar in the UK. For the legislative background to the diagram see IRC Section 351 (capital contribution), 
IRC Section 311 (distribution in-kind), IRC Section 332 (liquidation), IRC Section 368 (mergers) and IRC 
Section 1001 (sales). The analysis assumes that the different qualification requirements for these provisions
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In essence, a corporate group navigates through complex transactional maps defined by tax 
law, which vary depending on the ownership threshold in the corporate group member, 
and on the good transferred and its tax attributes. On each transactional map, tax 
consequences depend on the direction and legal form adopted to implement the intra­
group transfer.318 The corporate group’s expected behaviour will be to choose the correct 
mix of these elements (especially direction and legal form)319 that better serves its interests, 
namely, to transfer assets and/or cash from one subsidiary to the other, minimizing the 
transfer costs (including taxes) and general operating costs in order to maximize profits.320 
In addition, the group may be interested in generating and using tax losses, which reduce 
taxable income, and, therefore, the tax amount payable. Since in the Standard CIT System 
the use o f tax losses is subject to asymmetries in the form of several basket restrictions,521 
groups may also often be interested in changing the character, source or timing o f the loss 
so that it can be better availed of.
5,8 See discussion supra at pg. 106ff.
519 For practical m otives, the good transferred and its attributes are not easily subject to manipulation. D ue to 
non-tax frictions, the manipulation o f  ownership thresholds may also be more difficult.
520 As previously discussed, this flexibility occurs essentially because CIT is built around realization. Under a 
realization-based tax system, taxpayers are relatively free to determine the occurrence, value and timing o f  a 
transfer as well as its legal characterization.
521 See discussion supra at pg. 99ff.
In order to achieve such objectives, the group may thus, be interested in manipulating the 
amount, location and character o f tax attributes. In light o f the nature o f the Standard CIT 
System, this may be achieved by changing the value, timing and legal characterization o f 
intra-group transfers. The primary decision will generally consist of choosing between 
taxability and non-taxability o f the transaction.522 This should depend on the tax attributes 
o f the entities involved, fundamentally their inside and outside tax bases amounts; their 
taxable income for the year; the available carryovers o f tax losses; and, in certain cases, the 
possibility offered by a transaction to carryover tax attributes. Consider the following 
examples.
As previously discussed, the attribution o f a separate tax existence to corporations under 
the Standard CIT System requires the creation o f a dual tax basis.523 Due to their 
mechanical independence, the value o f outside and inside bases may differ.524 As a result, 
by characterizing a transfer as an asset or a stock sale, the corporate group may manipulate 
the amount o f taxable gain or loss recognized on the transfer. Thus, when interested in 
transferring the business o f one o f its nodes (A2) to a different node (B2) under a taxable 
transaction, the group may, depending on the value o f B2’s outside and inside tax bases, 
opt to transfer the subsidiary’s stock (B2) or its underlying assets. The higher the tax basis, 
less taxable gain or more taxable loss may be derived from the transaction. Further, the 
selection o f a taxable asset versus stock disposition may allow the group to control the 
location o f the taxable gain or loss in that the transfer o f the underlying assets will give rise 
to recognition at the level o f the transferee corporation (A2), while the transfer o f stock 
will give rise to recognition at its parent level (Al). Depending on the parent’s (Al) or 
transferee’s (A2) tax attributes, the group may be interested in structuring the transaction 
differently.
Last but certainly not least, the selection o f an asset versus a stock taxable disposition may 
significantly alter the treatment o f the tax losses o f the node transferred. As previously 
discussed, the transfers o f stock o f a business with NOLS or NCLs in its taxable income 
accounts are subject to different limitations to those imposed when only assets are
522 This option, when we are in the presence o f  a corporate group, due to its unitary economic direction, will 
be fundamentally different from the one o f  an economically independent corporation. Specifically, the group 
may be expected to maximize its overall tax attributes in a transaction. This attitude is fostered by the judicial 
culture in the US and UK that tends to defend the taxpayer’s ability to legitimately reduce its tax costs.
523 See discussion supra at pg. 103ff.
524 Id.
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transferred.525 Specifically, while the taxable transfer o f assets does not result in a transfer 
o f  tax attributes, the transfer o f stock also implies the transfer o f the target corporation’s 
tax attributes, namely, potential current and accumulated NOLS and NCLs.526 The 
selection o f an asset versus a stock acquisition may, thus, also depend on the tax attributes 
o f the target corporation (A2).527
Also, in certain cases, the changes in the location o f tax attributes may involve changes to 
the group’s functional structure. Consider, for instance, the group’s potential interest in 
locating additional tax deductions in a profit making node (Al) and tax inclusions on a loss 
making node (A2). To change the group’s functional structure and have A2 providing 
administrative services for A l, as well as for the rest o f the group, provides one potential 
approach. As a result, while the remaining group entities, including A l , have deductions for 
the payments made for services, the entity rendering such services (A2) may effectively 
offset the group’s taxable income using its unused losses from other lines o f business. By 
the same token, group financing may be channelled through a sole entity, compounding the 
loan related deductions in such profit making entity (Al).528
An alternative approach to obtaining a more beneficial tax treatment is the implementation 
o f the transfer through an indirect route, either to obtain higher tax benefits or to avoid 
specific anti-avoidance rules. For instance, in order to avoid taxability o f the transaction, an 
intra-group transfer may be structured as a tax-free merger instead o f a straight asset sale or 
through the implementation o f several transactions instead o f only one, such as capital 
contributions in cascade (from P to A l, and from A l to A2) instead o f a straight asset sale 
to a lower tier subsidiary (from P directly to A2).529
The manipulation o f the qualification requirements for application o f the non-recognition 
provisions, namely the concept o f control, is also a viable strategy available to alter tax 
treatment. As previously discussed, the mechanics o f the Standard CIT System vary
525 See discussion supra at pg. 106.
526 Id.
527 In the US, see IRC Section 338 allowing the taxpayer to elect to treat certain stock purchases as asset 
purchases. If the election is made, the corporation takes a cost basis in its assets and is purged o f  all o f  its 
prior tax attributes. See also IRC Section 338(h)(10) (acquisition o f  stock o f  a subsidiary). For the differences 
associated with an asset vs. a stock acquisition in the UK, see TlLEY, Revenue Law, supra note 437, at 846.
528 Similar strategies exist for managing the group’s intellectual property. These strategies are especially 
common once an open setting scenario is considered, due to the increased benefits provided by lower or 
inexistent corporate income tax rates in certain countries where to locate these types o f services.
529 The indirect transactional route may also involve an unrelated party. For instance, a back-to-back loan 
between two corporate group members using a bank as an intermediary.
considerably depending on the degree o f ownership o f a parent over its affiliates, as 
generally assessed through ownership thresholds. By manipulating such ownership 
thresholds and associated substantive requirements, the group may thus have access to a 
different tax treatment for its intra-group transactions. Since the concept of control is a 
rather elusive concept in face o f financial innovation and o f the legal and operational 
flexibility o f corporate groups, such manipulation may often be rather difficult to control.
Also, the group may want to manipulate the character o f the taxable income or loss in 
order to avoid the capital/ordinary income divide and its associated loss limitations. For 
instance, assume a situation where the group’s parent (P) has a considerable amount o f 
accumulated NOLs to use but no accumulated NCLs, and wants to sell the stock with 
built-in gain that it holds in one o f its subsidiaries (Al). In this situation, instead o f directly 
selling the stock and being fully taxed on capital gains, the group may prefer to have such 
gains characterized as ordinary gains. Thus, the group may opt to implement, first, a 
distribution o f profits from the subsidiary (Al), so that such income may be treated as 
ordinary income, and, only then, the disposition o f its stock. Absent specific anti-abuse 
rules,530 the disposition o f stock would be treated as a capital gain. However, due to the 
pre-disposition distribution, the capital gain amount would be lower (or even, result in a 
capital loss if the actual market value o f the company was now inferior to its outside 
basis).531 A similar example o f manipulation o f character is where the group opts to 
structure an internal asset transfer as the rental o f property, so that the rental payment may 
be characterized as ordinary income, instead o f as a sale where the income would be 
characterized as capital gain.532
Finally, in certain situations, a corporate group may be interested in changing the timing of 
a taxable event.533 For example, in order to use up expiring accumulated losses, the group 
may sell a built-in gain asset before its optimal business timing. In particular, a transfer that 
might otherwise not be done, or that under a regular scenario would only be implemented
530 In the US, these transactions, commonly known as “bootstrap acquisitions,” are subject to close scrutiny. 
See BlTTKER &  EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 417, 
Sections 8.07[2] and 9.06.
531 Similar distributions made in close proximity to the corporation’s liquidation also receive close scrutiny as 
to their character, i.e., as ordinary dividends or liquidating distributions. See id., at Section 5.05[6], at pg. 5-52.
532 This assumes that the asset is not used in the trade or business o f the transferee corporation. As previously 
discussed, unless specific non-tax frictions are present, in the context o f organizationally-bound property 
rights it may be indifferent to the group to have the title on the property transferred or not to a different 
affiliate.
533 As previously discussed, this thesis is not concerned with the manipulation o f the value o f  transactions.
at a later point in time, may be implemented, that is, a “lock-out” effect occurs. A similar 
interest may be founded on the desire to step up the tax basis o f  assets to their fair market 
value for depreciation purposes, or the desire to sell assets to permit a change in the 
depreciation schedule to one that is more highly accelerated.534
The same type o f timing distortions may occur with built-in loss assets.535 Unless a group 
has no capital gains for the year or has sufficient carryover capital losses to offset its tax 
liability for the year at the level o f all o f its members, the group may also be interested in 
triggering loss recognition, in order to minimize capital gain recognition. By the same 
token, in order to cash in more quickly and more fully tax-attributes such as carryforwards 
o f NOLs or NCLs,536 the group may implement a transaction that allows for the transfer of 
expiring capital losses to a member with built-in gain assets to sell.537 A reverse timing 
effect, i.e., “lock-in,” may also occur in certain situations.538
As a reaction to these, and many available other avoidance opportunities generated by the 
structural asymmetries o f the Standard CIT System,539 a complex arsenal o f specific anti­
abuse rules was developed and substantial developments in judicial anti-abuse doctrines 
took place.540 Corporate groups have reacted to these primarily piecemeal reforms by 
fostering organizational and transactional complexity in the exploration o f innovative 
substitute transactions.
534 SCHOLES & WOLFSON, The Effects of Changes in Tax Earn in Corporate Reorganisation Activity, supra note 182, 
at 141-142.
535 That is, assets whose market value declined to a level below their tax basis.
536 As well as other tax attributes, such as investment tax credits or foreign tax credits. See SCHOLES &  
WOLFSON, The Effects of Changes in Tax Lam  in Corporate Reorganisation Activity, supra note 182, at 141-142.
537 For instance, a tax-free merger.
538 For instance, in the case o f  provisions that require a minimum holding period following the transfer for 
substance purposes (common where a tax-free transaction occurs), the corporate group may refrain from 
selling an asset in order to avoid triggering taxability under the anti-abuse provisions.
539 See, e.g. the array o f planning opportunities available under the current US CIT System for corporate 
acquisitions and restructurings described at MARTIN D. GlNSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, Mergers, Acquisitions, 
and Buyouts (Aspen. 1999).
540 See discussion supra at pg. 118ff.
D. The Dynamic Effects of Taxing Corporate Groups under the Standard CIT
System
Due to their nature, corporate groups are generally able to manipulate the value, legal 
characterization and timing o f transactions. In the previous section, this thesis analyzed 
how this ability could be used to manipulate the mechanics o f the tax system. In particular, 
it demonstrated how such ability could allow corporate groups to manipulate location, 
character and amount o f tax attributes, and, thus, absent the application o f specific anti­
abuse rules, to fundamentally alter their tax treatment. In the present section, this thesis will 
examine the dynamic effects (i.e., the behavioural and economic effects) o f such 
manipulation, for corporate groups and for the state.541
1. The Manipulation of Legal Characterisation
a. Discontinuity. Substitution and Transaction Costs
Due to its realization-based nature, tax is only levied upon an actual transfer o f tide on 
property. This com er stone o f the CIT system results in a discontinuous body o f tax 
rules.542 When there is discontinuity in the tax rules, the potential for substitution 
increases.543 As discussed, this problem of substitution is particularly acute when corporate 
groups are taxed under the Standard CIT System. The reason is two-fold. First, the 
Standard CIT System significantly increases its discontinuity when high-ownership 
thresholds are present due to the applicability o f non-recognition rules. Second, corporate 
groups enjoy particular flexibility to alter their tax treatment.
541 The thesis will focus on the dynamic consequences o f  the group’s ability to manipulate the legal 
characterization and the timing o f transactions. As previously discussed, the capacity o f  corporate groups to 
manipulate the value o f  transactions is outside the scope o f our analysis.
542 The corporate-level nature o f  the CIT System and its yearly tax assessment rule are two additional primary 
contributors to such discontinuity.
343 That is, corporations sufficiently close to the discontinuity should have a higher propensity o f moving to 
the lower taxed regime. In principle, this should occur whenever transaction costs are inferior to the tax 
savings and associated risk. See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Taw, supra note 13, at 874. (“Where there is 
discontinuity, taxpayers sufficiently near the discontinuity will shift to the lower taxed regime, if transaction 
costs are less than the tax savings[.]”).
For corporate groups, the root o f the dynamic problems associated with such substitution 
is that, in a world o f costly contracting and information asymmetries, the search and 
adoption o f substitute transactions has associated costs and potential operational 
inefficiencies.544
b. Perfect and Imperfect Substitution
The implementation o f a substitute transaction has associated structuring and 
implementation transaction costs. These costs include, first, the fees paid to professionals 
to locate these alternatives and to evaluate how cost effective it is to bear the potential 
frictions associated with the new tax position.545 Second, the costs associated with 
implementing the substitute transaction.546
Apart from these costs, substitution may also result in additional inefficiencies.547 This will 
depend on whether the substitute transaction is a perfect, or imperfect, substitute for the 
substituted transaction.548 In the case o f perfect substitutes, the corporate group should 
substitute without any associated inefficiencies/4* In the case o f imperfect substitutes, 
however, the implementation o f the substitute transaction may have associated 
inefficiencies. In particular, these inefficiencies may include:
a. Transfer o f resources to a corporate member that does not provide the best 
economic return for their use;
b. The adoption o f a sub-optimal functional structure;
544 Also, there are certain equity issues involved, but they are outside the concern o f  this thesis. Broadly, due 
to the reduction in taxes levied, some other taxpayers will have to share an increased tax burden in order to 
support the expenses o f the state. See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 886 (“Tax 
motivated transactions are inefficient and, by lowering tax receipts, they impose an externality on everyone 
else in the form of higher tax rates.”).
545 Both on monetary and reputational terms. See SCHENK, A n  Efficiency Approach to Informing a Realisation-Based 
Tax, supra note 55, at 516.
546 Restructuring costs, etc. See id. at 516
547 See SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 3 (“In a world 
o f cosdy contracting, implementation o f tax minimization strategies may introduce significant costs along 
nontax dimensions.”).
548 This terminology is based on Weisbach. See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 875 
(“Tax arbitrage is inefficient. If the forms used in the arbitrage are perfect substitutes, there is no economic 
cost to the arbitrage; the social costs are the transaction costs, which can be large — as large as the tax avoided. 
If the forms are not perfect substitutes, taxpayers can change their economic position to obtain a tax 
advantage, creating inefficiencies [.]”).
549 The state, however, suffers a revenue loss.
c. The adoption o f a sub-optimal legal structure; and
d. The adoption o f a more complex transaction.
First, as a result o f substitution, the transfer o f group resources may be made to a 
corporate member that does not provide the best economic return for their use. As 
discussed, in order to locate deductions, inclusions, and capital gains or losses on the entity 
whose tax attributes are m ost beneficial, the location o f assets and income within a 
corporate group may not be the most efficient from an economic perspective. Second, the 
implementation o f substitute transactions may require the adoption o f a sub-optimal 
functional structure. For instance, in certain cases, tax planning may be conducive to the 
adoption o f a functional structure with a greater degree o f centrali2ation o f management 
than would otherwise be optimal.550
Further, the substitute transaction may involve the adoption o f a legal structure that is not 
the best from a business perspective. As previously discussed, certain tax planning 
strategies may require manipulation o f the corporate veil, including the amalgamation o f 
several group businesses in a sole corporate member or the wind up o f certain corporate 
members. That is prejudicial to the corporate group, in that from an efficient management 
perspective, in certain cases it may be preferable to maintain the corporate veil o f a certain 
line o f business.551 Finally, the substitute transaction may be more complex than otherwise
550 That is, information asymmetries may require more decentralized organizational structures. See SCHOLES, 
et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A  Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 168 (“W hen a com plex  
organization is com posed o f  distinct legal entities... shifting incom e from one pocket to the next may require 
considerable coordination, and tax rules often induce a greater degree o f  centralization o f  management than 
would otherwise be optimal.”); id. at 156 (“ (T|ax considerations and information-related transaction cost 
considerations often have conflicting implications for efficient organizational design. Sometimes tax 
considerations dominate in importance and sometimes information considerations dominate. But frequently, 
both factors are important and trade-offs must be made.”); SCHOLES & WOLFSON, The Effects of Changes in 
Tax Laws in Corporate Reorganisation Activity, supra note 182, at 144 (“ |T]n designing an organization, tax 
considerations and information-related transaction cost considerations are often in conflict with one  
another.”).
551 For instance, research conducted by the Canadian government identified the following non-tax costs with 
respect to the use o f  amalgamations or windups: corporations operating in regulated industries are either 
directly limited in how they must conduct their activities or indirectly encouraged by the existence o f  
regulations to operate non-regulated business in separate corporations; profit centre management controls 
may not operate as well if  the separate corporate status is eliminated; debt covenants may have evolved that 
restrict different members o f  the group to different degrees; minority shareholders may block or delay the 
reorganization; groups with high-risk projects or startup situations may conduct activities through separate 
corporations in order to limit liability to the equity directly related to individual projects; and the cost o f the 
reorganization in money and management time may be considerable. See DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 
CANADA, A Corporate Loss Transfer System for Canada (Budget Papers. 1985). Further, it may be desirable 
to maintain the separate operational independence, track records and corporate marketing identities achieved 
by the segregation o f  businesses in distinct but related companies. There may also be labour and management
required, leading to less transparency in internal group flows and the group’s organizational 
structure.552
In short, when corporate groups are taxed under the Standard CIT System, the problem of 
substitution is particularly acute. Such substitution, in a world o f costly contracting and 
information asymmetries, has associated structuring and implementation costs for 
corporate groups as well as, in certain cases, additional operational inefficiencies. As will be 
discussed, these costs and inefficiencies are the root o f the dynamic problem of 
substitution for corporate groups.
2. The Manipulation of Timing
Corporate groups are also able to manipulate the timing o f transactions in order to control 
their tax treatment. As previously discussed, since a potential built-in gain or loss on an 
asset is only includable in taxable income once a qualifying transfer occurs, the members o f 
the group may anticipate (“lock-out” effect), postpone (“lock-in” effect) or, in more 
extreme cases, cancel such transfer in order to obtain a better aggregate tax result.553 The 
type and magnitude o f the behavioural distortion will generally vary depending on the tax 
attributes o f the corporations in question and the type o f assets transferred.
3. The Consequences of Manipulating the C IT System
The manipulation o f the form and timing o f transactions results in several negative 
consequences, for the state and corporate groups, namely:
a. Increased complexity o f the tax system with an associated increase o f tax 
overhead costs, both for corporate groups and the state;
issues arising when corporations with distinct cultures and unions merge into one conglomerate, or financial 
considerations when subsidiaries within a group have different costs o f capital. Also, corporate investors 
setting up new uncertain ventures may find it desirable to co-invest with minority shareholders who may 
contribute their own expertise and networking to the success o f  innovative projects. See ALEXANDRE 
LAURIN, Cleaning Up the Books: A  Proposal for Revamping Corporate Group Taxation in Canada, 284 C.D. Howe 
Institute's Fiscal Policy 1 (2009) at 5-6.
552 See discussion supra at pg. 128ff.
553 See SHAVIRO, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Redes Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 
4, at 48 (“The efficiency detriment o f [nonrecognition rules that apply only to loss] ...is that taxpayers may 
alter their transactions to avoid the rules, rather than give up on selectively realizing losses.”).
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b. Reduction o f the ability o f corporate groups to shift capital to its most 
efficient use;
c. Agency problems; and
d. Rigid and potentially sub-optimal functional and legal structures,
a. Complexity and Transaction Costs
The manipulative behaviour o f corporate groups should lead to three different types of 
complexity, namely, transactional, rule and compliance complexity. To begin with, the 
corporate groups’ manipulative behaviour may result in increased transactional 
complexity.554 As previously discussed, increased transactional complexity may arise due to 
the implementation o f substitute transactions that use more complex legal instruments 
and /o r indirect transactional routes, aiming to manipulate the formalism o f the Standard 
CIT System.
In turn, this tax-minimizing behaviour breeds additional complexity from tax reformers 
and legislators who respond with measures designed to circumvent the latest tax 
manoeuvres.555 The counteraction o f the manipulative behaviour o f corporate groups 
increases the quantity and complexity o f the tax rules. The bigger challenge to interpret 
such tax rules raises the transaction costs for corporate groups through the need for 
professional tax preparers, lawyers and accountants.556 As for the state, it raises the cost o f 
designing tax rules and o f supervising their operation.557
Further, the need to provide adequate proof of the fulfilling o f the formal and substantive 
requirement associated with the applicable anti-abuse rules significantly increases 
compliance complexity.558 That is, corporate groups experience more difficulties and incur
554 As previously discussed, transactional complexity refers to the hardships associated with altering behaviour 
to benefit from the preferred routes o f  action defined by the legislator. See discussion supra at pg. 62.
555 See BRADFORD, Untangling the Income Tax, supra note 180, at 266-67.
556 See WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 860.
557 See discussion supra at pg. 63. See also SHAVIRO, A n  Ffficieng Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under 
the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 24.
558 As previously discussed, compliance complexity includes the difficulties faced by taxpayers such as keeping 
records, choosing forms, and making necessary calculations. See discussion supra at pg. 63. For the arsenal o f  
anti-abuse rules and their associated compliance requirements applicable when high-ownership thresholds are 
present, see discussion supra at 116ff.
higher costs to ensure their ongoing compliance with the tax system. By the same token, 
the supervision o f the massive quantity o f documentation produced to ensure compliance 
with these tax rules results in significant transaction costs to the state.559
In sum, the increased complexity o f  the CIT System caused by the manipulative behaviour 
o f corporate groups results in increased tax overhead costs, both for corporate groups and 
the state.
b. Reduction o f Ability to Shift Capital to its Most Efficient Use
As a direct result o f the strategies implemented to manipulate the CIT System, corporate 
groups may reduce their ability to shift capital to its most efficient use. To begin with, due 
to rule and compliance complexity, it is more expensive for corporate groups to determine 
what rules and regulations apply to a specific transaction, to determine the ensuing tax 
consequences and to comply with them. At some point, the transaction costs fostered by 
the lack o f certainty become so prohibitive that the corporate group does not undertake the 
planned action, because the “expected benefits o f the action are less than the sum of the 
costs o f implementing the action plus the transactions costs o f determining its legal 
outcome.”560 That is, when these tax-related costs come into the calculus, the economic 
efficiency gain o f an intra-group transaction may not be sufficient to offset its associated 
tax costs and, thus, the transaction may not be implemented or may be implemented 
outside its optimal timing.561 Further, besides the additional transaction costs, rule 
complexity may lend to uncertainty as to tax results, which may deter corporate groups 
from entering into certain transactions.562 As previously discussed, if a planned action is not
559 See discussion supra at pg. 64.
560 FELLOWS, Nonrecourse Debt and Real Estate: The Issues of Tax Basis, supra note 261, at 271.
561 See EDREY, What are Capital Gains and Tosses Anyway?, supra note 407, at 170-174 (“[F]irms might choose 
not to replace an asset producing a lower rate o f return if they take tax into account when calculating the cost 
o f  the new asset, which reduces its rate o f  return.”). See also SHAV1RO, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Realisation and 
Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 24 (“Taxing gain or loss upon sale.. .cannot help 
but change some taxpayers' decisions regarding the retention o f  particular assets.”); GEORGE R. ZODROW, 
Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: Realisations, Revenues, Efficiency and Equity 48 Tax Law Rev. 419 
(1993) at 467 (“[T]he taxation o f capital gains on sales o f  business assets might discourage asset sales that 
otherwise would occur, thus reducing firm operating efficiency.”).
562 See BIRD, Why Tax Corporations?, supra n o te  131, at 1 (“ [UJncertainty as to  the precise tax im plications o f  
various corporate decisions m ay act as a general deterrent to  investm ent.”). See also COOPER, Themes and Issues 
in Tax Simplification, supra note  249, at 423 (“ [W ]hen faced w ith  com plexity  (in the sense o f  an uncertain  
o u tcom e), all taxpayers are risk-avoiders and will try to  elim inate the risk arising from  uncertain tax ou tco m es, 
ev en  i f  it m eans abandoning the transaction altogether.”).
undertaken, society's wealth is lowered, as a corporate group foregoes an otherwise 
productive activity.563
Moreover, as a result o f substitution, the transfer o f group resources may be made to a 
corporate member that does not provide the best economic return for their use. In order to 
locate deductions, inclusions, and capital gains or losses on the entity whose tax attributes 
are most beneficial, the location o f assets and income within a corporate group may not be 
the most economically efficient. Lastly, depending on the magnitude o f the “lock-in” effect 
and the “lock-out” effect, the transaction may be implemented outside its optimal business 
timing or it may not be implemented at all. In these cases, a second best option in terms of 
economic efficiency is maintained, in that assets or income are kept in a corporate member 
that does not ensure the best economic return for their use.564 Overall, in such situations, 
the corporate group becomes less responsive to changes in the prospects o f its 
investments.
In sum, the manipulative behaviour o f corporate groups fostered by the nature o f the 
Standard CIT System may reduce their ability to shift capital to its most efficient use. In 
these situations, the flexibility o f corporate groups to transfer resources between their 
constituent parts is penalized. This may negatively impact the corporate groups’ “organized 
internal market” dynamic and, to that extent, may reduce the capacity o f the economic 
system to allocate resources to their most productive use.
c. Agency Problems
As a result o f the higher number o f transactions and to their higher complexity, the 
corporate group’s manipulative behaviour should produce less transparent internal group 
flows and more convoluted organizational structures.565 This internal complexity makes the 
group more opaque from an informational perspective. Notably, it becomes more difficult 
for top management and other stakeholders to continue to be accurately informed about
563 FELLOWS, Nonrecourse Debt and Real Estate: The Issues of Tax Basis, supra note 261, at 271.
564 See CECIL, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the Internal Revenue Code: A  New Paradigm for the Deductibility of 
Capital Losses, supra note 410, at 1104 (“[T]he lock-in effect prevents the flow o f capital to its best economical 
use.”).
565 In the same sense see FRIESE, et al., Taxation and Corporate Governance - The State of the A rt, supra note 169, at 
380 (“[T]ax rules tend to foster complexity and reduce transparency because they promote convoluted, tax- 
driven corporate structures.”).
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the operations o f the group.566 As a result, a shift o f power from the board to inside 
managers and an increase o f  the potential for managerial opportunism transpires.567 
Further, this internal complexity o f corporate groups fostered by the tax system may 
increase the costs o f the state to supervise the compliance of corporate groups with the tax 
rules.
d. Rigid and Potentially Sub-Optimal Functional and Legal Structures
Besides potentially giving rise to the implementation o f sub-optimal functional and legal 
structures, the tax minimization strategies to explore the asymmetries o f the Standard CIT 
System may rigidify these structures.568 This rigidity follows from two main reasons. First, 
due to the transaction costs associated with the definition and implementation o f corporate 
structures, once a certain structure is implemented to benefit from a tax advantage or to 
avoid a specific anti-abuse rule, it should remain in operation for a certain time.569 Second, 
due to the application o f anti-abuse rules, the corporate structure existing at the time o f the 
transaction may have to be kept in place for a certain period in order for the tax treatment 
afforded to  the transaction to be respected.570 Although flexibility may be possible in 
certain cases, it usually comes at a higher cost.571 This rigidity reduces the corporate group’s
566 This may also result in additional management inefficiencies. See, e.g., id. at 379 (“[Cjompanies become less 
transparent with respect to an inter-temporal aspect: due to frequent and complicated tax-driven 
reorganizations, the development o f  the business performance o f certain companies or their parts often 
cannot be easily determined because the entities involved are not comparable over time.”).
567 See DESAI &  DHARMAPALA, Tax and Corporate Governance: A n  Economic Approach, supra note 121, at 14 
(“[T]ax avoidance demands complexity and obfuscation to prevent detection. These characteristics, in turn, 
can become a shield for managerial opportunism.”). See also STEFAN MAYER, The Link Between Taxation and 
Corporate Governance: Report on the Discussion, in Tax and Corporate Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed. 2008) at 
67 (“[T]he intuition that tax planning shifted power away from the board to inside managers was supported 
by the experience from past scandals. For instance, the business o f Tyco has been structured in such a 
complex way and with so many subsidiaries that hardly anybody had a complete picture o f the enterprise’s 
activities.”).
568 See MARTINA BAUMGARTEL, Taxation, Accounting and Transparency: The Interaction of Financial and Tax 
Accounting;, in Tax and Corporate Governance (Wolfgang Schon ed. 2008) at 99 (“’Over-optimization’ very 
often leads to inflexible and complicated structures and downsides in case the tax legislation changes.”).
569 These costs include fees paid to external consultants {i.e., lawyers’ fees, accountants, management 
consultants, etc) as well as the internal costs required to implement new operational guidelines throughout the 
organization.
570 See, e.g., in the US, IRC Section 368 (requiring a post-acquisition continuity o f business); IRC Treas. Reg. 
Section 1.355-2(d) (imposing restrictions on post-distribution sales); IRC Section 382 and IRC Treas. Reg. 
Section 1.368-1 (d)(disallowing carryover unless business-enterprise continuity exists for two years after the 
limitation-triggering event and subjecting built-in losses to limitation if they are recognized during the five- 
calendar-year post-change recognition period).
571 See SCHOLES, et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A  Planning Approach, supra note 114, at 185 (“In the 
presence o f  uncertainty regarding future pretax cash flows and the tax rules themselves, a premium is placed 
on contracts that offer flexibility in tax planning to respond to unexpected changes in tax status. But building 
flexibility, however, into contracts does not come free...flexibility typically requires greater contracting 
costs.”).
capacity for adaptation to outside disturbances, which, as previously discussed, may 
penalize its economic performance.572
Therefore, the taxation o f corporate groups under the Standard CIT System may result in 
the following overall effects:
a. Increase o f tax overhead costs both for corporate groups and the state;
b. Reduction o f corporate groups’ ability to shift capital to its most efficient use;
c. Agency problems; and
d. Rigid and potentially sub-optimal functional and legal structures.
All these effects, according to the parameters defined in this thesis, constitute deadweight 
loss.573 The next section will examine alternative mechanical solutions to tax corporate 
groups under a corporation income tax system and assess how they deal with these 
problems.
572 The situation may be especially damaging where the functional or legal structure adopted to benefit from 
tax advantages or avoid the application o f  specific anti-abuse rules is sub-optimal from a transaction cost or 
agency perspective.
573 See discussion supra at pg. 72ff.
PART III | The Tax Integration o f Corporate Groups under a CIT System  
A. The Mechanics of Tax Integration
/. The Tax Integration Solutions
Under the Standard CIT System, as a matter o f principle, corporate group members are 
treated as separate taxable entities.574 Consequently, the system requires recordation o f the 
amount, the location and the character o f income at the level o f each corporate group 
member. In light o f the nature o f the Standard CIT System, corporate groups may 
substantially alter such individual records and, thus, their tax treatment, by changing the 
value, timing and legal characterization o f intra-group transactions. With regard to legal 
characterization,575 unless an arsenal o f anti-abuse rules exists, corporate groups’ flexibility 
enables them to easily manipulate the formalistic nature o f  the Standard CIT System 
through the accurate selection o f transactional routes, legal forms o f transactions and legal 
and functional structures. This manipulation o f the Standard CIT System results in several 
negative consequences, both for the state and corporate groups, including the increase of 
tax overhead costs; a reduction o f corporate groups’ ability to shift capital to its most 
efficient uses; agency problems and the potential adoption o f sub-optimal corporate 
structures.
The current section intends to examine alternative mechanic solutions to tax corporate 
groups under a CIT system and to assess how they cope with these problems. Adopting an 
opposite perspective to the Standard CIT System, the section will focus on the study o f 
mechanic solutions that aim at treating the corporate group as a sole taxable entity. Thus, 
this section will analyze tax solutions that, to the maximum extent possible, allow for the 
free transfer o f assets, income and tax attributes inside a corporate group, and that impose 
a single layer o f  taxation on the income derived by corporate group members. For 
purposes o f this thesis, these different taxation models will be referred to as Tax 
Integration Solutions.
574 For the exceptions to this general rule on anti-abuse situations see generally discussion infra at pg. 116ff.
575 This thesis is not concerned with the manipulation o f the value o f transactions. For the manipulation o f  
timing see supra discussion at pg. 43.
2. The Structure of Tax Integration Solutions
The taxation models that allow for tax integration may be conceptualized as closed 
operating systems that use particular tax mechanics within the boundaries o f a qualifying 
corporate group (hereinafter, “Tax G roup”) aimed at integrating its operating results as if  a 
sole taxable entity was at stake.576 Although these models frequently make use o f mechanic 
concepts alien to the Standard CIT System, their mechanic structure must be designed in a 
way that allows for a proper interaction with it. This occurs for two reasons.
Firstly, Tax Group members generally interact with entities taxed under the Standard CIT 
system and, thus, their tax attributes must be compatible with those existing under the 
Standard CIT System. For example, if an asset is transferred outside the Tax Group, be it 
in a taxable transaction or a tax-free transaction, it must be attributed a tax value, i.e., a tax 
basis, so that the acquirer may determine its amount o f gain (or loss) on a subsequent sale 
and its amount o f allowable amortization deductions. By the same token, if  a Tax Group 
member makes an interest payment to an unrelated entity, a tax deduction at the Tax 
Group level and an inclusion by the same amount at the unrelated entity level must occur 
to ensure that no tax attributes effectively “drop out” o f the tax system.
Secondly, the corporate group has a volatile nature. Thus, entities previously subject to the 
Standard CIT System may join the Tax Group. Similarly, at a certain point in time, some 
corporate group members may leave the Tax Group and start a new existence as a separate 
taxable entity subject to the rules o f the Standard CIT System.577 Therefore, a tax 
integration regime must interact with the Standard CIT System when dealing with an 
entity’s pre-entry tax attributes and when determining what occurs to an entity once it exits 
the Tax Group.
Besides interacting with the Standard CIT system rules, the Tax Integration Solutions may 
interact with rules from other regulatory fields. For instance, to totally disregard a 
corporation for tax purposes may have associated corporate law consequences (e.g., which 
entities to sue if the group does not pay its consolidated tax bill; whether the tax 
consolidation o f the group’s results collides with the legal rights o f minority shareholders;
576 For the issues surrounding the definition o f  qualifying corporate group for tax integration purposes see 
discussion infra at pg. 181ff.
577 This may occur for different reasons, such as sale o f stock, disqualification for Tax Group eligibility 
requirements, etc.
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etc). Finally, although an issue outside the scope o f this thesis, Tax Integration Solutions 
may interact with the international tax system. For instance, the classification o f corporate 
group members for purposes o f application o f tax treaties or their classification for foreign 
tax purposes may condition the implementation o f certain models o f tax integration.
First, this section will discuss a Tax Integration Solution that completely eliminates the 
separate tax existence o f corporate group members. As will be discussed, although this 
model may be a particularly sound solution to tax corporate groups, it is advisable only 
when complete ownership is present. When ownership is incomplete, as often occurs in the 
business world, this model raises very strong problems. Accordingly, the section will then 
discuss alternative solutions that may be applicable in cases o f partial ownership. The 
section will first discuss a pass-through model o f integration and then the US and UK 
group taxation models. Throughout this discussion, the qualification o f the corporate 
group members for the eligibility requirements for the different integration regimes 
analyzed will be assumed. This approach allows the discussion to focus on the complex 
mechanic issues o f tax integration. After discussing the extent to which the different tax 
integration models may be combined into a more efficient mechanic design, the section will 
then briefly discuss the problems associated with the definition o f corporate group for tax 
integration purposes. In conclusion, the section will assess the dynamic effects o f tax 
integration and will suggest, following the policy guidelines previously proposed, how 
corporate groups should be approached under a CIT system.
3. The Tull Tax Integration Model
a. The Mechanics o f Full Integration
The full tax integration model completely eliminates the separate tax existence o f corporate 
group members. It effectively treats all corporate group members as a single taxable entity 
and, thus, gets rid o f the need to track the amount, location and character o f income for 
each corporate group member. From a mechanic standpoint, it eliminates the outside basis 
o f all Tax Group members, except for the group’s parent, and their individual tax 
attributes. By losing stock basis, all Tax Group members are effectively treated as divisions 
o f the group’s parent for tax purposes. This means that a unified tax calculation o f tax
attributes for all Tax Group members exists and that all tax tracking is made exclusively at 
the parent corporadon’s level. See diagram below.
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Diagram 9
This method of taxing corporate groups reduces the opportunities for manipulation of the 
CIT system and its associated complexity. Within the boundaries of a fully integrated 
corporate group, flows o f cash and assets occur without any tax consequences, both in 
upward, downward and transversal flows, independendy of their formal characterization 
and of the corporate group member that undertakes the transaction.3 8 Intra-group 
transactions, in whichever form or direction, may be effectively disregarded for tax 
purposes. By the same token, tax attributes, including NOLs and NCLs, are freely
578 When assets are transferred, this treatment applies independently o f  whether an asset has a built-in gain or 
loss.
transferable within the boundaries of the fully integrated group. In contrast to the Standard 
CIT System, the significance of line-drawing in intra group transactions is completely 
eliminated. See diagram below.
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Diagram 10
The Problems of the Full Integration Model
This model, despite the appeal o f its simplicity, has certain problems. First, and 
fundamentally, with incomplete ownership, the attribution o f an outside basis to each 
corporate group member is advisable in order for the tax system to operate and, thus, the 
tax existence o f group members may not be completely eliminated for tax purposes.3 9
A further set o f problems relate to the interaction o f this model with the Standard CIT 
System. Consider the group’s relationship with outside parties. Although the stock basis of 
Tax Group members is eliminated, their stock may still be sold to outside parties. When 
that occurs, the issue that arises is what should be the tax value o f the stock. A potential 
solution may be to treat the sale o f stock as a sale of the underlying assets. In such case, 
inside basis could dictate the amount of capital gain (or loss) on the stock sale. In principle, 
this capital gain (or loss) would be recognized at the level o f the parent corporation, the 
only entity with tax attributes under this model.380
579 See discussion infra at pg. 176.
580 This is the solution adopted by the US tax system for entities that classify as disregarded entities under the 
Check-the-Box regime. Under this type o f  solution, since the sale o f  stock is the sale o f  the underlying assets, 
an issue arises as to whether stock may classify as an asset used in the trade or business and thus, under the 
generally applicable rules, whether the respective sale gives rise to ordinary income (or losses) instead o f
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The treatment given to an entity’s tax attributes once it enters or leaves a fully integrated 
tax group produces a further interaction problem with the Standard CIT System. A 
possible solution for pre-entry tax attributes may be to eliminate all the entity’s tax 
attributes upon entry to the Tax Group. In such case, the outside basis o f the corporate 
group member, together with all remaining tax attributes, would be eliminated without 
recognition o f gain (or loss) by any member o f the Tax Group. In principle, the inside basis 
for all assets would carryover. This type o f solution, although more restrictive to the 
taxpayer in that all o f its pre-entry tax attributes would be effectively lost, remains attractive 
because o f its simplicity and difficulty to manipulate.581
An alternative solution, more beneficial to the taxpayer but with higher associated 
complexity, assumes a tax-free liquidation to the parent corporation upon entry o f the new 
corporate group member and allows the carryover o f old tax attributes o f the new 
corporate member to the group’s parent. In this case, all assets, liabilities, and items of 
income, deduction, and credit o f the entering corporation would be treated as assets, 
liabilities, and items o f income, deduction and credit, o f the group’s parent. In principle, 
the transfer o f assets and the deemed liquidation would be disregarded for tax purposes.582 
However, this solution should require complex rules to avoid abuses {e.g., limiting the use 
o f pre-entry losses to income derived by the corporate group member), and more complex 
tax accounting.
As for the exit o f a Tax Group member, a potential solution could be to treat the departing 
corporate group member as a new corporation acquiring all o f its assets and assuming all o f 
its liabilities. In such case, the departing Tax Group member would take a cost-basis in its 
assets, which should determine the value o f its new stock basis. In addition, the carryover 
o f any attributes generated while it was a member o f the Tax Group could be simply 
disallowed.
Thus, although the interaction o f the full integration model with the Standard CIT System 
raises some mechanic issues, they could, in principle, be dealt with using more or less
capital gains (or losses). This solution o f attributing all the group’s activities to its parent {i.e., the only entity 
with tax attributes under this system), could also be used to deal with the treatment o f inbound and outbound 
flows o f  cash. Thus, in the case o f a loan entered into with an unrelated party by a Tax Group member, 
potential tax deductions (on payment) and tax inclusions (on receipt) should occur solely at the parent’s level.
581 That is, this solution eliminates the potential for tax planning operations aimed at importing losses into the 
fully integrated tax group by acquiring corporations with accumulated losses.
582 See similar policy for QSub corporations at IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1361-4.
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restrictive mechanic solutions. Although this issue will not be subject to further 
development in this thesis, we note that it must be carefully considered by the legislator to 
avoid potential loopholes or malfunctions o f the tax system.
The relationship o f the full integration model with other regulatory fields presents another 
area o f trouble. Fundamentally, the implementation o f this model is subject to a corporate 
law and accounting analysis o f the feasibility o f making the tax treatment independent of 
the corporate law treatment. In the US, as the recent experience with the Check-the-Box 
regime demonstrated, this should pose no extraordinary problems.583 However, in 
jurisdictions that more closely align corporate law and corporate income tax law, to totally 
disregard the separate tax existence o f a corporation for tax purposes may be more 
troublesome.584
Finally, the elimination o f the separate tax existence o f corporate groups raises certain 
international tax issues. Although these issues remain outside the scope o f this thesis, it is 
worth noting that the application o f tax treaties to the disregarded corporate group 
members, the classification o f disregarded corporate group members for foreign tax 
purposes, and the treatment o f foreign losses must be analyzed once one considers the 
implementation o f this model. The US experience with the Check-the-Box regime should 
provide a rich source o f analysis o f potential problems and solutions in this field.585
In sum, the full integration model presents considerable advantages to tax corporate 
groups, reducing opportunities for manipulation o f the CIT system and its associated 
complexity. However, it presents certain implementation issues. Although the interaction 
o f this model with the Standard CIT System raises certain mechanical issues, it appears as if 
they can be dealt with through the use o f more or less restrictive mechanic solutions. This 
is an issue that the legislator must carefully consider. The model’s relationship with other 
regulatory fields and with the international tax environment incorporate more complex
583 See, e.g., HUGH DOUGAN, et al., "Check-the-Box" - Looking Under the Lid  75 Tax Notes 1141 (1997).
584 For instance, which entities are deemed liable for the payment o f the group’s tax liability; what happens in 
terms o f  court proceedings, etc. In certain countries, an issue also arises regarding the legal grounds for the 
tax pooling o f  profits and losses. For example, in Germany a legal contract between corporate group 
members is required in order to implement tax consolidation. See IF A, Group Taxation (Sud Fiscale & 
Financiele Uitgevers. 2004) at 43.
585 In this regard, see, eg., ALICE G. ABREU, Making Something Out of Nothing: Tax Planning With Disregard Entities 
in Tax Planning for Domestic & Foreign Partnerships, LLCs, Joint Ventures & Other (Practising Law 
Institute ed. 2004); REUVEN S. Avi-YONAH, T o End Deferral A s  We Know It: Simplification Potential of Check-the- 
Box 14 Tax Notes 219 (1997); DANIEL S. MILLER, The Strange Materialisation of the Tax Nothing 87 Tax Notes 
685 (2000).
issues, which, as the US experience with the Check-the-Box regime demonstrates, are 
solvable. Fundamentally, in order to avoid complexity and abuses, careful analysis must 
precede potential implementation.
4. The Partial Integration Models
Often, the corporate group is not the sole shareholder o f a corporate group member. In 
these cases, as will be further discussed, the outside basis should not be eliminated as 
occurred under the full integration model. This maintenance o f the dual basis mechanism 
in cases o f partial ownership is a major source o f mechanical complexity for integration 
models.
In these cases o f partial ownership, two taxation solutions are mechanically feasible.586 A 
first option is to tax the partially-owned corporate group member under a flow-through 
regime, akin to those applicable to partnerships or closed corporations. Alternatively, 
partially-owned corporate group members may maintain their separate taxable personality, 
but through different mechanic solutions, they may be treated as if a sole taxable entity is at 
stake. This section will investigate the mechanics o f both Tax Integration Solutions.
a. The Flow-Through Model
i. The Mechanics o f the Flow-Through Model
Under a flow-through model, corporate group members would be subject to a tax regime 
similar to those currently applicable to partnerships or closed corporations. Under this
model, an outside basis would still be required. However, it is not the “rigid” outside basis
o f the Standard CIT System discussed previously.587 Under the mechanic principles of 
flow-through taxation, the outside basis o f Tax Group members would have, instead, a 
floating nature. In particular, under this model, the outside basis o f each member would be 
regularly increased and decreased to keep track o f taxed amounts, distributions and tax
586 In theory, a mark-to-market solution could also be devised whereby the group and the minority 
shareholders would be taxed on the periodic changes in value o f  the shares o f partially-owned corporate 
group members. Besides raising issues regarding valuation and liquidity concerns, this type o f  solution would 
not commingle tax attributes o f  corporate group members and, thus, is not included in this study as a Tax 
Integration Solution.
587 Under the Standard CIT System, outside basis is generally unaltered independently o f  corporate-level 
events, such as distributions or use o f losses to offset taxable income.
attributes, such as losses and deductions that flow-through to the group and other 
shareholders. This would allow the tax system to allocate the tax attributes of Tax Group 
members among the group and its minority shareholders and to avoid potential situations 
o f double or no taxation. Consider, for instance, the taxation of corporation A l in the 
diagram below.
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Diagram 11
Under this model of tax integration, A l’s shareholders, P and the unrelated corporation 
XCo, would be taxed on a flow-through basis as partners in A l’s business. The taxation of 
A l’s profits would occur at P’s and XCo’s level independently of distribution. In order for 
the tax system to avoid situations of double or no taxation, whenever P and XCo were 
taxed on their share of A l’s undistributed income, their bases in A l’s stock would increase 
to reflect such fact.588 As a result, P and XCo would not be taxed a twice if they sold their 
stock at a price reflecting the income that they reported on their returns, but that Al 
retained and accumulated. Following the same mechanic logic, P and XCo would have to 
reduce the basis o f their A l’s stock by their pro rata shares of A l’s deductions and losses. 
That is, since P and XCo could take advantage of these items on their returns, the 
reduction in basis would be necessary to prevent the same items from being used to reduce 
their gain (or increase their loss) upon selling the stock. For the same reason, the basis of 
the stock would have to be reduced if P and XCo received any distribution from A l. That 
is, since these distributions would consist o f previously taxed corporate income, the 
adjustment would offset the earlier increase in the basis of the stock when the income
588 In effect, P and the XCo would increase the basis o f  their shares just as if  the income had been distributed 
and reinvested as a contribution to A l ’s capital.
passed through to P and XCo.589 Finally, the character o f A l’s income should pass through 
to P and XCo. Income, losses, deductions, and credits would retain their corporate-level 
character, be allocated to P and XCo and treated by them as if  attributable direcdy to the 
source from which they were generated.590
ii. The Problems o f the Flow-Through Model
This type o f model, although mechanically feasible, generates several problems. First, as 
may be seen from the taxation o f partnerships and closed corporations, it should be rather 
complex. In particular, the disposition o f A l’s assets or stock, either in a taxable 
transaction or tax-free transaction, and transactions between A1 and its shareholders, P and 
XCo, generate a multitude o f complex problems.591 In addition, this system may generate 
complicated administrative issues if  many shareholders or foreign shareholders exist. A 
further problem of this model is the negative implications it may have for minority 
shareholders. That is, the taxation o f the minority shareholder XCo depends on who owns 
the remaining 80% of A l’s stock. Consequently, the tax treatment o f XCo may change not 
by its own actions but by who else bought shares in A l, i.e., in our example, corporation P. 
This may give rise to two interrelated problems. First, the treatment o f XCo could be 
different if  the 80% were not owned by P but by other shareholders taxed under the 
generally applicable tax rules, a fact over which XCo may have no control at all. In 
particular, depending on whether the 80% interest is owned by P or not, XCo may see its 
tax treatment radically modified, from a flow-through treatment to a separate entity 
treatment. In the case o f a later disposition o f P’s interest in A l to parties taxed under the
589 Any excess would be generally treated as gain on the sale o f property. These principles should generally 
apply for distributions o f cash and property. However, a distribution o f appreciated property would trigger 
the recognition o f gain at the corporate level. This gain would pass through to the shareholders, P and XCo, 
and result in an increase o f  their basis o f A l ’s stock. This, in turn, would ensure that the distribution itself 
was tax-free to them.
590 This is in line with the treatment currently afforded to close corporations in the US. Following the same 
principles, A l should be able to sell its assets with only a single tier o f  tax (at the shareholders’ level) and be 
able to participate in tax-free reorganizations, buy the assets or stock o f another business, redeem its own 
stock, divide tax-free into two or more separate entities or liquidate. See treatment o f S Corps in US at 
BlTTKER & EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 417, Section 6.
591 For the issues that would be associated with the disposition o f A l ’s assets or stock, see, e.g., id., Section 
6.09[3] (discussing similar issues in the context o f  S Corporations) and WILLIAM S. MCKEE, Federal Taxation 
o f Partnerships and Partners (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 2007) (discussing the complex issues associated 
with the disposition o f  partnership interests). For the issues that would be generally associated with the 
transactions entered into between A l and its shareholders, see, e.g., IRC Section 707 and respective Treasury 
Regulations. See also M cK ee at Chapter 13. Broadly, the main issues revolve around whether the transactions 
should be taxed and how to allocate the attributes o f  the pass-through entity from such transactions. For 
instance, in the partnership rules, a rather controversial assessment o f facts is required in order to determine 
whether the interest holder in the pass-through entity acted or not is his capacity as a member o f the entity 
with respect to each particular transaction.
generally applicable tax rules (whereby separate entity treatment would in principle apply to 
A l and its shareholders), potentially complex mechanic rules could also be required to 
ensure that XCo’s transition between tax regimes occurred without tax attributes effectively 
dropping out o f the tax system or giving rise to abusive tax planning opportunities. Second, 
since a flow-through regime applies, P ’s actions as a controlling shareholder over A l’s 
business and tax policies should directly affect XCo’s yearly tax return (e.g., decision to sell 
certain A l’s capital assets with built-in losses in order to obtain a capital loss inclusion in a 
specific tax year advantageous to P, with immediate inclusion at XCo’s and P’s level o f the 
capital loss derived by A l on the sale). These problems may be especially acute in that 
under the corporate laws o f many jurisdictions the restrictions that are generally applicable 
to the transfer o f interests in partnerships and close corporations - whereby the law often 
puts in place mechanisms to restrict the free transferability o f interests - may not be 
applicable. Thus, in this case minority shareholders could face a significantly low degree of 
protection. Although these constitute effective problems, we note that there are certain 
solutions available that could ameliorate these downsides o f the model (e.g., celebration of 
agreement between XCo and P whereby P commits to reimburse XCo for potential 
downsides associated with A l’s operations on XCo’s tax return and /o r requirement of 
XCo’s consent to transfer P’s interest in A l to other parties). Finally, it should be noted 
that this model may also result in a potential worsening o f agency problems. That is, since 
XCo and P are taxed directly on A l’s income, the firm’s tax policy takes on a distinct 
dimension for them. In such situation, XCo and P are expected to become more interested 
in controlling the decisions o f A l’s management in order to obtain a better individual tax 
result, what as previously discussed may give rise to agency problems. Finally, problems 
similar to those identified under the full integration model transpire upon the entry of, and 
the exit o f  corporate group members from the integrated corporate group, and upon the 
model’s interaction with other regulatory fields and the international tax environment.
In sum, although the flow-through model is a mechanically feasible solution to integrate 
partially owned corporate group members, it raises several complex issues.
b. The Group Taxation Model
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In several jurisdictions, there are special taxation regimes that, while maintaining the 
separate tax existence o f  corporate group members, allow for their integration for tax
purposes.592 A corporate group member may generally access these regimes provided that 
there is a significant control o f the corporate group over the corporate group member.593 
These special regimes generally allow, to various degrees and in different ways, for the 
offset o f profits and losses among corporate group members and for the deferral o f tax on 
intra-group transfers o f assets and income. There are several group taxation models with 
different rules to achieve one or both objectives.594
All these group taxation regimes face a standard set o f mechanic problems to integrate 
corporate groups for tax purposes, because the separate tax existence o f corporate group 
members continues, and, thus, the location, character and amount o f tax attributes must 
still be recorded at the level o f  each corporate group member. Consider the following 
mechanic problems that arise once we try to integrate for tax purposes corporations with a
595separate tax existence-
Problem 1: Treatment o f Intra-Group Asset Transfers
Consider the following situation. Assume that corporation A2, a member o f P ’s corporate 
group, owns an asset with a tax basis o f 50 and a FMV of 100. In year 1, A2 transfers the 
asset to B2, a member o f the same corporate group. During year 2, this asset appreciates in 
value and its FMV is now 150. At the end o f year 2, B2 sells the asset to an unrelated party.
592 See, e.g., DlETER ENDRES, The Concept of Group Taxation: A  Global Overview, 31 Intertax 349 (2003).
593 See discussion infra at pg. 183ff for eligibility requirements for US and UK.
594 See generally on Group Taxation models, IFA, Group Taxation, supra note 584; WlLMAN, E qualing the 
Income Tax Burden in a Group of Companies, supra note 366; ENDRES, The Concept of Group Taxation: A  Global 
Overview, supra note 592; ANTHONY TING, Polity and Membership Requirements for Consolidation: A  Comparison 
Between Australia, New Zealand and the US, 3 British Tax Review 311 (2005); J. RICHARD, Comparison Between UK 
and French Taxation of Group Companies, 31 Intertax 20 (2003); ABADAN JASMAN &  JUNAID SHAIKH, 
Developments and New Ideas in the Group Relief Framework, 8 IBFD Asia-Pacific Bulletin 334 (2002); DUBROFF, 
Federal Income Taxation o f  Corporations Filling Consolidated Returns (Matthew Bender. 2005).
595 This problematization o f  group taxation regimes builds on the work developed at IFA, Group Taxation, 
supra note 584, at 40-42 and 51-52.
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PROBLEM 1
If we decide to integrate the tax treatment o f this corporate group, an issue o f how to treat 
these asset transfers for tax purposes arises. Location of the gain recognized presents a 
primary issue. A possible option is to make each party recognize the amount of gain that 
accrued while it owned the asset. Thus, A2 would recognize a gain of 50 and B2 would 
recognize the remaining gain of 50. In this scenario, a further issue arises regarding the 
timing o f recognition, that is, whether the gain should be recognized immediately on each 
transfer or only later upon disposition of the asset outside the group, a solution more in 
line with tax integration.
Another possible option regarding location o f gain is to make the total gain accrued while 
the asset was within the group be recognized exclusively by either A2 (i.e., through the 
disregard of intra-group asset transfers) or B2 (i.e., through the application of a carryover 
basis mechanics to intra-group asset transfers). Thus, in these cases, either A2 or B2 would 
recognize the full 100 of gain. Under these options, recognition would only occur once the 
asset was transferred outside the group.
Apart from these problems regarding location and timing of gain recognition, amortization 
deductions provide a further issue. That is, in each of these different scenarios, which 
entity should benefit from the amortization deductions on the asset and which cost basis 
should be used to determine the amount of the amortization deductions.
Problem 2: Double Counting
A further problem that arises once we integrate the tax treatment of corporate group 
members is the elimination of the potential double taxation of profits or the double 
deduction of losses. Consider the following situation, assuming that no mechanism for ^ a§e 
integration of corporate and shareholder taxation is applicable.
Diagram 13
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PROBLEM 2
Imagine that A2’s stock basis and market value is 100. Assuming we integrate P’s group, 
when A2 earns profits of 50, this amount is consolidated with the group’s profits and taxed 
immediately at the group level, independently o f distribution. Assuming a 35% tax rate, a 
tax of 17,5 is imposed on such profits. If  later, A l sells A2’s shares at a price o f 132,5, the 
amount of gain is 32,5. However, A2’s profits o f 32,5 have already been taxed as part of the 
consolidated income o f the group. Taxation o f gains in stock would represent a second 
layer of taxation on the same profits within the same group. By the same token, the danger 
of double counting exists with regard to losses. Imagine that A2 incurs operating losses or 
losses from the sale o f its assets of 50, which reduce the consolidated income o f the group. 
Later, A l sells the A2s shares at a price of 50. If the cost base of A2’s shares remains 100, 
Al recognizes a capital loss of 50. In this case, a double deduction within a single group 
transpires.
For jurisdictions that have already implemented a participation exemption mechanism 
covering distributions, and capital gains and losses derived on stock transfers, these 
situations should pose no particular problems. Any potential real or deemed distributions,
and potential gains or losses on stock transfers, would simply be exempt from taxation. 
However, for jurisdictions, such as the US, that have not yet implemented a participation 
exemption, the tax integration o f a corporate group requires that these double counting 
problems are adequately dealt with.
Problem 3: Intra-Group Payments
A further problem relates to intra-group payments. As a rule, under the Standard CIT 
System, no general principle requires the tax consequences of a transaction to be 
determined based on another taxpayer’s treatment o f the same transaction, i.e., the so-called 
“Systemic Matching.”596 Thus, when one taxpayer takes a deduction, the Standard CIT 
System does not necessarily require another taxpayer to include the deducted amount in its 
income.597 In the face o f the nature of corporate groups and of the existence o f highly 
complex hybrid instruments, allowing for consolidation, without such principle being 
applicable, may lead to the implementation of circular cash-flows that generate phantom 
deductions and reduce the taxable income o f the entire group.
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Problem 4: Entry and Exit of Corporate Group Members
The fact that corporate entities that make up a group may have had, or may have in the 
future, their own separate existence as business entities presents a further problem of
596 ROIN, Unmasking the "Matching Principle" in Tax \ mw, supra note 140.
597 Id.
integration. Tax law is forced to recognize a dual nature in each component o f the group: 
its nature as a member o f an aggregate entity and its individual nature as a business entity, 
which despite “dormant” while the corporation is a member of a group, may, at any 
moment, be brought to life due to its exit o f the corporate group.
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PROBLEM 4
The main mechanic problems associated with this dual nature of corporate group members 
relate to the treatment to be afforded to pre-entry and post-exit tax attributes, 
fundamentally tax losses, so as to avoid either a double use or an unreasonable purging of 
such attributes.
Problem 5: Treatment of Minority Shareholders
A final mechanic problem relates to the treatment o f minority shareholders. Consider 
corporation A l below.
Diagram 16
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PROBLEM 5
I f  we decide to integrate A l with P, whether we should allocate all or only a part o f A l’s 
results to the group remains in question. I f  we attribute all o f A l’s results to the corporate 
group, the issue then becomes when, and how, to reimburse XCo for the fact that A l lost 
tax attributes that could reduce its taxable income in future tax years.
Overall, all group taxation regimes face this standard set o f mechanic problems. The next 
section will analyze and compare the mechanic solutions that the US and U K  Group 
Taxation regimes propose to tackle these problems and to integrate corporate groups for 
CIT purposes.598
i. The Mechanics o f  the US Group Taxation Regime
The US Group Taxation regime proposes a Tax Integration Solution that substantially 
alters the mechanics o f  the Standard CIT System.599 The alterations introduced allow the 
regime to integrate a corporate group for tax purposes, while avoiding situations o f no or 
double taxation. The following section will start by analyzing two core mechanic devices of 
the US Group Taxation regime, i.e., its altered outside and inside basis. Subsequently, the 
section will analyze certain additional alterations introduced to the regular mechanics o f the 
Standard CIT System and discuss how the regime determines the consolidated tax liability 
o f  the group. The section will conclude by examining the problems raised by this Tax 
Integration Solution.
1. Outside Basis
Under the US Group Taxation regime, outside basis operates as a highly interactive floating 
mechanism. Following a mechanic logic akin to the flow-through model, its value increases 
and decreases every year to keep track o f changes in the value o f corporate group members 
and o f  the amount o f their individual losses that are used to offset the group’s consolidated
598 As previously discussed, the current thesis focuses on the analysis o f  the US and UK tax laws. Note, 
however, that further group taxation models are available, such as the “Organshaft” or the “Group 
Contribution” models. Both these models have, however, important short backs. The Organshaft model does 
not allow for the deferral o f  gains or losses arising from intra-group transfers o f assets. In turn, tax relief 
under the Group Contribution model is generally conditioned upon a transfer o f wealth, what generates 
several practical and corporate law problems. Probably for these reasons, these models have a reduced 
representation in the international tax arena. See generally on both models IFA, Group Taxation, supra note 
584.
599 The US Group Taxation regime is commonly known as “Consolidated Return” regime. This thesis will, 
however, adopt the Group Taxation taxonomy.
taxable income.600 Significantly, in order to fulfil the maximum potential o f its floating 
nature, outside basis is even allowed to go negative, something mechanically unique in the 
entire US CIT system. This allows outside basis to perform its tracking functions without 
requiring immediate gain recognition when the recorded balance becomes negative.601 See 
diagram below.
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This mechanism allows the US Group Taxation regime to tackle the double counting 
problem (See Problem 2 above). Specifically, the system increases outside basis whenever it 
considers that the corporation experienced an increase in value that should not be subject 
to tax, either because it has already been taxed or because it should be exempt from 
taxation. Through this upward adjustment, the system avoids double taxation or taxation of 
tax exempt amounts when the stock o f the corporation is later transferred in a taxable
600 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-32.
601 When outside basis is negative, a so-called ELA (“Excess Loss Account”) arises. ELA must be recognized 
on a later disposition o f stock. In particular, if the stock o f the subsidiary is sold before the balance turns 
positive, the negative amount o f basis is included in the parent’s income when it disposes o f  the stock o f its 
subsidiary and generally treated as gain from the sale o f stock. See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-19.
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transaction. Since the value o f outside basis increases, the group will recognize a smaller 
gain (or a larger loss) upon a later taxable transfer o f the corporate group member’s stock. 
By the same token, outside basis is reduced whenever the system considers that the value 
o f the corporate group member has been reduced or a certain amount which has not yet 
been taxed should be subject to tax. Due to this downward adjustment, the group will have 
to recognize a larger gain (or a smaller loss) upon a taxable transfer o f the corporate group 
member’s stock in the future.
In particular, at year end,602 outside basis suffers an upward adjustment for undistributed 
income and a downward adjustment for distributions and losses utilized in consolidation, 
both operating and capital.603 Income and tax attributes that have no relevance for tax 
purposes {i.e., tax exempt income and non-deductible expenses) are neutralized following 
the same mechanic logic. That is, outside basis increases by the amount o f tax-exempt 
income for the year and decreases by the amount o f non-capital, non-deductible
604expenses.
Although complex, this tracking system is particularly accurate. Consider the taxation of 
ordinary income. At year end, if the taxable income balance is positive, outside basis will 
increase by the amount o f such balance. This means that such amount has already been 
subject to tax as part o f consolidated taxable income and, therefore, should not be subject 
to tax again. However, if the balance is negative, the change will not occur automatically. It 
will only occur if  the N O L is actually used to reduce the consolidated taxable income o f the 
group. That is, if  the loss does not leave the corporation, it may be used in future tax 
returns and, thus, the potential loss carry forward must be factored into the value o f the 
corporate group member. Similar mechanic principles apply to capital gains and losses. A 
positive balance will always result in a corresponding increase in the value o f outside basis.
602 As a rule, the adjustments to outside basis are made at the close o f  each consolidated return year. 
However, adjustments may also occur whenever necessary to determine “a tax liability o f  any person.” See 
IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-32 (b)(1).
603 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-32. For the issues associated with the allocation o f  these adjustments to 
different classes o f stock see IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-32 (c).
604 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-32 (b)(2). The interactive nature o f outside basis under the US Group 
Taxation regime extends also to the tax attributes o f other Tax Group members. That is, the outside bases o f  
all tax group members are linked vertically. When stock basis adjustments are made at year-end, they tier up 
from lower tier to higher tier members. See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-32 (a)(3)(iii).
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In comparison, a negative balance, a NCL, will only reduce outside basis once utilized by 
the group.603 See diagram below.606
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Following the same mechanic logic, since the value of a corporation decreases with the exit 
o f cash to its shareholders, outside basis is reduced by the amount of distributions.607
605 See BlTTKER & EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 417, at 
Section 13.44 [2] [a]. Note that the adjustments to outside basis when losses are availed o f by the group, occur 
on the year in which loss arose (if loss is used in past year tax return) or in year in which loss is used in tax 
return (if loss is used in the same year). See IRC Treas. Reg. Sections 1.1502-32(b)(3)(i)(A), (B).
606 At the beginning o f the year, Corporation A l outside’s basis has a tax value o f  0. At year end, A l 
recognizes +2 o f ordinary taxable income and +2 o f capital income. Its outside basis is increased by +4. 
However, if A l’s ordinary and capital income are negative (-2 each) the adjustment of-4 to outside basis will 
only occur when losses are availed o f by the group.
607 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-32 (b)(2). This adjustment occurs independently o f the characterization 
o f the distribution as a dividend or non-dividend distribution. Because the outside basis o f the distributing 
corporation is reduced equally independently of the characterization as dividend or non-dividend, there is no 
difference in consolidation regarding one or the other in this aspect as far as the distributing corporation is 
concerned. See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13 (f)(2)(ii). Nevertheless, in opposition to the Standard CIT 
System, if a dividend distribution by a member is no t out o f E&P and exceeds the distributee’s tax basis in 
such member’s stock, the gain which would otherwise be recognized (under IRC Section 301) will be added 
to the ELA o f such member and only reported as income when tracking is no longer possible {i.e., when its 
stock is considered to be disposed of). N ote that this linking o f adjustments to taxable income instead o f to 
E&P arises as a result o f legislative history and has to do with the fact that it made more sense to link stock 
basis adjustments to taxable income in that they both have a same underneath rationale, i.e., prevent 
understatement o f amounts (as opposed to E&P where the rules try to avoid overstatement). See GEORGE L. 
WHITE, BN A Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Consolidated Returns— Investment in 
Subsidiaries (755-3rd) (Tax Management Inc. 2009) at Section IV-C.
W hen outside basis disappears, tracking is no t possible. Thus, intercompany items 
associated with a member’s stock, that is, deferred gain or loss from previous intercompany 
transactions, are triggered when the Tax Group member liquidates.608
2. Inside Basis
Similarly to outside basis mechanics, the mechanics o f inside basis under the US Group 
Taxation regime deviates from the traditional mechanic rules o f the Standard CIT System. 
Instead o f the conventional carryover or cost basis mechanics, an original mechanic device 
applies whereby the transaction is granted deferral {i.e., no tax is recogni2ed on the 
transaction), but the acquirer gets an updated cost basis in the asset transferred.609 This so- 
called “Deferred Sale System” provides another interesting example o f sophisticated tax 
engineering. It allows the amount and location o f gain or loss on a taxable asset transfer to 
be determined on a separate entity basis, while timing and character are determined on a 
single entity basis.
Consider Problem 1 discussed above. Under the US Group Taxation regime, timing is 
determined on a single entity basis. Thus, the built-in gain or loss on asset X  will be 
triggered only when B2 transfers the asset in a taxable transaction to a party outside the 
Tax Group. In addition, following the same single entity rationale, the holding periods of 
A2 and B2 are “blended,” and the character of the gain or loss is determined taking into 
account the activities o f both A2 and B2 with respect to the property.610
However, separate entity treatment applies for purposes of determining the amount and 
location of these items. Specifically, due to the treatment o f the intra-group transfer on a 
cost basis, once asset X  leaves the Tax Group, A2 and B2 are taxed on the respective 
shares of asset appreciation that occurred during their holding periods. Thus, A2 and B2
608 That occurs even when the liquidation is tax-free to the shareholders under IRC Section 332. The items 
are taken into account immediately before it first becomes impossible to achieve tracking. Note that there is 
elective relief for reincorporation and certain other specified cases {e.g., liquidations under IRC Treas. Reg. 
Section 338(h) 10)). See id. at Section V-B. Further, note that the stock ownership o f  all members is aggregated 
to determine whether tax-free treatment applies to the distribute on the liquidation. See IRC Treas. Reg. 
Section 1.1502-34.
609 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13.
610 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13 (c). The holding period o f  property transferred in an intercompany 
transaction is generally the aggregate o f the holding periods o f  seller and buyer. However, if  the basis o f the 
property is determined by reference to the basis o f other property, the property’s holding period is 
determined by reference to the holding period o f  the other property. For example, if  A2 distributes stock to 
A l in a distribution to which IRC section 355 applies, A l ’s holding period in the distributed stock is 
determined by reference to A l’s holding period in the stock o f  A2. See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13.
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are treated as effectively engaging in the transaction and owning the actual property 
involved.611 These mechanic principles apply to different types o f transactions such as sales, 
distributions in liquidation or in-kind distributions.612
A substantial problem that arises with this altered mechanics is the treatment o f the 
amortization deductions associated with asset X. Since B2 obtains an updated cost basis in 
asset X at the time o f its acquisition from A2, an issue arises as to whether B2’s 
amortization deductions should be calculated on such updated basis. I f  that occurs without 
any adjustments, there could be a stepped up tax basis with increased deductions that could 
be used to offset the income o f the whole Tax Group. This could be used ad infinitum to 
constandy generate new tax deductions. For this reason, under the US Group Taxation 
regime, B2 maintains A2’s previous asset basis with the same rate o f depreciation, i.e., it 
simply gets into the shoes o f A2 for its amount o f basis.613
As for the step up amount, a new depreciation period starts.614 Further, in order to 
neutralize the tax effects o f this operation, A2 recognizes gradually as income the amount 
o f depreciation deductions recognized by B2 on the stepped up tax basis amount. In the 
end, B2’s amortization deductions on the stepped up amount and A2’s income recognition 
neutralize themselves in a wash by coinciding on the same date, i.e., the date o f the 
amortization deduction.615 Despite its complex nature, this mechanism prevents the use o f 
amortization deductions to abusively reduce taxable income and allows depreciable 
property to be transferred from one member to another without losing the benefit o f rapid 
depreciation methods.616
Interestingly, while gain attributable to member stock is generally triggered currently when 
that member’s stock is disposed o f in a redemption or liquidation transaction, property 
distributed in the redemption or liquidation transaction remains subject to the deferral 
regime. The logic provides that since matching can continue in the distributee member, the
611 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13.
6,2 In general, under the US Group Taxation Regime, intercompany distributions o f  property are equated 
with intercompany sales. See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13 (f)(2)(iii). For a detailed discussion o f  
intercompany sale transactions see GEORGE L. WHITE, BNA Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, 
Computation o f  Consolidated Tax Liability (756-3rd) (Tax Management Inc. 2007).
613 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13.
614 Id.
6,5 Id.
616 JWIRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-12 (g).
regimes allows for continued deferral for the deferred intercompany items o f the 
liquidating member (including gain or loss generated in liquidation).617
3. Other Relevant Mechanic Alterations
Apart from these alterations to outside and inside bases mechanics, the US Group 
Taxation regime introduces certain other deviations o f relevance to the regular mechanic 
rules o f the Standard CIT System. Elements o f especial relevance for our analysis include 
the application o f a matching principle to intra-group payments and the treatment o f boot 
in intra-group reorganizations.618
As previously discussed, under the Standard CIT System, a taxpayer’s treatment o f one 
transaction may determine the tax consequences o f  a later, related transaction. For 
example, the amount o f gain a taxpayer recognizes upon the disposition o f an asset 
depends on the circumstances under which the taxpayer acquired the asset, namely, the tax 
basis created as a result o f the acquisition.619 Such a tracking mechanism ensures that a 
taxpayer neither omits nor counts twice income items affected by transactions taking place 
in two different taxable years.620
However, a similar principle does not exist to ensure that the tax treatment o f one taxpayer 
in a transaction will determine the tax treatment o f another taxpayer in the same 
transaction. For instance, a principle requiring that when one taxpayer takes a deduction, 
another taxpayer must include the deducted amount in its income. Administrative reasons 
primarily explain the absence o f such a principle under the Standard CIT System. The 
massive quantity o f information involved {i.e., large number o f taxpayers, transactions, tax 
years, etc) should make the system extremely difficult to administer.621
617 See BlTTKER &  EUSTICE, Federal Income Taxation o f Corporations and Shareholders, supra note 417, at 
Section 13.43 [3].
618 Other noteworthy alterations to the regular Standard CIT System mechanics include the treatment o f  in- 
kind distributions o f  loss property (deferred and not eliminated) and redemptions (amount distributed is 
treated as a tax-free distribution). Since they are not central to our analysis they will not, however, be 
developed here. See generally WHITE, BNA Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Computation o f  
Consolidated Tax Liability (756-3rd), supra note 612.
619 See ROIN, Unmasking the ''Matching Principle" in Tax Taw, supra note 140, at 813.
620 Id. at ft. 4.
621 See JOSEPH M. D o d g e , The Logic o f Tax: Federal Income Tax Theory and Policy (West Publishing 
Company 1989) at 102 (Dodge asserts that mandatory joinder is unworkable because there are “too many 
parties to too many transactions involving too many taxable years for such a system to work”). Similarly Roin 
points out that under normal circumstances “it is often difficult to join all parties to a transaction for 
purposes o f  determining each one’s tax liability.” In addition, Roin underlines that “requiring an absolute
While it is understandable that to enact this type o f general principle under the Standard 
CIT System is farfetched, the same should not occur within the limited boundaries o f a 
corporate group. In this case, a limited number o f parties and transactions would be 
matched. Indeed, this thesis believes that Systemic Matching, i.e., relating the tax treatment 
o f various parties in a given transaction to each other’s tax treatment, should be a basic tax 
policy tool with regard to corporate groups. As previously mentioned, in face o f  the nature 
o f corporate groups and o f the existence o f highly complex hybrid instruments, the 
absence o f a Systemic Matching principle within the closed boundaries o f a corporate 
group may lead to abuses. Based on the current existing knowledge on the behavioural 
nature o f corporate groups,622 corporate groups may well structure internal circular cash­
flows with the sole aim o f creating phantom tax deductions, without offsetting income 
inclusions, to reduce the group’s taxable income. By allowing this focus on transactional 
results as an instrument o f assessment o f tax coherence, the reliability o f the tax system 
improves, in that deductions will always have corresponding inclusions, or even simpler, 
both may be simply eliminated.
This is precisely the approach that the US Group Taxation regime proposes for intra-group 
payments. Under the US regime, intra-group payments offset each other in a wash, the 
timing o f which is controlled by the paying member’s timing rule.623 Going back to 
Problem 3, the timing o f B2’s inclusion and P ’s interest deduction are synchronized, with 
the timing o f B2’s inclusion determined based on the accounting methods o f P. That is, the 
matching is obtained by making the deduction and the inclusion occur on the same specific 
date, and, thus, effectively obtaining a wash for intra-group transactions. Different types of 
intra-group payments and transactions remain subject to this matching principle,624 
including intra-group payments o f interest, royalties, rents and fees.625
The treatment o f boot in intra-group reorganizations presents another noteworthy 
alteration to the Standard CIT System. An intercompany reorganization is one that is
matching o f  tax consequences in all circumstances w ould conflict with basic features o f  our current incom e 
tax system, such as the co-existence o f  different accounting systems and the maintenance o f  multiple, 
progressive rate schedules.” See ROIN, Unmasking the "Matching Principle" in Tax Law, supra note 140, at 814.
622 See discussion supra at pg. 124ff.
623 See WHITE, BNA Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Computation o f Consolidated Tax 
Liability (756-3rd), supra note 612.
624 The matching rule under the US Group Taxation regime applies uniformly to period transactions {eg., 
payment o f  currently deducted interest), sales o f  property, performance o f  capitalized services, and 
transactions involving stock or obligations o f members. See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13 (b)(l)(i)(c).
625 Note that each payment o f interest or accrual or premium on a loan qualifies as a separate intercompany 
transaction. See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13 (b)(l)(i).
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wholly internal to the Tax Group {i.e., all parties to the reorganization are members o f the 
group before and after reorganization). Property received as part o f a reorganization 
exchange is boot.626 The US Group Taxation regime bifurcates the boot and the 
reorganization.627 In this adopted fiction, the boot is received in a transaction separate from 
the reorganization exchange. Accordingly, the boot is treated as a distribution.628 N on- ^ a8e 
taxability with correspondent adjustment to outside basis ensues.629 This rule provides a 
very good example o f regulatory simplification based on pragmatic assumptions associated 
with the reality o f a Tax Group.
4. The Determination o f the Tax Liability o f the Corporate Group
Making use o f these altered mechanics, at year end, the system determines the tax liability 
o f the group. The separate calculation by each corporate member o f its taxable income 
presents the starting point. The entity must calculate its separate taxable income as if  all the 
transactions that occurred with other group members did not exist for tax purposes.630 
Thus, all intra-group transactions must be neutralized. The neutralization of intra-group 
transactions occurs through the use o f the mechanisms discussed above, i.e., altered outside 
and inside basis mechanics, application o f the matching rule to intra-group payments, tax 
free treatment o f boot in internal reorganizations, etc. This operation results in the 
elimination o f intra-group distributions, and profits and losses from intercompany 
transactions. In addition, certain tax attributes, which must be calculated on a joint basis, 
are not taken into consideration on this calculation. Thus, capital gains and losses and 
NOLs are disregarded in computing each member’s separate taxable income.631
Once the separate taxable incomes are calculated in this manner, they are combined in a 
global account, made up o f adjusted separate taxable incomes. Then, the items calculated 
on a joint basis are added to such global account. Thus, the last step o f the calculation is to
626 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13 (f)(3)(i).
627 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-13 (f)(3(ii).
628 That is, boot is treated as received under IRC Section 302 and as distributed under IRC Section 311. See 
Rev. Rul. 93-61,1993-2 C.B. 118.
629 The term "boot" is used to describe nonqualifying property, such as money, that is received in a 
reorganization exchange along with qualifying property (stock).
630 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-12.
631 Also, certain attributes such as Foreign Tax Credits and the Dividends Received Deductions {see IRC 
Section 243) are calculated in an aggregated fashion. That is, the limitation percentage is applied to the 
appropriate consolidated, rather than the separate income item. Thus, a deduction or credit which would 
otherwise be unavailable to a member o f the group in a separate return (because o f  insufficient income or 
tax) might become available to the group in a consolidated return. See WHITE, BNA Tax Management 
Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Computation o f  Consolidated Tax Liability (756-3rd), supra note 612.
combine the separate taxable incomes and compute NOLs, and the capital gains and losses 
on a consolidated basis.632 As a rule, the current loss must be absorbed first. Thus, current 
income and losses o f all members must offset each other in the consolidated computations 
before any carryovers or carrybacks can be absorbed on a consolidated basis.633 The 
foregoing formulates the taxable income o f the consolidated group. This hybrid figure 
constitutes the consolidated taxable income over which tax will be levied.634
5. Entry and Exit o f Corporate Group Members
As previously discussed in Problem 4, the treatment o f pre-entry losses is a transversal 
problem to all integration regimes. There are three types o f pre-acquisition losses that may 
generally carryover, NOLs, NCLs and built-in losses.635 The US Group Taxation regime 
classifies these three types o f pre-entry losses into a separate category, the so-called 
Separate Return Limitation Year (“SRLY”), and restricts their use, either totally or 
partially.636 As a rule, losses subject to the SRLY limitation may only be used to offset the 
group’s income to the extent o f the member’s contribution to consolidated taxable 
income.637
632 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-21.
633 Once such losses are used to offset consolidated taxable income, the outside basis o f  the group member 
that contributed such losses suffers a downward adjustment. As previously discussed, net losses are a negative 
adjustment only to the extent they are used in the current year consolidated return or are carried back to 
another year. See WHITE, BNA Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Computation o f  
Consolidated Tax Liability (756-3rd), supra note 612.
634 In an effort to keep the separate tax existence o f  each member alive the tax liability is allocated to each 
member. Although each member is responsible for such tax liability and for the tax liabilities o f  all remaining 
group members, this allocation is important because it is used to calculate E&P. That is, such tax liability will 
reduce E&P. Id.
635 See discussion supra at pg. 104.
636 See IRC Treas. Reg. Sections 1.1502-1 (e),(f) (definition o f SRLY); IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-15 
(limitation on built-in losses); IRC Treas. Reg. Sections 1.1502-21 (a),(b),(c) (computation and operational 
rules for NOLs) and IRC Treas. Reg. Sections 1.1502-22 (a),(b),(c) (computation and operational rules for 
NCLs). The restriction on the use o f  pre-entry losses may also occur under IRC Section 382, which continues 
to be applicable under the US Group Taxation regime. The consequences arising from admission to a Tax 
Group under both SRLY and section 382 events depend upon the timing o f these events. Where the SRLY 
event {i.e., the time at which the corporation becomes a member o f the Tax Group) occurs within six months 
o f the IRC Section 382 triggering event, an “overlap rule” applies, and the Section 382 event supersedes the 
SRLY event; that is, the section 382 limitation alone applies to the utilization o f the NOLs by the Tax Group. 
Where the SRLY event occurs more than six months after the section 382 triggering event, both the SRLY 
and section 382 limitations apply to the NOLs transferred to the Tax Group. Where the admission o f  the 
corporation to the Tax Group is neither a SRLY nor a section 382 event, the NOLs carried over become 
consolidated net operating losses (CNOLs) and can be utilized unencumbered by the consolidated group. See 
IRC Treas. Reg. Sections 1.1502-21 (g)(1) and 1.1502-21(g)(2)(ii)(A).
637 Interestingly, the member’s contribution to consolidated taxable income is not measured on a year-by-year 
basis but cumulatively over the entire period during which the corporation is a member o f  the group. Thus, 
N O L carryovers and carrybacks subject to the SRLY restriction may be included in the group’s consolidated 
N O L deduction only to the extent that they do not exceed the aggregate consolidated taxable income for all 
consolidated return years o f that specific group member, computed by taking into account only the loss
As for the exit o f a Tax Group member, in principle, all deferred intra-group items trigger 
upon exit. Further, when this occurs during the taxable year, the departing corporation 
takes its allocable share o f N OLs.638 Once the member exits the Tax Group, it can be 
readmitted only after five years.639
6. The Treatment o f Minority Shareholders
From a mechanic perspective, minority shareholders are effectively isolated from the 
consolidation process. Their stock basis is not affected by the different adjustments 
introduced to a Tax Group member’s stock basis by the US Group Taxation rules.640 
Further, although not valid against the Internal Revenue Service, Tax Group members can 
contractually agree to allocate the burden for the consolidated group tax liability through a 
“tax-sharing agreement.”641 These agreements provide a certain level o f protection to 
minority shareholders in that they allocate the tax burden on the basis o f each separate 
corporation’s taxable profits, as if such entity were to file a separate federal income tax 
return.642
member’s items o f  income, gain, deduction and loss. Further, the US Group Taxation regime does not permit 
the separate NO L carryover or carryback o f a member to be applied direcdy against its own taxable income 
included in the consolidated return. It does not matter whether the NO L arose in a consolidated return year 
or in a SRLY. That is, even NOLS subject to the SRLY restriction that are carried over or back by the loss 
member are deducted as part o f the consolidated N O L deduction that offsets the income o f  the group as a 
whole. See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-21 and IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-22. See also WHITE, BNA  
Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Computation o f Consolidated Tax Liability (756-3rd), supra 
note 612.
638 In particular, the portion o f  the consolidated NOLs allocable to that corporation becomes its own NO L  
for carryforward. The NO L available for carryforward by the departing corporation is determined after the 
CNOLs have been applied to the consolidated taxable income for the year, i.e., only the CNOL attributable to 
the departing corporation which is not absorbed by the group in that year is carried over to the departing 
corporation’s first separate return year. IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-21 (b)(2)(ii)(A). A corporation that 
joins or leaves a consolidated group during the taxable year has a deemed taxable year-end on the date its 
group status changes. IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-76(b)(1)(ii).
639 IRC Section 1504(a)(3).
640 See IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-32 (c)(1). In general, adjustments are allocated to all shares o f  the Tax 
Group member on a share-for-share basis. As a result o f  this rule, adjustments are allocated even to shares 
owned by non-members (minority interests). However, the adjustments allocated to minority stock have no 
effect on the basis o f  such stock because non-members are not subject to the investment basis adjustment 
system. See WHITE, BNA Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Consolidated Returns—  
Investment in Subsidiaries (755-3rd), supra note 607.
641 Tax Group members are jointly and severally liable for the entire tax o f  the group. See WHITE, BNA Tax 
Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Computation o f Consolidated Tax Liability (756-3rd), supra note 
612.
642 See GEORGE L. W h it e , BNA Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Consolidated Returns - 
Elections and Filing (754-3rd) (Tax Management Inc. 2005).
7. The Problem of Transfers of Tax Group Members’ Stock
T h e  u se o f  a floatin g  ou tsid e  basis to  n eu tra lize intra-group  transactions w h ile  m ainta in in g  
the separate tax ex isten ce  o f  a corp orate  g rou p  m em b er sign ifies a sign ifican t setb ack  o f  the  
U S  so lu tio n  for partial in tegration . T h is m ech a n ism  g ives rise to  substantia l co m p lex ity  
o n c e  sto ck  o f  a T ax  G rou p  m em b e r  is transferred. C on sid er the fo llo w in g  situations.
S itu ation  1
Diagram 19
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SITUATION 1
In this situation, A 1 acquires A 2  's stock from an unrelated party. A 2  owns an asset with a built-in gain. 
Later, while a member of the Tax Group, A 2  sells its built-in gain asset and recognises a taxable gain. 
Under the basis adjustment rules discussed above, A U s outside basis would be stepped up by the amount of 
gain recognised in A 2 ’s asset sale. The problem is that i f  A 1  then sells A 2 ’s stock, it will recognise a loss 
(or a reduction on taxable gain) on an amount equal to the prior step up in A 2 }s stock basis. In this 
situation, the basis adjustment to A 2 ’s stock does not reflect an increase in A 2 ’s underlying assets. Thus, 
the loss realised by A 1  on the sale of A 2 ’s stock does not represent an economic loss to either A 1  orA2.
Situation 2
Diagram 20
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SITUATION 2
In this situation, A 2  owns an asset that declines in value while A 2  is a member of the Tax Group. Under 
the basis adjustment rules, since the loss is not realised, it does not produce an adjustment to A 2 ’s stock 
basis. I f  A 1  then sells A 2 ’s stock to an unrelated party, it will recognise a loss (or a reduction on taxable 
gain) of an amount equal to the decline in value of A 2 ’s assets. In addition, later when A 2  sells its built-in 
loss asset, it will recognise such built-in loss. Thus, in this situation, the value of A 2 ’s built-in loss may be 
effectively duplicated.
Situ ation  3
Diagram 21
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SITUATION 3
In this situation A 2  has current losses. A 1  then decides to sell A 2 ’s stock. Despite the adjustment rules 
discussed above, due to the offset of AVsgains with A 2 ’s losses in consolidation, the sale would not have 
any net effect upon consolidated taxable income.
In  order to address situations such as those described in Situations 1 and 2, the US Group 
Taxation regime has an additional body o f very complex provisions, the so-called Loss 
Disallowance Rule (“LDR”) and Deconsolidation Rule.643 Broadly, the LDR provides that 
no loss is recognized by a member upon the disposition o f the stock o f a subsidiary. This 
rule is backstopped by an additional anti-avoidance rule, i.e., the Deconsolidation Rule.644 
Under this rule, subsidiary stock is generally reduced to its value upon the deconsolidation 
o f a subsidiary.645 Lastly, in order to address situations such as Situation 3, the US Group 
taxation regime does not allow A 2’s losses to be used to offset A l’s stock gain. A2’s losses 
can only be used to offset other income o f the group.646
In sum, the neutralization o f transactions through the use o f a floating outside basis poses 
several problems once the stock o f  a Tax Group member is transferred, either at a gain or a 
loss. If  no limitations are imposed, the floating outside basis mechanics may be easily 
manipulated to obtain unlawful tax benefits. To deal with such problems, very complex 
anti-abuse rules are required.
643 That is, eliminate the possibility that gain recognized on the disposition or consumption o f  an acquired 
subsidiary’s built in gain assets may be offset by a loss at the parent level created by an investment adjustment 
attributable to the subsidiary’s recognized built-in gains (see Situation 1); and prevent losses o f a subsidiary 
from being duplicated in the form o f a parent’s investment losses (see Situation 2). See IRC Treas. Reg. 
Section 1.1502-20 (a) (Loss Disallowance Rule) and IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-20 (b) (Deconsolidation 
Rule).
644 Without it, consolidated return filers could easily avoid the brunt o f  the LDR. For instance, assume P has 
an unrealized loss in A l stock. P sells sufficient A l stock to cause A l to drop out o f  the P consolidated 
return into a separate return environment where the LDRs would be inapplicable to a subsequent sale o f  the 
A l stock retained by P. The deconsolidation rule thwarts this scheme by marking to market the basis o f  the 
A l stock retained by P, thus precluding the recognition o f  loss by P on a subsequent sale o f A l stock. See 
WHITE, BNA Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income Series, Computation o f  Consolidated Tax Liability 
(756-3rd), supra note 612, at Section III-G.
645 A  “deconsolidation” is any event that causes a share o f  stock o f  a subsidiary that remains outstanding to 
be no longer owned by a member o f any consolidated group o f  which the subsidiary is also a member. Where 
there is an overlap between a disposition (which triggers the LDR) and a deconsolidation (which triggers a 
basis reduction), the former controls. Id.
646 For purposes o f determining the amount o f  gain or loss on a disposition o f A2’s stock, the consolidated 
taxable income or loss o f  the group is tentatively determined without regard to any gain or loss on the 
disposition o f  the stock. Investment adjustments are then made to the basis o f  this stock based on this 
tentative computation. Gain or loss on the disposition is then determined based on this adjustment to the 
basis o f the stock. This problem is usually referred to as the “circular basis problem”. Id.
8. Conclusion on the Mechanics o f the US Group Taxation Regime
The US Group Taxation regime is overly complex. Although it has developed very 
interesting mechanic solutions for tax integration, the overall complexity o f the regime 
does not make it very appealing as a comprehensive solution to integrate corporate groups 
for tax purposes. A core problem o f the regime is the use o f a floating outside basis to 
avoid the double counting problem. Although this mechanism allows for a rather accurate 
tracking o f relevant intra-group events, it gives rise to very complex situations once a sale 
o f stock o f a Tax Group member occurs. Also, the operation o f the mechanism itself is 
particularly intricate. Further, although the determination o f the tax liability o f the Tax 
Group comes very close to achieving a true single-entity result, the complexities associated 
with such calculations (e.g., intricate ordering rules for use o f losses, intricate calculations of 
separate and consolidated taxable items, etc.) raise the issue o f whether an outright 
consolidation o f results o f separate taxable entities is desirable from an overall efficiency 
perspective. Lastly, this type o f system raises complex interaction problems. In particular, 
due to the complexity o f  its altered mechanics, the interaction o f the US Group Taxation 
regime with the tax rules for taxation o f partnerships and disregarded entities proves 
particularly troublesome.647
Nevertheless, the US Group Taxation regime is illustrative for the sophistication o f certain 
solutions it uses to integrate corporate groups for tax purposes. In particular, the Deferred 
Sale System and its associated rules for the amortization o f transferred assets; the Matching 
Rule on intra-group payments; the treatment o f boot in Tax Group reorganizations; and 
the comprehensive restrictions to the use o f pre-entry losses provide commendable 
approaches to tax corporate groups.
ii. The Mechanics o f the UK Group Taxation Regime
The U K  tax system proposes an entirely different solution to the tax integration o f 
corporate groups. While maintaining the separate tax existence o f corporate group 
members, the UK solution uses a simpler mechanic apparatus to integrate corporate groups 
for tax purposes. The secret o f the comparative simplicity o f the UK regime lies in the fact
647 See, e.g., COLLINS, et al., Consolidated Return Planning and Issues Involving Disregarded Entities, supra note 301; 
HYDE, et al., The Use of Partnerships and I J jC s in Structuring Consolidated Groups, supra note 301. These authors 
describe how disregarded entities and partnerships can be used to manipulate the US Group Taxation regime 
(e.g., not to recognize an ELA, etc.).
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that, by and large, it uses the regular mechanics o f its Standard CIT System. Although the 
degree o f tax integration achieved is not as high as under the US Group Taxation regime, 
the UK solution is mechanically simpler.
1. The Structure o f the UK Tax Integration Regime1 —   ■ 1 o  o
In  the UK the integration process is simplified due to the fact that a participation 
exemption is applicable under its Standard CIT System. Dividends and gains or losses on 
the sale o f a Tax Group member’s stock are effectively neutralized using this mechanism 
and, thus, the problem of double counting upon integration (see Problem 2 above) is 
avoided. Further, the UK does not consolidate the tax results o f the Tax Group members, 
as occurs under the US Group Taxation regime. Instead, each corporate group member 
calculates its taxable income separately and losses are set-off individually. Due to the 
participation exemption and to the simpler loss offset mechanism, the complexities 
associated with the use o f an altered outside basis are avoided.
In  contrast to the US, the UK regime has followed a segregated approach to the tax 
integration o f corporate groups, individualizing tax attributes and types o f income in 
different regimes. Specifically, the tax integration o f corporate groups is achieved using the 
following mechanisms:648
1. Participation exemption (allows for tax free distributions inside the group and for 
the avoidance o f double taxation or double use o f losses upon the sale o f a 
corporate group member’s stock);649
648 See YASH RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IFA, Group Taxation, Cahier de Droit Fiscal 
International Vol. 89b (Yoshihiro Masui, et al. eds., 2004) at 697; FURSDON, British Tax Guide: Corporation 
Tax, supra note 410, at 141-142.Note that the UK corporation tax legislation has been rewritten over the last 
two years as part o f  the Tax Law Rewrite programme. It is now largely contained in the Corporation Tax Acts 
2009 and 2010 (CTA 2009 and CTA 2010 — the latter includes Group Relief) and the Taxation (International 
and Other Provisions) Act 2010 (TIOPA 2010). The exception is the material on the chargeable gains o f  
companies, which remains unrewritten in the Taxation o f Chargeable Gains Act 1992, which it is not planned 
to rewrite.
649 Note that owing to changes flowing from EU issues, distributions are not automatically free from 
corporation tax (see CTA 2009, Part 9A -  applicable since July 2009); however, distributions from controlled 
companies are generally exempt (CTA 2009, Section 931E), subject to the anti-avoidance rules, especially 
Section 931. As the participation exemption for the sale o f stock o f a group member, this thesis refers 
referring to the substantial shareholding exemption in TCGA 1992, Schedule 7AC. This exemption has only 
applied since 2002. Note that this exemption has a one-year minimum holding period and that it applies 
essentially only to trading groups (thus, excluding in particular investment activities).
2. Group relief (allows for transfers o f NOLs inside the group);
3. Capital gains group (allows for tax free transfers o f assets and transfers o f  NCLs 
inside the group);
4. Loan relationships and derivative contracts transfers (allows for the transfer o f loan 
relationships and derivative contracts between group companies on a tax neutral 
basis);650
5. Roll-over relief (allows for the rollover o f tax provided the proceeds from certain 
sales are reinvested in group operations);
6. Intangible fixed assets transfers (allows for the transfer o f intangible fixed assets 
between group companies on a tax free basis); and
7. Pooling o f foreign tax credits (allows excess foreign tax credits to be surrendered 
by one company to another company in the group).651
The following discussion will focus on the group relief and capital gains group regimes due 
to their relevance to our analysis.
2. Intra-Group Transfers o f Assets and NCLs
The transfer o f assets between members o f the same Tax Group does not give rise to gains 
or losses.652 The transfers are no t ignored. However, the consideration received by the 
transferor for the transfer is deemed to be o f such an amount that secures that neither a
650 Note that if the loan relationship or derivative contract is accounted for on the amortising cost basis, the 
transfer is tax free, but if  it is accounted for on the fair value basis, the transfer is on normal terms; however, 
the latter is consistent with the fair value basis as it is not a realization basis, so the basis does not accelerate 
tax liability on an intra-group transfer, it merely allocates any gain or loss for the year between the group 
members on the basis o f  the value at the transfer date.
651 This regime is relatively new, dating back only to 2001. It only applies to tax credits in respect o f  foreign 
dividends and the profits o f foreign branches. For additional mechanisms o f  integration in the UK, for 
instance, for stamp duty purposes, see FURSDON, British Tax Guide: Corporation Tax, supra note 410, at 141- 
142.
652 See TCGA 1992, Section 171. The applicable legislation refers to a Tax Group as a “Chargeable Gains 
Group.” N ote that relief applies to all capital assets but special rules apply if the asset forms part o f the 
“trading stock” o f  either the transferor or the transferee. In other words, if  it changes its character to or from 
capital. See YASH RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IFA, Group Taxation, supra note 648, at 696.
gain nor a loss arises to the transferor.653 The transfer is implemented on a carryover basis, 
i.e., the transferee corporation inherits the tax basis o f the transferor on the asset.654 This 
postpones any tax liability until the asset is disposed o f outside the group.
Besides facilitating the free transfer o f assets between Tax Group members, the UK regime 
allows for the transfer o f NCLs between them. Thus, an asset may be transferred directly 
out o f a Tax Group member and benefit o f the NCLs o f another member to reduce the 
gain on the transfer.655
3. Intra-Group Transfers o f Losses
Under the UK  solution for intra-group transfers o f losses (i.e., so-called “Group Relief’ 
regime), each member o f the Tax Group computes its tax liability on a single entity basis.656 
A company may then make a claim on its tax return to use the losses o f another Tax 
Group member incurred in the same fiscal year to offset its profits for the year.657 This 
process o f loss offset involves therefore a so-called “claimant”- company (i.e., the company 
that claims the use o f another company’s tax losses in its tax return) and a “surrendering” 
company (i.e., the company that surrenders the losses to the claimant company).
The claim for group relief has to be made in the claimant company’s tax return with the 
consent o f the surrendering company.658 However, note that both the claimant and the 
surrendering company remain responsible for preparing their separate tax computations
653 Id.
654 Id. In the UK, this value is generally adjusted for indexation relief. Id. Note that the UK tax legislation 
does not use a concept analogous to “basis,” although practitioners refer to “base cost.” Having no concept 
o f  “basis,” the UK legislation cannot make adjustments to basis or carryover basis, but has to use other 
mechanisms to achieve similar results.
655 For gains and losses accruing before July 21, 2009 this result could only be achieved by election for the 
notional transfer o f the asset before its disposal to a third party. See TGCA Section 171 A, as inserted by FA 
2009, Section 31, Sch. 12. See also FURSDON, British Tax Guide: Corporation Tax, supra note 410, at 141-142 
and 164-165 (describing in detail the operation o f this mechanism). Under the new regime, where a group 
company realises a chargeable gain or allowable loss (i.e. on a disposal outside o f  the group), there is now an 
election enabling it to transfer the gain or loss to another group member. As before, allowable losses can only 
be offset against chargeable gains, even when transferred.
656 Note, as will be further discussed below, that the qualification requirements for the Chargeable Gains 
Group and Group Relief differ. See discussion infra at pg. 184ff.
657 The group relief regime applies to the transfer o f  trading losses, excess interest expenses on borrowings 
and certain other amounts (excess capital allowances, management expenses o f  investment companies, 
charges on income and certain losses relating to intangibles. Capital losses cannot be surrendered as group 
relief. However, losses surrendered under group relief can be set o ff against all types o f  profit, including 
capital gains.
658 It is possible to enter into simplified arrangements which enable a group to appoint one o f its members to 
act on behalf o f  the group in making the necessary claims.
and discharging their tax liability. In general, group relief is set-off against total profits 
(including capital gains once realized) o f the claimant company for the current accounting 
period. These total profits are arrived at after deducting all reliefs available to the claimant 
company that relate to previous accounting periods.
The same year restriction for group relief is a primary feature o f this regime. This means 
that losses carried forward from an earlier accounting period or carried back from a later 
accounting period o f the surrendering company cannot be claimed. By the same token, 
group relief surrendered to a claimant company cannot be carried back or forward to other 
accounting periods o f the claimant company.
N ote that there is no compulsion to surrender losses by way o f group relief and the loss- 
making company is free to choose to carry losses forward to reduce its tax liability on 
future profits or, in case o f certain losses, to carry losses back against the profits o f 
previous periods.
Another point o f relevance is that the losses o f a corporation may be divided among 
several Tax Group members. Different claims may be made in respect o f different portions 
o f the losses o f the surrendering company and by different members o f the Tax Group. 
The group chooses what proportion o f losses available for surrender is to be surrendered, 
and which corporations are to be the claimant companies.659 Claims are made on an 
accounting period by accounting period basis.660
4. Entry and Exit
Similarly to the US, the UK has several restrictions to the use o f pre-entry losses. As a 
general rule, ordinary losses incurred by the surrendering company prior to its joining 
cannot be surrendered. Only losses which are incurred whilst the surrendering company is
659 A claim can be withdrawn at the group’s discretion within appropriate time limits.
66° Note that UK corporate tax law further provides for a so-called “consortium relief.” Broadly, whereas 
group relief requires 75% ownership but gives the right to surrender 100% o f  a loss, consortium relief applies 
where a number o f companies (a consortium) each owns at least 5% but less than 75% o f  a subsidiary. A  loss 
o f the subsidiary can only be surrendered to a consortium member in proportion to its ownership, i.e. 45% of  
a loss could be surrendered to a 45% owner. Conversely if a consortium member surrenders a loss to the 
subsidiary, it can surrender the loss only up to the ownership proportion o f  the subsidiary’s profits, so the 
45% owner could only surrender enough o f  the loss to offset 45% o f the subsidiary’s profits. There are also 
rules about what happens when a consortium member is part o f a group or the subsidiary has a group under 
it. Consortium relief is generally restricted to trading companies. See generally TlLEY, Revenue Law, supra 
note 437, at 929-932.
in the group can be surrendered and they can only be set o ff against those profits o f the 
claimant company that are earned whilst it is in the group.661 Similarly, the use o f pre-entry 
capital losses (including built-in losses) is subject to several restrictions.662 Also, the set-off 
o f capital losses by a group against gains realized by a corporation before it joins the group 
is subject to limitations.663
With respect to the exit o f a corporate group member o f a Tax Group, there is a trigger of 
deferred gains on intra-group asset transfers undertaken within the prior six years to the 
date o f the exit.664 However, note that there is no recapture o f group relief if the claimant 
company leaves the group.
5. The Treatment o f Minority Shareholders
Where a Tax Group member has minority shareholders, such member may still surrender 
all o f its eligible losses to the Tax Group and it may set off group relief from the Tax 
Group against all o f its relevant profits.665 Although no such requirement exists, the 
claimant company may compensate the surrendering company for group relief by making a 
payment to it. A surrender o f group relief has no impact on the tax basis o f any 
corporation. As a rule, a payment for group relief will not be taxable (or deductible) 
provided that it does not exceed the amount o f the loss surrendered.
661 See YASH RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IF A, Group Taxation, supra note 648, at 693.
662 Specifically, the use o f pre-entry losses is restricted where a corporation joining a group brings with it 
capital losses realized prior to it becoming a member o f the Tax Group and where losses are realized by a 
corporation after its membership o f  the Tax Group has commenced but in respect o f assets held by it prior 
to it joining the group. These losses can only be set-off against gains on the assets that the joining corporation 
(or its associated corporations) brings into the new group or against gains on new assets acquired from a third 
party and used in an existing trade o f the new member. Further, where the loss in relation to a pre-entry asset 
is realized after membership o f the new group has commenced, a proportion o f  that loss is treated as a pre- 
entry loss and is subject to these limitations.
663 Note that the limitation on the use o f pre-entry gains is currently limited to cases o f  tax avoidance under 
TCGA 1992, Section 184B. See the Guidance Notes at Appendix 8 to the HMRC Capital Gains Manual 
(available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/CGlmanual/index.htm).
664 In particular, to prevent abuses through the transfer o f an asset which is to be sold outside the group to a 
new group member followed by the sale o f the shares in the new member (i.e., to benefit from the exemption 
on capital gains on sale o f  shareholdings), an “exit charge” applies. Specifically, if  the transferee company (or 
an “associated” company) leaves the group whilst holding the asset within 6 years o f  the intra-group transfer, 
the transferee company is deemed to have disposed o f  the asset at its market value immediately after it 
acquired the asset from the other group member. This exit charge may not be imposed if  both the transferor 
and transferee company leave the group together (and are associated immediately thereafter). See YASH 
RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IFA, Group Taxation, supra note 648, at 696.
665 Note that this does not occur in the case o f consortium relief
6. Conclusion on the Mechanics o f the UK Group Taxation Regime
Although the degree o f tax integration achieved under the UK Group Taxation regime is 
not as high as under the US Group Taxation regime, the UK solution remains mechanically 
simpler. One interesting feature is the avoidance o f a floating outside basis mechanics due 
to the use o f a participation exemption and to the individual set-off o f losses. However, the 
regime has certain drawbacks. First, although the regime is fairly flexible from an entity 
carryover perspective, it is extremely restrictive from a year carryover standpoint.666 
Further, the segregation o f the tax integration regime into different regimes generates 
unneeded complexity. In particular, it gives rise to the proliferation o f qualification 
requirements, which do not always match up.667
5. The Molecular Group Taxation System Proposal
Based on the analysis undertaken, the realization-based model that achieves all the 
objectives o f tax integration in the simplest possible form is the full integration model. 
Assets, income and tax attributes are freely transferable inside the corporate group and 
income derived by corporate group members is subject to a single taxation layer at the 
shareholder level. However, this model retains an important drawback. For mechanic 
reasons, it would most likely require complete ownership over the corporate group 
member. This is due to two reasons. First, since we may be considering a corporation with 
listed shares, once a corporate group member has more than one shareholder, the tax 
system must attribute an outside basis to each shareholder for it to be able to trade freely 
on its stock. Second, where a flow-through regime is applicable to a corporation that is 
owned by more than one shareholder, the tax system might well attribute an outside basis 
to each shareholder in order to keep track o f taxed amounts, distributions and tax 
attributes {e.g., losses and deductions) that flow-through to the shareholders. In these cases, 
outside basis should allow the tax system to allocate the tax attributes o f the flow-through 
entity among its shareholders and to avoid potential situations o f double or no taxation. 
Due to these limitations, where ownership is partial, alternative realization-based models
666 Apparently, the explanation for such restrictive use o f losses has to do with the fact that the rules for 
offsetting losses from one source against income from another and the rules for carryback and carryforward 
are overly technical. See See YASH RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IF A, Group Taxation, supra 
note 648, at 706.
667 See discussion infra at pg. 184ff regarding differences o f  qualification requirements for Group Relief and 
Chargeable Gains Group purposes.
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that attribute an outside basis to each shareholder o f the corporate group member would 
better be applied. The problem with these alternative models is that they either fall short o f 
achieving the objectives o f full tax integration or achieve them with added complexity.
Therefore, from a pure mechanic perspective, the most sensible solution would be to use 
the full integration model wherever possible and, for the remaining cases, adopt an 
alternative integration model. Thus, while in the case o f wholly-owned entities the full 
integration model would apply, the partially-owned entities would be subject to a partial 
integration solution. This co-existence o f full and partial integration solutions in a sole tax 
integration regime is not entirely new. In practice, this already occurs in the US with the 
interaction o f the US Group Taxation regime with the US CTB provisions.
Based on the lessons from the US experience, the use o f a floating outside basis must be 
ruled out for this type o f proposed hybrid model to work properly. Specifically, in order to 
ensure a safe interaction with the full integration model, the floating outside basis o f the 
flow-through model and o f the US Group Taxation regime should better be ruled out as 
partial integration possibilities.668 Therefore, the use o f a Group Taxation solution that does 
not require a floating outside basis should qualify as a preferable approach to the tax 
integration o f partially owned entities within such a hybrid model.669
In particular, based on the analysis undertaken, the partial integration solution that would 
better interact with the full integration solution, while ensuring the highest possible degree 
o f tax integration, should have the following mechanic characteristics:
a. Use o f the regular outside basis mechanics o f the Standard CIT System. As 
witnessed in the US experience, although the use o f a floating outside basis for tax 
integration purposes allows for an accurate tracking o f relevant intra-group events, 
it gives rise to very complex situations once there is a sale o f stock o f a Tax Group 
member. Also, the operation o f the mechanism itself is particularly intricate. Finally,
668 See supra note 301.
669 Further advantages o f  a Group Taxation model over a pure flow-through model include the fact that the 
proportionality o f  allocation is eliminated and, thus, the regime is simplified. In addition, under the Group 
Taxation model, the partially owned entity is kept, as a matter o f  principle, as a separate tax entity. This 
simplifies the interaction with the Standard CIT System rules, with other regulatory fields and with the 
international tax system.
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based on the current US experience, it gives rise to complex interaction problems 
with the remainder o f the CIT system.
Use o f a participation exemption mechanism, even if only within the limited 
boundaries o f the Tax Group. As previously noted, the Tax Integration Solutions 
work as closed operating systems. Thus, the solutions for tax integration do not 
necessarily need to replicate the mechanisms o f the Standard CIT System. 
Therefore, even in a tax system such as the US, which has not yet implemented a 
participation exemption under its Standard CIT System, a participation exemption 
may be implemented for the limited purposes o f tax integration o f corporate 
groups. One o f the problems o f the participation exemption is its potential for 
sheltering o f unrealised gains. For instance, due to the exemption for capital gains 
on stock sales, corporate taxpayers may be encouraged to disguise the sale o f assets, 
which should be taxable, as the sale o f stock, which is not. By the same token, a 
parent corporation may acquire the shares in a subsidiary as part o f  a tax-free 
reorganization from persons that would not be able to utilize the capital gains 
exemption, namely, individuals and partnerships. These incentives for tax planning 
could add a new layer o f difficulty to the government's ability to administer the tax 
law. For this reason, a participation exemption should generally be cumulated with 
additional rules to prevent abuses. For instance, restrictions preventing a non- 
eligible entity from avoiding capital gains taxation by transferring shares tax-free to 
a corporation or a step transaction doctrine enabling the tax authorities to recast a 
purported stock sale as an asset sale whenever deemed required.
Apply a regime for individual set-off o f losses similar to the UK Group Relief 
instead o f an outright consolidation o f the group’s results as proposed by the US 
Group Taxation regime. The complexities associated with the outright 
consolidation o f results o f separate taxable entities (e.g., use o f a tracking 
mechanism based on adjustments to outside basis, intricate ordering rules for use of 
losses, intricate calculations o f separate and consolidated taxable items, etc.) make 
this option less appealing.
As for the adoption o f the UK solution for individual transfers o f NOLs, maintain 
the same approach regarding entity carryover but enlarge its year carryover scope, 
allowing for unlimited NOLs carryforwards. As will be further discussed, this
option is also advisable from a dynamic perspective.670 For similar motives, adopt 
an equivalent approach to intra-group transfers o f NCLs (i.e., flexible entity and 
year carryover limitations).
e. Use Deferred Sale System for accounting for intra-group transfers o f assets. This 
mechanism allows for a very accurate determination and location o f tax attributes 
and for transfers o f property without losing the benefits o f rapid depreciation 
methods.
f. Apply a Systemic Matching principle to intra-group transactions, adopting the 
“wash” solution o f the US Group Taxation regime (i.e., make payment deduction 
and income inclusion coincide in the same specific date).
g. Treat boot in intra-group reorganizations as tax free distributions.
h. Maintain limitation for pre-entry NOLs, NCLs, and built-in losses. On exit, trigger 
o f deferred items, but no recapture o f loss amounts used.
i. Unified regime with respect to qualification requirements for tax integration. The 
segregation o f the tax integration regime into different regimes generates unneeded 
complexity, namely as far as the proliferation of qualification requirements is 
concerned.
j. Lastly, provided corporate group members are appropriately reimbursed for the use
of their tax attributes at the group level, there is no reason why the Tax Group 
should be limited to entities that meet a 75% or 80% ownership threshold. 
Although its advantages and disadvantages must be carefully considered prior to 
implementation, this thesis suggests that the legislator should be aware that the 
regime may also be made applicable, for instance, to >50% owned entities.671
670 See discussion infra at pg. 191ff.
671 This is, for instance, the position adopted by Germany, with a 50 percent test. See IFA, Group Taxation, 
supra note 584, at 38. The protection o f  the interests o f  minority shareholders may be accomplished in 
different ways, such as the existence o f a right for the minority shareholders to force the majority owner to 
acquire the minority shares; an agreement from the minority shareholders consenting to consolidation; 
guaranteed dividends to minority shareholders; or the existence o f  compensating payment made to minority 
shareholders. See IFA, Group Taxation, supra note 584, and WlLMAN, Equalising the Income Tax Burden in a 
Group of Companies, supra note 366.
Thus, under this proposed hybrid solution, hereinafter referred to as “Molecular Group 
Taxation System,” there would be two different levels of tax integration, the intra-atomic 
level and the inter-atomic level. Each tax atom would correspond to a corporate group 
node fully-integrated for tax purposes. While at the intra-atomic level full integration would 
apply, the inter-atomic relationship would be subject to the partial integration solution I
described above.
Inside the tax atom the tax consequences of the transactions entered into by corporate 
group members would be totally independent o f legal formalism and the corporate veil 
fiction. Inside these tax atoms, assets, stock, income and tax attributes, including losses, 
would be freely transferable. The stock basis and tax attributes of the parent corporation of 
each corporate group node {i.e., the filled-in square in the diagrams below) would be the 
record keepers for tax purposes of all that occurs inside that specific node, as well as of the 
transactions that occur between corporate group members of that node and other parties, 
including transactions entered into with corporate group members from different nodes.
The tax atom may be conceptualized as follows:
Diagram 22
In turn, the inter-atomic relationship would be subject to the partial integration solution 
described above. The tax molecule may be conceptualized as follows:
Diagram 23
As an exemplification of the operation of the proposed tax integration system, assume the 
following corporate group:
A1
C2 C4 D2 D4A4 B4
A3 A5 B5 C3 C5 D3 D5
Diagram 24
Under the Molecular Group Taxation System, the A l, B l, Cl and D1 group nodes would 
be fully integrated. Within each o f these nodes, or tax atoms, all the considerations discussed 
above regarding the operation o f the full integration model would apply.672 At the inter­
atomic level, if corporation A5 made a payment of interest, royalties, rents or service fees 
to corporation B3, the Systemic Matching rule would apply. Therefore, the payment 
deduction by A5 and its respective inclusion by B3 would offset each other in a wash 
controlled by A5’s accounting of the payment deduction. Further, the transfer of assets 
between A5 and B3 would be subject to the Deferred Sale System rules, while the transfer 
o f NOLs and NCLs between them would occur under an individual set-off mechanism, as 
described above. In turn, the distributions from A l, B l, C l and D1 to P would be exempt 
under a participation exemption. The sale o f shares in each of these corporations, either at 
a gain or loss, would be exempt from taxation under the same mechanism. The allocation 
of the relevant tax attributes of each tax atom to the group would be made on a full basis. 
The minority shareholders of each tax atom, in turn, would receive adequate compensation 
for the use of the tax attributes of the tax atom by the corporate group.
As previously noted, the implementation of this model in jurisdictions that closely align 
corporate tax law and corporate law treatment is subject to a feasibility analysis of making 
the tax treatment independent of the corporate law treatment. Further, the considerations 
made above regarding the international tax aspects of full integration should be paid due 
attention.
672 See discussion supra at pg. 144ff.
6. The Definition of Qualifying Corporate Group for Tax Integration Purposes
Throughout the above discussion on the mechanics o f tax integration, corporate group 
members were assumed to qualify as Tax Group members for purposes o f the different 
integration solutions analyzed provided they met simple ownership thresholds. As 
previously noted, this approach allowed the discussion to focus on the complex mechanic 
issues o f tax integration. Now that the mechanic issues o f tax integration have been dealt 
with, the current section aims to look into the particularities associated with the definition 
o f  a qualifying corporate group for tax integration purposes. The section will start by 
contextualizing the problem through a brief review o f the issues commonly associated with 
the definition o f corporate groups for general regulatory purposes. Once this general 
framework is laid out, the section will discuss the specificities associated with the definition 
o f  corporate groups for tax integration purposes.
a. The Definition o f Corporate Group for General Regulatory Purposes
As previously discussed, corporate groups have no formal existence or organs o f their own. 
For that reason, the definition o f their boundaries for application o f external regulations is 
normally operated based on the concept o f “control.”673 The prevalent agreement on the 
adoption o f “control” to define the boundaries o f corporate groups has not resulted, 
however, in a uniform approach to its definition. Extremely diverse definitions o f control 
have been proposed in different jurisdictions and in different regulatory contexts.674 This 
diversity is a symptom of the complexity o f the intercorporate control phenomenon.
Control is a complex phenomenon that extends far beyond simple de jure definitions. I t is a 
“structural relation through which a particular category o f owners have de facto capacity to 
mobilize the powers vested in the company itself5675 and that may be implemented through 
a multiplicity o f legal and economic mechanisms.676 Recognizing the complexity o f this 
phenomenon, legislators, courts and commentators have often gone beyond simple de jure
673 Legislators in most countries, and for most regulatory purposes, have realized that “without the existence 
o f  control, the corporations do not constitute a corporate group. See BLUMBERG, The Multinational 
Challenge to Corporation Law: The Search for a New Corporate Personality, at 14.
674 Id. See also LAMB, When is a Group a Group? Convergence of Concepts of Group in European Union Corporate Tax, 
supra note 409.
675 See SCOTT, Corporate Groups and Network Structure, supra note 499, at 294.
676 See supra discussion at note 498 on the legal and economic instruments that may be used to implement 
control.
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definitions o f control and proposed more encompassing definitions based on the effective 
control o f the parent corporation over the behaviour and economic existence o f its 
subsidiaries. The implementation o f these more encompassing de facto or hybrid standards 
has generally been aimed at counteracting the potential for manipulation o f simple de jure 
definitions.677
For instance, in the US, the legislator and the courts have proposed definitions such as 
“unitary business,” “integrated enterprise” or “economic integration.”678 These more 
encompassing standards generally combine control with elements such as economic 
integration and managerial structure. For example, the “unitary business” standard requires 
that the affiliates are “functionally integrated” into the parent’s business. That is, it requires 
a “substantial mutual interdependence” o f the group components and o f the 
“contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of 
management and economies o f scale.”679 These de facto standards generally allow for a more 
realistic definition o f the boundaries o f a corporate group, providing less opportunity for 
corporate groups to affirmatively elect out o f regulatory provisions. However, their 
adoption is problematic. Fundamentally, their practical verification may involve such an 
administrative hurdle that, in practice, their implementation as regulatory standards is often 
impracticable.680
b. The Definition o f Corporate Group for Tax Integration Purposes
The definition o f the boundaries o f a corporate group for tax integration purposes faces 
similar hurdles to those outlined above.681 While the adoption o f administratively simple de
677 This potential for manipulation is based on the diversity o f legal and economic mechanisms available to 
implement effective intercorporate control. In certain regulatory contexts {e.g., regulation o f  economically 
diversified corporate groups such as conglomerates) the implementation o f  such standards has also been 
operated because simple de iure definitions have not been considered sufficient to identify those circumstances 
under which the rights and duties o f  one corporation o f  a corporate group should be attributed to its parent 
corporation or other affiliated constituent companies o f  the group. See BLUMBERG, supra note 4 36  and 350.
678 See BLUMBERG, The American Taw of Corporate Groups, supra note 346, at 324.
679 See BLUMBERG, supra note 350, at 351 ff. Certain commentators have also focused on “non-contractual” or 
power elements o f  control, introducing concepts o f  control such as “control through a constellation o f  
interests.” See SCOTT, Corporate Groups and Network Structure, supra note 499, at 303ff (Scott suggests that large 
enterprises with dispersed capital are controlled by a small but diverse constellation o f  institutional 
shareholders. The overlapping constellations create a complex network o f  constraining shareholdings, which 
underlies the specific contractual relations which enterprises establish with one another).
680 See BLUMBERG, supra notes 346 and 350. See also PHILLIP BLUMBERG, The Law o f  Corporate Groups - 
Procedural Problems in the Law o f Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (Little. 1983).
681 This discussion assumes that all corporate members are includible corporations for purposes o f  the US 
and UK  Group Taxation regimes. Broadly, in the US, an includible corporation is any entity taxable as a
jure definitions makes the tax provisions subject to easy manipulation, the adoption o f more 
encompassing, or de facto standards, may not always be adequate to satisfy the need for 
expediency required in the tax laws. The positions adopted in the US and UK Group 
Taxation regimes differ in this matter. While the US has adopted a de jure definition o f 
control backed up by comprehensive attribution rules, the UK has adopted a hybrid 
standard, requiring certain de facto elements to recognize the existence o f control.
Specifically, in the US, the definition o f control is based on a threshold o f stock ownership 
test, which requires ownership o f at least 80 percent o f the total voting power and 80 
percent o f the total value o f all outstanding stock.682 In order to avoid abuses, complex 
attribution rules complement this test.683 A different, and more complex, position is 
adopted in the UK tax laws. To start with, as previously noted, the UK tax laws have 
adopted different eligibility requirements for the Group Relief and Chargeable Gains 
regimes. Although the conditions for eligibility for these benefits overlap in certain aspects, 
they remain distinct. Further, in addition to a de jure definition o f control, each o f these 
regimes requires an economic nexus between corporate group members to effectively 
recognize the existence o f control.
In particular, the Group Relief regime requires two cumulative tests to recognize a 
corporation as an eligible member to integrate a Tax Group, namely, the “75 percent
corporation except those corporations specifically excluded by the statute. In general, all domestic 
corporations will qualify as includible corporations except certain domestic corporations that are either tax 
exempt or subject to special taxing regimes. As a general rule, all foreign corporations are excluded from the 
definition o f  an includible corporation including those with a US permanent establishment. Similarly, in the 
UK only companies can be members o f  a Tax Group for group relief purposes. Although non-UK resident 
companies can be members o f  a group, both the surrendering company and the claimant company must 
either be UK tax resident or be carrying on a trade in the UK through a permanent establishment. Similar 
rules apply for the chargeable gains regime purpose. A  non-UK resident company can be a member o f the 
group, although an asset can only be transferred to it without tax consequences if  the asset will be connected 
with a permanent establishment through which that non-resident company carries on a trade in the UK. See 
YASH RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IFA, Group Taxation, supra note 648, at 688 and 694.
682 IRC Section 1504(a)(2). The 80 percent test must be met every day o f  the taxation year (IRC section 1501). 
Note that for a Tax Group to exist there must be at least two or more companies in the group with a 
common parent that is also an includible corporation. Thus, brother—sister chains o f includible corporations 
do not meet this affiliation test if  they are connected through a non-includible entity such as an individual, a 
partnership, or a foreign parent. In addition, the includible common parent must own directly the stock 
meeting the 80 per cent vote and value threshold in at least one other includible corporation. By the same 
token, the stock meeting the 80 per cent vote and value threshold in each o f the other includible corporations 
(excluding the common parent) must be owned directly by one or more o f the other includible corporations. 
Thus, stock ownership in an includible corporation (other than the entity controlled directly by the common 
parent) meeting the 80 per cent vote and value threshold may be disbursed among members o f  the affiliated 
group. However, stock held by a non-includible corporation cannot be considered as held by the Tax Group. 
Lastly, note that once the affiliated group has been identified, the consent o f all includible corporations is 
required for the formation o f the consolidated group. IRC Treas. Reg. Section 1.1502-75(b).
683 See IRC Section 318 and related IRC Treas. Regulations.
subsidiary” test and the “75 percent profits and assets tests.” Broadly, the “75 percent 
subsidiary test” will be satisfied in relation to a subsidiary if the parent company owns 
directly or indirectly at least 75 percent o f the nominal value o f the issued ordinary share 
capital o f the subsidiary.684 As for the “75 percent profits and assets” tests, they will be met 
if, in the relevant accounting period, the parent company is entitled to at least 75 percent of 
(1) the accounting profits o f the subsidiary that are available for distribution to its “equity 
holders,” and (2) the assets available for distribution to “equity holders” in the subsidiary 
on a notional winding up o f the subsidiary (as shown in the subsidiary’s balance sheet at the 
end o f the relevant accounting period).
The application o f these “profits and assets” tests is particularly complex. From the 
definition o f “equity holders” and the associated definitions o f preference shares and 
commercial loans, to the anti-avoidance rules associated with these tests (for instance, 
regarding the use o f options), complexity is the touchstone o f these provisions.685
The definition o f control for purposes o f the Chargeable Gains regime follows a similar 
logic. Broadly, a chargeable gains group consists o f a company (the “principal company”) 
and its “75 percent subsidiaries.”686 For a company to be a “75 percent subsidiary,” the 
parent company must hold at least 75 percent o f the ordinary share capital o f the 
subsidiary.687 In addition to this de jure test, a de facto requirement is imposed. Specifically, a 
company that is not an “effective 51 percent subsidiary” o f the principal company cannot 
be a member o f the group. A company will be an “effective 51 percent subsidiary” o f the 
principal company if  the principal company is beneficially entitled directly or indirectly to 
more than (1) 50 percent o f the profit available for distribution to “equity holders” o f the 
subsidiary and (2) more than 50 percent o f the assets o f the subsidiary that are available for 
distribution to its “equity holders” on a winding up.688 The definition o f “equity holder” is
684 Ownership for these purposes means beneficial ownership. Broadly, “ordinary share capital” means all the 
shares o f  a company apart from capital, the holders o f  which have a right to a dividend at a fixed rate and no 
other right to share in profits. See YASH RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IFA, Group Taxation, 
supra note 648, at 689. For the rules for determining indirect ownership see CTA 2010, Sections 1154-1157.
685 See YASH RUPAL, Rjeport on Group Taxation in the UK, in IFA, Group Taxation, supra note 648, at 689-692. It 
should be underlined, however, that although these provisions are rather complex, the new rewriting under 
CTA 2010, Chapter 6 introduced a significant improvement to the previous ICTA 1988, Sch. 18.
686 See TGCA 1992, Section 170. See also NATALIE LEE, Revenue Law - Principles and Practice (Tottel 
Publishing 25th ed. 2007) at 1072.
687 The definition o f  “ordinary share capital” that applies is the same as for group relief.
688 See FURSDON, British Tax Guide: Corporation Tax, supra note 410, at 149-150.
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the same as for group relief and these profit and assets tests, with some exceptions, are 
applied in a similar manner.689
The UK solution, especially for a group that intends to qualify for both the Group Relief 
and Chargeable Gains regimes, involves a considerable administrative hurdle. Further, in 
face o f the chameleon-like nature o f corporate groups, these rules may be an invitation for 
complex tax planning,690 with associated deadweight loss both for the state and corporate 
groups.
In light o f the nature o f corporate groups previously discussed in this thesis and to the 
need for expediency in the tax laws, the solution proposed by Hellerstein and Mclure of 
defining corporate groups for tax integration purposes based on a simple de jure definition 
(similar to the current US definition) complemented with comprehensive attribution rules 
and certain objective and easily administrable indicia o f economic integration {e.g., a 
percentage o f revenues derived from related-party transactions) should merit further 
consideration from researchers and policymakers).691
B. The Dynamic Effects of Tax Integration
O n the previous section this thesis analyzed the mechanics o f tax integration. The section 
showed that several mechanic possibilities exist to integrate corporate groups and that all 
available models remain subject to practical and mechanic limitations. It then suggested 
that once these different limitations are taken into consideration, the solution that more 
fully achieved the mechanic objectives o f tax integration {i.e., allow for the free transfer o f
689 The main exceptions are that the option arrangements provisions that apply for group relief do not apply 
and the group relief rules dealing with shares and securities carrying varying rights have limited application. 
Note that there is no requirement that the principal company o f the group exercise voting control over any 
member o f  the chargeable gains group. See YASH RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IFA, Group 
Taxation, supra note 648, at 695.
690 See planning intricacies associated with the manipulation o f  the definition o f  control in UK at YASH 
RUPAL, Report on Group Taxation in the UK, in IFA, Group Taxation, supra note 648, at 697-700.
691 See WALTER HELLERSTEIN & CHARLES E. MCLURE, The European Commission's Report on Company Income 
Taxation: What the E U  Can Team from the Experience of the US States, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 
199 (2004) at 206 (“[W]e give our nod to a legal, rather than an economic, definition o f the consolidated 
group.”); id. at 205 (“One could...introduce anti-tax abuse safeguards into a group definition based on legal 
ownership that might mitigate this issue. (For example, the constructive stock ownership rules embodied in 
the Internal Revenue Code for purposes o f  denying losses among related parties (IRC Section 267) and in 
connection with various corporate transactions (IRC Section 318) would restrain the ability o f  economically 
related parties to manipulate their ownership interests to achieve tax benefits.)...In addition, one might 
impose certain objective and easily admininistrable indicia o f economic integration as a condition o f  
consolidated filing (e.g., a percentage o f revenues derived from related-party transactions).
assets, income and tax attributes inside a corporate group and impose a single layer of 
taxation on the income derived by corporate group members) blended full and partial 
integration solutions. Further, the section suggested that the partial integration model that 
better interacted with the full integration model, while ensuring the highest possible degree 
o f integration, was based on a blending o f mechanic solutions o f the US and the UK 
Group Taxation regimes. The section concluded by suggesting that, in light o f the different 
limitations imposed to tax integration, the Molecular Group Taxation System should be the 
model that would achieve the mechanic objectives o f tax integration in the fullest and 
simplest available way.
The issue that arises at this stage is whether tax integration is an appropriate approach to 
tax corporate groups once both the perspectives o f the state and the corporate groups are 
taken into consideration. In order to answer this question, this section will evaluate the 
potential effects o f tax integration on the operation o f corporate groups and on the 
functioning o f the tax system. The analysis will use the Molecular Group Taxation System 
as the reference model o f tax integration. This option is taken because this model was 
considered the solution that better implemented the mechanic objectives o f tax integration, 
and, thus, it should provide a more accurate indication o f the dynamic effects of 
integration. Further, since this model blends full and partial integration models, it provides 
a richer analytical perspective for the proposed evaluation.
1. The Dynamics of Tax Integration
a. The Continuity o f the Tax Rules in Intra-Group Transactions
Under tax integration, the CIT system has a high degree o f continuity within the 
boundaries o f a Tax Group. That is, intra-group transactions and their closest substitutes 
tend to be taxed equally. This means that a mere change in transactional form in an intra­
group transaction will not yield a substantially different tax result. Consider the transfer o f 
income inside the Tax Group. Both at the intra-atomic and inter-atomic levels, it is 
indifferent whether the transfer o f income is characterized as a payment o f  interest, 
royalties, management fees or dividend distribution. While at the intra-atomic level all these 
transactions would be simply disregarded, at the inter-atomic level the Systemic Matching 
rule (for payments o f interest, royalties and management fees) and the Participation
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Exemption (for dividend distributions) would render the transactions irrelevant for tax 
purposes. By the same token, in light o f the mechanic treatment o f intra-group asset 
transfers, the characterization o f an asset transfer as a merger or a sale should be largely 
irrelevant for tax purposes both at the intra and inter-atomic levels.
A fundamental effect o f the continuity in the tax rules is that there is no tax benefit 
associated with substitution. As a result, taxpayers are generally not interested in 
substituting transactions.692 Thus, no need to adopt more complex legal instruments or 
implement more expensive and complex transactions than those strictly required to achieve 
the desired economic end result exists. Since transactional form is largely irrelevant for tax 
purposes, the group will be inclined to structure the transaction in the simplest and 
cheapest possible way.693 Thus, within the boundaries o f the Tax Group, the transfer o f 
assets and income should, in principle, be implemented using simpler transactions and 
corporate law instruments than under the Standard CIT System (e.g., transfer o f income 
using a direct loan instead o f complex hybrid instruments or indirect transactional routes; 
straight sale instead o f complex merger; etc.).
Thus, beyond avoiding taxpayers to base economic decision-making at least in part on tax 
considerations as opposed to the underlying economic factors, tax integration should result 
in a reduction in the costs incurred by taxpayers to implement transactions. As previously 
discussed, in a world o f costly contracting and information asymmetries, the search and 
adoption o f substitute transactions has associated costs. Besides the fees paid to 
professionals to locate and to evaluate substitute transactions and the costs associated with 
their implementation, substitution may result in additional inefficiencies in case the 
substitute transaction is an imperfect substitute for the substituted transaction (e.g., 
adoption o f sub-optimal functional or legal structures). Tax integration should result in a 
substantial reduction o f these costs and inefficiencies.
692 Several commentators have already underlined the efficiency advantages o f  a continuous tax law. See 
SHAVIRO, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Realisation and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, supra note 4, at 4 
(“A  tax system minimizes substitution effects by being neutral at key decisional boundaries, thereby giving 
taxpayers no reason to change their decisions or behavior.”). See also WEISBACH, A n  Efficiency Analysis of Line 
Drawing in the Tax Law, supra note 17, at 71 (“ [L]ines should be drawn so that a transaction or item is taxed 
like its closest substitutes.”); WEISBACH, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 13, at 873 (“A  discontinuous 
law ...m ay have very different behavioural effects than a continuous law [.]”); id. at 874. (“Where there is 
discontinuity, taxpayers sufficiendy near the discontinuity will shift to the lower taxed regime, i f  transaction 
costs are less than the tax savings [.]”).
693 This should generally occur unless specific risk-management considerations, creditor demands or financial 
reporting issues may dictate otherwise.
Further, the decrease in the complexity o f internal group flows that follows from the 
reduction o f substitution should make the corporate group more transparent from an 
informational perspective.694 This increased internal transactional transparency should make 
it easier for top management and other stakeholders to be accurately informed about the 
operations o f the group. As a result, the potential for managerial opportunism should be 
minimized.695 Also, this internal transparency o f corporate groups should decrease the costs 
o f the state to supervise the compliance o f corporate groups with the tax rules.
It must be noted that the transactions that tax integration would in principle eliminate {i.e., 
mostly pure tax planning transactions) are not informational in nature. Accordingly, their 
reduction or elimination should not result in negative consequences to the CIT’s regulatory 
functions previously identified.696 Indeed, a relative improvement o f such functions should 
occur due to the more transparent group structures and intra-group transfers.
All in all, the secret o f the integration approach lies on its success to deal with the 
“chameleon-like” nature o f corporate groups. As previously discussed, the group’s flexible 
governance structure poses a serious challenge to tax policy since it is often used to avoid 
tax regulations. Tax integration eliminates this problem since within the boundaries o f the 
Tax Group the corporate veil and the formal characterization o f transactions lose most 
practical relevance for tax purposes. The result, as suggested above, is a reduction of 
deadweight loss, both for corporate groups and the state, and corporate governance 
improvements.
b. Optimization o f Group Resources
Since under tax integration the tax factor is largely irrelevant in intra-group transfers, assets 
or income may be transferred at the optimal business timing to the corporate member that 
ensures the best economic return for their use. That is, tax integration eliminates the 
interest in structuring transactions with the aim o f locating deductions, inclusions, and 
capital gains or losses on the corporate group member whose tax attributes are more
694 See LAURIN, Cleaning Up the Books: A  Proposal for Revamping Corporate Group Taxation in Canada, supra note 
551, at 1 (“[T]he web o f  intragroup transactions and structural changes needed to achieve some degree o f  tax 
consolidation adds complexity and artificiality to the tax system and the business environment since the sole 
purpose for these business activities is to gain a tax advantage.”).
695 See discussion supra at pg. 137.
696 This includes the deterrent and the reliability functions. See discussion supra at pg. 138.
beneficial. Thus, absent constraints from other regulatory fields, in principle, assets and 
income will be transferred to the corporate member that ensures the best economic return 
for their use.697 Further, since the “lock-in” and “lock-out” effects are eliminated in intra­
group transactions, these transfers may occur on their optimal business timing. Hence, 
under tax integration, the CIT system should not interfere with the flexibility o f corporate 
groups to transfer resources between their constituent parts and, thus, should not 
negatively affect their “organized internal market” dynamics. Overall, the corporate group 
should become more responsive to changes in the prospects o f its investments.
c. Flexibility for Restructurings o f Corporate Structures
Further, at the intra-atomic level, group restructurings would be made easier since all 
restructurings would be regarded as a mere internal transfer o f  assets without any tax 
consequences. With certain limitations, a similar result would be obtained at the inter­
atomic level. This approach is in line with the “organizationally-bound” property rights o f 
corporate groups. Further, as previously discussed, this flexibility to restructure corporate 
structures allows for the constant adaptability o f corporate groups to their economic reality, 
and, thus, ensures their best economic performance.698
d. Simplified Combination of Tax Attributes
Lasdy, tax integration should allow for the mix up o f the corporate group’s attributes, most 
importantly losses, in a cost efficient way. When available, alternative ways o f obtaining the 
same benefits under the Standard CIT System, such as mergers,699 are generally more 
expensive and complex and may often have negative collateral consequences for corporate
700groups.
697 See discussion on the group’s organized internal market dynamics above at pg. 32ff.
698 Nonetheless, functional and legal structures may be somewhat influenced by the desire to include or 
exclude corporate group members from tax integration.
699 Other examples include transfer o f  loan receivable to loss making entity, “sale and leaseback” transactions, 
write-off o f  the shares o f  loss making entity, financing triangulations, “stuffing” o f  loss making entity, “round 
robin” transactions, etc.
700 See LAURIN, Cleaning Up the Books: A  Proposal for Revamping Corporate Group Taxation in Canada, supra note 
551, at 5 (“Current loss-utilization techniques involve complex transactions that may be costly to implement, 
not to mention difficult for authorities to trace. Other than management time and planning costs, tax 
planning strategies often involve substantial accounting and administrative costs...In  addition, the complexity 
o f some o f these tax-planning measures raises the issue o f  higher auditing costs for tax collectors... Large 
corporate groups may go to great lengths to set up the web o f  intragroup transactions necessary to shift 
profits and losses among related corporations ... These transactions add complexity and artificiality to the tax
All things considered, tax integration should result in a significant reduction o f the 
deadweight loss associated with the operation o f the CIT System for corporate groups. In 
addition, it could also benefit the state due to the reduction in the administration and 
supervision costs that follow from the reduction in transactional and compliance 
complexity.
The CIT system’s impact on the firm’s organizational arrangements and on the Structural 
Distortions o f timing and transaction costs under tax integration should be considerably 
different from those under the Standard CIT system. The CIT system’s impact on risk 
taking presents another Structural Distortion that may be substantially altered with tax 
integration. The next section explores this issue.
2. Tax Integration and Corporate Risk-Taking
This section will investigate the impact o f tax integration on corporate risk-taking. First, the 
section will investigate the relationship between corporate taxation and corporate risk- 
taking. Once this general analytical framework is established, the section will examine the 
impact o f tax integration on corporate risk-taking.
a. The CIT System and Corporate Risk-Taking
As previously discussed, the CIT system may impact the level o f corporate risk-taking.701 In 
principle, since investment decisions are based on after-tax returns, a CIT system should 
discourage the undertaking o f risk by taxing the rewards from an investment, and 
encourage the undertaking o f risk by bearing a portion o f the losses.702 In principle, pure
system. Their artificial appearance may create difficulties for auditors — and corporate managers — in trying to 
establish the intent and determine the valid business purpose o f such transactions.”).
701 See discussion supra at pg. 43. For a definition o f risk see DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation 
and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 396 (“O f all possible questions which the investor may ask, the most 
important one, it appears to us, is concerned with the probability o f the actual yield being less than zero, that 
is, with the probability o f a loss. This is the essence o f risk.”). In general, the risk literature distinguishes 
between systematic risk - the risk o f the market - and unsystematic risk - the risk o f  a particular asset. 
Unsystematic risks can be managed by diversifying into different types o f  investments, while systematic risk is 
unavoidable and inherent in the nature o f the system. For an extensive definition o f  risk see REBECCA S. 
RUDNICK, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 229 (1993) at 267-270.
702 See RUDNICK, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, supra note 702, at 273-278. See also 
MARTIN H. D a v id , Alternative Approaches to Capital Gains Taxation (Brookings Institution. 1968) at 140 
("The deductibility o f  losses has a profound effect on the willingness o f private investors to undertake risky 
investments."); CECIL, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the Internal Revenue Code: A  New Paradigm for the 
Deductibility of Capital Losses, supra note 410, at 1107.
neutrality towards risk should not be possible under a realization-based CIT system.703 The 
characteristics o f the loss offset system should dictate whether the CIT system enhances or 
reduces the risk-taking capabilities of corporations.704 Specifically, the following spectrum 
of loss relief is theoretically possible under a CIT system:
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The spectrum of loss relief under a CIT system ranges from the possibility of providing no 
relief for the losses incurred by a business to providing a full refund for such losses. Within 
these two extremes, several intermediate positions exist. In these intermediate positions, 
although refund is denied, the CIT system may allow for the carryover of losses to different 
tax years, different sources of income and/or different entities. Specifically, the possible 
spectrum ranges from relief being granted only to losses from the same tax year, incurred 
by the same entity, and respecting to the same source of income, to carryover being 
allowed both to prior and subsequent tax years, to all types of related and unrelated entities, 
and to offset income from whatever source {i.e., independently o f the character of the
703 See, e.g. SCARBOROUGH, Risk, Diversification and the Design of the I j >ss Umitations Under a Realisation-Based 
Income Tax, supra note 410, at 685 (“ [Neutrality towards risk is not possible under a realization-based income 
tax.”); id. at 717 (“If losses were allowable without limit, taxpayers would be encouraged to make risk}7 
investments so that they could selectively realize losses. If losses were limited, however, risky investments 
could give rise to unusable losses and thus would be discouraged. N o treatment o f losses eliminates both of 
these biases.”).
704 See DOMAR &  MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 391 ff (In general, 
whether an income tax system with a realization requirement encourages or discourages risk depends on how  
the system treats losses).
income, or the activity or country where it was generated). In principle, the risk-taking 
consequences o f these different alternatives should vary. The following section will review 
each o f these alternatives in turn.
b. N o Relief For Losses
A first possibility is to provide no relief for losses. Under this possibility, a corporation 
would be taxed whenever it generated profits. However, in the years where it suffered a 
loss, no relief would be granted for such loss. This policy has certain advantages. 
Fundamentally, it is simple and should deter the continued operation o f unsuccessful 
investments.705 Further, in the short-term, it would likely result in an increase in tax 
revenues. Based on available research, this type o f policy should, however, penalize risk- 
taking and result in a double taxation o f capital.706 In addition, in the medium to long-term, 
the unfavourable conditions for investment could potentially decrease tax revenues.
c. Relief With Full Refund
O n the other extreme o f the relief spectrum, the possibility o f granting a refund for the 
losses incurred by a business exists. Under this alternative, the government would 
reimburse the taxpayers in the tax year when the loss was incurred. In principle, this type of 
policy should encourage risk-taking.707 Further, this type o f alternative could contribute to 
cyclical stability by providing a source of funds to firms during recessions.708 In addition, it 
could also increase the supply o f external finance. Specifically, since the potential tax
705 See M. DONNELLY & A. Y o u n g , Policy Options for Tax Lass Treatment: How Does Canada Compare?, 50 
Canadian Tax Journal 429 (2002) at 439.
706 On the risk-taking consequences see DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 
supra note 156, at 390 (“Since, without loss offset, the yield is cut, while risk is unchanged, the competition for 
risk-taking is reduced...practical evidence would indicate that the investor is likely to shift in the direction o f  
less risk.”). On the double taxation o f  capital that results from this policy option see CAMPISANO & ROMANO, 
Recouping Lasses: The Case for Tull Lass Offsets, supra note 414, at 717 (“When a firm generates losses its costs o f  
producing income will not be fully accounted for by the tax system unless the loss can be deducted, and the 
nonavailability o f  a deduction against zero income effectively constitutes a tax on the loss firm’s capital...But 
since that capital has been taxed once before, prior to its investment in the firm, the business’s inability to 
recover the loss for tax purposes results in a double taxation o f  the capital.”).
707 See SCARBOROUGH, Risk, Diversification and the Design of the Lass Limitations Under a Realisation-Based Income 
Tax, supra note 410, at 717; (“If...the Treasury were to pay refunds to investors with losses, risk taking would 
be encouraged.”); in the same sense see DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 
supra note 156, at 392 and CAMPISANO & ROMANO, Recouping Lasses: The Case for Tull Lass Offsets, supra note 
414.
708 See DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 392. ANDREW 
WEISS, The Tair Tax: A  Tax Reform To Alleviate Recessions and Reduce Biases in the Tax Code, Boston University 
Working Paper, available at SSRN: http:// ssrn.com/abstract=258853 (1999) at 3.
subsidy could be pledged to repay debts in the case o f defaults on loans, it should reduce 
the risk to lenders and, thus, increase their willingness to lend.709 Finally, this type o f policy 
should eliminate the potential for a double tax on capital and the potential for 
discrimination associated with alternative loss relief systems.710
For these different reasons, several commentators have defended the implementation o f 
this type o f loss relief system.711 Despite its theoretical appeal, this system has not enjoyed 
practical success. The main reason for the dismissal o f this policy option lies on its alleged 
high cost to the public coffers.712 However, certain commentators have disputed this 
argument and argued that the full refund option should not be more costly than the system 
o f partial refundability that currently exists in the US or the UK.713 The argument is that 
full refundability would only speed up the use o f the loss and, thus, the difference would be 
only one o f timing.
This argument, although attractive, assumes full utilization o f losses during the available 
carryover periods, which does not seem to be generally the case.714 Further, this argument 
loses sight o f the fact that, based on the behavioural nature o f the taxpayer, the benefit o f 
the refund could well induce additional tax planning. Specifically, the possibility o f selective
709 See WEISS, The Fair Tax: A. Tax Reform To Alleviate Recessions and Reduce Biases in the Tax Code, supra note 709, 
at 3.
710 See CAMPISANO &  ROMANO, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Lass Offsets, supra note 414, at 718 
(“Recoupment eliminates ... double tax on corporate capital. The firm immediately cashes in its losses and its 
capital therefore remains unimpaired with respect to collections by the Treasury.”); id. at 711 (“ [Recoupment 
would not discriminate in favor o f some firms and against others — as does the current averaging system 
through its varying restrictions on loss deductibility [.]”).
711 See id. at 711 (“[The] policy underlying the compensation o f taxpayers should ... be based on the concept 
o f recoupment: that is, the full recovery o f the tax value o f  the NOL.”); See also DONNELLY & YOUNG, supra 
note 706, at 444 (“[T]he full refundability system is believed by many to be the most conceptually and 
philosophically “pure” [.]”); MICHAEL L. SCHULTZ, Section 382 and the Pursuit of Neutrality in the Treatment of Net 
Operating Lass Carryovers, 39 U. Kan. L. Rev. 59 (1990) at 84 (author argues that neutrality concerns raised by 
loss carryovers could be eliminated by current reimbursement o f  losses); WEISS, The Fair Tax: A  Tax Reform 
To Alleviate Recessions and Reduce Biases in the Tax Code, supra note 709.
712 See CANADA D e p a r t m e n t  OF F i n a n c e , Report o f the Technical Committee on Business Taxation 
(Department o f Finance. 1998) at 4:15 (“The full and immediate refundability o f  losses would substantially 
reduce or virtually eliminate corporate income tax revenues for several years. With reduced taxes on business, 
governments would need to increase business taxes by other means [.]”). The report cites several subsidiary 
reasons for the rejection o f  this policy, namely (1) to reduce the availability o f tax incentives to inefficient 
businesses that are more likely to earn a low economic rate o f  return on their investments compared to 
efficient businesses; (2) to reduce the scope for tax evasion that arises when businesses report claims for 
refunds without actually suffering losses for which claims are made; (3) to preserve the business tax base and 
to preserve a substantial revenue loss to governments; and (4) to reduce the volatility o f  corporate income tax 
revenues and resulting spill-over effects into other parts o f the tax system. Id.
713 See D o n n e l l y  & Y o u n g , supra note 706, at 445.
714 For instance, research undertaken in Canada showed that only a small fraction o f  the losses was utilized at 
the earliest possible time and not all loss carryforwards were able to be claimed. As Donnelly notes, “in the 
Canadian experience, only about 10 percent o f the available loss balance is utilized at the earliest possible 
time, and not all loss carryforwards are able to be claimed in the 10-year carryover period.” Id. at 445.
triggering, generation and recharacterization o f losses should not be discarded. As 
previously discussed, when faced with the realization-based nature o f the current CIT 
system, the corporate taxpayer may engage in lock-in and lock-out behaviour, as well as in 
tax planning operations to abusively generate tax losses. In face o f the refund benefit, these 
tax planning operations would likely increase. Thus, despite its theoretical appeal, the 
implementation of this type o f system should, in principle, have a strong negative impact 
on government revenues and increase the potential for abusive tax planning.715
d. Relief Without Refund But With Carryover Allowed
Under a realization-based CIT system, not allowing for loss relief should discourage 
corporate risk-taking and result in a double taxation o f capital. The other extreme position, 
i.e., providing for a full refund for losses incurred, should solve such problems and result in 
additional collateral benefits. However, in all likelihood, it should produce a substantial 
revenue loss for governments and increase the potential for abusive tax planning. The 
definition o f the treatment o f losses under a CIT system faces therefore a dilemma. While 
not allowing for relief unduly penalizes businesses, providing for a full refund may 
impoverish the state's treasury and may generate a potentially significant deadweight loss. 
Most probably for these reasons, the US and the UK, as many other countries around the 
world, have adopted intermediate positions to loss relief whereby, although a refund is 
denied, the carryover o f losses to different entities, tax years and/ or sources o f income is 
generally allowed.716
i. Inter-Entity Loss Carryovers and Tax Integration
A first possibility o f loss carryover is to allow losses incurred by an entity to reduce the 
taxable income o f a different entity. The possible spectrum o f inter-entity loss carryover
715 Other commentators have also discarded this option as a viable policy alternative for tax loss treatment. 
See id. at 445-446 (“In the end, we must conclude that the conceptual advantage o f  a policy o f  recoupment is 
not enough to overcome the more pragmatic need to preserve the business tax base and survive the political 
realities o f corporate tax policy formulation.”).
716 See ALAN J. AUERBACH, The Dynamic Effects of Tax Eaw Asymmetries, 53 The Review o f  Economic Studies 
205 (1986) at 206 (“[The] current tax treatment [of partial refundability] represents a compromise between 
discouraging undesirable activity and not discouraging risk-taking.”). But see JACK M. MlNTZ, A n  Empirical 
Estimate of Corporate Tax Refundability and Effective Tax Rates, 103 Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 225 (1988); 
JACK M. Min t z , Corporation Tax: A  Survey, 16 Fiscal Studies 23 (1996) (author argues that the current 
asymmetric treatment o f  tax losses discriminates against risk-taking and entrepreneurship since expected taxes 
disproportionately reduce the rate o f  return expected on risky investments when compared to riskless 
investments). On the different regimes for loss-offset around the world see generally HUGH J. AULT, et al., 
Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis (Kluwer Law International 3rd ed. 2010).
ranges from one extreme where entities may freely trade in losses as regular saleable 
assets,717 to another where only the entity that incurred the loss may use it in its tax 
return.718 The US and UK tax laws have adopted intermediate positions to inter-entity loss 
carryover whereby losses, in specified circumstances, may be transferred to related parties. 
One o f those circumstances is under the tax integration regimes previously described.719
While the risk-taking consequences associated with the no relief and full refund positions 
were relatively clear,720 the determination o f the risk-taking consequences associated with 
an intermediate position such as tax integration is more ambiguous. This stems from 
mainly two reasons. First, the restrictions imposed to inter-entity loss carryovers interact 
with the restrictions imposed to year and source loss carryovers making this assessment 
particularly difficult. A very restrictive inter-entity loss carryover regime will have a 
different impact on risk-taking if coupled with very restrictive year and source loss 
carryover rules (e.g., losses may only be used in the same year they are incurred and must 
respect to income o f the same activity, character and country) or with a very flexible one 
(e.g., losses may be carried back and forward for several years and may be offset against
717 In theory, a CIT system may allow for the actual legal transfer o f  a loss consistent with the view o f  losses 
as saleable assets. Under this position, no economic interdependence between the transferor and transferee 
corporations is required. This solution represents, however, only partial refundability due to transaction costs 
associated with the market mechanisms required to make this system operational. That is, to encourage the 
transferee to acquire the loss on the open market, the tax value o f the loss would have to be discounted. The 
transferor corporation will not realize the full value o f  the loss, and the transferee will have a windfall gain to 
the extent that the tax savings are less than the cost o f purchasing the loss. In addition, the inefficiency 
inherent in free market trading in losses is compounded by the transaction costs incurred to implement the 
transfer. See SATYA PODDAR, Refunding the Tax Value of Unutilised Losses, in Policy Options for the Treatment 
o f  Tax Losses (Clarkson Gordon Foundation ed. 1991) at 5:11. See also CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 
Report o f  the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, supra note 713.
718 There is a considerable theoretical debate regarding who is the actual owner o f the loss in order to support 
these different inter-entity loss carryover positions, i.e., whether the business as a legal entity or its corporate 
or individual shareholders. The debate is centred on the fact that if the loss is considered to belong to the 
corporation, it should not be transferable to other corporations or individuals. If, instead, the loss is 
considered to belong to the shareholders or to the corporate group o f  which the company is a part, there 
should be some provision for the loss to be transferred from the loss corporation to another taxpayer within 
the group, to its shareholders or even, at the limit, to other unrelated corporations provided adequate 
compensation was received in return. In practical terms, this debate has, however, been relatively sterile in 
that no sound guidance for tax policy has resulted from it. See CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Report 
o f  the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, supra note 551, at 4:14; See also LAURIN, Cleaning Up the 
Books: A  Proposalfor Revamping Corporate Group Taxation in Canada, supra note 713, at 2.
719 See discussion supra at pg. 150ff. For other situations where the transfer o f losses among related entities is 
allowed, such as mergers and windups, and for the restrictions generally associated with such transfers see 
discussion supra at pg. 106ff.
720 Although most authors agree on the risk-taking consequences o f  these two extreme positions, the impact 
o f  taxation on risk-taking is not without controversy. See, e.g., MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN, The Effects of Taxation on 
Risk Taking, 77 The Journal o f Political Economy 755 (1969) at 763 (“The widely accepted proposition that 
proportional taxation with full loss offsets causes increased risk taking has been shown to rest on weak 
theoretical foundations.”). See also JEREMY I. BULOW & LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 
92 The Journal o f  Political Economy 20 (1984) at 22 (“The paradoxical conclusions obtained in much o f  the 
literature suggesting that taxes on risky assets may actually encourage investment in them are shown to 
depend on implausible assumptions.”).
income from any source). For most taxpayers, the potential for unusable losses, and, thus, 
the discouragement to risk-taking, should be very different under each o f these scenarios.
Further, the task is particularly complex because, under intermediate positions, the 
determination o f the impact o f tax on risk-taking behaviour is more dependent on the 
specific profile o f each taxpayer. While when analyzing the no relief and full refund 
positions, the main variable associated with the taxpayer’s profile that could impact the 
analysis was whether the taxpayer had incurred or expected to incur losses, the elements 
associated with the taxpayer’s profile that may impact the assessment o f an intermediate 
loss relief position are far and away more complex. Specifically, under intermediate 
positions such as the ones currently adopted by the US or the UK, the impact o f the loss 
relief system on corporate risk-taking should vary significantly depending on a firm’s size, 
degree o f diversification and degree o f establishment, and on its potential for selective 
recharacterization and triggering o f tax losses. Also, the determination o f the impact o f a 
taxpayer’s present and expected future tax attributes on the analysis is more complex.
Consider the characteristics o f a business. Under an intermediate loss relief system such as 
the ones presently in existence in the US and the UK, elements such as the size, degree of 
diversification or degree o f establishment o f a firm may substantially alter the impact o f the 
loss relief system on risk-taking.721 For instance, in face o f the availability o f inter-entity loss 
carryovers, a large and diversified firm should be more likely to rapidly use up losses than a 
small and non-diversified firm.722 By the same token, whether the firm has been established 
or not for a long time and, thus, whether or not it possesses past taxable income, should 
alter its ability to benefit from the loss carryback provisions. Similarly, in light o f the 
propensity o f new businesses to incur losses in their first operating years, the use o f a loss 
as a carryforward by a new business may only occur much later in time than would be the
721 Although not developed in this work, a firm’s use o f  hedging may also alter its reaction to the loss relief 
rules. See SCARBOROUGH, Risk, Diversification and the Design of the Doss Limitations Under a Realisation-Based Income 
Tax, supra note 410, at 685 (“[H]edging... can be used by taxpayers to eliminate the bias against risk that 
results from the potential for unusable losses).
722 See, e.g., DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 391 (“A  large 
corporation or a large-scale financial investor may undertake a risk investment as a sideline and know that 
possible losses are covered by other income which is reasonably certain to be derived from the main line o f  
business.”); ROSANNE ALTSHULER & ALAN J. AUERBACH, The Significance of Tax Daw Asymmetries: A n  Empirical 
Investigation, 105 The Quarterly Journal o f  Economics (1990) at 81 (“The incidence o f  tax constraints varies by 
firm size.”); CAMPISANO & ROMANO, Recouping Dosses: The Case for Full Doss Offsets, supra note 414, at 709 
(“Provisions for consolidated corporate tax returns favor conglomerate corporations over non-diversified 
ones.”).
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case if the firm had been long established for a long time.723 Overall, the characteristics o f 
businesses may result in a different propensity to accumulate unusable tax losses and, thus, 
result in different risk-taking consequences for each o f them.
Another element that may significandy impact the reaction o f a taxpayer to an intermediate 
loss offset regime is its ability for selective re-characterization and triggering o f losses. 
Notably, under systems with basket limitations such as the US and the UK, the impact of 
the CIT system on risk-taking should change depending on whether the taxpayer can easily 
re-characterize capital losses as ordinary losses, or foreign losses as domestic losses, and 
can easily trigger tax losses. A taxpayer more able to manipulate the loss relief rules should 
have an inferior propensity to accumulate unusable tax losses and, thus, be less discouraged 
by loss limitations to incur risks. As discussed, the ability o f the corporate taxpayer to 
manipulate the loss relief rules should depend on their degree o f substitution. In turn, the 
degree o f substitution o f the loss relief rules should vary depending on a multitude of 
variables, many specific to each taxpayer, such as the relative importance o f the taxpayer’s 
competing non-tax goals, risk-taking profile or organizational design.724
Lastly, on these intermediate positions, the determination o f the impact o f a taxpayer’s 
present and expected future tax attributes on the analysis is more complex. For instance, 
under an intermediate loss relief position such as the ones o f the US or the UK, if  the 
taxpayer has no use for its losses in its past and future tax returns for several years and has 
no related entities to which it may transfer such losses, it should be in a position equivalent 
to the no relief position described above. However, if despite its inability to use losses in its 
past and future tax returns, the taxpayer is able to transfer its losses to a related entity in the 
year the loss is incurred and obtains a reimbursement for the transfer o f such loss, in effect, 
the taxpayer is in a position equivalent to a full refund. By the same token, while a taxpayer 
with continuous losses and no related entities to which it may carryover losses should 
suffer more from the absence o f a loss offset, it may be more likely to accelerate 
investment to use up loss carryforwards.725 Thus, on these intermediate positions, the
723 See, e.g., DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 392 (“[L]oss 
carryback...gives an “old” corporation (that is, a corporation with past net income) the certainty o f possible 
loss offset, thus placing it in a very advantageous position as compared with a new company.”).
724 See discussion supra at pg. 53ff.
725 See AUERBACH, The Dynamic Effects of Tax Law Asymmetries, supra note 717, at 206.
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determination o f the impact o f a taxpayer’s present and expected future tax attributes on 
the analysis is far more complex than under the no relief and full refund options.726
In sum, due to these different variables, it remains very difficult to assess the impact of 
intermediate loss relief positions, such as tax integration, across the board for all taxpayers. 
A t the most, certain broad principles may be advanced. In particular, based on existing 
research, the following principles may be advanced with relative legitimacy:
■ The higher the rate o f loss offset enjoyed by a taxpayer once all the elements 
discussed above are taken into consideration, the higher should be the degree of 
risk taken after the tax;727
■ Where tax integration allows a specific corporate group to benefit from a loss in 
the same year it is incurred, tax integration should be closer to a full refund than 
partial relief;728 and
■ For this specific corporate group, the full loss offset allowed by tax integration 
should, in principle, provide an encouragement to risk-taking.729
726 See RUDNICK, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, supra note 702, at 274 (“An investor's 
utility for gain and disutility for loss determines her risk aversion.”). See also DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, 
Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 391 (“The extent to which investors may utilize 
these provisions [i.e., carryforward and carryback o f  losses] depends upon the availability o f  other income. 
Here the position o f various taxpayers differs greatly.”).
727 See DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 391 (“[T]here 
appears little doubt that the higher is the rate o f loss offset, the higher will be the degree o f risk taken after 
the tax.”). N ote that although for purposes o f this thesis risk-taking is generally assumed as a positive good, 
there is a substantial controversy on whether risk-taking is or not beneficial. Even assuming risk-taking is 
beneficial, as defended by several authors, there is a substantial controversy on whether tax is the ideal mean 
to foster it. This issue is beyond the scope o f  this work. For a good introduction see RUDNICK, Enforcing the 
Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, supra note 702. See also Avi Fiegenbaum & Howard Thomas, 
Attitudes Toward Risk and the Risk-Return Paradox: Prospect Theory Explanations, 31 Acad. Mgmt. J. 85 
(1988) (surveying the risk-return literature).
728 See CAMPISANO & ROMANO, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, supra note 414, at 711 (“[Bjecause 
some firms can file consolidated returns, or simply diversify, a patchwork system o f recoupment already 
exists sub rosa.”); MICHAEL LIVINGSTON, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the Taxation of High Risk 
Activities, 48 Tax L. Rev. 163 (1993) (author argues that the current system approaches complete loss offsets 
in the case o f  established firms that can offset losses from one venture with the income from another); 
LAURIN, Cleaning Up the Books: A  Proposalfor Revamping Corporate Group Taxation in Canada, supra note 551, at 13 
(“[B]y improving the after-tax return on risky investments for corporate taxpayers, the ... group reporting 
regime would likely lead to greater risk taking [.]”).
729 The loss relief under tax integration should also result in a control o f cyclical downturns, in that the ability 
to use tax losses more effectively may enable corporate groups to maintain loss-making operations in certain 
subsidiaries during cyclical downturns for a longer period o f time than would otherwise have been possible. 
Further, it may help firms stabilize their operations by reducing the incidence o f  temporary disruptions in 
production or hiring plans due to cyclical slowdowns. See LAURIN, Cleaning Up the Books: A  Proposal for 
Revamping Corporate Group Taxation in Canada, supra note 551, at 13. See also MICHAEL COOPER & MATTHEW
ii. Year Carryovers
As noted above, besides allowing for inter-entity loss carryovers, a CIT system may allow 
losses to be carried back to prior tax years, carried forward to future tax years, or both. The 
carryover periods may be the same for NOLs and NCLs or, as occurs under the US and 
U K  tax laws, may be distinct.730 In general, when losses are carried back, the taxpayer 
obtains a benefit for the losses in the same year they are incurred. For this reason, a 
carryback should, in effect, result in a full refundability o f losses.731 Conversely, where 
losses can only be carried forward, refundability should only be partial. This is because 
losses that must be carried forward may be subject to two penalties, a loss o f interest and 
expiration.732 That is, in light o f the time value o f money, a loss applied in a future taxation 
year is worth less than in the year in which it arose. In addition, where there is a definite 
carryover period, the probability o f completely utilizing the loss is limited.733
Allowing for an unlimited carryforward with interest provides one possibility to counteract 
these two problems o f loss carryforwards. As noted by certain commentators, this presents 
an interesting policy alternative to loss relief insofar as the benefits o f a full refund may be 
obtained without the associated drawbacks.734 Specifically, since future income is still 
required to benefit from the loss, the impoverishment o f the state coffers and fraud should 
be limited.735 The current approach under the US and the UK Standard CIT systems is, 
however, more restrict. In both jurisdictions, the solution chosen was to allow for limited 
carrybacks supplemented by carryforwards, which may be either limited, as in the US, or 
unlimited, as in the UK.736 This thesis generally agrees with this approach.737 However, 
while the limitation o f carrybacks is understandable for administrative reasons, no reason 
exists to cap carryforwards. The taxpayer is already penalized by the loss o f interest.
KNITTEL, Partial Loss Refundability: How Are Corporate Tax Losses Used?, 59 National Tax Journal 651 (2006) at 
651-663.
730 See discussion supra at note 410. It is not clear what type o f policy rationale may reasonably underlie a 
differentiation o f  carryover periods between the two types o f  losses. For simplicity and clarity, it would be 
more reasonable to unify both carryover periods.
731 DONNELLY & Y o u n g , supra note 706, at 441. A  problem o f  the carryback is that it may discriminate 
against corporations with different economic histories. Id.
732 AUERBACH, The Dynamic Effects of Tax Law Asymmetries, supra note 717, at 205.
733 D o n n e l l y  &  Y o u n g , supra note 706, at 441.
734 See, e.g., AUERBACH, The Dynamic Effects of Tax Law Asymmetries, supra note 717, at 220.
735 Id. (“[A] system o f unlimited loss carryforward with interest would appear to protect against [fraudulent 
abuse]...It is unclear what other problems, if any, such an approach would present, or why it has not been 
adopted.”).
736 See supra note 410 for the year carryover periods o f  tax losses in the US and the UK.
737 In principle, this solution is biased in favour o f the state coffers.
Therefore, a sensible approach rests on an unlimited carryforward of losses supplemented 
by a limited carryback.738 This solution would avoid impoverishment o f the state, while not 
creating an unnecessary bias against risk-taking.739
W hether tax integration regimes should be subject to the same year carryover rules o f the 
Standard CIT system or to distinct year carryover rules raises further fruit for discussion. 
Provided the Standard CIT system retains reasonable year carryover rules, as occurs in the 
US and the UK, this thesis believes that the same treatment o f year loss carryovers should 
be applicable to tax integration regimes and to the Standard CIT System. N o reasonable 
argument establishes a distinction. Adjustments to the rate structure address potential 
equity concerns better than inefficient drafting o f the tax rules.740
iii. Source Carryovers
Finally, the CIT system may allow losses to offset only income from the same source or 
income from any source (i.e., independently o f the character o f the income, or the activity 
or country where it was generated). As with the year loss limitation, the less restrictive the 
treatment, the more reduced the possibility o f the existence o f unusable losses, and, thus, 
the lesser the possibility o f discouraging risk-taking. In face o f the nature o f corporate 
groups, this thesis defends a relaxed approach to source limitations in a tax integration 
scenario, especially with regard to character and activity.
In sum, the CIT system may impact the level o f corporate risk-taking. In principle, since 
investment decisions are based on after-tax returns, a CIT system should discourage the 
undertaking o f risk by taxing the rewards from an investment, and encourage the 
undertaking o f risk by bearing a portion o f the losses. The characteristics o f the loss offset 
system should dictate whether the CIT enhances or reduces the risk-taking capabilities o f 
corporations. Specifically, the spectrum of loss relief under a CIT system ranges from the 
possibility o f providing no relief for the losses incurred by a business to providing a full
738 In the same sense see DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 
392 (“[I]f necessary and feasible, unlimited carry-forward o f  losses should be permitted, supplemented by a 
limited carry-back.”).
739 Tax policy should aim at eliminating unnecessary bias for or against risk. See SCARBOROUGH, Risk, 
Diversification and the Design of the Lass Limitations Under a Realisation-Rased Income Tax, supra note 410, at 717 
(“Although there is no way to treat losses under a realization-based income tax that is neutral, several reforms 
o f  the current law capital loss limitation are possible that would eliminate unnecessary bias for or against 
risk.”).
740 See discussion supra at pg. 74.
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refund for such losses. Within these two extremes, several intermediate positions are 
possible. In these intermediate positions, although refund is denied, the CIT system may 
allow for the carryover o f losses to different tax years, different sources o f income and /or 
different entities. Due to the different variables at stake, assessing the impact o f these 
intermediate positions, such as tax integration, on risk-taking across the board for all 
taxpayers is especially difficult. Nevertheless, a broad rule may be advanced. Specifically, 
the higher the rate o f loss offset enjoyed by a taxpayer, the higher should be the degree o f 
risk taken after the tax. Thus, for the specific corporate group that, due to tax integration 
mechanics, is able to benefit from a full loss offset in the same year the loss is incurred, tax 
integration should provide an encouragement to risk-taking when compared with the 
Standard CIT system.
C. T h e  T axation  o f C orporate G roups under T ax  In tegra tion  R egim es
This section examined the taxation o f corporate groups under tax integration regimes. The 
section showed that there are several mechanic possibilities to integrate corporate groups 
for tax purposes and that all available models are subject to practical and mechanic 
limitations. Then, in light o f these different limitations, the section argued that the 
achievement o f the mechanic objectives o f tax integration in the fullest and simplest 
available way should involve a blend o f full and partial integration solutions.
After determining the most appropriate mechanic approach to tax integration, the section 
then analyzed whether, once both the perspectives o f the state and corporate groups are 
taken into consideration, tax integration is a commendable approach to tax corporate 
groups. In order to answer this question, the section evaluated the potential effects o f tax 
integration on the operation o f corporate groups and on the functioning o f the tax system 
using a hybrid integration model as the reference model (of tax integration). Following the 
policy approach previously defined in this thesis, the analysis o f the effects o f tax 
integration was made by identifying and by evaluating the potential distortions, and their 
interactions, introduced by the tax rules to corporate behaviour, and by factoring them into 
the analysis. The results o f the analysis undertaken allow this thesis to draw the following 
conclusions:
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^  Taxing corporate groups under the proposed tax integration model is more efficient than taxing 
them under the Standard C IT system.
Tax integration should result in a minimization o f substitution effects {i.e., changes in the 
taxpayer’s decisions or behaviour due to the tax system) and in a reduction o f the amount 
o f resources consumed in applying the tax system, when compared with the Standard CIT 
system.741 First, under tax integration, intra-group transactions and their closest substitutes 
tend to be taxed equally. This means that a mere change in transactional form in an intra­
group transaction will not generally result in a substantially different tax result. A 
fundamental effect o f this continuity in the tax rules is that there is no tax benefit 
associated with substitution. As a result, taxpayers are not generally interested in 
substituting transactions. Thus, there is no need to adopt more complex legal instruments 
or implement more expensive and complex transactions than those strictly required to 
achieve the desired economic end result. Since transactional form is largely irrelevant for 
tax purposes, the group will likely, absent non-tax law constraints, structure the transaction 
in the simplest and cheapest way possible. Thus, within the boundaries o f the Tax Group, 
the transfer o f assets and income should, in principle, be implemented using simpler 
transactions and corporate law instmments than under the Standard CIT System
Second, since under tax integration the tax factor is largely irrelevant in intra-group 
transfers, assets or income may be transferred at the optimal business timing to the 
corporate member that ensures the best economic return for their use. That is, the interest 
o f structuring transactions with the aim o f locating the deductions, inclusions, and capital 
gains or losses on the corporate group member whose tax attributes are most beneficial is 
eliminated. Thus, absent constraints from other regulatory fields, assets and income will, in 
principle, be transferred to the corporate member that ensures the best economic return 
for their use. Further, since the “lock-in” and “lock-out” effects are eliminated in intra­
group transactions, these transfers may occur at the optimal business timing. Hence, under 
tax integration, the CIT system should not interfere with the flexibility o f corporate groups 
to transfer resources between their constituent parts and, thus, should not negatively affect 
their “organized internal market” dynamics. Overall, corporate groups should become 
more responsive to changes in the prospects o f their investments.
741 See supra pg. 72 for definition o f  efficiency for purposes o f  this thesis.
Third, tax integration should allow for the mix up o f a corporate group’s attributes, 
fundamentally tax losses, in a cost efficient way. W hen available, alternative ways o f 
obtaining the same benefits under the Standard CIT System, such as mergers, are usually 
more expensive, more complex and may have negative collateral consequences for the 
group.
Thus, beyond discouraging taxpayers from basing economic decision-making on tax 
considerations, as opposed to the underlying economic factors, tax integration should 
reduce the costs incurred by taxpayers to implement transactions. This includes the fees 
paid to professionals to locate and to evaluate substitute transactions, and the costs 
associated with their implementation. Further, the decrease in the complexity o f internal 
group flows, as a result o f the reduction o f substitution, should make the corporate group 
more transparent from an informational perspective. This internal transparency o f 
corporate groups should decrease the costs o f the state to supervise compliance o f 
corporate groups with the tax rules.
In sum, it should be more efficient to tax corporate groups under tax integration than 
under the Standard CIT system. In particular, tax integration should minimize the 
substitution effects and reduce the amount o f resources required to apply the tax system 
when compared with the Standard CIT system, both for corporate groups and the state. 
Based on the policy approach previously defined in this thesis, the issue that arises is 
whether the potential collateral drawbacks o f tax integration outweigh these efficiency 
advantages. In this regard, the results o f the analysis undertaken allow this thesis to draw 
the following conclusions concerning the collateral effects o f tax integration:
^  Tax integration minimises the impact of the corporate tax system on the firm's organisational 
arrangements, being better adapted to the objectives and the needs of corporate groups.
The taxation o f corporate groups under the Standard CIT system should generally reduce 
their ability to shift capital to its most efficient uses and result in a potential 
implementation o f sub-optimal functional and legal structures. Tax integration should 
minimize these negative impacts o f tax on the firm’s organizational arrangements, being 
better adapted to the objectives and needs o f corporate groups. As discussed above, tax 
integration is better able to deal with the corporate group’s chameleon-like nature,
organizationally-bound property rights and organized internal market dynamics. In 
particular, it minimizes the relevance o f the corporate veil and the formal characterization 
o f transactions for tax purposes; allows for an optimization o f group resources and a 
simplified combination o f tax attributes; and allows for a higher flexibility for internal 
corporate restructurings, and, thus, for a higher adaptability o f corporate groups to their 
environment.
^  The taxation of corporate groups under tax integration should not result in negative corporate 
governance consequences. Indeed, when compared with the Standard C IT system, a relative 
improvement should occur due to the more transparent group structures and intra-group transfers.
Based on the policy principles defined in this thesis, research should be mindful of 
potential indirect corporate governance implications o f  proposed tax reforms. As a rule, 
research should ensure that the proposed tax intervention does not result in indirect 
negative corporate governance implications and profit from the corporate governance 
advantages that naturally ensue from CIT’s existence. As discussed, the elimination o f 
transaction costs and other sources o f deadweight loss should be pursued only when it 
does not adversely affect CIT’s regulatory functions. Otherwise, when regulatory functions 
are at stake, research should go through a cost-benefit analysis before eliminating 
transaction costs and other sources o f deadweight loss.
In this regard, it should be noted that the transactions that tax integration would eliminate 
{i.e., mostly pure tax planning transactions) are not, in principle, informational in nature. 
Accordingly, their reduction or elimination should not result in negative consequences to 
CIT’s regulatory functions.742 Indeed, a relative improvement o f such functions should 
occur due to the more transparent group structures and intra-group transfers. Further, 
from the specific perspective o f the corporate group, this increased internal transactional 
transparency should make it easier for top management and other stakeholders to be 
accurately informed about the operations o f the group. As a result, based on the analysis 
undertaken, the potential for managerial opportunism should be minimized.
Overall, tax integration should not result in negative corporate governance consequences. 
Indeed, when compared with the taxation under the Standard CIT system, a relative
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742 This includes the deterrent and the reliability functions. See discussion supra at pg. 32ff.
improvement should occur as a result o f the more transparent group structures and intra­
group transfers.
y  For the specific corporate group that, due to tax integration mechanics, is able to benefitfrom a fu ll
loss offset in the same year the loss is incurred, tax integration should provide an encouragement to 
risk-taking when compared with the Standard C IT system.
A further element that research must take into consideration when evaluating CIT reform 
proposals is their interaction with general market dynamics and with the Structural 
Distortions. In this regard, this thesis argued that, apart from the impact on timing and 
transaction costs, tax integration could impact corporate risk-taking. However, the thesis 
concluded that due to the different variables at stake, it was very difficult to assess the 
impact o f tax integration on risk-taking across the board for all taxpayers. Nevertheless, a 
broad rule was advanced. In particular, for the specific corporate group that, due to tax 
integration mechanics, was able to benefit from a full loss offset in the same year the loss 
was incurred, tax integration should provide an encouragement to risk-taking when 
compared with the Standard CIT system.
^  Tax Integration may raise certain equity issues. These issues should be dealt with by the use of
non-tax law frictions and/  or adjustments to the C IT system's rate structure.
As previously discussed, it is important to analyze the interaction o f the constraints and 
benefits imposed by the tax system with the frictions imposed by other regulatory fields 
and, when required, consider the possibility o f making an affirmative use o f such frictions. 
This is especially relevant when analyzing tax integration because, since all intra-group 
transactions are tax-free, tax integration may provide an incentive for the group to prefer to 
transact more within itself than with unrelated parties and, thus, to internalize certain 
operations within the boundaries o f the Tax Group. Further, the coupling o f the benefits 
o f inter-entity loss offset, with the limited liability o f corporate group members, may make 
this model especially attractive to undertake business when compared with other business 
forms. Overall, tax integration may potentially provide an incentive for economic 
concentration. This thesis believes that this issue should be dealt with by non-tax law 
frictions, namely, anti-trust laws. Corporate tax law should focus on efficiency. To tackle 
the issue o f economic concentration using the CIT system would create a paradoxical
opposing objective. It is better for the CIT system to pursue solidly the objective of 
efficiency and leave other opposing objectives to be pursued by existing non-tax law 
frictions.743
If  this is not considered sufficient by the legislator, a solution that could be considered, & 1
although subject to further analysis, is to impose a slightly higher statutory corporate tax 
rate on corporate groups. In order to explore the feasibility o f this solution, it would be 
im portant to consider, taking into consideration the corporate taxpayer’s potential for 
arbitrage, whether the general conditions for investment should be more favourable under 
a somewhat higher tax rate, together with more complete loss offset or, instead, under a 
lower tax rate accompanied by more imperfect offset conditions.744
In sum, tax integration should significantly reduce the deadweight loss associated with the 
operation o f  the CIT System for corporate groups. In addition, it should be beneficial to 
the state due to the resultant reduction in administration and supervision costs that ensue 
from the reduction in transactional and compliance complexity. Further, besides being 
more efficient, it minimizes the negative collateral impact o f the Standard CIT system.
Thus, under the criteria defined in this thesis, taxing corporate groups under tax integration 
regimes rather than under the Standard CIT system constitutes an incremental 
improvement to the taxation o f corporate groups.
Since tax integration is the best way to tax corporate groups under a CIT system, this thesis 
recommends that its scope o f application be enlarged. First, although its advantages and 
disadvantages must be carefully considered prior to implementation, this thesis suggests 
that the legislator should be aware that tax integration may also be made applicable to 
>50% owned entities. In this regard, in line with other commentators, this thesis suggests 
that in light o f the nature o f corporate groups and the need for expediency in the tax laws, 
the definition o f corporate groups for tax integration purposes may be operated based on a 
simple de jure definition (similar to the current US definition), complemented with 
comprehensive attribution rules and certain objective and easily administrable indicia o f
743 See SCHIZER, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, supra note 16 (defending the affirmative use o f non-tax 
law frictions to pursue tax policy objectives). See also discussion supra at pg. 76 regarding the care that must be 
taken when using non-tax law frictions.
744 See DOMAR & MUSGRAVE, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, supra note 156, at 392 (“Even if 
some loss in revenue results, the condition for investment will be more favorable under a somewhat higher 
tax rate, together with more complete loss offset than under a lower tax rate accompanied by more imperfect 
offset conditions.”); id. at 420 (“[T]the optimum tax rate will be the higher, the higher is the rate o f  offset”).
economic integration (e.g., a percentage o f revenues derived from related-party 
transactions). Second, it would be worth analysing whether tax integration could be enacted 
as a mandatory regime for corporate groups, and not elective, as is currently the case in the 
US, the U K  and all other jurisdictions that have enacted similar regimes.745 In principle, the 
proposed definition o f control should effectively avoid corporate groups electing whether 
or not to be taxed under tax integration.
CONCLUSION | The Taxation o f Corporate Groups Under a CIT
Corporate groups are notoriously difficult to tax. At the moment it is not clear whether 
corporate groups should be approached as single taxable entities or whether a separate tax 
existence should be attributed to corporate group members. The current ambiguity creates 
problems not only for the government and society, but also for corporate groups, 
generating a substantial deadweight loss for the entire economic system. In the light o f the 
current state o f affairs, the thesis sought to determine what may be the best approach to 
tax corporate groups once both the perspectives o f the government and corporate groups 
are taken into account. In order to answer this central question, the thesis first tackled three 
preliminary questions.
First, it determined how research should approach corporate taxation. The thesis argued 
that CIT law is influenced and constrained by a wide range o f elements. Thus, the proper 
apprehension o f the problems under study demanded that these different influences and 
constraints were factored into the analysis. In turn, this demanded the adoption o f an 
interdisciplinary approach whereby elements such as market imperfections, the behavioural 
nature o f the corporate taxpayer, or the rules o f related regulatory fields, were brought into 
the investigation. Further, in light o f the nature o f CIT law, the thesis argued that it could 
be more productive for this research project to adopt an analytical perspective that started 
from the analysis o f the existing CIT system, taking into consideration its different 
influences and constraints, than to assume a clean plate perspective. Therefore, the thesis 
adopted a perspective o f incremental change rather than a fundamental tax reform 
perspective.
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745 See YOSHIHIRO MASUI, General Report, in IFA, Group Taxation, Cahier de Droit Fiscal International Vol. 
89b (Yoshihiro Masui, et al. eds., 2004) at 39.
Once the thesis defined its methodological approach to the study o f corporate taxation, it 
determined whether it made sense for research to focus on potential improvements to the 
current CIT system or, in light o f other potentially available alternatives, whether it would 
be better to simply discard it as a valid option to tax the corporate sector. Despite the
I 209merits o f alternative proposals to tax the corporate sector, the thesis concluded that ® 1 
research focusing on the optimization o f the current CIT system should be rather useful 
and, therefore, decided to focus its efforts on the study o f the current CIT system.
Based on the analysis undertaken to the core structural elements o f the CIT system, the 
thesis argued that m ost o f the current CIT system’s deficiencies resided on its theoretical 
pillars and suggested that research should take into consideration the following problems:
• The deficiencies o f the system when related parties are involved;
•  The asymmetries that result in transactional discontinuities;
•  The encouragement provided for taxpayers to engage in tax planning;
•  The distortions introduced to the regular modus operandi o f economic agents that
penalize their economic efficiency; and
• The formalism and the complexity o f the CIT law.
In addition, the thesis argued it would be important to factor into the analysis the CIT 
system’s specific strengths, namely its regulatory potential. In light o f the substantial 
amount o f research being undertaken on the Reliability Effect and Deterrent Effect, the 
thesis decided to focus its efforts on the Control Effect.
Once it determined whether it is valuable or not to pursue further work on the current CIT 
system and identified its core strengths and problems, the thesis then examined the 
determinants associated with the CIT system’s impact on corporate behaviour in order to 
refine its approach to the central research question.
The thesis argued that the use o f CIT law for corporate behavioural control should only 
occur when direct subsidies are not a better option. In particular, the thesis claimed that the 
use o f the CIT system for corporate behavioural control could produce significant non­
intended negative consequences and be subject to a considerable degree o f uncertainty
regarding its intended behavioural effects. The thesis concluded that in many cases direct 
subsidies should have higher targeting potential and lower associated transaction costs.
In addition, the thesis suggested that if considered that in a specific situation tax 
intervention could be more adequate than direct subsidies, the intervention should achieve 
the desired behavioural effects with as few as possible associated distortions and costs. The 
thesis then suggested several guidelines to achieve this purpose.
Once the thesis understood the determinants associated with the CIT system’s impact on 
corporate behaviour, it suggested how the central research question should be approached. 
The thesis argued that as a result o f the different distortions, and their interactions, 
associated with the design and operation o f the CIT system, to simply look at how far a 
certain policy was from optimality could be insufficient to determine whether an 
incremental improvement was occurring. Accordingly, the path this thesis proposed to 
determine whether incremental improvements were indeed improvements consisted in 
looking for more efficient tax solutions and, then, go further by identifying the distortions and their 
interactions associated with the operation of the C IT system, andfactor them into tax polity analysis.
For this purpose, the thesis defined efficiency as the minimization o f transaction costs and 
other sources o f deadweight loss. This included the minimization o f substitution effects 
{i.e., changes in taxpayer decisions or behaviour due to the tax system) and tax overhead 
costs (i.e., the amount o f resources, including the value o f time or labour, consumed in 
applying the tax system, through taxpayer or government activities such as tax planning, 
compliance, litigation, administration, and law-making). Based on the analysis undertaken, 
the thesis further proposed that this efficiency objective could be pursued by looking for 
the tax treatment that was better aligned with the particularities associated with the nature 
o f each category o f business entities. The thesis noted that it was concerned with a 
classification criteria based on corporate structure.
In addition, the thesis proposed that, in order to adequately factor into the analysis the 
different distortions and their interactions associated with the operation o f  the CIT system, 
the following guidelines should be observed:
•  As a general rule, the use o f the CIT system to implement policy objectives other 
than raising cash should be minimized;
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• Take into consideration the pre-existing distortions o f the playing field, including 
the Structural Distortions, market imperfections, and the regulatory effects o f the 
CIT system;
• Focus on corporate-level intervention and avoid shareholder-level intervention;
•  Ensure that the tax intervention does not result in indirect negative corporate 
governance implications and profit from the corporate governance advantages that 
naturally follow from CIT’s existence. In this regard, the elimination o f transaction 
costs and other sources o f deadweight loss should be pursued only when it does 
not adversely affect CIT’s regulatory functions. Otherwise, when regulatory 
functions are at stake, go through a cost-benefit analysis before eliminating 
transaction costs and other sources o f deadweight loss;
•  To the extent consistent with the tax policy objectives, minimize the negative 
impact o f tax rules on the operation o f business entities. This requires that the 
objectives and needs o f business entities are adequately taken into consideration in 
the process o f policy design;
•  Favour long carryover periods for tax attributes; and
•  Analyze the interaction o f the CIT system with the frictions imposed by other 
regulatory fields and consider the possibility o f making an affirmative use o f such 
frictions.
The thesis then underscored that it was not concerned with equity issues in the CIT law. 
Following other commentators, the thesis argued that equity issues could be better dealt 
with at the shareholder’s level or with adjustments to the CIT’s rate structure.
Finally, the thesis argued that it would follow a non-uniform approach to CIT policy 
design. The design o f a CIT system with differing structural rules for different business 
entities, despite raising certain problems, especially higher interaction costs, should allow 
for better adaptability o f tax law to the underlying economic and business reality o f the real 
world o f transaction costs, information asymmetries and agency costs.
Following this policy approach, the thesis then analyzed the economic, legal and functional 
nature o f corporate groups in order to identify the potential sources of deadweight loss and 
other collateral effects that could arise when corporate groups were taxed under the 
Standard CIT system.
The thesis argued that the corporation that is a member o f a corporate group is a part o f a 
larger entity, an atom o f a molecular structure, and that the integration o f the corporate 
atomistic entity into the molecular group structure is achieved through its submission to a 
group level unitary economic direction. The tension between this unitary economic 
direction and the individual corporation’s legal and economic substratum generate the 
internal dynamic or chemical bond, that gives rise to the corporate group’s molecular 
structure.
The analysis showed that this internal dynamic constitutes the critical element for the 
characterization o f the corporate group as a particular form o f enterprise. The thesis 
claimed that in the same way that molecules may only exist if there is an exchange o f 
electrons between atoms to create a chemical bond, the corporate group may only exist if 
there is an exchange o f assets and income between group members to create the internal 
dynamic o f an organized internal market. Overall, the thesis concluded that corporate 
groups require flexibility to transfer assets and income internally in order to be 
economically viable.
The thesis further claimed that in the group context, individual actions simultaneously and 
cumulatively orient to the common goal and to the individual goals o f the members, with 
no normative primacy o f one orientation or the other. As a result o f this internal decision­
making system, the thesis concluded that the corporate group’s governance structure could 
assume an indeterminate variety o f forms and characteristics, depending on the blending o f 
market and hierarchy, contract and organization, strategically implemented at each 
moment.
Further, the thesis argued that the internal dynamic o f the corporate group created 
substantial distortions to the individual corporation’s structure. W hen controlled by 
another corporate entity and submitted to the external interest o f the headquarters, the 
corporation’s sovereign nature was distorted. In this situation, the controlled corporation
could lose its self-determined entity status and become an entity subject to an alien 
hierarchical structure that favoured a higher collective interest over its own single interest. 
This could distort the corporation’s legal personality and promote the creation o f  a 
different type o f  property rights within the groups, i.e., the so-called “organizationally- 
bound” property rights.
Finally, the thesis claimed that the functional structures o f corporate groups do not 
necessarily follow their legal structures. The design o f a group’s functional structure follows 
a different rationale from the one that generally underlies the design o f its legal structure, 
and, although both structures could eventually coincide in certain groups, they are 
increasingly diverging. Also, the thesis argued that the flexibility to create functional 
structures that deviate from legal structures allows for the constant adaptability o f 
corporate groups to their economic reality.
The thesis concluded that the nature of corporate groups poses very specific challenges to 
tax policy. Specifically, the thesis argued that, in order to minimize the deadweight loss o f 
the CIT system, tax rules should be structured so as to preserve the economic efficiency 
advantages that corporate groups developed during their evolution as business enterprises. 
Further, tax rules should implement models that, ab initio, take into consideration the 
“chameleon-like” nature o f corporate groups and its potential use to obtain (unlawful) tax 
advantages.
After analyzing the economic, legal and functional nature o f corporate groups, the thesis 
then moved on to identifying the sources o f deadweight loss that could arise when 
corporate groups were taxed under the Standard CIT System. The thesis argued that the 
degree o f substitution o f the Standard CIT System when facing corporate groups was 
especially high. In  addition, the thesis claimed that the Standard CIT System was 
structurally discontinuous when high levels o f ownership were present. As a result o f these 
two factors, the thesis concluded that the incentive for tax planning in intra-group 
transactions should, in many situations, be quite significant. Specifically, the thesis argued 
that the ability o f corporate groups to manipulate the value, legal characterization and 
timing o f transactions could be used to manipulate the mechanics o f the tax system since it 
allowed corporate groups to manipulate the location, character and amount o f tax
attributes, and, thus, absent the application o f specific anti-abuse rules, to fundamentally 
alter their tax treatment.
The thesis then examined the dynamic effects o f such ability for manipulation, for 
corporate groups and for the state. For corporate groups, the thesis argued that the root of 
the dynamic problems associated with such manipulation was that, in a world o f costly 
contracting and information asymmetries, the search and adoption o f substitute 
transactions had associated costs and could result in certain operational inefficiencies. In 
the case o f imperfect substitutes these inefficiencies could include transfer o f resources to a 
corporate member that did not provide the best economic return for their use; the 
adoption o f a sub-optimal functional structure; the adoption o f a sub-optimal legal 
structure; and the adoption o f a more complex transaction.
Further, the manipulative behaviour o f corporate groups under the Standard CIT system 
should lead to transactional, rule and compliance complexity. Transactional complexity 
should arise due to the implementation o f substitute transactions that use more complex 
legal instruments and /o r indirect transactional routes, with the aim o f manipulating the 
formalism o f the Standard CIT System. The counteraction o f this manipulative behaviour 
should increase the quantity and complexity o f the tax rules. In turn, the greater challenge 
to interpret such tax rules should raise the costs o f transactions for corporate groups 
through the need for professional tax preparers, lawyers and accountants. As for the state, 
it should raise the cost o f designing tax rules and o f supervising their operation.
Further, the need to provide sufficient proof o f the fulfilment o f the formal and 
substantive requirement associated with the applicable anti-abuse rules should significantly 
increase compliance complexity. Specifically, corporate groups should experience more 
difficulties and should incur higher costs to ensure their ongoing compliance with the tax 
system. By the same token, the supervision o f the massive quantity o f documentation 
produced to ensure compliance with these tax rules should result in significant transaction 
costs to the state. Overall, the thesis concluded that the increased transactional, rule and 
compliance complexity o f the Standard CIT System caused by the manipulative behaviour 
o f  corporate groups should result in increased tax overhead costs, both for corporate 
groups and the state.
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In addition, as a direct result o f the strategies implemented to manipulate the Standard CIT 
System, corporate groups should reduce their ability to shift capital to its m ost efficient use. 
Due to rule and compliance complexity, it should be more expensive for corporate groups 
to determine what rules and regulations are applicable to a specific transaction, to 
determine the ensuing tax consequences and to comply with them. When these tax-related 
costs were taken into consideration, the economic efficiency gain o f an intra-group 
transaction could be insufficient to offset its associated tax costs and, thus, the transaction 
could be implemented outside its optimal timing or not be implemented.
Further, besides the additional transaction costs, rule complexity could result in uncertainty 
as to tax results, which could deter corporate groups from entering into certain favourable 
transactions. Moreover, as a result o f substitution, the transfer o f group resources could be 
made to a corporate member that did not provide the best economic return for their use. 
Overall, in these situations the flexibility o f corporate groups to transfer resources between 
their constituent parts should be hampered and they should become less responsive to 
changes in the prospects o f their investments. This could negatively impact the corporate 
groups’ “organized internal market” dynamic and could reduce the capacity o f the 
economic system to allocate resources to their most productive use.
Further, the thesis argued that because o f the higher number o f complex transactions, the 
corporate group’s manipulative behaviour should result in less transparent internal group 
flows and more convoluted organizational structures. This internal complexity should make 
the group more opaque from an informational perspective, and should make it harder for 
top management and other stakeholders to remain accurately informed about the 
operations o f the group. As a result, a shift o f power from the board to inside managers 
and increased potential for managerial opportunism could occur. Also, this internal 
complexity o f corporate groups fostered by the tax system could increase the costs o f the 
state to supervise the compliance o f corporate groups with the tax rules.
Finally, the thesis claimed that, besides potentially giving rise to the implementation o f sub- 
optimal functional and legal structures, the tax minimization strategies to explore the 
asymmetries o f the Standard CIT System could rigidify these structures. This could occur 
for two main reasons. First, due to the transaction costs associated with the definition and 
implementation o f corporate structures, once a certain structure was implemented to
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benefit from a tax advantage or to avoid a specific anti-abuse rule, it should tend to remain 
in operation for a certain time. Second, due to the application o f anti-abuse rules, the 
corporate structure existing at the time o f the transaction could have to be kept in place for 
a certain period in order for the tax treatment afforded to the transaction to be respected. 
The thesis argued that this rigidity reduces the corporate group’s capacity for adaptation to 
outside disturbances, which could penalize its economic performance.
Overall, the thesis concluded that the taxation o f corporate groups under the Standard CIT 
system should yield significant tax overhead costs both for corporate groups and the state; 
a reduction o f corporate groups’ ability to shift capital to its most efficient use; agency 
problems, and rigid and potentially sub-optimal functional and legal structures.
Subsequently, the thesis examined alternative mechanic solutions to tax corporate groups 
under a corporation income tax system and assessed how they dealt with these problems. 
In particular, the thesis investigated how corporate groups could be taxed using Tax 
Integration Solutions. The thesis showed that there are several mechanic possibilities to 
integrate corporate groups and that all available models are subject to practical and 
mechanic limitations. Further, in light o f these different limitations, the thesis argued that 
the achievement o f the mechanic objectives o f tax integration in the fullest and simplest 
available manner should involve a blend o f full and partial integration solutions.
After determining the most appropriate mechanic approach to tax integration, the thesis 
analyzed whether tax integration was a commendable approach to tax corporate groups 
once both the perspectives o f the state and corporate groups were taken into consideration. 
In order to answer this question, the thesis evaluated the potential effects o f tax integration 
on the operation o f corporate groups and on the functioning o f the tax system using a 
hybrid integration model as the reference model (of tax integration). Following the policy 
approach previously defined, the results o f the analysis undertaken allowed this thesis to 
draw the following conclusions:
y  Taxing corporate groups under the proposed tax integration model is more efficient than taxing 
them under the Standard C IT System.
Tax integration should result in a minimization o f substitution effects and in a reduction o f 
the amount o f resources consumed in applying the tax system, when compared with the
Standard CIT System. First, under tax integration, intra-group transactions and their closest 
substitutes tend to be taxed equally. This means that a mere change in transactional form in 
an intra-group transaction will not generally result in a substantially different tax result. A 
fundamental effect o f this continuity in the tax rules is that there is no tax benefit 
associated with substitution. As a result, taxpayers are not generally interested in 
substituting transactions. Thus, there is no need to adopt more complex legal instruments 
or implement more expensive and complex transactions than those strictly required to 
achieve the desired economic end result. Within the boundaries o f the Tax Group, the 
transfer o f assets and income should, in principle, be implemented using simpler 
transactions and corporate law instruments than under the Standard CIT System
Second, since under tax integration the tax factor is largely irrelevant in intra-group 
transfers, assets or income could be transferred at the optimal business time to the 
corporate member that ensures the best economic return for their use. Specifically, the 
interest in structuring transactions to locate deductions, inclusions, and capital gains or 
losses on the corporate group member whose tax attributes are more beneficial, should be 
eliminated. Thus, absent constraints from other regulatory fields, in principle, assets and 
income should be transferred to the corporate member that ensures the best economic 
return for their use. Further, since the “lock-in” and “lock-out” effects are eliminated in 
intra-group transactions, these transfers should occur at their optimal business time. Hence, 
under tax integration, the CIT system should not interfere with the flexibility o f corporate 
groups to transfer resources between their constituent parts and, thus, should not 
negatively affect their “organized internal market” dynamics. Overall, corporate groups 
should become more responsive to changes in the prospects o f their investments.
Third, tax integration should allow for the mix up o f a corporate group’s attributes, 
fundamentally, tax losses, in a cost efficient way. When available, alternative ways o f 
obtaining the same benefits under the Standard CIT System, such as mergers, are generally 
more expensive, complex and may have negative collateral consequences for the group.
Thus, beyond avoiding taxpayers to base economic decision-making on tax considerations, 
as opposed to the underlying economic factors, tax integration should reduce the costs 
incurred by taxpayers to implement transactions. This includes the fees paid to 
professionals to locate and to evaluate substitute transactions, and the costs associated with
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their implementation. Further, the decrease in the complexity o f internal group flows due 
to the reduction o f substitution should make the corporate group more transparent from 
an informational perspective. This internal transparency o f corporate groups should 
decrease the costs o f the state to supervise the compliance o f corporate groups with the tax 
rules.
Overall, the thesis concluded that it should be more efficient to tax corporate groups under 
tax integration than under the Standard CIT system. Tax integration should minimize the 
substitution effects and reduce the amount o f resources consumed in applying the tax 
system, both for corporate groups and the state, when compared with the Standard CIT 
system. Based on the policy approach previously defined, the issue that arose was whether 
the potential collateral drawbacks o f tax integration could outweigh these efficiency 
advantages. In this regard, the results o f the analysis undertaken allowed this thesis to draw 
the following conclusions:
^  Tax integration minimises the impact of the corporate tax system on the firm's organisational 
arrangements, being better adapted to the objectives and the needs of corporate groups.
The taxation o f corporate groups under the Standard CIT system should generally reduce 
their ability to shift capital to its most efficient uses and to implement optimal functional 
and legal structures. Tax integration should minimize these negative impacts on the firm’s 
organizational arrangements, as it is more adaptive to the objectives and the needs o f 
corporate groups. Also, tax integration is better able to appreciate the corporate group’s 
chameleon-like nature, organizationally-bound property rights and organized internal 
market dynamics. In particular, it minimizes the relevance o f the corporate veil and the 
formal characterization of transactions for tax purposes; allows for an optimization o f 
group resources and a simplified combination o f tax attributes; and allows for a higher 
flexibility for internal corporate restructurings, and, thus, for a higher adaptability o f 
corporate groups to their environment.
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^  The taxation of corporate groups under tax integration should not result in negative corporate 
governance consequences. Indeed, when compared with the Standard C IT system, a relative 
improvement should occur due to the more transparent group structures and intra-group transfers.
The thesis noted that the transactions that tax integration would in principle eliminate {i.e., 
mostly pure tax planning transactions) were not informational in nature. Accordingly, their 
reduction or elimination should not yield negative consequences to CIT’s regulatory 
functions. Indeed, a relative improvement o f such functions should occur due to the more 
transparent group structures and intra-group transfers. Further, from the specific 
perspective o f the corporate group, this increased internal transactional transparency 
should make it easier for top management and other stakeholders to remain accurately 
informed about the operations o f the group. As a result, the potential for managerial 
opportunism should be minimized.
Overall, the thesis concluded that tax integration should not result in negative corporate 
governance consequences. Indeed, when compared with the taxation under the Standard 
CIT system, a relative improvement should transpire due to the more transparent group 
structures and intra-group transfers.
y  For the specific corporate group that, due to tax integration mechanics, is able to benefitfrom a fu ll
loss offset in the same year the loss is incurred, tax integration should provide an encouragement to 
risk-taking when compared with the Standard C IT system.
The thesis suggested that, apart from the impact on timing and transaction costs, tax 
integration could potentially impact corporate risk-taking. However, the thesis concluded 
that due to the different variables at stake, it was very difficult to assess the impact o f tax 
integration on risk-taking across the board for all taxpayers. Nevertheless, a broad rule was 
advanced. In particular, for the specific corporate group that was able to benefit from a full 
loss offset in the same year the loss was incurred, tax integration could potentially provide 
an encouragement to risk-taking when compared with the Standard CIT system.
^  Tax Integration may raise certain equity issues. These issues should be dealt with the use of non­
tax law frictions and! or adjustments to the C IT system’s rate structure.
The thesis argued that tax integration could potentially provide an incentive for economic 
concentration and claimed that this issue should be dealt with by non-tax law frictions, 
namely, anti-trust laws. In particular, the thesis argued it was better for the CIT system to
solidly pursue efficiency and to leave other opposing objectives to existing non-tax law 
frictions.
The thesis further argued that if  this measure was not considered sufficient by the 
legislator, it would be worth considering whether a slightly higher statutory corporate tax 
rate could be imposed on corporate groups. In order to explore the feasibility o f this 
solution, it would be important to consider, taking into consideration the corporate 
taxpayer’s potential for arbitrage, whether the general conditions for investment should be 
more favourable under a somewhat higher tax rate, together with more complete loss 
offset or, instead, under a lower tax rate accompanied by more imperfect offset conditions
All in all, the thesis concluded that tax integration should result in a significant reduction of 
the deadweight loss associated with the operation o f the CIT System for corporate groups. 
In addition, it should be beneficial to the state due to the reduction in administration and 
supervision costs that follow from the reduction in transactional and compliance 
complexity. Also, besides being more efficient, tax integration should minimize the 
negative collateral impact o f the Standard CIT system. Thus, under the policy criteria 
adopted, taxing corporate groups under tax integration regimes, rather than under the 
Standard CIT system, should constitute an incremental improvement to the taxation o f 
corporate groups.
Since tax integration should be the best way to tax corporate groups under a CIT system, 
this thesis recommended that its current scope o f  application should be enlarged. First, the 
thesis suggested that partial Tax Integration Solutions could also apply, for instance, to 
more than 50% owned corporate group members. In this regard, the thesis claimed that in 
light o f the nature o f corporate groups and the need for expediency in the tax laws, the 
definition o f corporate groups for tax integration purposes could potentially be operated 
based on a simple de jure definition, complemented with comprehensive attribution rules 
and certain objective and easily administrable indicia o f  economic integration. Second, the 
thesis argued that it would be worth considering whether tax integration could be enacted 
as a mandatory regime for corporate groups, and not an elective regime. The thesis 
suggested that the proposed definition o f control could, in principle, avoid corporate 
groups effectively electing whether or not to be taxed under tax integration, although this 
issue should be the subject o f further research.
In light o f the discussion undertaken, this thesis believes that it could be beneficial to 
review the current US and UK legislation for taxation o f corporate groups. As discussed, 
potential areas that should be subject to consideration include reformulating the current US 
Group Taxation Regime in order to eliminate the floating outside basis mechanism and 
substitute it with a participation exemption; introduce longer carryover periods for loss 
offsets in the UK Group Taxation regime; consider implementing a full integration model 
in the U K  in conjunction with the UK Group Taxation regime; consider making the US 
and the UK Group Taxation regimes applicable to more than fifty percent-owned entities 
using the control criteria defined above; and consider making tax integration regimes 
mandatory in both countries. Further, it would be important if subsequent research could 
expand the analysis undertaken herein, bringing into the research foreign entities and 
foreign transactions. Finally, it would be interesting to analyze the current discussion on the 
creation o f a consolidated tax base in the European Union using the conclusions from this 
research project.746
Corporate groups are notoriously difficult to tax. Based on the research undertaken, this 
thesis concludes that approaching corporate groups as single taxable entities is the best 
approach to tax corporate groups once both the perspectives o f the government and 
corporate groups are taken into consideration.
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